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The Indonesian Elite and Its Authority

Abstract

This chapter looks at the shifting ideology and elite production in Indonesia as a result of decolonization. Changing elite identity markers from traditional feudal towards modern education and expertise represented changes in relations between elites and the new postcolonial state. The problem of endowing authority towards the new educated elites was perennial in the history of Indonesian state-society relations and the Guided Democracy period represented a transitional phase in the ideological underpinnings of this authority. The new educated elite had to wait for the creation of an ideological scaffolding that would protect them within a cocoon of authority. This authority had been challenged by the older Republican political elites headed by President Sukarno because they saw the new upstart generation as undermining the elite position of the old political class. The formation of a foundational ideology for the Indonesian state had been a product of compromise and strategies of the old elite to ensconce the new educated managerial class within a state ideology that placed at the center the old political class. This structure would remain after the replacement of that political class with an army elite during the New Order.

Keywords

Indonesian elite – political class – managerial class – 1945 generation – elite authority

Throughout the 1950s, efforts by both the government and the military to root out corruption put some of Indonesia's most prominent financial and economic policymakers behind bars. In a large round-up of corruption suspects carried out by the military in 1957 many prominent policymakers, including Bank of Indonesia's first governor, Jusuf Wibisono, and economists such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Ong Eng Die, and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, were implicated.¹ Throughout the nation's history, the position of policymakers has been precarious. Only during the New Order did the offices of those in charge

¹ *Keng Po*, 28 March 1957.

of determining Indonesia's policy direction become relatively safe from scrutiny. A strong state was what was needed to create this 'safe space', something that was achieved by both the colonial and the New Order regimes.

How to ensure bureaucratic authority in an open and politically active society was the big question of the 1950s. The *priyayi* class formed the Javanese bureaucracy, and its claim to rule was based on traditional notions of authority and the support of the Dutch colonial state.² However, the roots of its authority were deteriorating by the 1950s. The anti-feudal rhetoric of the nationalists attacked core *priyayi* privileges, while their support from the general populace weakened. The miracle, perhaps, was how they managed to survive relatively well as a group into the 1950s and 1960s. In an analysis of the country's elite in the early New Order period, Donald Emmerson showed that the fundamental classification of the Indonesian elite remained the same until the early 1970s, with *abangan*³ in control of the bureaucracy and *santri*⁴ in control of Parliament, and both *aliran* having an equal share of control of the military.⁵

As a social group, the *priyayi* had institutional assistance in overcoming the difficulties of transitioning to a modern Indonesian state. They had two main strengths. First, they monopolized the local administrations. Nationalists, most of whom hailed from a *priyayi* background, did not inherit or develop a bureaucracy to counter the official bureaucracy of the colonial state. Suggestions of destroying the *priyayi* bureaucracy early on in the independence year of 1945 came to naught, as most of the state leaders, including Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, and Sjahrir, understood that they were dependent on the Pangreh/Pamong Praja (indigenous bureaucracy).⁶

Second, their access to state power allowed them access to education.⁷ Their near-monopoly on higher education meant that they could equip

2 Heather Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite. The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979), 144–51.

3 Javanese Muslims who practise a syncretic form of Islam.

4 Javanese Muslims who practise an orthodox form of Islam.

5 The military elite, though, was by the early 1960s overwhelmingly Javanese (60–80% of the officers). Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 37. These figures changed from the 1960s onwards as access to education expanded. See Theodore M. Smith and Harold F. Carpenter, 'Indonesian Students and Their Career Aspirations', *Asian Survey*, 14/9 (September 1974), 807–26.

6 Sukarno very much supported the Pangreh Praja and extolled their virtues in many of his speeches to the corps during the revolution. The republican elite gave priority to the Pangreh Praja for the top echelon posts during early independence, for instance. Anthony Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution, 1945–1950* (Hawthorn: Longman, 1974), 32.

7 Thomas R. Murray, *A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, the First Half Century, 1920–1970* (Singapore: Chopmen, 1973), 90.

themselves to meet the needs of the modern state. Even more importantly, they were able to obtain the power needed to determine state–society relations through the new authority that they acquired from education: the authority of experts. The modernization theory model based on the authority of experts, crafted by development economics, sociology, scientific management, and public administration specialists, was a model of modernity that the *priyayi* found inherently attractive. The most important aspect of the model was the monopolistic position of the managers as a special group of educated supermen.

Yet it would be a mistake to think that a mere diploma was enough to confer the magic of authority on these newly graduated students. Java's pre-colonial bureaucracy employed gangs of *jago* (strongmen) and hoodlums as tools of societal control. As Heather Sutherland has remarked, in pre-colonial times, 'under Mataram [rule] terror and torture had been essential instruments of control; under the Dutch, in theory, there was the rule of law. In practice, many *priyayi* had recourse to intimidation and bribery.'⁸ Discussions of the criminality of the state and the role of strongmen and gangsters (*preman*) as clients or extensions of the state illustrate the inherent flaw in abstracting the state as a specific set of bounded institutions with specific authorities. In fact, the state extended beyond its legal boundaries.⁹ This dichotomy of the official, legal, professional, and modern against the other side – the unofficial, illegal, unprofessional, and traditional – continued in the post-colonial state. The Pangreh Praja, the indigenous bureaucracy that originated from Java but was assigned to positions throughout the archipelago, arose from a pre-colonial bureaucracy whose claim to authority was based on military power.¹⁰ Its accession to being part of the state was based on a prior demonstration of real military power. Robert Cribb showed that this notion of violence as conferring legitimate

8 Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite*, 26.

9 The *jago* and *preman* element as part of the state-extension in society is discussed in all periods of Indonesian history. See, for instance, Schulte Nordholt and Sutherland for the colonial period, Barker for the New Order, and Lindsey for the post-New Order period. Henk Schulte Nordholt, 'The Jago in the Shadow: Crime and Order in the Colonial State', *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 25/1 (Winter 1991), 74–91; Joshua Barker, 'State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order', *Indonesia*, 66 (October 1998), 6–43; Tim Lindsey, 'The Criminal State: Premanisme and the New Indonesia', in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon L. Smith (eds), *Indonesia Today. Challenges of History* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 283–97.

10 Henk Schulte Nordholt, 'A Genealogy of Violence', in Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad (eds), *Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 33–61.

authority was what caused many of the members of Jakarta's underworld to fight in the revolution.¹¹

Although the Dutch prided themselves on their ability to enforce the rule of law in the archipelago, there continued to be something of a *modus vivendi* between the *priyayi* bureaucrats and the criminal elements/local bullies who kept order in rural society. The local bureaucracy had to have protection from above and collaboration from local strongmen. These two long arms of the bureaucracy would increasingly be provided by the military, as both the overseer of the state and its enforcer on the ground.

The history of the modern Indonesian state is thus a history of its bureaucracy and, by extension, the nation's *priyayi* elite. As Professor James Mackie contends, Indonesia's elite and growing middle class were 'essentially bureaucratic elites or, as in the Sukarno era, a party-political elite. To the extent that an Indonesian middle class has been emerging over the last three decades, it is primarily a salaried and professional middle class, not an entrepreneurial or propertied [one].'¹² This is, of course, a simplification of the reality. First, although the majority of Indonesian bureaucrats were Javanese, there were large numbers of non-Javanese who became important members of the elite; this was particularly true for the military.¹³ Many of the economists that were to play an important part during the New Order, such as Emil Salim and Frans Seda, were not Javanese.¹⁴ Second, the *priyayi* class itself, as a result of education, was undergoing significant changes.

Franklin Weinstein divided Indonesia's twentieth-century elite into three groups based on their respective generations: 1928, 1945, and 1966. The 1928 generation had enjoyed a good colonial education and furthered their studies at Dutch universities. Their world view was highly influenced by the works of Karl Marx and other European social theorists, and although initially they had a positive view of the United States, the 'betrayal' of America during the revolutionary struggle made them wary of the US.¹⁵

11 Robert Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries. The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945–1949* (North Sydney: Allen Unwin, 1991), 89–99.

12 J. A. C. Mackie, *Property and Power in New Order Indonesia* (n.p.: n.n., 1983), 1.

13 Ann Gregory has noted, though, that the number of Javanese occupying important government positions increased during Guided Democracy and the New Order. Ann Gregory, 'Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite: Guided Democracy and the New Order', PhD dissertation, Columbia University, New York, 1976, 108.

14 Many of the technocrats were also non-Muslim, including the Catholic Frans Seda and J. B. Sumarlin and the Protestant Radius Prawiro, among others. Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1981), 76.

15 Franklin Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 42–65.

The second group was the 1945 generation. The majority of this generation joined student or youth militias set up and led by the Japanese during the Second World War. Some of the Japanese propaganda determined their world view after the war. Unlike the 1928 generation, the 1945 generation did not receive a full colonial education. The government's reduction of the education budget in the 1930s, owing to the Depression and the increasing availability of 'nationalist' schools that competed with Dutch education in the colony, affected their outlook.¹⁶ Aside from becoming soldiers and participating in the war, many youngsters also had the chance to become low- and mid-level civil servants before going off to universities in Indonesia, with some continuing with post-graduate study in the United States. Although less Marxist in their outlook in comparison to many of the nationalists of the 1928 generation, they were generally open to the ideas of the left. Their involvement in the Indonesian state as administrators or army officers and their formative educations abroad were important factors that meant that they had a different view of state–society relations to the earlier generation, which had had little opportunity to work in managerial government services, had received an almost exclusively Dutch education, and were Dutch-speaking.¹⁷

The 1966 generation was the one that grew up during the Guided Democracy and cheered at the ending of Sukarno's regime and the rise of the New Order.¹⁸ This generation was generally deeply anti-Marxist, if not apolitical, but for our purpose will not be referred to further because of its limited relevance to the discussion.

The shift from the democracy of the 1950s to Guided Democracy and the New Order can be seen in terms of the shift from the 1928 generation to the 1945 generation. The gradual control of the bureaucracy and state by the 1945 generation occurred under the aegis of the 1928 generation. The Guided Democracy was a period of transition and many in the 1928 generation saw their powers being eroded. The younger members of the generation, just graduating from American universities, were able to obtain government positions but saw their influence as highly limited to middle management or academic positions.

16 A process of politicizing the teachers in government-owned Indonesian schools also occurred during the period, signifying the increased attention being paid to participatory pedagogy, which Agus Suwignyo has termed 'public intellectuality'. This process appeared again as part of the participatory discourse of Indonesian nationalism, which will be discussed further in the next chapters. Agus Suwignyo, 'The Breach in the Dike: Regime Change and the Standardization of Public Primary-School Teacher Training in Indonesia, 1893–1969', Dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, Leiden, 2013, 152–207.

17 Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 42–65.

18 Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 42–65.

Yet, the Guided Democracy was anything but under the full control of the 1928 generation. Many of its influential policymakers espoused ideas that were a reaction against the upstart 1945 generation. In an age where the iconic image of the white-collar office leader or plant manager was a man employing mathematically inclined science and social science,¹⁹ even in such an underdeveloped society as 1950s' Indonesia, the old elite was educationally inadequate. In the face of the new perspectives on efficiency and its associated managerial tools, the old elite came from another time. They came from a period when leadership was earned through revolutionary capabilities, and where history and literature, rather than the graphs of economists, the analyses of psychologists, and the theories of sociologists guided the workings of human society and the paths of nations; a period in which understanding how the state worked and how government functioned meant studying the law, instead of time-motion or other Taylorist tools.

Ann Gregory wrote:

There is no continuity between the Guided Democracy non-party elite segment and the technocrats of the New Order. The very nature of the two segments differs. The technocratic segment contains a high number of professionals for whom politics is a secondary career begun after success was achieved in their primary occupation, whereas for most of the Guided Democracy non-party elite politics was their primary career.²⁰

This difference, as we will see, resulted in a deep distrust of the new generation of expert social scientists. According to MacDougall, 'their emergence in policy making roles represents a fundamental shift in the nature of the ruling elite'.²¹ It was this inherent tension between what Roeslan Abdulgani termed the 'professionals' and 'unprofessionals', Herbert Feith called the 'administrators' and 'solidarity-makers',²² Pye called the 'administrators' and 'politicians' in Burma,²³ and Franz Schurmann called the 'experts' and 'reds' in China,²⁴ or

19 C. Wright Mills, *White Collar. The American Middle Class* (New York: Galaxy, 1956), 142–60.

20 Gregory, 'Recruitment and Factional Patterns', 349.

21 John James MacDougall, 'Technocrats as Modernizers. The Economists of Indonesia's New Order', PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1975, 15.

22 Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, 24–6 and 113–22.

23 Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 97–109.

24 Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 163–7.

indeed amongst Indonesians themselves that worried the authorities.²⁵ The bureaucracy's authority was made possible due to an international protocol that was determined by educational and ideological status. To understand the Indonesian state and society without considering this important international dimension would omit a basic component in determining the reasons why a certain group of people, who were American-trained, came to dominate policymaking in what was essentially a military dictatorship.

1 Tensions in the Guided Democracy: The 1928 Generation and Their Ideology

Roeslan Abdulgani said that 'we are therefore faced with the peculiar situation where economists, stern anti-communists all, present us with a plan which politicians believe impossible without economic and social coercion along communist lines.'²⁶ What those of the older generation feared from economists and other social scientists was what they considered the inherently authoritarian nature of their ideology. The premise of both communism and Western social science was an authoritarian state wherein people of intelligence and good faith were excluded from participation and authority. This dislike was obviously shared by Sukarno. In his address at the Bandung Non-Alignment Summit (Konferensi Asia–Afrika, KAA), he expounded: 'I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation.'²⁷ The fear of authoritarianism seemed to be a peculiar irony, considering the fact that

25 For instance, in the discussion on the creation of expert manpower and the university system in the 1960s, which emphasized the creation of both 'reds' and expert cadres. See Bachtiar Rifai, *Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi selama 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka* (Jakarta: Departemen Perguruan Tinggi dan Ilmu Pengetahuan, 1965), 26.

26 Roeslan Abdulgani, *Beberapa Soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi. Buah Karangannya Roeslan Abdulgani dalam 'The Far Eastern Survey' dan 'United Asia'* (Jakarta: Dewan Nasional, 1958), 33. Of course, Abdulgani was a politician first and a thinker second. He was to survive the transition to the New Order and become part of the new regime, one that was to be dominated by those professional, textbook thinkers he had once derided. Whatever his belief, his position as a spokesperson of the Guided Democracy state gave credence to his announcement, if not purely of his own devising, then as a perfectly capable filter from which the state produced its discourse.

27 Quoted in Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 18.

Guided Democracy itself limited the participation of parties and organizations it deemed dangerous, the most significant of which were Sjahrir's Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI) and the *santri*-based Masyumi Party. Both the PSI and Masyumi were banned in 1960.

Yet, the attack on these parties was also explicitly an attack on the nascent technocracy, whose 'liberal' credentials had been built up through its control of the liaison institutions that connected the pools of financial aid and the educational opportunities of the international community with its Indonesian protégé. These institutions were often managed by the PSI, whose members and sympathizers became prominent authorities in important bodies such as the National Planning Body (Badan Perantjang Nasional, BPN) and the Army Staff and Command School (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, Seskoad). The formation of various Guided Democracy institutions was intended to replace these bodies, which had become dominated by 'administrators'. There was one important and major exception: the Army Staff and Command School under General Abdul Haris Nasution. Although Nasution had little sympathy for the PSI,²⁸ he was considered a relatively able administrator.

Sukarno needed the support of the military, yet the development of the army in the 1950s resulted in the reduced influence of PETA-based army commanders,²⁹ who had similar ideological views to Sukarno and who were just as suspicious of the educated 'professionals'.³⁰ However, the group was initially successful in ousting Nasution from power after the attempted putsch of 1952.³¹ Despite this, after 1955, Nasution saw his star rise again. In fact, it was Sukarno who appointed him chief of staff of the army in 1955, thus placing Nasution at the head of a vast and growing military government that mimicked and then took over many of the administrative duties of civilian institutions within the state and the economy. Nasution thus, by the end of the 1950s, had control of both the military government and the military schools.³² As newly graduated

28 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution. A Political Biography* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985), 125–6. Sjahrir calling the headquarters of the army 'a fascist military clique headed by Nasution' further distanced him from this party.

29 PETA stands for Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Homeland).

30 In an article in *Vrij Nederland*, the Dutch journalist J. Eijkelboom called Abdulgani a parrot. The parroting nature of the elites of the Guided Democracy may point to the weakness in saying that there was a whole generation of pro-Sukarnoist elements, but it is undeniable that there was a coterie of people within the elite who risked their fortunes on supporting Sukarno throughout the entire Guided Democracy.

31 Penders and Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution*, 82.

32 Splits within the army elites occurred at the regional level instead of the national level, with regional commanders opposing Nasution's rationalization policies. Crouch, *The Army and Politics*, 32.

Indonesian social scientists started to arrive from the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they found a state that was suspicious of receiving them but at the same time keen to benefit from their expertise. One major institution that opened its arms to incoming social scientists was Nasution's army. His successor, General Ahmad Yani, although loyal to Sukarno, kept the doors of the military open to these recent graduates.

The tension of the Guided Democracy can be understood, albeit simplistically, as a tension between Sukarno and Nasution, each representing an ideology produced from totally different eras. Nasution was born on 3 December 1918, seventeen years after Sukarno (6 June 1901). They came from different generations, maturing intellectually in different periods and under different social conditions. While Sukarno was a typical 1928-generation member, forming his ideas on state–society relations during the colonial period, Nasution's formative period was during the revolutionary struggle. The revolution was a formative period that forged the 1945 generation. For instance, many of the people in the 'Berkeley Mafia', the notorious name coined for Suharto's cabal of technocrats, had been soldiers during the revolution.³³

2 Sukarno

Sukarno was born in Surabaya in the year 1901. Unlike many of his fellow nationalists, he had never gone to Europe. He did, however, consume a large number of books written by European social theorists, from Marx to Weber. His father was Javanese and his mother Balinese, and despite his depiction of poverty in his autobiography, his family was wealthy enough as minor members

33 For instance, Suhadi Mangkusuwondo joined the Student Army of the Republic of Indonesia (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar, TRIP) militia in Malang, Emil Salim was active in the student army in Palembang, and Subroto joined in the fight with the PETA army. Those who had not been active in fighting during the revolution, amongst them Mohammad Sadli and Sarbini Sumawinata, were slightly older and thus were more intellectually active. See Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, 'Recollections of My Career', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 31/1 (April 1996), 34–5; Subroto, 'Recollections of My Career', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 34/2 (August 1998), 68–70; Emil Salim, 'Recollections of My Career', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 33/1 (April 1997), 47; Mohammad Sadli, 'Recollections of My Career', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 39/1 (April 1993), 36; and Sarbini Sumawinata, 'Recollections of My Career', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 28/2 (August 1992), 34–5. Lastly, the doyen of the Berkeley Mafia, Widjojo Nitisastro, also took part in the revolutionary war for independence. Peter McCawley and Thee Kian Wie, 'In Memoriam: Widjojo Nitisastro, 1927–2012', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 48/2 (2012), 275.

of the *priyayi*.³⁴ His father, being a theosophist, was deeply into the Javanese religion. Sukarno himself grew up within a Javanese milieu and would forever remain enthralled by the history and culture of Java.³⁵ Although a follower of the Javanese religion, Sukarno was happy enough to venture into explorations of Islam during his period of banishments in the 1930s.³⁶

A peculiar and enduring theme of Sukarno's belief was corporatism, the possibility of reconciling the fragmented divisions of Indonesia's *aliran* into one imposing unity. In a 1926 article, Sukarno expounded his Nasakom³⁷ vision, which reasoned away the differences by stressing the commonalities of the major strands of Indonesia's radical political movements: radical nationalist, Islamic revivalist, and communist.³⁸ The most significant commonality was their anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-liberal drives, and their calls for Indonesian independence.³⁹ Sukarno was unusual in that the ideas he espoused never fundamentally changed throughout his life. Imprisonment and banishment had left him distrustful of both the state and its institutions, particularly the courts. Like many of his fellow nationalists, he was enthralled by the ideas of Marxists, who subscribed to the anti-colonial cause. Reading the works of Karl Kautsky, Rudolf Hilferding, Karl Renner and H. N. Brailsford, he came to equate colonialism, the state, and capitalism with each other.⁴⁰ For him, the promise of technical and material progress made by the West/capitalism was a lie. Sukarno kept pointing to people's suffering as a result of imperialism. He saw capitalism as a big pipe that drains the wealth and prosperity away from those on the negative end of the modern imperial project.⁴¹

34 Leslie H. Palmier, 'Sukarno: The Nationalist', *Pacific Affairs*, 30/2 (June 1957), 101–19.

35 His Nasakom vision was influenced by Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo's Taman Siswa philosophy. CLM Penders, *Life and Times of Sukarno* (Rutherford: Farley Dickinson University Press, 1974), 24. Mangoenkoesoemo, according to Dutch administrator Charles van der Plas, played an important role in Westernizing Sukarno. Bob Herring, *Soekarno: Founding Father of Indonesia, 1901–1945* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 132–4.

36 Lambert Giebels, *Soekarno, Nederlands onderdaan. Een biografie, 1901–1950* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1999), 214–18. Also see Sukarno, *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, Vol. 1 (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), 325–455.

37 Nasionalisme-Agama-Komunisme – Nationalism, Religion, Communism.

38 Herring, *Founding Father*, 95.

39 Penders, *Life and Times of Sukarno*, 30.

40 Sukarno, 'Swadeshi dan Massa-Aksi di Indonesia', in *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, 121–57. His own idea, which led to the coining of the term Marhaenism, was rooted in the Marxist ideas of Karl Kautsky and Bakunin. Giebels, *Soekarno, Nederlands onderdaan*, 80–1. Although borrowing from many Western thinkers, he did not bind himself to a single Western frame of thought. Herring, *Founding Father*, 102.

41 Sukarno, *Indonesia Menggugat* (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1961), 55.

Sukarno was suspicious of liberalism. Although the Netherlands espoused a social-democratic ideology, the liberal elements of the Dutch state were the mainstay that endured in the Netherlands throughout the inter-war period when many other European states turned to fascism or communism. The 1920s and 1930s saw many parts of Europe ending their experiments with parliamentary democracy and the rise of strongmen as the leaders of unified, racially purified nations – in the process displacing hundreds of thousands of people in Eastern Europe, and later, during the war, killing millions.⁴² Although the Netherlands never fell into extremism, its imperialist policies strengthened Sukarno's disdain for liberals. Here was a liberal, democratic, and enlightened European state and yet it was also the agent of Western capitalism, draining the wealth of the people of the Indies.

Growing up in the aftermath of the First World War, Sukarno believed in the Marxist criticism of capitalism and heralded the end of the liberal order as the result of the loss of political control over the masses. Sukarno, like many of his nationalist compatriots, had a much more positive view of the United States of America prior to Indonesia's revolution. There was thus a perception that democratic states were different from authoritarian ones. Sukarno grew up being explicitly anti-fascist in this regard: 'The Indonesian soul is the soul of democracy, the soul of the common people (*kerakyatan*), while the fascist soul is anti-democratic, anti-people.'⁴³

He placed the rise of fascism within the logic of capitalism as an expression of the last phase of the decline of capitalism.⁴⁴ From this Marxist viewpoint, fascism was the product of cooperation between the corporation and the petite bourgeoisie.⁴⁵ In a speech to Parliament during the Guided Democracy, he said:

We can no longer follow the politics of liberalism [...] our revolution is a multi-complex revolution, a summing up of many revolutions in one generation, all of which generates conflicts. Without the leadership in providing planning in each of the fields and complexity of this revolution, we will achieve a complexity in chaos. We must have a planned

42 Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 1–75.

43 Sukarno, 'Indonesia versus Fasisme. Faham jang bertentangan dengan Djiwa Indonesia', in *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, 457.

44 Sukarno, 'Beratnja Perdjoangan melawan Fasisme. Perlunja Menarik Simpati Kaum Kleinburgertum dan Kaum Tani di Djerman', in *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, 549. All translations in the book is made by the author.

45 Sukarno, 'Beratnja Perdjoangan melawan Fasisme', 549.

policy. This is the central idea of Guided Democracy. Our revolution is not a revolution for the sake of revolution, it is a highly planned, clear and certain type of revolution.⁴⁶

In fact, the word 'Guided' itself has a somewhat similar ring to the 'expert and manager-led' state and society. It is a rearrangement of the entire society, towards the creation of a 'Socialism à la Indonesia'.⁴⁷

The role of the state was to guide the revolution, produce elites, and recreate society in the most logical and scientific fashion possible. Replacing an atomized society, the state would eventually take over the economy. In the words of Abdulgani:

Within the framework of Indonesian society, economic cooperation and collective action will be effective, not nineteenth-century Western individualism. In any case, the fact is that such individualism is outmoded, even in the West. It has been displaced by state enterprise and monopoly, which leave little scope for the idealized capitalism of an earlier day.⁴⁸

Liberalism was the ideology that was imposed on Indonesia to allow for the sinister neocolonial domination of international capitalism over society. Here we see a major conundrum in the Guided Democracy revolution: despite Sukarno's sincere intention to apply his ideals of corporatism and unite the various strands of national ideologies in the country, his championing of the state as the prime agent of revolution meant, in essence, giving more authority to the bureaucrats than to anyone else. Within the National Planning Council (Dewan Perantjang Nasional, Depernas) development plan, this danger was acknowledged. As E. H. Carr states in his book *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*:

If on the other hand we neglect the 'social' aspect, we shall fall into the heresy of efficiency for efficiency's sake and conclude that planning is simply the instrument of national power and national aggrandizement – the doctrine of fascism. Hitlerism took the name of national socialism. But the fact that it was not capitalist did not make it socialist: it approximated

46 Sukarno, *Handbook on the Political Manifesto*, 31.

47 Sukarno, *Handbook on the Political Manifesto*, 31.

48 Abdulgani, *Demokrasi dan Ekonomi*, 38.

far more nearly to the conceptions of the American ‘technocrats’ or of Mr Burnham’s ‘managerial revolution’ – the cult of efficiency for the sake of power.⁴⁹

As we will see, in the initial Guided Democracy state, there was a genuine effort to involve a variety of people within the state.⁵⁰ This only lasted briefly and acted to strengthen the idea that the country needed the experts it once thought it could do without. The focus on planning or retooling, the institutional approach to revolution, and the centralization of power within bodies and experts highlights the difficulties of allowing ‘society’ into the ‘state’ while at the same time applying a planning programme that was to be meticulous, scientific, and efficient. In the words of D. H. Assegaff: ‘In the practice of development, there needs to be firm leadership. Without leadership, the development would be shaky, and could even result in the failure of a well-thought-out plan.’⁵¹

This state-controlled idea, embodied in Keynesianism and communist industrialism, represented the *Weltanschauung* of the era. This explains why Guided Democracy was so successful in bringing together a range of widely disparate groups within the government. The application of Nasakom to Guided Democracy, which entailed giving equal roles to the three major *aliran* in the various institutions, transcended the ideological divide. It also meant that the nation-state could go either way: becoming a communist state or a military state. The real possibility of a communist takeover seemed slim, even in the middle of the 1960s. Yet, the fear of one was enough to push the army to position itself comfortably within the ever-expanding state institutions that were replacing the ‘nineteenth-century individualism’ of Indonesian liberalism. Many of the ideas of the army were established, or at least voiced, by its most important member, army chief of staff General Abdul Haris Nasution.

49 Quoted in *Rantjangan Dasar Undang-undang Pembangunan Nasional Semesta Berantjana Delapan Tahun: 1961–1969*, Buku ke I, Djilid 11: *Sosialisme Tripola Pembangunan*, 236. Carr was quoted in Dutch and Abdugani omitted the line ‘Hitlerism took the name of national socialism’ to avoid any comparison between socialism à la Indonesia and fascism. E. H. Carr, *The Soviet Impact on the Western world* (London: MacMillan and co., 1946), 27.

50 This was also Lenin’s policy in his attack on the bureaucracy and his wish to draw the masses into the direct management of state affairs. Carr, *The Soviet Impact*, 17–19.

51 D. H. Assegaff, ‘Aspek Management dalam Pembangunan Semesta Berantjana’, *Manager*, 30/3 (September 1962), 274.

3 Nasution

In many ways, Nasution was the opposite of Sukarno. Unlike Sukarno's Javanese credentials, Nasution was a Batak, a term referring to a people living in the interior of North Sumatra in the Lake Toba region. He was thus an 'Outer Islander'. Unlike Sukarno's *abangan* religious beliefs, Nasution was a devout Muslim and continued to be so throughout his life.⁵² Sukarno was brash and impulsive; Nasution was reflective and pragmatic. He studied to become a teacher at the Training School for Indigenous Teachers (Hogere Inlandse Kweekschool, HIK) in Bandung in 1935. Sukarno and other nationalists influenced Nasution in the 1930s, as he was reaching intellectual maturity.⁵³ Nasution's essentially pragmatic character saw him deciding to join the colonial army at the outbreak of the Second World War in what he ironically considered to be a nationalist gesture.⁵⁴

When the Netherlands capitulated to Germany in May 1940, Nasution volunteered as a cadet officer and was admitted, along with five other Indonesians, to the newly created Royal Military Academy (Koninklijke Militaire Akademie, KMA) in Bandung. Nasution specialized in infantry studies. After the fall of the Netherlands East Indies to Japan in 1942, Nasution went into hiding in various places on Java. After three months, he returned to Bandung when the Japanese released all Indonesian Royal Netherlands Indies Army (Koninklijke Nederlands-Indisch Leger, KNIL) soldiers. Knowing full well that the Japanese would ultimately be defeated, Nasution worked with a number of his KNIL colleagues, university students, and youth leaders. He did this initially by joining the paramilitary organizations created by the Japanese. Instead of joining PETA, he joined the Priangan Soldier's Aid Society (Barisan Pemuda Priangan) and was elected to the governing board. He also worked as an army instructor for the Seinendan, Keibodan, and other organizations. During the first year of the revolution, Nasution was promoted from an army instructor to commander of the Siliwangi Division (Komando Daerah Militer Siliwangi) (1946). He would then rise to commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Java (1948) and chief of staff of the army (1949–1952 and again 1955–1963).⁵⁵

Many of his ideas concerning state–society relations were formulated during the revolutionary period, especially during the military emergency

52 Penders and Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution*, 3.

53 A. H. Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Jilid 1: *Kenangan Masa Muda* (Jakarta: Haji Masagung, 1990), 38–40.

54 Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Jilid 1, 64–5.

55 Penders and Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution*, 8–11.

of the Second Dutch Aggression (19 December 1948–5 January 1949), which, as he was chief of operational staff at the Army Headquarters (Markas Besar Tentara), resulted in the publication of his guerrilla instructions. Because of a lack of focus on the part of the political leadership, the army was not able to form a conventional ground force before the arrival of the Dutch. Nasution blamed this indecision squarely on the bickering politicians. In contrast, he resented the ability of the Dutch to create, from scratch, a functioning army within a short period of time that was able to be deployed to the Indies.

For the early part of the revolution, Nasution was busy trying to create a professional army within his West Java Siliwangi Division. The division was to become the most professional part of the army. Based in Bandung, it also contained most of the KNIL military elements that had decided to join the Indonesian revolution. There were plenty of military thinkers and strategists within the division, which enabled the sharing of ideas. Nasution's main ideas somewhat resembled those of Mao Zedong and can be summed up by Mao's statement about the military being a fish and the people being the water. A fish out of water is akin to an army without the people's support.⁵⁶ As mentioned above, the idea of a guerrilla war was put forth and executed by Nasution during his tenure as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Java, when he also published a pamphlet on guerrilla warfare. As a military strategist, Nasution saw the implementation of 'total war' as a central component of Indonesia's current and future security strategy.

Nasution's 1948 guerilla strategy reduced the whole of state–society relations to within the dictates of a military strategy. As he phrased it: 'In this framework of total warfare, the leadership could recruit and plan a strategy of the whole people for one aim.'⁵⁷ During the 1948 aggression, Nasution created a 'guerrilla administration', in which civilian administrators, who were not keen on cooperating with the Dutch administration, left for the countryside and recreated the state. The experience reduced the legitimacy of the politicians and the assertion of their necessary presence to the functioning of the state. In Nasution's words: 'The leadership is held by civilian authorities, with the assistance of the "territorial" forces, but in its relationship to war, everything must be brought under the supervision of the military leadership.'⁵⁸

56 Penders and Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution*, 47–50.

57 Abdul Haris Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), 26.

58 Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, 89.

Conforming to this idea, a military administration was created to mirror the civilian one. Guerrilla warfare was based on decentralized leadership and, in essence, had to be conducted on a local basis.⁵⁹ Much of this was modelled on the German military district or *Wehrkreise* system, with the formation of seven independent military district (*Tentara & Territorium*).⁶⁰ The military district was a product of militarized states such as America and Britain during the Second World War, and the Chinese and Vietnamese variants that continued after the war. Thus, a Military Sub-District Command (Komando Onder-District Militer, KODM) was created at the *kecamatan* (or sub-district) level; a Military Region Command (Komando Distrik Militer, KDM), at the *kabupaten* (or district) level; and a Military Sub-Territorium Command (Sub-Territorium Militer, STM), at the residency (*karesidenan*) level, with a commander appointed in every province. This idea was continued during the Guided Democracy under the Tjatur Tunggal⁶¹ system.

The assumption of territorial decentralization limited the national leadership to coordinating and directing. As Nasution explained, 'The military, political, psychological, economic and social wars are conducted on a regional basis. Complete decentralization is an essential feature of a guerrilla war.'⁶² Basic schooling, with the aim of eradicating illiteracy, and mobile health clinics were envisaged as being provided by the military administration.⁶³ The militarization of the administration would allow a degree of decentralization within the bounds mandated by the army's vertical command structure. While decentralization offered flexibility, it was predicated on the highly reduced roles of civilian politicians and the civil administration. This 'territorialization' of command allowed the central military authority to have greater control of the regions. For Nasution, the village had proven to be the most important component in guerrilla warfare. The territorial structure started from the village level. The *lurah* (village leaders) were integrated into the lowest level of military government. It was thus also in the villages that much of the social and economic development work carried out by the guerilla administration occurred.

59 In fact, '[t]he most salient characteristics of the army was its local character'. Gregory, 'Recruitment and Factional Patterns', 242.

60 Penders and Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution*, 55.

61 Tjatur Tunggal literally means four-in-one, a regional system of government in which the executive is replaced by a four-section committee; composed of the governor, the military commander, the police head and the head of the regional parliament. The system was dominated by the army.

62 Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, 52.

63 Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, 144.

4 The Idea of Guided Democracy

Both the ideas of Sukarno and Nasution focused on the state as the provider of action. In Sukarno's case, as a leadership that guides society on to the path to revolution; in Nasution's, as an extension of the military, whose tentacles embraced the village and community. These ideas tried to solve the problem, outlined at the beginning of this chapter, of how to ensure the authority of the bureaucracy during the tumultuous years of revolution and parliamentary democracy in the 1940s and 1950s. On the one hand, revolution, as an ideological banner, inadvertently became a way to legitimize the guiding authority of the bureaucracy. As Sukarno stressed over and over again, Guided Democracy was a planned policy to enact a corporatist, national plan.

Nasution's idea of total and territorial warfare elevated the role of the military to that of an essential component of state bureaucracy. The Guided Democracy state experienced the extension of military, that is, army, involvement throughout the bureaucracy and the economy. One might cynically surmise that this was an effort to spread corruption on a grand scale. Yet, that would be to miss the more important point about state authority and control. The military presence at the village level was an affirmation of the authority of the bureaucracy-cum-military state leadership. The army's deep relationships with parts of civil society, students, criminals, labour organizations, and so forth not only competed with those of its communist counterpart during the Guided Democracy; it was also used to regulate a specific kind of state-society relationship in which society was to be fully subordinated through these civil society clienteles that were, in effect, extensions of the military.⁶⁴

In the New Order, the army would thus provide the two things that the colonial state had provided, but which had been lost during the revolutionary and the pre-New Order period. The first was the safety of bureaucratic legitimacy and authority. The army as the purveyor of power would convey authority to the bureaucracy through its power to protect them from state and non-state civil actors, such as Parliament and political parties. It also conveyed legitimacy through the implementation of a state ideology that put these bureaucratic experts on a pedestal: the ideology of development. Today, we think of development as inherently different from Sukarno's revolution; yet, this is purely a result of the failure of Guided Democracy.

64 Loren Stuart Ryter, 'Youth, Gangs and the State in Indonesia', PhD dissertation, University of Washington, Seattle, 2002.

The second was the bureaucratic extension of control to rural areas. During the colonial era, the state used traditional authority and its local-bully clientele to provide this control.⁶⁵ In the post-colonial period, this job was taken on by the army, along with its clients, to ensure state control at the lowest levels, thus leaving the bureaucracy with the job of planning development.

Although the core leadership of the Guided Democracy displayed a lack of coherence over key issues regarding the Guided Democracy state and ideology, there was one person who succeeded in becoming Sukarno's main ideologue, a person who was capable of translating 'His Master's voice' with fidelity. This man was Roeslan Abdulgani, politician par excellence and former minister of information, who was, on several occasions, accused of corruption and who, along with Nasution, was one of only two members of Sukarno's inner circle to have made the transition to the New Order alive and well. It is difficult to gauge the sincerity of Abdulgani's words during this period. Yet, there is no doubt about his influence on Sukarno and the regime as a whole. Casper Schuurung claims that 'Roeslan had a "steering hand" in the so-called guided democracy'.⁶⁶ Sukarno entrusted him with producing important papers and information on the Guided Democracy and Economy, and it was Roeslan who was asked to confer with Professor Djokosoetono to develop a constitutional order for the new state.⁶⁷

Perhaps one of the most enduring features of early Guided Democracy thought was the deep distrust of so-called experts. There was a particular distrust of Western economists. In the words of Abdulgani: 'I am no economist, and I have reservations about the purely professional approach of the economist. Particularly, I have reservations about the purely professional approach of the non-Indonesian economist, who, while putting his great skill and knowledge at our disposal, is still outside the stream of our life, our hopes and desires.'⁶⁸ Roeslan Abdulgani's explicit dislike of economists can be summed up in another of his quotes. Siding with what he called the 'unprofessionals' as

65 Schulte Nordholt, 'Genealogy of Violence', 33–63. Schulte Nordholt argued that the colonial state was a violent state and that 'criminal elements' such as the *jago* were an integral part of the state's expression of power.

66 Casper Schuurung, *Abdulgani. 70 jaar nationalist van het eerste uur* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2003), 47. 'Roeslan had een "sturende hand" gehad in de zogenoemde geleide democratie.'

67 Sukarno, 'Pidato Presiden Sukarno tentang "Demokrasi Terpimpin" dalam Sidang Dewan Nasional Ke-VIII Tanggal 23 Djuli 1958', in *Demokrasi Terpimpin*, 2.

68 Abdulgani, *Demokrasi dan Ekonomi*, 36.

opposed to the professional experts, he said, 'it was these unprofessionals who created and forwarded the Indonesian Nationalist Movement which proved capable of leading the country to shake off the bonds of colonialism [...] There is no reason why such persons should be any less successful in the task of continuing the revolution.'⁶⁹

The problem, then, was not simply economics per se, but its particular Western version. The Indonesian must search for his own economic theory and experiment:

It is here, in connection with this effort to attain perfection, there lies the appropriateness of my recommendation to always 'think and rethink', 'shape and re-shape' [...] and not to immerse ourselves in textbook thinking alone, not to immerse ourselves in only swallowing everything stuffed down our throats from the outside, not just to immerse ourselves in the atmosphere of *Hollandsdenken* – Dutch way of thinking.⁷⁰

Roeslan lamented on the failure of the first Five-Year Plan that had been hatched by the State Planning Bureau (Badan Perantjangan Negara, BPN):

Perhaps the plans have failed, and perhaps they have not even been applied, because they run counter to certain basic truths about our country. They are plans based on Western conceptions, and do not necessarily have validity in another political and social environment. I am prepared to admit that, in the realm of pure economics, they are certainly ideal, but no economic planning can exist in a vacuum. It is dealing with people living in a society. I know of no reason to support the idea that Indonesian people will react in the same way to the same incentives as Western people do.⁷¹

69 Roeslan Abdulgani, 'The Lessons of Indonesia's Experience of Planning', in *Politik dan Ilmu* (Jakarta: Prapantja, 1962), 159.

70 Sukarno, *The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution. Supplements: Manipol-Usdek and the Birth of Pancasila* (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1965), 34. The dislike of economists was obviously also well known amongst economists themselves. Widjojo Nitisastro commented that 'there was a strong view among the public at the time that the science of economics was totally useless textbook thinking. Some even viewed this as something that could harm the way of life of the people.' In Widjojo Nitisastro, *The Indonesian Development Experience* (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2011), 3.

71 Abdulgani, *Demokrasi dan Ekonomi*, 36.

That the West failed to provide an adequate economic plan for the nation meant that Indonesia needed another plan, one that would throw away the constraints of textbook thinking:

To solve the economic problems of a nation that has been already formed, especially for nations that are called *nations arrivés*, perhaps the person of outstanding skills in the routine of economics would be required, very precise knowledge of economic science would be required, very highly technical, very 'expert', knowledge of economics would be required. But praise be to God, I know that our economic problems do not have to be solved in a routine fashion.⁷²

The revolutionary character of the Guided Democracy was to be placed in the hands of what he termed the 'non-professional' – those who had had experience in the real world, with a broad education and broad interests: 'Government by experts is no substitute for democracy, any more than good government is any substitute for self-government. Again, that pattern of thinking shows a deplorable lack of faith in the good sense and intelligence of the people.'⁷³

This belittling of the professional was a major theme of Sukarno's speeches, in which he often attacked those 'bald headed non-political individuals and textbook thinking teachers'.⁷⁴ This sentiment was to be displayed by the Depernas, which was to be composed of ordinary people, with a smattering of intellectuals. As Abdulgani phrased it: 'Differing from the planning and development boards of the past, who restricted their membership to the expert-intellectuals, the Depernas will supply its membership from the *golongan karya*,⁷⁵ who are

72 Sukarno, *The Resounding Voice*, 44.

73 Abdulgani, *Demokrasi dan Ekonomi*, 19.

74 Selo Soemardjan, *The Changing Role of Intellectuals in Indonesian National Development: A Socio-Historical Interpretation* (n.p.: n.n., 1976), 14. The particular attack on the Economics Faculty of the University of Indonesia after the PRRI rebellion and Sumitro's role was directed by the leftist element and President Sukarno. The faculty's relationship with Berkeley and the Ford Foundation made it an even easier target. John Bresnan, *At Home Abroad. A Memoir of the Ford Foundation in Indonesia, 1953–1973* (Jakarta: Equinox, 2006), 41. For more on the PRRI rebellion, see Chapter 2, fn. 33.

75 *Golongan karya* (or *Golkar*) functional groups are groups of associations based on their role in society (youth, women, farmers, journalists, intellectuals, and so forth), which in Sukarno's ideal society were to replace political parties as the main components of political participation. Golkar was continued under the Suharto regime as a method of political control and became the main political party of the New Order.

rooted and live in the community, without ignoring the advice and opinion of the experts.⁷⁶

Expert-intellectuals are motivated only by careerism and professionalism, which, according to Abdulgani, was the root problem of modern bureaucracy. Instead, the membership of the Depernas was to be comprised of the cultivated man, being 'a person who has a general education and a wide and forward-looking perspective, who may not be or has not yet become a specialist, but who is not yet infected by the disease of modern bureaucracy'.⁷⁷

Thus, the assumption of the Guided Democracy must be seen as an appeal for collectivism and the raising of the Indonesian masses as participants in its development. As discussed previously, the true 'socialism à la Indonesia' incorporated the masses as political subjects in the development process. In a speech in front of the Depernas in August 1959, Sukarno said: 'Within management there must be decentralization and the democratization of control.'⁷⁸ The state was to be decentralized and democratized by opening up its management, which had previously been strongly monopolized by the experts. By empowering the non-professional, the people, that is, the masses, were empowered. Socialism à la Indonesia was not merely a means to reach the goals of the nation-state: it was the goal itself. It required deep and wide-ranging changes within the Indonesian psyche.

The need to balance Western rationality and Indonesian spirituality was a touchy subject: 'The scientific/rational way of thinking is something new to us Indonesians, because previously our culture has placed an emphasis on spiritual issues. This rational way of thinking is the result of Western culture, where a harmonious relationship has been achieved between rationality and the core values of Western culture.'⁷⁹ Because of the divide in Indonesian

76 Roeslan Abdulgani, *Sosialisme Indonesia* (Jakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1963), 63. 'Berbeda dengan dewan2 perantjang dan pembangunan jang duluz, jang menitik-beratkan keanggautaannya kepada para intelek-ahli dan intelek-expert, maka Depernas mengutamakan keanggautaannya untuk golongan2 karya jang berakar dimasyarakat dan ditengah-tengah rakjat tanpa mengabaikan nasehat dan pendapat para ahli dan para expert.'

77 Abdulgani, *Sosialisme Indonesia*, 63. 'seorang jang berpendidikan umum, dan berpandangan luas serta djauh kemuka, jang mungkin tidak ada atau belum gespecialiseerd, tetapi tidak kena tularan kesempitan pandangan dari penjakit birokrasi modern.'

78 Quoted in Runturambi, *Problim Management Ekonomi di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Sumber Tjahaja, 1963), 8.

79 *Rantjangan Dasar Undang-Undang Pembangunan Nasional Semesta-Berentjana Delapan Tahun: 1961-1969*, Buku ke III, *Bidang Mental/Ruhani dan Penelitian*, Jilid v: *Pola Pendjelasan, Bidang Kebudayaan dan Pendidikan* (Jakarta: Dewan Perentjanaan, 1960), 1024. 'Tjara berfikir setjara ilmiah/rasionil ini merupakan sesuatu jang baru bagi kita di Indonesia, karena sebelumnya kebudayaan kita lebih menekankan pada soal2 spirituil.

culture between belief and rational thought, it was important that the school system did not purely focus upon rationalism. The intellectualist foundation of the colonial education system had resulted in the estrangement of its Indonesian pupils from their own culture, leading them to consider their own culture worthless. This had led to the formation of a Westernized man: individualistic, materialistic, capitalistic, liberal, and intellectual, thus differing from the Eastern man, who was a collectivist and a socialist, with a sense of family (*kekeluargaan*), and a focus on harmony and giving weight to spiritual matters.⁸⁰

The main appeal was thus to Indonesia's newly educated youth, that is, the future elite of the nation. The universities therefore had a very important role in the process. Instead of liberal theories, they were expected to cultivate the ideas of scientific socialism. The universities thus were not expected to confine themselves to producing experts; they were also to produce militant, revolutionized youths between the ages of 20 and 25 years. They were not to be a *sanctum sanctorum saevis tranquillis in undis*, an island of peace amongst the revolutionary upheaval, producing cynical, sceptical, hyper-intellectual, and hedonistic young people. Universities were not to be ivory towers that allowed the importation of ideas that would become barriers to progress and socialism.⁸¹ Sukarno reiterated the dangers of these types of intellectuals: 'Cynicism would appear. The faith in the ability of their own nation would be shaken. The *inlander* souls would look down upon their own nation and praise to high heavens the foreigners. Especially amongst the intellectuals.'⁸²

Abdulgani used the image of the helmsman assisted by experts to depict the Indonesian 'elite' under Guided Democracy. The experts would thus be relegated to the position of assistants to the more broadly cultivated elite. In speeches to the National Council (Dewan Nasional) conferences during the early years of Guided Democracy, Sukarno never once used the term experts (*ahli*); instead, he used the word 'intellectuals'. In comparison, Djuanda and Nasution both used the word 'experts' in a positive light. Sukarno reiterated several times the experimental nature of the revolution and asked students and intellectuals to

Tjara berfikir setjara rasionil ini adalah hasil kehidupan kebudayaan di Barat, dimana telah tertjapai harmoni antara tjara berfikir setjara rasionil itu dengan dasar2 kehidupan kebudayaan bangsa2 Barat itu.'

80 *Rantjangan Dasar Undang-undang Pembangunan Nasional*, Buku Ke III, Jilid V, 1024.

81 Abdulgani, *Sosialisme Indonesia*, 98.

82 Sukarno, 'Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita', in *Tudjuh Bahan2 Pokok Indoktrinasi* (Jakarta: Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, 1962), 103. 'Sinisme lantas timbul. Kepertjajaan kepada kemampuan bangsa sendiri gojang. Djiwa inlander jang memandang rendah kepada bangsa sendiri dan memandang agung kepada bangsa asing muntjul disana-sini, terutama sekali dikalangan kaum intellektuil.'

fill in the blanks: 'It is you, the youths who are pursuing knowledge, the experts, the professors, all those with intelligence of the mind, that I ask to enrich my ideas.'⁸³ The idea of having intellectual supremacy over the more technical experts was, of course, an elite conception that would allow the position of the 1928 generation to continue despite the onslaught of the new generation. By positioning the politician as the helmsman in a boat, helped by the experts, the politician, as the purveyor of the revolution, would still have a role to play.

Sukarno always stressed his ideology's universal nature, putting the Indonesian revolution within the spectrum of a humanity-wide revolution. He was to equate it favourably with the Chinese revolution. The roots of this fascination with China were based on the alleged efficacy of Chinese collectivism:

It is not to be denied that the development in the People's Republic of China is a development under the policy of a New Democracy or a People's Democracy, a type of state–society relations (*ketatanegaraan*) that is in accordance with the character of the Chinese nation. This is similar to the Guided Democracy, which we are implementing today in order to replace a worn and outdated liberal democracy. The wish of the people to be directed so as to participate in the development with efficiency of funds, time and forces should be made real.⁸⁴

The Guided Democracy state shares a number of similarities and differences with the New Order state. Both saw the revolution and Indonesian socialism as having deep roots in Indonesia's ancient cultural past. This cultural root is the source of Indonesian socialist ideals. 'The Javanese concept of "Ratu Adil", the Goddess of Justice' is used by the Guided Democracy state, 'for it is

83 *Rantjangan Dasar Undang-Undang Pembangunan Nasional*, Buku ke III, Djilid v, 202. 'Kepadamulah, hai pemuda-pemudi jang sedang mengedjar ilmu, kepada Saudaraz ahliz, mahaguruz, kepada semua orang jang mempunjai intelligensi untuk berfikir, berusaha memperkaja ide saya ini.'

84 *Rantjangan Dasar Undang-Undang Pembangunan Nasional*, Buku Ke I, Djilid 1: *Pendahuluan*, 22. 'Dan suatu kenjataan jang tidak dipungkiri ialah, bahwa pembangunan di RRT tersebut, adalah pembangunan dengan rentjana keseluruhannya dibawah pimpinan kebidjaksanaan daripada Demokrasi Baru atau Demokrasi Rakjat, jaitu suatu bentuk ketata-negaraan jang sesuai dengan kepribadian bangsa Tionghoa, seperti Demokrasi Terpimpin ditanah Indonesia jang akan kita laksanakan dewasa ini untuk menggantikan Demokrasi liberal jang telah usang dan tidak memenuhi tuntutan zaman. Terutama hasrat Rakjat jang dikerahkan tenaganja untuk ikut membangun dengan melihat tendens untuk berhemat pembiajaan, waktu dan tenaga, hendaklah diperhatikan benar2, supaja ditimbulkan pula pada Rakjat membangun: berhemat biaja, waktu dan bahan.'

again social justice which is meant here, not merely the implementation of laws, regulations and other social codes'.⁸⁵ The Indonesian past is an agrarian-communitarian past, an ur-communist society whose latent socialism is inherent in its deepest make up.⁸⁶ The ancient past is thus shown to be socialist and leftist, not the glorification of a rightist, culturalist aristocratic culture:

Since ancient times, Indonesian society has been averse both to dictatorship and to the individualism of liberalism. The old system of government was based upon *musjawarah* and *mufakat* (consensus) with the leadership of a single central authority in the hands of a 'sesepuh' or elder, who did not dictate, but led and protected.⁸⁷

This idea of an elder who was not dictatorial was also used by the New Order to depict the ideal leadership. This is different from the feudal aristocratic assumption of authority based on heredity. Alluding to the ideas of the aristocratic nationalist Noto Soeroto, Abdulgani said that

Guided Democracy was not an Aristo-democracy or a Demo-aristocracy [...] This is because the term Guided Democracy is not a combination of the term Demos with Aristos, or the *Kawulo* with the *Gusti*. In other words, the Demos is not combined with Hero, Führer, Held or Il Duce, but with the idea of social justice; it is the synthesis between Democracy and Socialism.⁸⁸

The body politic of the nation was to be pictured within the harmonious image of the family. In Abdulgani's words: 'Guided Democracy is the democracy of the family system, without the anarchy of liberalism, without the autocracy of dictatorship.'⁸⁹ Sukarno, though, rarely used the image of himself as father of the revolution for his position in Indonesian society. In comparison to Suharto, who fashioned himself as the father of development, Sukarno's depiction of himself was as an active man, who was part of the youth.⁹⁰ Thus the

85 Roeslan Abdulgani, *Manipol and USDEK in Questions and Answers* (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1961), 36.

86 Abdulgani, *Sosialisme Indonesia*, 12.

87 Abdulgani, *Manipol and USDEK*, 40.

88 Roeslan Abdulgani, *Resapkan dan Amalkan Pantjasila* (Jakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1964), 110.

89 Abdulgani, *Manipol and USDEK*, 39.

90 Instead of father of the revolution, he was its mouthpiece, signifying vigour and participation. This was inherently different from Suharto, who looked on with the benign and concerned visage of the father, or the sultan from his throne.

leadership of the Guided Democracy was actually the leadership of an idea, of the nationalist ideology of Pancasila. Perhaps the most peculiar of the ideas that were discussed surrounding the Guided Democracy was its stated ideal of democracy. By extension, it was coupled with keeping a healthy distance from the military. Obviously, the period in question was to see a greater increase in military participation in all walks of life, but within the writings of its main ideologues, with the exception of Nasution, the military was always assumed to be a state apparatus.

5 The Ideology of the 1945 Generation

Selo Soemardjan, secretary to Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and one of the pioneers of sociology in Indonesia, explicitly divided the elite into three groups: the aristocrats, the religious leaders, and the intellectuals. Differing from Geertz's broad classification of the *abangan* and *santri*, Soemardjan placed greater emphasis on the third group, whose legitimacy was created purely through education and technical capabilities: 'It can even be said without exaggeration that a university degree in modern Indonesian social life functions in the same way as did the now de-socialized aristocratic titles before the 1945 revolution for national independence and democracy.'⁹¹ It is of no little irony, though, that many of the Indonesian intellectuals were those men who had fought during the revolution and had the good luck of being family members of bureaucrats.⁹²

There were two reasons for this. First, the revolutionary credential was an important component of legitimacy. Several of Suharto's most important economic policymakers, including Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli, and Subroto, were active in the war in a student battalion.⁹³

Second was the American educational experience. For the top policymakers, America represented a formative influence that was not only important because it helped to determine the kinds of ideas that they had for the nation and the state, but more importantly, because their stay in the USA was punctuated by an increasing sense of togetherness and a feeling of solidarity and common goals. In terms of economic policymaking, it was in the dormitories of the University of California, Berkeley and in the halls of the Army Staff

⁹¹ Soemardjan, *The Changing Role of Intellectuals*, 4.

⁹² Gregory, 'Recruitment and Factional Patterns', 52. The technocrats and the military came from the highest social-status origins (97% and 71% respectively).

⁹³ Gregory, 'Recruitment and Factional Patterns', 327–57.

and Command School that the ideas for a future Indonesian economy were thought out. The head of the school, General Suwanto, often asked the economists to stay the night at the compound to discuss the Indonesian economy.⁹⁴ Widjojo Nitisastro came to be the natural leader of the small team of economists (seventeen people in total) that determined policymaking during the entire New Order period.⁹⁵ The American experience also underscored the importance of a university education as a binding force among the group. As Gregory stated, ‘The technocratic elite led primarily academic lives, before and after the completion of their degrees.’⁹⁶ The universities represented a mechanism for elite recruitment and for forging solidarity, just as the officer school and the military legal school reflected the military side of the equation.

As David Bouchier and Vedi Hadiz explained, the New Order national discourse seemed to be a mishmash of ideas that at first sight appeared to clash with one another. On the one hand, the state was seen to be organicist,⁹⁷ that is, state–society relations were seen through familial, nativist, and organic metaphors, with the state or elite being the father and the nation being the children. In line with Eastern ideals of family relationships, the emphasis was on harmony: the children were obliged to respect and follow the orders of the father. The roots of this organic notion were plucked from the ideas of the noted legal scholar Soepomo and then carried over into the New Order under Brigadier General Soetjipno and the Military Law Academy (Akademi Hukum Militer, AHM).⁹⁸

The second strand of state–society relations was the emphasis on the communitarian and agricultural basis of Indonesian society, which came from the army’s experience during the revolution and their anti-communist strategies at the end of the 1950s and 1960s, when they actively created and promoted civilian organizations that were extensions of the army in various sectors of society. Fearing social revolution from the agrarian population as a result of

94 Emil Salim, ‘Tanpa Tedeng Aling-aling’, in *Ekonomi Indonesia di Era Politik Baru: 80 Tahun Muhammad Sadli* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2002), 6.

95 Ahmad Helmy Fuadi, ‘Elites and Economic Policies in Indonesia and Nigeria, 1966–1998’, PhD dissertation, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 2012, 75.

96 Gregory, ‘Recruitment and Factional Patterns’, 334.

97 David Bouchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (ed.), *Indonesian Politics and Society. A Reader* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 27; see also Anthony Reid, ‘Political Tradition in Indonesia: The One and the Many’, *Asian Studies Review*, 22/1 (March 1998), 23–38; Barry Turner, ‘Nasution: Total People’s Resistance and Organicist Thinking in Indonesia’, PhD dissertation, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, 2005, 1–28.

98 Bouchier and Hadiz (eds), *Indonesian Politics and Society*, 27.

communist agitation, the army's main aim was to develop and create programmes that would involve the military in rural areas on a more-or-less permanent basis.⁹⁹

What was significant about the ideas of the New Order was actually how widely it was accepted amongst the elite. There were certainly differences of opinion as to whether the economy should be opened up to investment or whether an import-substitution industrialization model was the better option. Another significant aspect was how many of the New Order's ideas were actually a continuation of those that had been developed during the Guided Democracy. As General Panggabean remarked during his opening speech at the second army seminar in 1966:

What we mean by the New Order is not a political, economic or societal order that is totally different from the Old Order [...] What we want is to do away with some of the Old Order way of thinking and social system that would be a hindrance to our goals of achieving our national dream.¹⁰⁰

As Bourchier and Hadiz wrote, 'the regime's managerial and developmentalist character grew partly out of Soeharto's close relations with Lieutenant-General Suwanto, the man who brought together Indonesia's first generation of US-trained economists and senior officers at the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad).'¹⁰¹ According to Koentjoro-Jakti, 'the culmination of these trends emerged when all the ideas finally appeared as an ideological package under the authoritarian systems of Guided Democracy, and later, the New Order.'¹⁰² The traditionalist ideas of New Order organicism and rural bias had been developed earlier, as part of the revolutionary war or even as part of the

99 Guy Pauker, 'Political Consequences of Rural Development Programs in Indonesia', *Pacific Affairs*, 41/3 (Autumn 1968), 386–402.

100 Sarbini Sumawinata, *Amanat/Pidato, Prasaran dalam Seminar AD Ke-II, 1966* (Jakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1967), 3. 'Jang kita maksudkan dengan Orde Baru bukanlah suatu tata politik, tata ekonomi atau tata masyarakat jang sama sekali berbeda daripada jang dinamakan Orde Lama. [...] Jang kita mau buang djauh2 dari Orde Lama adalah beberapa tjiri tata fikir dan tata kehidupan jang tidak mungkin dapat membawa kita ketudjuan nasional jang kita idam-idamkan dahulu.'

101 Bourchier and Hadiz (eds), *Indonesian Politics and Society*, 27.

102 He defined the trends as technocracy, elitism, populism, and nationalism, all of which were at some variance with each other similar to Bourchier and Hadiz's analysis. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, 'The Political Economy of Development: The Case of Indonesia under the New Order Government, 1966–1978', PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1980, 29.

effort by Indonesian intellectuals to understand the nature of Indonesian society during the colonial period.¹⁰³ What Sukarno called a ‘revolution’ was what many of the New Order intellectuals termed ‘development’: its modernist and planned character, its managerial component, and its need to control and change society.

In 1965–1966, several conferences were held at Seskoad and the University of Indonesia (Universitas Indonesia, UI) to discuss what the change in regime meant for Indonesian state–society relations. Reading the speeches given at these conferences, one gains an insight into a project that entailed moulding a traditional society into its modern form. A persistent theme of many of the papers given at this conference was the almost logically assumed position of the military within a leadership position. Thus Emil Salim stated that there was good reason for the launching of the Guided Economy by Sukarno because ‘economic activities cannot be left to the mercy of market powers alone, but would need to be controlled and commanded’.¹⁰⁴ The Guided Democracy’s effort at militarily controlling the economy and Sukarno awarding military ranks to himself and the state’s economic policymakers, such as Abdulgani, Soebandrio, and Chairul Saleh, were seen not so much as a break with the perceived normal route towards modernity but as a lack on the part of the leadership to orient themselves with development. Thus, Sarbini Sumawinata contends: ‘Only a leadership that was “developmentally oriented” could face the challenges of development. A leadership that failed to orient its goals towards development would fail to maintain stability within the community.’¹⁰⁵

The doyen of the technocracy, Widjojo Nitisastro, based his support for a militarized economy on the natural quality of military leadership: ‘The raw determination to overcome economic difficulties in a responsible and disciplined manner can only be achieved if all of the government’s apparatus can

103 To what extent the rural bias of the army was a fully Indonesian invention is open to doubt. Although generally speaking the roots of the army’s Civic Action programme were attributed to Ibrahim Adjie’s Siliwangi Division’s efforts to develop the community after a successful counter-insurgency programme against the DI/TII rebels, it is also possible that it had American roots.

104 Emil Salim, ‘Politik dan Ekonomi Pantjasila’, in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor Ipsolos* (Jakarta: Terbatas, 1965), 103. ‘Oleh karena itu kebutuhan untuk melansir konsep Ekonomi Terpimpin. Kegiatan ekonomi tidak dapat dibebaskan pada kekuatanz didalam pasar semata akan tetapi perlu dikendalikan dan dipimpin.’

105 Sarbini Sumawinata, ‘Masalah Stabilisasi Politik’, in *Amanat/Pidato, Prasaran dalam Seminar AD Ke-II, 1966* (Jakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1967), 48. ‘Hanjalah leadership jang “development oriented”-lah jang akan menghadapi tantanganz tersebut. Suatu leadership jang orientasi-nja kearah segala sesuatu jang bukan pembangunan, pasti akan gagal mempertahankan stabilitas.’

work as one harmonious team with an effective “unity of command” in the economic sector.¹⁰⁶

Nitisastro would actually run a relatively tight ship within his group of technocrats and so his reference to a ‘unity of command’ was to a large extent aimed at technocratic policymakers. Yet, the militarized language conceded the necessity of a military-run state, one which the technocrats would eventually, hopefully, help in directing towards development.

The people were reconfigured in a new imagery: the masses. According to Barli Halim, ‘the masses have a temporary relationship with the individual members, one based on emotion and less on rationality. The masses feel that they are “more powerful and more potent” than other people/groups or have a tendency to blame other groups for something despite a lack of evidence.’¹⁰⁷ As a managerial specialist with an MBA, Halim reduced the people and their political aspirations to the form of a mob or homogenous mass. Sumawinata’s discussion on stability panders to this image of the masses, noting that a society transitioning from the traditional masses to a modern citizenship contains within it political, social, and cultural powers that will have to be channelled by the authority in a way that benefits the development process.

The goal of political stability should be a dynamic stability, in which social forces should neither be suppressed nor equalized, but should be channelled and guided toward positive and productive activities. This type of stability is not in ‘static equilibrium’, but must be understood as a type of control and supervision, in which all tensions and conflicts are resolved in a peaceful manner, without killing its dynamism.¹⁰⁸

106 Widjojo Nitisastro, ‘Persoalan Ekonomi-Tehnis dan Ekonomi-Politis dalam Menanggulangi Masalah2 Ekonomi’, in *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor Ipolsos* (Jakarta: Terbatas, 1965) 13. ‘Kebuletan tekad untuk menaggulangi kesulitan2 ekonomi dengan konsekwen dan dengan penuh self-discipline hanjalah dapat dijadikan kenjataan apabila alat2 pemerintah bisa bergerak sebagai satu team jang serasi dengan “unity of command” dibidang ekonomi jang efektif.’

107 Barli Halim, ‘Massa dan Media’, in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor Ipolsos* (Jakarta: Terbatas, 1965), 64. ‘Massa bersifat sementara dalam hubungan diantara para anggautanja, sedangkan tiap anggautanja lebih banjak beremosi dan kurang rasionil. Berdasarkan ini massa mempunyai perasaan “lebih kuat dan lebih perkasa” dari orang/golongan lain, atau massa itu tjepat menjalahkan golongan lain walaupun buktiz tidak tjukup lengkap dan sebagainya.’

108 Sumawinata, ‘Masalah Stabilisasi Politik’, 47. ‘[S]tabilitas politik jang harus ditjapai ialah stabilitas jang dinamis, dimana kekuatan sosial tidak ditekan ataupun diimbangkan, melainkan harus dapat disalurkan dan didjuruskan ke arah kegiatan2 jang positif dan produktif. Stabilitas jang demikian ini bukanlah suatu “static equilibrium”, melainkan harus diartikan sebagai suatu penguasaan dan pengawasan keadaan, dimana

The people as the masses were seen as being in opposition to the nurturing and managing capability of the elite. In fact, the military elite was seen as the opposite of the masses. Kartomo Wirosuhardjo's article paints the inevitable picture of societal harmony. If each group knows where it belongs within the pyramidal structure of social stratification, then peace and harmony will reign in the body politic. This traditionalist and static view of society was couched within a depiction of modern transition.

In fact, the top tier of the pyramid should be filled with a combination of three groups of elites. First, the military elite with their 'discipline, initiative, militancy, and earnestness in doing their duty'. Second, the secular intelligentsia, which are those 'people who have obtained an expert education, for instance doctors, economists, lawyers, engineers, agricultural experts, educational experts, journalists, and others. This is a group of people who use science and technology in their line of work. They have expertise in their field but sometimes lack the push to conduct real change.' The third group consists of the entrepreneurs, who are 'creators or people who use new ways to obtain great profits. They are drivers of industry and trade and are composed of people who are always searching for greater success.'¹⁰⁹ These three groups working together would strengthen modernity among the masses. The people, on the other hand, required the guiding hands of disciplined experts and creators. In fact, instead of power, the masses would be given culture.

A national culture based on the nation's history was essential in indoctrinating the people to accept this pyramidal structure with its military-expert-business elite at the helm. Wirosuhardjo again argued for the need to create a culture that would be immune to the outside cultural influences that had had a devious tendency to seep into the Old Order's national culture which

semua ketegangan2 dan konflik2 dapat diselesaikan setjara damai, tanpa mematkan dinamiknja.'

109 Kartomo Wirosuhardjo, 'Masalah Kekaryaan ABRI', in Sarbini Sumawinata, *Amanat/Pidato, Prasaran dalam Seminar AD Ke-II, 1966* (Jakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1967), 197. 'Golongan militer mempunyai disiplin, inisiatif, militansi dan kesungguhan dalam melaksanakan satu tugas.' [...] 'Golongan seculer intelligentsia ini terdiri dari orang-orang jang mendapatkan pendidikan keahlian, yakni dokter, sardjana ekonomi, hukum, teknik, pertanian, pendidikan, wartawan dan lain-lain. Golongan ini terdiri atas orang-orang jang dalam pekerdjaannja mengetrapkan ilmu dan tehnologi modern dalam praktek. Mereka ini mempunyai ketjakapan dalam bidangnja tetapi sering kurang mempunyai dorongan untuk perubahan-perubahan jang njata.' [...] 'Golongan entrepreneur ini merupakan pentjipta-pentjipta atau orang-orang jang menggunakan tjara-tjara baru untuk memperoleh keuntungan atau hasil-hasil jang lebih besar.'

included flags, traditional dances, language, paintings and songs.¹¹⁰ The New Order would thus have to search for its own specific forms of national culture; and a return to tradition was what was offered by many social scientists. Selo Soemardjan called for a revival of the traditional idea of the role model (*panutan*), which had deep roots in Javanese society. The Javanese word *manut* means to follow, specifically to follow the leadership. The Javanese role model is passive, while its modern role would be active.

In other words, the role model of the past requires only *tut wuri handayani*, which means pushing their influence from behind. But now role models within Indonesia's modern society are expected to take the lead and fulfil their role as *ing ngarsa sung tulada*, i.e. to lead by example. The appreciation of society in today's democratic age for their role models would surely increase if they also situated themselves as *ing madya mangun karsa*, which is to live in society and work together with society to build a strong spirit in an effort to create societal happiness and state magnificence.¹¹¹

What is significant about Soemardjan's imagery is again the deeply feudal form taken from Java's long feudal past, something that the nationalists, leftists, and many Islamists in Indonesia abhorred. Soemardjan, though, himself an aristocrat and a loyal follower of, and personal secretary to, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, must have had few qualms about painting this picture of modern Indonesian society through an aristocratic Javanese frame of reference. Even more significant is, of course, his credential as the 'father of Indonesian sociology'. His American education did not conflict with what he saw as a rational way of ordering society. Wirosuhardjo's ideas on indoctrination are also rooted

110 Kartomo Wirosuhardjo, 'Re-Thinking dalam Indoktrinasi', in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor Ipolsos* (Jakarta: Terbatas, 1965), 40–41.

111 Selo Soemardjan, 'Sifat2 Panutan didalam Pandangan Masyarakat Indonesia', in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor Ipolsos* (Jakarta: Terbatas, 1965), 53. 'Dengan perkataan lain, para panutan dalam zaman dahulu tjukup mengambil peranan "tut wuri handajani", jaitu memberikan pengaruh dari belakang. Tetapi sekarang para panutan didalam masyarakat Indonesia modern diharapkan tampil kemuka dan menempati kedudukan "ing ngarsa sung tulada", jaitu tampil kedepan untuk memberikan contoh. Penghargaan masyarakat dalam zaman demokratis sekarang terhadap para panutannya akan memuntjak tinggi apabila mereka itu djuga menempatkan diri "ing madya mangun karsa", jaitu hidup ditengah-tengah masyarakat dan bersama-sama dengan masyarakat membentuk semangat madju terus kearah kebahagiaan masyarakat dan kebesaran negara.'

in his time spent studying in America. A modern take on Indonesian culture thus primarily took the form of feudal revivalism.

6 Conclusion

The development of Indonesian ideas about authority and state–society relations evolved during the Guided Democracy. The change was partly brought about by a generational shift from the 1928 generation to the 1945 generation (terms I have borrowed from Weinstein’s analysis). More importantly, the roots of these changes were entwined with the developments of the 1950s and the expansion of education, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. The clash of ideas between Sukarno and expert economists represented a conflict over authority. The expert elite of the 1950s was considered a threat to Sukarno’s corporatist ideas. What Sukarno wanted was not to destroy and eliminate the experts, professionals, and economists but merely to discipline them and force them to conform to his ideas of state–society relations.

Two things happened. The major decision-makers of the 1950s were sidelined, and, more importantly, a new generation of experts was brought in to develop the new Guided Democracy state corporate discourse. As we will see in Chapter 7, their study of communist institutions increasingly drew them closer to the military managerial elites. The development of the military in relation to the corporatist state was an essential part of the Guided Democracy and one that cemented Indonesia’s long-lasting twentieth-century military rule. The coalescence of experts and the military elite was a side effect of Sukarno’s anti-expert ideology. The Guided Democracy thus had a profound role in moulding this emergent elite.