

Chapter Title: Of Dwarfs and Giants From Cold War Mediator to Bad Boy of Europe—Austria and the U.S. in the Transatlantic Arena (1990–2013)

Chapter Author(s): Günter Bischof

Book Title: Austria's International Position after the End of the Cold War

Book Editor(s): Günter Bischof and Ferdinand Karlhofer

Published by: University of New Orleans Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1n2txd9.4>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



This content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). To view a copy of this license, visit <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.



University of New Orleans Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Austria's International Position after the End of the Cold War*

JSTOR

Of Dwarfs and Giants From Cold War Mediator to Bad Boy of Europe— Austria and the U.S. in the Transatlantic Arena (1990-2013)

Günter Bischof^f

Introduction

During the Cold War Austria was the superpowers' "darling" of sorts and saw itself playing a "special role" between East and West. As a Cold War neutral it played a crucial role as a mediator and "bridge builder" between East and West. Vienna was the site of important summit meetings (Kennedy-Khrushchev in 1961, Carter – Brezhnev in 1979), and long-running arms control conferences (Conventional Force Reduction Talks), as well as becoming the third host (with New York and Geneva) of important United Nations agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Austria was an important player among the Neutral & Non-Aligned states in the preparation and execution of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, culminating in the Helsinki meeting in 1975 and cementing détente in Europe, and its follow-up meetings. After the end of the four-power postwar occupation (1945-1955), U.S. – Austrian relations "normalized." Politically, Washington respected Austrian neutrality since Foreign Minister and then Chancellor Bruno Kreisky defined his "active neutrality" policy as very pro-Western. Economically, Austria continued to profit from the counterpart funds left over by the Marshall Plan. In 1961, the American government handed over the entire counterpart account to the government of Julius Raab, who initiated the "*ERP-Fonds*" as an important permanent long-term, low-interest investment vehicle for the Austrian economy.² Austrians' perceived their

1. I would like to thank both Judeh Maher for his online research in American newspapers and Christian Riml for his help with researching Austrian newspapers. For their suggestions, critiques and keen advice I am very grateful to Alexander Smith, Berthold Molden, Peter Moser, Emil Brix and Anton Pelinka. Hanspeter Neuhold graciously saved me from some embarrassing formulations relating to international law. Mistakes and ill-advised interpretations continue to remain my own.

2. Günter Bischof/Anton Pelinka/Michael Gehler, eds., *Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical*

“special case” during four-power occupation (1945-55) and then as a Cold War neutral as a “*Sonderfall*” – call it “Austro exceptionalism.”

The U.S. tolerated the Austria’s growing trading relationship with Eastern Europe in the 1970s but looked askance at Austrian high-tech export to the Communist Bloc during the Reagan 1980s. Culturally, like the rest of Western Europe growing “Americanized” defined Austrian youth and acted on its part as a quasi-“cultural superpower” in its representations in the U.S.³ Austria made up its failure to integrate into the European Economic Community by closely aligning with the West German economy; while serving as a “secret ally” of the West during the occupation decade and beyond, it kept its defense expenditures to a minimum, never amounting to a credible level to defend its neutrality. Austria’s neutral status was incompatible with joining NATO and the transatlantic structures and networks emanating from it.⁴

The end of the Cold War (1989-1991) dramatically changed both the U.S.’s and Austria’s international positions. The United States transmuted into a hegemonic giant (what the French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine termed “hyperpower”)⁵, while Austria joined the European Union and became a dwarf of sorts (in the EU and in the world at large). Since the Presidency of George H.W. Bush, Austria—with its absorption into the EU and its failure to join NATO—figured less significantly in the U.S.’ geopolitics. The Bush administration virtually ignored Austria during the dramatic events of 1989/90.⁶ On the mental map of American policy makers

Context (Contemporary Austrian Studies [CAS] 14) (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2006), 113-169.

3. Günter Bischof/Anton Pelinka, eds., *The Americanization/Westernization of Austria* (CAS 12) (New Brunswick; Transaction, 2004).

4. Günter Bischof/Anton Pelinka/Ruth Wodak, eds., *Neutrality in Austria* (CAS 9) (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2000); Manfred Rauchensteiner, ed., *Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2010); Oliver Rathkolb, *Internationalisierung Österreichs seit 1945* (Österreich – Zweite Republik 15) (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2006). On transatlanticism see Mary Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jussi M. Hanhimäki/Benedikt Schoenborn/Barbara Zanchetta, *Transatlantic Relations since 1945* (London: Routledge, 2012).

5. Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Günter Bischof, “Das amerikanische Jahrhundert: Europas Niedergang - Amerikas Aufstieg,” *Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 28 (March-April 2001), 75-95.

6. This is the impression one is left with after reading the hitherto opened National Security Council files in the Bush Library in College Station, TX. While the Bush White House views the reform process in Poland and Hungary with baited breath (Bush even visits these countries in July 1989), the opening of the iron curtain along the Austro-Hungarian border is hardly noticed, see also George H.W. Bush/Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New

Austria moved from Central to Western Europe (the European Economic Communities, NATO), while formerly communist “Eastern Europe” became “Central Europe,” namely the new post-Communist countries of East Central Europe that were rushing towards NATO and the EU.⁷

In 1989, when the Iron Curtain came down, Austria redirected her foreign policy both towards Central and Western Europe as Ursula Plassnik explains in considerable detail in her contribution to this volume. It rebuilt traditional ties with her East Central European and Western Balkans neighbors, building stronger trading and banking ties and investing enormously in the new markets of formerly communist Eastern Europe, while completing its economic integration into the European Economic Communities. In 1995 Austria joined the European Union and both its developing “Common Foreign and Security Policy” and (later under the Lisbon Treaty) “European Security and Defence Policy.”⁸ Becoming part and parcel of the ever deepening European political, military and economic integration processes, Vienna realigned its foreign policy with Brussels, abandoning Washington’s formerly tight embrace, which had been loosening since the Reagan years anyway.⁹ Austria moved towards full political and economic integration with Western Europe but never fully aligned its security policy with the Atlantic community—thusly it never fully arrived in the West. Meanwhile, Austria’s investments and trade grew with her newly democratic neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, as Andreas Resch’s essay shows, as did Austria’s cultural activities in the region and her public diplomacy position as Emil Brix’s essay deeply documents in this collection.

York: Vintage, 1998).

7. The State Department’s changing postwar geographic assignments of Austria were always politically motivated. The State Department’s official documentation *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) assigned Austria a “Central European” position along with West Germany in the volumes covering the years 1945 to 1960. In the 1961–63 volume Austria was moved eastward and grouped with Eastern Europe and, from Washington’s perspective, and presumably continues to be part of “Eastern Europe” until the end of the Cold War (the FRUS volumes are now being published for the first half of the 1970s). See Günter Bischof, “Verliert Österreich seinen guten Ruf? Österreichs Image in den USA nach der Bildung der neuen ÖVP/FPÖ-Regierung,” in: Heinrich Neisser/Sonja Puntcher-Riekmann, eds., *Europäisierung der österreichischen Politik: Konsequenzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft* (Vienna: WUV, 2002), 377–63 (here 39). In 1994, Clinton’s State Department elevated formerly communist Eastern Europe to “Central Europe” (see below).

8. Gunther Hauser, “ESDP and Austria: Security Policy Between Engagement and Neutrality,” in Bischof/Pelinka/Gehler, eds., *Austrian Foreign Policy*, 207–45.

9. Alexander Schröck, “Die US-Perzeption Österreichs in der Détente and Post-Détente-Ära,” in: Oliver Rathkolb/Otto Machke/Stefan August Lütgenau, eds., *Mit anderen Augen gesehen: Internationale Perzeptionen Österreichs 1955–1990* (Österreichische Nationalgeschichte nach 1945 2) (Vienna: Böhlau 2002), 35–86.



Foreign Minister Mock is celebrated by the Austrian delegation on the occasion of Austrian accession to the European Union. Photo credit: Austrian Press Agency.

On March 1, 2007, the Austrian Foreign Ministry was renamed “Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs.” This name change reflected the growing importance of “*EUropean* affairs” and the relative decline of all other foreign policy priorities. It also reflected a fear of the conservative People’s Party to lose EU competencies to the Social Democratic Chancellor. Yet after 1995 Austrian foreign policy alignment with EU foreign policy made Austria part and parcel of the *transatlantic structures-sans* NATO membership, including the dramatic ups and downs during the Clinton and Bush II years.¹⁰ With the close embrace of EU integration, Austria lost its “special” Cold War international status; one might argue it marked the end of Austrian exceptionalism.

During the Cold War the Austrian embassies in Washington and Moscow served as the most important missions abroad, after 1995 the

10. For three insider perspectives on the changing parameters of Austrian diplomacy and foreign policy and its “Western *EUropeanization*” and globalization, see Eva Nowotny, “Diplomats: Symbols of Sovereignty become Managers of Interdependence: The Transformation of the Austrian Diplomatic Service,” in: Bischof/Pelinka/Gehler, eds., *Austrian Foreign Policy*, 25-38; Peter Moser, *Bewegte Zeiten: 40 Jahre im auswärtigen Dienst* (TRANSATLANTICA vol. 5) (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2011), 167-74; Thomas Nowotny, *Diplomacy and Global Governance: The Diplomatic Service in an Age of Worldwide Interdependence* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2011).

Brussels Representation received highest priority on the Ballhausplatz. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) established the “European External Action Service”—the beginning of a European diplomatic service that is bound to further absorb Austrian foreign policy with the common European foreign policy agenda. Austria's relations with the United States experienced downgrading and lost its former Cold War pride of place. Vis-à-vis the U.S., Austria increasingly has been acting within this common EU diplomatic framework since 1995. Since the end of the Cold War, Austria has become an even smaller and less significant player from Washington's perspective, especially since it failed to join NATO. As Austria's neighbors in – what Washington now calls—“Central Europe” became part of NATO enlargement, their stature in Washington grew. On their stopovers in Europe these days, American presidents visit Prague and Warsaw rather than Vienna. While bilateral economic and cultural relations are holding their own, political relations are weakening between Austria and the U.S..

During the first half of the Cold War, Washington regularly posted top-notch *professional* career foreign service officers such as Llewelyn “Tommy” Thompson as ambassadors to Vienna.¹¹ As Austria's importance was waning on Washington's foreign policy agenda, presidents since Richard Nixon have dispatched political appointees to Vienna. After the end of the Cold War, all U.S. ambassadors to Austria have been wealthy *political appointees*, long and strong on big campaign contributors and as “bundlers” to successful presidential campaigns but not always richly endowed with Austrian expertise.¹² Ambassadorial appointments were an important indicator of Austria's relative standing on the Washington totem pole of global significance as a country. Meanwhile, the Austrian governments consistently has been posting top diplomats as ambassadors to Washington, signaling the continued importance of the Washington as the imperial center of the world for the Ballhausplatz.¹³

Frauen-Power began to prevail both on the Ballhausplatz/Minoritenplatz in Vienna and Foggy Bottom in Washington. For the first time in history, women became principal diplomatic actors on both

11. In 1951 the legation in Vienna was upgraded to an Embassy; John G. Erhardt (1946-1950), Walter J. Donnelly (1950-1952), Llewelyn E. Thompson, Jr. (1952-1957), H. Freeman Matthews (1957-1962), James G. Riddleberger (1962-1967), Douglas MacArthur II (1967-1969).

12. Roy M. Huffington (1990-1993), Swanee Grace Hunt (1993-1997), Kathryn Walt Hall (1997-2001), Lyons Brown, Jr. (2001-2005), Susan Rasinski McCaw (2005-2007), David F. Girard-diCarlo (2007-2009), William Eacho (2009-)

13. Fredrich Höss (1987-1993), Helmut Türk (1993-1999), Peter Moser (1999-2003), Eva Nowotny (2003-2007), Christian Prosl (2007-2011), Hans Peter Manz (2011-)

sides of the U.S. – Austrian relationship. Prominent women ambassadors were appointed on both sides (Nowotny, Hunt, Walt, McCaw) as were the first female secretaries of state/foreign ministers. President Bill Clinton promoted Madeleine Albright, his U.N. ambassador (1993-97), to become the first lady Secretary of State (1997-2001). President Bush II appointed his NSC-adviser Condoleezza Rice (2001-5) as his Secretary of State (2005-9) in his second term. President Obama made his rival in the 2008 campaign Hillary Clinton his Secretary of State (2009-13). Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel promoted two career diplomats as foreign ministers: Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2000-4)¹⁴ and his former chief-of-staff Ursula Plassnik (2004-8). However, foreign policies did not markedly change or soften under female leadership, maybe due to the fact that the foreign ministry staffs continued to remain largely male bastions of power.¹⁵ Particularly Albright and Rice were as militant in their conduct of U.S. foreign policy as their male counterparts, if not more so. Ferrero-Waldner and Plassnik were often overshadowed by Schüssel's dominant role in foreign policy formulation, especially vis-à-vis the EU.¹⁶ Ursula Plassnik's essay in this volume gives a good summary of Austrian foreign policy priorities since the end of the Cold War and also provides a personal view of sorts on crucial turning points.

The U.S. – Austrian relationship, becoming a small cog in the wheels of EUropean – American relations, became part and parcel of the growing transatlantic turmoil. U.S. – European relations since the end of the Cold War were a story of “divergence, disagreement, and at times overt hostility.”¹⁷ The everyday flow of bilateral U.S. – Austrian relations during the presidencies

14. Ferrero Waldner ran for the office of Austrian president in 2004 and lost the race; she then received the prestigious appointments of European Commissioner for External Relations (2004-9) and European Commissioner for Trade and Neighborhood Policy (2009-10). The outside world presumably perceived her role in Brussels as “European” rather than “Austrian.” Ever since the Balkans wars of the 1990s, the EU leadership often leaned on Austrian diplomatists in key diplomatic missions.

15. On “male bastions of power” see Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., *Die umstrittene Wende*, 491. Marlene Streueruwitz, Austrian writer and feminist and critic of the Schüssel government, charged that Ferrero-Waldner functioned like a man in the male dominated foreign ministry – in fact “she is a man” – see *Tagebuch der Gegenwart* (Vienna 2002) 7, cited in Ernst Hanisch, “Die Vergangenheitspolitik der schwarz-blauen Regierung,” in: Robert Kriechbaumer/Franz Schausberger, eds., *Die umstrittene Wende: Österreich 2000-2006* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2013), 405.

16. Reinhard Heinisch, “Unremarkably Remarkable, Remarkably Unremarkable: Schüssel as Austria's Foreign Policymaker in a Time of Transition,” in: Günter Bischof/Fritz Plasser, eds., *The Schüssel Era in Austria* (CAS 18) (New Orleans-Innsbruck: UNO/iup, 2010), 147f.

17. See Nolan's chapter “Imperial America, Estranged Europe” in: *the Transatlantic Century*, 356-73, 331 (quotation).

of George H.W. Bush ("Bush I"), William Jefferson "Bill" Clinton and George W. Bush ("Bush II") were rocked by significant international crises that reoriented and redefined the Austro-American relationship.¹⁸ As American foreign policy inclinations became more *unilateralist* after the end of the Cold War, they also became more imperial.¹⁹ These, then, were the significant markers and turning points that rocked and tended to lead to a steady deterioration of transatlantic relations:²⁰ 1) the end of the Cold War and the fall of the iron curtain from 1989 to 1991; 2) the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian crisis 1991 to 1995 and the Kosovo war in 1999; 3) the formation of the Schüssel government coalition government with the right-wing FPÖ in January 2000 and the subsequent international isolation of Austria;²¹ 4) the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on New York and Washington and the following "wars of preemption" against Afghanistan and Iraq (in the case of the former lasting to this day). "Bush's wars" in the Middle East produced the worst transatlantic discord since the Vietnam War and split Europe into US-critical "old" and US-friendly "new" Europe and unleashed a global wave of anti-Americanism, spilling over into Austria as well.²² While the presidency of Barack Obama aroused

18. There is hardly any scholarly literature concentrating on the specific U.S. – Austrian relationship after the Cold War. Michael Gehler's expansive chronicle of post-World War II Austrian foreign policy covers the post-Cold War foreign policy, but largely from the perspective of Austria's integration in the EU and with a concentration on the various crises; he largely ignores the U.S. – Austrian relationship. See *Österreichs Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik*, 2 vols. (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2005); the best analytical introduction is Heinisch, "Unremarkably Remarkable," 119–58.

19. Former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer points out that Washington's "unilateralist inclinations" started with the end of the Cold War, see "Between Kosovo and Iraq: The Process of Redefining the Transatlantic Relationship," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 41 (Fall 2007): 9–19 (quotation 13).

20. For a hard-nosed persuasive analysis, arguing for a steady demise of transatlantic relations since the Clinton era, long before 9/11, see Edwina S. Campbell, "From Kosovo to the War on Terror: The Collapsing Transatlantic Consensus, 1999–2002," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* vol. 1, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 36–78.

21. The domestic political, diplomatic, and international legal aspects of the "EU-14 sanctions" have received considerable scholarly attention, see Erhard Busek/Martin Schauer, eds., *Eine Europäische Erregung: Die "Sanktionen" der Vierzehn gegen Österreich im Jahr 2000. Analysen und Kommentare* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003); Waldemar Hummer/Anton Pelinka, eds., *Österreich unter "EU-Quarantäne": Die "Maßnahmen der 14" gegen die österreichische Bundesregierung aus politikwissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht. Chronologie, Kommentar, Dokumentation* (Vienna: Linde, 2002).

22. The Bush II period has received the most scholarly attention, but usually from the perspective of deteriorating transatlantic relations. Apart from Margit Reiter's chapter on the Austrian response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in Margit Reiter/Helga Embacher, eds., *Europa und der 11. September 2001* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2011), none of these works concentrate on Austria, see Waldemar Zacharasiewicz, ed., *Transatlantische Differenzen/Transatlantic Differences* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2004); Gustav E. Gustenau/Otmar Höll/Thomas

great expectations in Austria too, the Obama administration has been paying little attention to Austria. As President Obama has been “pivoting” his foreign policy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the entire transatlantic partnership has been losing its prior Cold War significance.

A preliminary word on sources: writing about very recent contemporary history can be treacherous terrain for historians used to digging up the primary record in archives. However, a “first draft of history” is possible by going to newspaper archives and online sources such as the homepages of Presidential Libraries and extensive Wikileaks files as well as a rare treasure trove of personal papers coming from a top Austrian diplomat who served as ambassador in Washington. American politicians and diplomats—with their big egos and strong sense of obligation in a democracy towards the attentive public—regularly explain their politics and world view in voluminous memoir volumes; Austrian politicians and diplomats rarely make the effort to explain their actions.²³ A scouring of such primary ego documents by Presidents Clinton and Bush, along with key cabinet members such as Madeleine Albright, Warren Christopher, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, Richard Holbrooke and George Tenet leaves one with the impression that Austria has become a minute speck in the infinite universe of Washington’s global purview. Thousands of pages of these memoirists have produced only a meager three references to “Austria” in the indexes of these voluminous memoirs.²⁴ There is considerable secondary literature both on Austrian and American foreign policy during the post-Cold War era in general but hardly any on U.S. – Austrian relations in particular.

Nowotny, eds., *Europe – USA: Diverging Partners* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006); Michael Gehler, “From accidental disagreement to structural antagonism: the US and Europe: old and new conflicts of interest, identities, and values, 1945-2005,” in: Barry Eichengreen/Michael Landesmann/Dieter Stiefel, eds., *The European Economy in an American Mirror* (London: Routledge, 2008), 458-499; Friedrich Korkisch, “Die österreichische Sicherheitspolitik – Neue Aufgaben für die militärische Landesverteidigung,” in: Alfred Payrleitner, ed., *Die Fesseln der Republik: Ist Österreich reformierbar?* (Vienna: Molden, 2002), 151-70, see also the essays by Michael Gehler of Austrian foreign policy, Paul Luif on neutrality, and Gunther Hauser on security policy in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., *Die umstrittene Wende*, 461-625.

23. An exception is Franz Vranitzky, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Vienna: Paul Zsolnay, 2004).

24. Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Vintage, 2005); George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Broadway, 2011); Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for an Era* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998); Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward, *Madame Secretary: A Memoir* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor* (New York: Crown, 2011); Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (New York: Sentinel, 2011); Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, *In My Life: A Personal and Political Memoir* (New York: Threshold, 2011); George Tenet with Bill Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

Still Mediator? The End of the Cold War, the War against Iraq, and the Breakup of Yugoslavia 1989-1995



Austrian foreign minister Alois Mock cuts the iron curtain with Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn on June 27, 1989, on the Austro-Hungarian border in this staged photo op. Photo credit: Austrian Press Agency.

The Iron Curtain began to come down on the Austrian – Hungarian border on May 2, 1989, most spectacularly iconized on June 27, 1989, when Austrian and Hungarian foreign Ministers Alois Mock and Gyula Horn cut the barbed wire with much press in attendance. When thousands of East German “tourists” began to take advantage of this border opening in the fall of 1989, the Vranitzky government in Vienna was as surprised as the Bush administration in Washington.²⁵ The subsequent events leading to the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the iron curtain coming down on the Austrian-Czechoslovak border starting on December 17, 1989), as well as the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and German (re)unification by October 1990 rendered observers reeling—the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1990/91 left them speechless. No one had seen this coming—none of the Western intelligence service had been predicting

25. The best detailed analysis of these dramatic events is Andreas Oplatka, *Der erste Riss in der Mauer: September 1989 – Ungarn öffnet die Grenze* (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2009).

it. These sea changes in Eastern Europe were occurring during the very months when the Austrian government was debating a “letter to Brussels.” After months of internal debate it sent the letter on June 17, 1989, asking for admission to the European Economic Communities (which by 1995, when Austria joined, had become the European Union [(EU)]). Given Austria’s neutral status, the letter received an “icy reception.”²⁶ Austria began to move *westward* towards EU integration while the fall of the iron curtain opened up unexpected opportunities *eastward* as Eastern and Western Europe were growing together. The “Europeanization” of Austrian foreign policy and the questioning of its neutral status quickly gained traction. The Bush I administration was overwhelmed by the rapidity of these sea changes unfolding in Eastern Europe and reacted overly timid. It welcomed the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of communism and encouraged the path of the bold Kohl government in West Germany when it rushed towards unification and integration of the unified Germany into NATO. Neutral Austria was dangling in these winds of change and quickly losing its Cold War bonus as mediator across the Iron Curtain separation. In the rapidly changing European security environment, Austrian neutrality seemed curiously hidebound. From Washington’s perspective Austria became just another one of the many small European countries that became game for NATO enlargement.²⁷

Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990 intersected with the end of the Cold War and opened up a new post-Cold War front in the Near East for the Bush I administration—a front that is still active to this day. While President Bush acted overly cautious and slowly vis-à-vis the revolutions in Eastern Europe, he showed determination in the Near East and forged a powerful coalition that kicked Saddam out of Kuwait and invaded southern Iraq in the winter months of 1991. The United Nations sanctioned action against Saddam, which gave Austria the green light to open its air space and transit routes for American military transports towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East. During the 1958 Lebanon crisis

26. “An Icy Reception for Austria’s Bid to Join European Community,” *New York Times*, May 1, 1989, D-8. For a sound scholarly analysis, see Paul Luif, *On the Road to Brussels: The Political Dimension of Austria’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s Accession to the European Union* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1995); for a useful survey see also Michael Gehler, *Österreichs Weg in die Europäische Union* (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2009). Chancellor Vranitzky comments much more extensively on Austria’s “letter to Brussels” in 1989 than the iron curtain coming down, see *Politische Erinnerungen*, 312–344.

27. Günter Bischof, “Die Amerikaner, die Deutsche (Wieder)Vereinigung und Österreich,” in: Oliver Rathkolb/Georg Schmidt/Gernot Heiss, eds., *Österreich und Deutschlands Größe: Ein schlampiges Verhältnis* (Salzburg: Otto Müller, 1990), 224–34.

Austria granted limited use of her air space for American military overflights from Germany to Lebanon; when the Americans abused the privilege and dispatched more flights (100) than had been approved (80), the Austrian government protested. Here was a first signal of Austrian neutrality policy becoming better defined between East and West (the American ambassador castigated it as “neutrality”).²⁸ Demonstrating solidarity with the West and allowing such transports after the end of the Cold War initiated the process of eroding Austrian neutrality. Nevertheless, local peace initiatives in the Tyrol protested the transfer of American tanks across the Brenner route.²⁹ The first Gulf War (or the second if you count the Iraq-Iranian War of the 1980s as the first), as well as the eventual Eastern expansion of the post-Cold War NATO alliance began to put pressure on neutral Austria to begin rethinking its own role in the emerging new European security environment. James S. Sheehan's essay in this volume traces the changing nature of Austrian neutrality from the Cold War to the post-Cold War eras in a comparative perspective between European neutrals.

While the Soviet Empire and the Soviet Union imploded peacefully, Yugoslavia exploded with a bang, booming throughout the 1990s. When Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, Austria (along with Germany) quickly recognized these two new states in the Balkans, thereby actively interfering as a neutral state in a civil war (in Serbia's view “fomenting separatism”³⁰). The President of Yugoslavia/Serbia Slobodan Milosevic sent his army into Slovenia and Croatia to stop the breakup of Yugoslavia but failed to do so. When Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence in 1992, a protracted and very bloody war of “ethnic cleansing” ensued in this breakaway province between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians. During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s Austria no longer pursued a policy of strict neutrality. This prepared the way for further erosion of Austrian neutrality in the following years when the conservative ÖVP was pushing Austrian membership in the Western European Union and NATO yet failed. With Austria's integration into the European Union in 1995 the country joined the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

28. Andrew E. Harrod, “Austrian Neutrality: The Early Years, 1955-1958,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 41 (2010): 216-46 (esp. 238-45); see also David McIntosh, “In the Shadow of Giants: U.S. Policy Toward Small Nations: The Cases of Lebanon, Costa Rica, and Austria in the Eisenhower Era,” in: Günter Bischof/Anton Pelinka, eds., *Austro-Corporatism: Past – Present – Future* (CAS 4) (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996), 222-79.

29. Gehler, *Österreichs Außenpolitik*, II, 664.

30. Heinisch, “Unremarkably Remarkable,” 126. Under international law though, neutrality does not prohibit political preference and does not include civil wars unless the rebels are recognized as belligerents. I thank Hanspeter Neuhold for this clarification.

continuing “the undeclared erosion of Austrian neutrality.”³¹

The EU assumed that the widening and deepening European integration process would make wars on the continent impossible – they were wrong, they still needed the U.S. for military intervention. European Union negotiators (Vance-Owen Plan) and peace keepers failed to mediate and resolve a deepening conflict close to the heart of Europe, leading to genocidal actions by the Serbs against the Bosnian population in towns like Srebrenica. In the new post-Cold War environment, the U.S. initially expected Europe to take care of its “backyard” and refused to get involved. Europe, however, was deeply divided and “marginalized” itself. No one wanted to touch the “tar baby” Yugoslavia.³² When the EC/EU failed to show the muscle and use force to resolve this growing civil war in the Balkans, a reluctant Clinton Administration intervened, eventually including the use of force. Clinton’s chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke engineered the “Dayton Agreement”, setting up an independent Bosnian state protected by NATO and administered by the international community (the UN, EU, and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe all being involved).³³ After the failure of European intervention, the Dayton Agreement brought “the Pax Americana.”³⁴ William Hyland castigates Clinton’s “first serious foray in great power politics” in Bosnia as “amateurish.” His procrastination in intervening earlier may have cost thousands of lives.³⁵

31. Anton Pelinka cited in Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., *Die umstrittene Wende*, 473; see also Luif, “Austria’s Permanent Neutrality,” in: Bischof/Pelinka/Wodak, *Neutrality in Austria*, 143–48.

32. As Richard Holbrooke argues perceptively about the vicious circle of Europe and the U.S. expecting the other to take care of the problem: “In this sorry sequence, Europe and the United States proved to be equally misguided. Europe believed it could solve Yugoslavia without the United States; Washington believed that, with the Cold War over, it could leave Yugoslavia to Europe. Europe’s hour had *not* dawned in Yugoslavia; Washington *had* a dog in this particular fight. It would take four years to undo these mistakes—four years before Washington belatedly and reluctantly, but decisively, stepped in and asserted leadership” [Holbrooke’s emphasis]. See Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 29.

33. Ivo H. Daalder stresses these deep disagreements and the “Atlantic divide” over Bosnia, see *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 2000); See the chapter “Horror in the Balkans” in Albright, *Madame Secretary*, pp. 224–44. The best inside view of the Bosnian crisis and the making of the Dayton Accords is the very readable memoir by Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War* (New York: Random House, 1998).

34. Anton Pelinka, *Nach der Windstille: Eine politische Autobiographie* (Vienna: Braumüller, 2009), 149.

35. William G. Hyland, *Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 29–49 (quotation 38). More defensive of their policies are three of the premier actors on Clinton’s foreign policy team, see the chapters “Bringing Peace to Bosnia,” in: Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 343–71, and the chapter “Horror in the Balkans,” in: Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 224–44; Holbrooke, *To End A War*.

Austrian peace keepers and key mediators such as Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch were involved, too, in securing the Dayton agreements (and later a resolution to the Kosovo conflict).³⁶ Long before 9/11 and the “Bush’s wars”, a deep “Atlantic divide” began to open up with the disagreements over how to handle Milosevic and the genocidal Bosnian Serbs during this crisis. Both Arnold Suppan’s and Hanspeter Neuhold’s essays in this volume deal with the Balkans crises of the 1990s and Austria’s role in greater detail – Neuhold’s article from the perspective of the involvement of international organizations’ approaches to the “Balkans laboratory.”

Austrian policies in what now became known as the “Western Balkans” region in international parlance was being submerged in EEC/EU foreign policy (“with the EU and through the EU”³⁷). In the wake of the quick German recognition of the new states of Slovenia and Croatia³⁸, Foreign Minister Alois Mock followed suit and helped speed up the collapse of Yugoslavia.³⁹ The Austrian people’s enormous humanitarian aid to region and acceptance of tens of thousands of refugees contributed much to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans. Austria’s significant dispatch of peace keepers to Bosnia-Herzegovina and later on to the Kosovo region—within EU and UN missions—as Erwin Schmidl argues in his essay in this volume, further enhanced its role in the Balkans arc of crises in the 1990s. The Ballhausplatz’s regular offers towards diplomatic mediation of the conflicts were accepted by the international community. All of this seemed to indicate that neutral Austria was looking for a new role in the post-Cold War environment, especially in neighboring regions such as the Balkans where the European Union (less so the Americans) welcomed Austrians’ expertise⁴⁰; these conflicts were close to home and threatened to spill over

36. The American memoirists are characteristically ungenerous in giving key European players such as Petritsch any credit.

37. So summarized by Austria’s top-Balkans expert Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, see his essay “Recent Balkans Diplomacy from the Austrian Perspective,” in Bischof/Pelinka/Gehler, eds., *Austrian Foreign Policy*, 264–79.

38. Steven Philip Kramer argues that in the first post-Cold War European crisis in Yugoslavia Germany was called upon to act as “normal’ nation through its unilateral recognition of Croatian independence” but it backfired, see “The Return of History in Europe,” *Washington Quarterly* 34/4 (Fall 2012): 8i–91 (here 83).

39. Great tensions characterized the formulation of Austrian foreign policy during these years within the governing SPÖ-ÖVP coalition. Chancellor Vranitzky and Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Mock did not see eye to eye in the alignment of foreign policy issues, see Vranitzky, *Politische Erinnerungen*, 149, 201–204 and *passim*.

40. Ex-Chancellor Franz Vranitzky served as the EU envoy in Albania; Wolfgang Petritsch as a EU special envoy and chief negotiator at the Rambouillet Conference for Kosovo, as well as EU Special High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina as did Valentin Inzko (the High Representative was the highest authority under the Dayton/Paris Agreement);

into her own territory. Yet apart from the Western Balkans region, Austrian diplomatic mediation was less sought after by the international community in the post-Cold War environment. While the U.S. welcomed Austria's cooperation during the Gulf War and recognized Austrian humanitarian efforts in the Balkans, it paid less attention to the good services of Viennese diplomats than during the Cold War. Moreover, when the later Kosovo reconstruction was lingering on, the George W. Bush administration was not impressed with what it uncharitably called the "washed up" diplomats European governments were sending to the Balkans.⁴¹

Neutrality or NATO? Austria's Accession to the European Union and Role in the Kosovo Conflict 1995-2000

Together with Finland and Sweden, Austria joined the European Union in 1995—from Brussels' perspective all three bearing "the stigma of neutrality."⁴² While Austria's excellent economic performance allowed her to enter as a "net payer", her insistence on maintaining her neutral international status created many headaches in Brussels and Vienna. During the first years in the EU, Austrians warmly embraced the European Union, even though there were clashes over environmental policies and trans-Alpine traffic flows. During the first half of 1998, Austria successfully organized her first term in the revolving "EU Presidency." Austrian found it much harder though to hang on to their cherished neutral status while vowing to fully join in the new European security architecture. In 1997/98 there was a great national debate about the country's future security status. Were the EU's expanded "Common Foreign and Security Policy" (CFSP) and "European Security and Defense Policy" (ESDP) after the Amsterdam Treaty compatible with Austria's neutral status? Was Austria's growing involvement as a peacekeeper in the Balkans eroding its neutral status? Should Austria become a member of the Western European Union (WEU)

Stefan Lehne served as EU "foreign minister" Javier Solana's Balkan coordinator; the EU appointed former Vice Chancellor Erhard Busek as its special Stability Pact Coordinator in the Balkans as did Albert Rohan in the role of Martti Ahtisaari's number two.

41. The newly elected President Bush had visited Kosovo in 2001 and was "appalled by the lethargic UNO presence more than two years after the war had ended." Condoleezza Rice recalls that the "President had opined that Kosovo seemed to be where European government sent their washed-up diplomats rather than their best and brightest." She adds: "I couldn't disagree," see *No Higher Honor*, 191.

42. "Austria, Finland and Sweden in Europe's New Security Plans," *New York Times*, June 29, 1995. The Austrian Parliament did pass Art 23 (f) as Constitutional amendments to avoid legal problems with the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties of the European Union.

and/or NATO? Or should Austria hold on to her low defense spending and continue as a “free rider” of the Western security architecture and hold on to her cherished yet eroding neutral status?

ÖVP Foreign Minister Alois Mock (1987-95) had a vision to fully integrate Austria in the West, including “anchoring it as much as possible in the Western alliance system.”⁴³ The U.S. observed Austrian security debates carefully and – given Austria’s vital geostrategic position between NATO’s southern and northern flanks – would have welcomed Austria joining NATO.⁴⁴ In 1995 Austria joined the “Partnership for Peace” (PFP), widely seen as the first step on the path to NATO accession.⁴⁵ Yet while the SPÖ/ÖVP coalition government under Chancellor Viktor Klima debated these “options” for Austria’s future security policy, deep partisan fissures emerged and no agreement was reached. The ÖVP and the FPÖ strongly supported joining the Atlantic Alliance, whereas the SPÖ—after a tortuous debate about the WEU and NATO options—decided not to join NATO. Andreas Khol, an ÖVP parliamentary leader, boldly predicted that “by 2003, we will be a member of NATO for sure.”⁴⁶ The left wing of the Social Democrats and the pacifist Green Party saw NATO as a tool for strengthening America’s “hegemonic” position in Europe and wanted to have nothing to do with it.⁴⁷ Given that two thirds of the population consistently insisted on maintaining Austria’s neutral status, the decision not to join NATO was popular. Neutrality had become part of the Austrian identity during the Cold War and therefor was not easily abandoned; safely ensconced in their neutralist cocoon, Austrians lived in a Cold War time warp. For many pacifist Austrians on the Left in the Social Democratic and Green camps, NATO stood for war-mongering. On April 1, 1998, the SPÖ made the fateful decision not to support the “options report” that would have opened up the opportunity to join NATO. Austria nevertheless had signed the Amsterdam Treaty and continued to confess to support the EU’s CFSP and ESDP, including support of the “Petersberg Tasks” (1992). The

43. Heinisch, “Unremarkably Remarkable,” 122. On Mock see also Martin Eichtinger/Helmuth Wohnout, “Alois Mock – Pioneer of European Unity,” in: Günter Bischof/Fritz Plasser/ Eva Maltschnig, eds., *Austrian Lives* (CAS 21) (Innsbruck-New Orleans: UNO/iup Press, 2012), 164-86, and idem *Alois Mock: Ein Politiker schreibt Geschichte* (Graz: Styria, 2008).

44. “Geography is the reason that NATO would it more convenient to have Austria in rather than out,” see “Torn by NATO Debate, Coalition Parties Can’t Devise a Security Policy: Neutrality Issue Deeply Divides Austria,” *New York Times*, July 8, 1998.

45. “PFP provided a road map to NATO membership,” see Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 212.

46. Quoted in *New York Times*, July 8, 1998.

47. A classic text of the Greens’ anti-American, anti-hegemonic posture is Peter Pilz, *Mit Gott gegen Alle: Amerikas Kampf um die Weltherrschaft* (Suttgart: dva, 2003).

“Petersberg Tasks” have been part of the CFSP, envisioning humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management; this agenda was also designed to combat terrorism.⁴⁸ Sending Austrian “peace keepers” to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan as a commitment to these common European missions, needless to say, have been further undermining and eroding Austrian neutrality to the point where it has become an empty shell.⁴⁹ Anton Pelinka derides Austria’s “rest neutrality” as “fictional.” As long as the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy remains underdeveloped, Austrians can live with this fiction.⁵⁰

During the spring of 1999 the crises in the Balkans continued, this time over the future of the Kosovo region. Milosevic and the Serbs had been reducing the autonomy status of Kosovo and began “ethnic cleansing”; tensions grew in the region as a result of refugees flooding neighboring states. Austria sent its leading diplomats to the region to mediate the conflict between Serbs and Kosovars, meandering “between neutrality and European solidarity.”⁵¹ NATO decided to fly air attacks against Serbian targets in Belgrade and elsewhere. The NATO air campaign continued for 78 days (April – June 1999) with thousands of missions flown (three quarters of them by American planes). For the first time in its history, NATO—including Germany—engaged in a controversial “out of area” military operations. During the intervention Washington found it difficult to operate through NATO since the European allies were “operationally irrelevant, and the Americans had made and carried out operational decisions *unilaterally*” [emphasis mine].⁵² Given that the UN did not support the NATO air campaign against Serbia with a formal resolution, Austria did not open its airspace for NATO overflights during the Kosovo crisis. The State Department’s Ambassador Thomas Pickering met Chancellor Klima, when he visited Washington for the 50th anniversary meeting of NATO, asking for permission for NATO planes to cross Austrian air space on their missions to Serbia. Klima fended him off with a non-committal reply,

48. Hauser, “ESPD and Austria,” in: Bischof/Pelinka/Gehler, eds., *Austrian Foreign Policy*, 207–45. For a dense and insightful discussion of the contested 1998 “options report,” see Heinrich Schneider, “Der sicherheitspolitische ‘Optionenbericht’ der österreichischen Bundesregierung: Ein Dokument, das es nicht gibt – ein Lehrstück politischen Scheiterns,” in: Erich Reiter, ed., *Jahrbuch für internationalen Sicherheitspolitik 1999* (Hamburg: E.S. Mittler, 1998), 419–96.

49. Markus Krottmayer, *Die Neutralitätsfalle: Österreichs Sicherheitspolitik in der Sackgasse* (Vienna: LIT, 2009).

50. Pelinka, *Nach der Windstille*, 151.

51. Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., *Die umstrittene Wende*, 481.

52. Campbell, “From Kosovo to the War on Terror,” 42–6 (quotation 44).

making the State Department believe that permission was granted. It was not. The State and Defense Departments were upset and many American observers were very unhappy with the position of the Austrian government, failing to show solidarity with the West. Hungary had just been admitted to NATO as part of the 50th anniversary celebrations of the alliance in Washington and provided bases and its air space to the NATO bombing campaign.⁵³ Hungary's new NATO membership made Austria's neutral position more manageable for NATO and deepened the irrelevancy of Austria's ambiguous security position and the isolation of Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schüssel's foreign policy.⁵⁴

Failing to join NATO hurt Austria's stature in the U.S. The U.S. defense alliance with the formerly communist Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland elevated them ahead of Austria towards trusted *transatlantic partnership status*. Austria dropped out of what Washington's new focus on post-Communist "Central Europe" (formerly Communist "Eastern Europe") – "the newly independent nations, wanting to rejoin the West quickly."⁵⁵ NATO accession became the fast track for them to join "the

53. Moser, *Bewegte Zeiten*, p. 102.

54. Schüssel was in charge of Austrian foreign policy, especially EU-policy, for 11 years, first as Foreign Minister (1995-2000), then as chancellor (2000-6). Unlike Mock, he was a neophyte without a vision – always giving priority to domestic affairs, he left Austrian foreign policy frequently isolated and "standing alone", see Heinisch, "Unremarkably Remarkable," 123f, 131ff, 148f, 150; for the opposite view, see the Plassnik essay in this volume.

55. When Richard Holbrooke became Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (EUR) in the summer of 1994, he reorganized the European Bureau's Central European division to reflect "the new emphasis we wished to place on that region." The "outdated" Office of Eastern European Affairs was abolished on Holbrooke's first day in office in September 1994 and three news offices – one of them dealing with "Central Europe" – were created "reflecting the post-Cold War realities of Europe." "Eastern Europe" was banned from the official State Department vocabulary and replaced with "Central Europe." Holbrooke laments: "Unfortunately, most people, including the media, still use the outmoded phrase." See *To End a War*, 7f.

Daniel Hamilton, who was Holbrooke's policy adviser in EUR, remembers the arcana of Washington "bureaucrats" at the time: "We created a new office of Nordic-Baltic affairs, (EUR/NB) taking the Balts out of the former Soviet orbit and the office that had previously been reporting to officials responsible for relations with Soviet Union and then the former Soviet Union. Politically speaking, that was the major change. Clinton had appointed Strobe Talbott to deal with relations with the then-crumbling Soviet Union; The intention had been to split the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, a huge bureau that accounted for about half of the memos and traffic going to the Secretary's office, into two, with Strobe overseeing the Soviet bureau, which was transitioning to the New Independent States. But Congress -- particularly Jesse Helms, then head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- objected to this, claiming that Clinton was accepting the notion of a Russian "sphere of influence." So the result was an awkward bureaucratic arrangement in which the New Independent States were simply placed directly in the Secretary's office (hence the bureaucratic designation S/NIS). It was thus not a separate bureau, so avoiding the

West.” High U.S. officials—“fellow Slavs and natives of Central Europe”—such as Czech-born Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the Polish-born Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili became their champions in Washington.⁵⁶ Austria had no such champions in the corridors of power in Washington. In an analysis written in 2003 at the height of the Iraq War, Ambassador Peter Moser observed that the US increasingly viewed Austrian neutrality in disbelief— even making fun of it like Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld during the Iraq crisis in 2002. Washington did not understand how Austria so desperately hung on to neutrality in spite of the rapidly changing international security environment after the end of the Cold War. Washington looked critically at Austria professing solidarity with European defense efforts being organized through the EU’s CFSP but not within the NATO alliance framework, argued Moser. With the new NATO members in Central Europe, Austria was becoming irrelevant for Washington as NATO was mutating “into a platform of discussions and coordination” with the new NATO members from which Vienna was absent. Moreover, Austrian companies were missing out on securing defense contracts from the European defense industry that was moving together. Austria was also losing out on the U.S. political good will that Austria’s neighbors were richly garnering from their alliance membership, concluded Moser, as the U.S. routinely treated its NATO allies better than the non-NATO partners.⁵⁷ Austria’s stock in Washington fell as a result of

Jesse Helms problem. But the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs became simply the Bureau for European Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary for that Bureau, eventually Holbrooke, did not have the NIS under his portfolio. Talbott also moved from this original posting—which was not confirmed by the Senate—to become Deputy Secretary of State, and he continued to oversee relations with Russia and NIS, including many other areas. In the Bush years the Bureau was made once again Bureau for European and Eurasian Affairs, and continues to be so under Obama.”


Hamilton adds: “The office including Austria at the time was labeled AGS, standing for Austria, Germany, Switzerland, a Germanic clustering. This office did report to a Deputy Assistant Secretary in EUR whose portfolio also included an office called Western Europe (EUR/WE), with countries like Spain, Portugal, France, etc. A separate office dealt with the UK and Benelux. In recent years, however, there have been other reorganizations at office level, so that Germany is now part of EUR/WE, and Austria and Switzerland are part of EUR/CE, or Central Europe. There is also EUR/SCE, which deals with countries in Southeastern Europe. The organization usually has to do with resources as much as priority themes. It could change again under a new Secretary.” Personal e-mail Daniel Hamilton to author, February 6, 2013.

56. Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 210, 211.

57. GZ. 3.42/10/03, “NATO und Österreich aus US-Sicht,” E-Mail Moser to Foreign Ministry, Sept. 2, 2003, Peter Moser Private Papers, CenterAustria. Even though this report was written in September 2003, the arguments used were as relevant for the 1990s debates. This revealing document is added *in toto* as an appendix to this essay. We are grateful to

the botched NATO membership fight in Vienna. It dropped to an all-time low with the formation of the new Schüssel government.

European Pariah? The Formation of ÖVP – FPÖ Coalition Government in 2000- 2001



Wolfgang Schüssel is sworn in as Chancellor by President Thomas Klestil who watches frostily as the Chancellor shakes hands with FPÖ party leader Jörg Haider. Photo credit: APA.

The October 1999 Austrian election produced close to a three-way tie among the SPÖ (33 percent), and the FPÖ and ÖVP both at 27 percent, with the right wing Freedom Party for the first time overtaking the conservative People's Party by a few hundred votes. When the Socialists failed to form a government, the FPÖ and ÖVP surprisingly succeeded in agreeing to form a coalition government. Even though the ÖVP's Wolfgang Schüssel became chancellor and the *enfant terrible* of Austrian politics Jörg Haider did not join the government as the vice chancellor or minister, the international community reacted with great indignation.⁵⁸ For the

Ambassador Moser for sharing it.

58. On Schüssel's leadership style, see David Wineroither, *Kanzlermacht – Machtkanzler?*

first time a xenophobic right wing party had entered a Western European government. The fourteen EU countries reacted strongly and issued “measures” vis-à-vis the new Austrian government by maintaining minimal bureaucratic contact with and isolating it. Israel withdrew its ambassador and the Clinton government recalled its ambassador in Vienna Kathryn Hall for consultation, but otherwise did not join the strong European front bestowing a pariah status on the Schüssel government.⁵⁹ The Austrian Embassy concluded that the American reaction to the formation of the Schüssel government was “devastating” (“*verbeierend*”) to the image of the country in the U.S. While American newspapers first reported about the events in Vienna objectively in the front pages, after a couple of weeks the commentary slipped into the subjective “opinion” back pages. Especially Haider’s multiple statements “friendly to National Socialist [...] tore open old wounds” and revived all the old clichés of Austria’s failed mastering of its World War II past (“*Austria = Hitler + Waldheim + Haider*” [emphasis mine]). It would take years to recover from collapse of the Austrian image in the U.S. public.⁶⁰ Ambassador Moser (and his successor in Washington) spent enormous efforts on preserving a decent Austrian image in the U.S., containing the “campaign against Austria” (“*Österreichhatz*”).⁶¹ Eventually the EU appointed a troika of “wise men” to go to Vienna and take a close look at the policies of the Schüssel government and eventually putting relations with the “EU-14” governments back on a normal track.⁶²

The U.S. quickly unfroze relations with Vienna, especially once the Schüssel government in the early days of the administration embarked on a remarkable new path of restitutions for World War II injustices committed in Nazi-occupied Austria during World War II in which the Clinton administration acted as the mediator. Chancellor Schüssel appointed special envoys both for negotiating restitution settlements with Eastern European

Die Regierung Schüssel im historischen und internationalen Vergleich (Vienna: LIT, 2009), and the essays in Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., *Die umstrittene Wende*.

59. “Austria Coalition Sworn In as Diplomatic Fallout Rises,” *New York Times*, Feb. 5, 2000, A-6.

60. GZ. 3.1/59/00, “Neue Bundesregierung; Imageschäden in den USA – Gegenstrategie,” E-Mail Moser to Foreign Ministry, Mar. 1, 2000, and GZ. 1.30/45/03, Aug. 28, 2003, “Abschlussbericht: 4 Jahre USA, Rückblick,” E-Mail Moser to Foreign Ministry, Aug. 28, 2033, both Peter Moser Private Papers, CenterAustria.

61. *Ibid.*

62. For a summary of these events see Michael Gehler, “Präventivschlag als Fehlschlag: Motive, Intentionen und Konsequenzen der EU-14 Sanktionsmaßnahmen gegen Österreich 2000,” in: Busek, ed., *Eine Europäische Erregung*, pp. 19-74, and the Suppan essay in this volume. The Schüssel government and the Austrian press were quick to castigate the EU-14 “measures” as “sanctions” in order to unleash a patriotic backlash against the European Union, see Pelinka, *Nach der Windstille*, 154-58.

slave laborers working on the territory of Austria during World War II (the former governor of the National Bank Maria Schaumayr), as well as filling “gaps and deficiencies” in restitutions to Jews whose houses, apartments, businesses and assets had been seized and stolen by Austrian “aryanizers” of Jewish property after the Anschluss in March 1938 (Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa).⁶³ Based on its official doctrine of having been “the first victim of Hitlerite aggression,” the Austrian government had been slow in admitting responsibility and procrastinating in making restitution payments for such World War II injustices.⁶⁴ In complex negotiations with the American government and numerous legal counsels who had filed class action lawsuits on behalf of Jewish organizations and victims⁶⁵, the Schüssel government managed to come to terms in record time and signed agreements with the Clinton Administration in its final days in office. Stuart Eizenstat, the Undersecretary of the Treasury and Clinton’s chief negotiator dealing with Holocaust era assets, was impressed with personal Schüssel’s engagement in the details of the “substantive negotiations [...] underscoring both his knowledge of the subject and its extreme political sensitivity.” Eizenstat credited the Austrian chancellor with engaging him in “the most intensive negotiation with a head of government during all the years of my Holocaust pursuits.”⁶⁶ During the 1990s Austria’s politics of restitution had got caught up in the “Americanization of the Holocaust.” Swiss banks, German and Austrian companies and their governments all bowed to the pressure from

63. Günter Bischof, “Watschenmann der europäischen Erinnerung”? Internationals Image und Vergangenheitspolitik der Schüssel/Riess-Passer-ÖVP/FPÖ-Koalitionsregierung,” in: idem/Michael Gehler/Anton Pelinka, eds., *Österreich in der EU: Bilanz einer Mitgliedschaft* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003), pp. 445-78; Günter Bischof/Michael S. Maier, „Reinventing Tradition and the Politics of History: Schüssel’s Restitution and Commemoration Policies,” in Günter Bischof/Fritz Plasser, eds., *The Schüssel Era in Austria* (CAS 18) (New Orleans-Innsbruck: uno press-iup, 2010), pp. 206-34; on Schüssel’s „politics of history“ and the restitution negotiations, see also the essays by Robert Kriechbaumer, Ernst Hanisch and Michael Gehler in Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., *Die umstrittene Wende*, pp. 183-210, 397-416, 497-508.

64. For a tight summary of the spillover of “the Americanization of the Holocaust” ever since the “Waldheim fiasco” of the late 1980s, see Christian Thonke, *Hitlers Langer Schatten: Der mühevollte Weg zur Entschädigung der NS-Opfer* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2004). For a comparative perspective on the international politics of restitutions after totalitarian regimes, see Oliver Rathkolb, ed., *Revisiting the National Socialist Legacy: Coming to Terms with Forced Labor, Expropriation, Compensation, and Restitution* (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2002).

65. One such group was the Claims Conference pressuring “the Austrian government to acknowledge complicity during the Nazi regime and to improve reparations to Jews”, see “Holocaust Group to Step Up Pressure on Austria for Reparations,” *New York Times*, July 20, 2000, A-5.

66. Stuart E. Eizenstat, *Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unfinished Business of World War II* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 298.

Washington during the late Clinton years to come clean of their failed or procrastinated restitution politics of the past.⁶⁷

Peter Moser, the Austrian Ambassador to the U.S. (1999–2003), managed Austrian relations with the Clinton (and then Bush II) governments during these difficult years when Austria sunk to “pariah” status.⁶⁸ He travelled the country and spoke to many different audiences explaining that the Schüssel government had been formed meeting all provisions of the Austrian constitution. While Haider’s FPÖ may have been obnoxious and appealing to the prejudiced and xenophobic elements in society, it was not “neo Nazi.” The poisonous Governor of Carinthia Haider made life difficult for his own party and the government coalition with his two superfluous visits of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Vice Chancellor Susanne Riess-Passer from the FPÖ came to the opening of the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City in February 2002. Her party “boss” Haider surprised her with a call that he had just visited Saddam on a “humanitarian mission.” During her visit to Washington, the Vice Chancellor dismissed Haider’s “private exploits” (*Privataktion*). The State Department spokesman noted that Haider’s visit was “a punch in the face of the civilized world”, then pooh-poohed Haider’s visit as “Saddam Hussein and Jörg Haider—birds of the same feather stick together.”⁶⁹ Next to playing fire brigade with the State Department over Haider “going off the reservation”, Moser walked the halls of Congress tirelessly to prevent even harsher American reactions vis-à-vis the new governing coalition such as “freezing” relations with Austria. Appealing to the Jewish electorate, Tom Lantos (D-CA) wanted the House of Representatives to pass a resolution calling Haider’s party a “Neo-Nazi” party and boycotting Austrian businesses (trade with Austria, tourism, flights by Austrian Airlines etc.). Ambassador Moser managed to have the Resolution railroaded towards insignificance by the House leadership and thereby preventing the U.S. response becoming even more severe than the “EU-14 measures.” During the period when Washington’s relations were “frozen” with Austria, official Austrian visitors did not get appointments with their high level counterparts in the Washington government and bureaucracy. Starting in June 2000, with the visit of the Austrian Interior

67. On the spillover effects of the “Americanization of the Holocaust” ever since the 1980s “Waldheim fiasco”, see Thonke, *Hitlers Langer Schatten*, 88–105.

68. The *Times* dedicated a story to Moser’s “nightmare” days, see “Diplomat Picks Up the Pieces of Austria’s Broken Image,” *New York Times*, Feb. 14, 2000, 14.

69. This episode is recounted in Moser, *Bewegte Zeiten*, 145; see also “Iraq-Reise: Entsetzen über Haiders Besuch bei Saddam,” *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 12, 2002 <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/irak-reise-entsetzen-ueber-haiders-besuch-bei-saddam-a-182066.html> (accessed February 5, 2013).


Minister, the ice was broken and meetings on the ministerial level were restarted.⁷⁰

Since the late 1990s restitution of famous art treasures “expropriated” during the World War II era became another big issue in Austrian – American relations.⁷¹ As soon as he arrived in the U.S., Ambassador Moser was confronted with two famous Egon Schiele pictures (“Portrait of Wally” and “*Tote Stadt III*”) on loan from the Leopold Foundation Museum in Vienna for an exhibit to the Museum of Modern Art in New York; they were seized by the New York District Attorney’s Office. Descendants of the former proprietors claimed the pictures as their inheritance. After a long court battle Ambassador Moser managed to snag *Tote Stadt III* from the U.S. authorities in September 2009, put it on a plane and sent it back to Austria (“*Wally*” was bought back in 2010). Moser was not so lucky with the “Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I” (known as the “Golden Adele”), a famous Gustav Klimt painting that had been hanging since World War II in the Austrian Gallery in Vienna. The picture had a similarly complex history of previous ownership and ended up property of the Austrian state. “Adele I” was claimed by the legal heiress, Adele’s niece Maria Altmann, a Jewish refugee from Vienna living in Los Angeles since World War II. After an even longer court battle going all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court and ending in mediation, Altmann was proclaimed the legal heir. Billionaire Ronald Lauder, an heir to a cosmetics empire and the former American ambassador in Austria, bought the picture for an alleged \$137 million, at the time the highest price ever paid for a painting. Today it is a masterpiece hanging in Lauder’s “Neue Gallerie” in New York. “Adele’s” departure to New York is considered a significant loss to Austria’s famed artistic patrimony.⁷²

70. Peter Moser is the rare ambassador to write memoirs. These memoirs are a great source of information for historians and intimately document this period of Austrian-American relations exceptionally well, see his *Bewegte Zeiten*, pp. 101–21; see also GZ. 1.30/45/03, Aug. 28, 2003, “Abschlussbericht: 4 Jahre USA, Rückblick,” E-Mail Moser to Foreign Ministry, Aug. 28, 2033, Peter Moser Private Papers, CenterAustria. Based on reports like this one and a treasure trove of personal papers, Moser wrote these memoirs while serving as the Marshall Plan Chair at UNO in 2009/2010. He donated these private papers to CenterAustria at UNO and they are utilized here for the first time.

71. A good introduction to the larger issues of Nazi art theft in Austria are the essays in Verena Pawlowsky/Harald Wendelin, eds., *Enteignete Kunst: Raub un Rückgabe – Österreich von 1938 bis heute* (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2006); for the larger background of Nazi art politics, see Jonathan Petropoulos, *The Faustian Bargain: The Art World in Nazi Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

72. For a good summary of the complex legal and diplomatic issues, see Moser, *Bewegte Zeiten*, 102, 136–42; see also the documentary *Adele’s Wish* by Terence Hunter, Calendar Films 2008.



Chancellor Schüssel visits President at the White House on October 31, 2001. Photo credit: APA.

During the late Clinton years Austrian relations with the United States hit some rocky patches. Austrian reactions to the contested November 2000 elections of George W. Bush, often disparagingly called “the cowboy” from Texas, were as critical as in the rest of Western Europe. Relations remained frosty during early visits. Moser suggested to Vienna to overcome the bad blood with a visit from Chancellor Schüssel. The Bush White House not only granted an appointment with the President, but also invited the Schüssel delegation to stay in “Blair House,” the president’s guest house for official high level visitors to Washington. Only Chancellor Kreisky had been given the honor to stay in this official U.S. government residence by President Gerald Ford, when he visited in the mid-1970s. Chancellor Schüssel visited Washington on October 31, 2001, only a few weeks after the September 11 attacks. He had lunch with a number of senators and an appointment with Bush in the White House where Iran and Iraq were prominent issues discussed. The Chancellor then went to New York and visited the 9/11 site and mayor Rudolf Giuliani. Schüssel refused to be interviewed by the famous CNN host Larry King – a great mistake in Moser’s estimation to improve Austria’s image in the U.S. The high level Schüssel visit, however,

“normalized” relations after the rocky Clinton years.⁷³ The honeymoon did not last long.⁷⁴

A Neutral Stuck in ‘Old Europe’? Terrorism and the Bush Wars (2001-2008)

When the terrorists attacks crashed their planes into the towers of the World Trade Center in New York and into the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), the American mainland was attacked from the outside for the first time in American history (the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was an attack on American overseas territory—Hawaii only became a state of the union in 1958).⁷⁵ The world and international politics changed forever as a result of these brazen and bloody attacks into the hearts of American financial and military power (a fourth plane, probably directed against the Capitol, the heart of American political power, was brought down by the passengers in Pennsylvania). The Bush II administration was shocked and angered—Americans were sickened and deeply hurt.⁷⁶ European governments and publics quickly proclaimed their deep sympathy for the victims and their families and their “undivided solidarity” with Americans. The Austrian government, too, chimed in with this chorus of enormous pain and regret. Politicians

73. Moser, *Bewegte Zeiten*, pp. 142-44. Eva Male, the Washington correspondent of *Die Presse*, reported that the Bush administration wanted to get to know one of the few conservative chancellors in Europe, was grateful for the Austrian support in the “war on terror” (Austria had allowed overflights and cooperated in tightening the banking laws), and wanted to pay tribute to Austria’s restitution legislation compensating Holocaust victims, see “Post 9/11: Zusammenarbeit zur Terrorbekämpfung/Sanktionen u. Haider kein Thema,” *Die Presse*, Nov. 2, 2011.

74. The ups and downs of U.S. – Austrian relations can also be gleaned from the writings of Austrian reporters that covered the Clinton and Bush years. For a superficial book written by a television journalist in the breathless style of a diarist, see Eugen Freund, *Mein Amerika: Bestandaufnahmen, Beobachtungen, Berichte 1995-2001* (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 2001). For more thoughtful reflections by a print journalist, see Eva Male, “I feel like I have two homes, or maybe none at all ... Four years [1999-2003] in the United States as a Correspondent for the Austrian Daily *Die Presse*,” in: Günter Bischof/Anton Pelinka/Hermann Denz, eds., *Religion in Austria* (CAS 13) (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2005), 165-75.

75. For a comparison of the Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 attacks within their respective historical contexts, see John W. Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9-11/Iraq* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010).

76. The profound shock produced by the 9/11 attacks and deep-seated fear and paranoia about more attacks is a principal theme in the memoirs of all the members of the Bush administration, see Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Foreign Policies of the George W. Bush Administration: Memoirs, History, Legacy,” *Diplomatic History* 37 (April 2013): 190-216 (esp. 199f).

and commentators joined the European community of solidarity with Americans. Yet solidarity soon turned to questioning attitudes, blaming Americans themselves and their policies in the Near East and elsewhere for the attacks; finally came naughty *Schadenfreude*—the “hegemonic” Americans have been asking for this.⁷⁷

The “Bush revolution” and his policies of “preemption” had been long in the making. Some of his foreign policy advisers like Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney—called the “Vulcans”—had been calling for a new policy of anticipating threats and preempting them with the help of “ad-hoc coalitions of the willing” since the early 1990s. Bush’s determined foreign policy team detested Clinton’s cautious and often indecisive engagement of the world – along with his humoring of reluctant allies like the Europeans; the “Vulcans” had only disdain for Clinton’s reliance on multilateral frameworks (be it the United Nations or NATO, the Kyoto Protocol), or nuclear disarmament such as the bilateral U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty. Any close Austrian or European observer following the details of Bush presidential campaign should have discerned this.⁷⁸ The massive shock of the 9/11 attacks gave the Bush White House the cause and the wherewithal to implement what had been brewing in the “neo-conservative” foreign policy community and Republican think tanks; the Bush administration embarked on bold new policies. The relentless “war on terror” painted the world in black and white (“those that are for us and those that are against us”).⁷⁹ 10 years after the Iraq invasion Cheney is still unapologetic about this disastrous war.⁸⁰ Europeans never fully appreciated Americans’ dark reading of 9/11 and the new strategic realities in Washington’s global war on terror, where NATO and Europe no longer were any longer on top of the U.S. foreign policy priority list.⁸¹

77. Margit Reiter, “Signaturen des 11. September, 2001 in Österreich,” in idem/Embacher, eds., *Europa und der 11. September 2001*, 161-92

78. Joschka Fischer believes that the U.S. abandoned its consensual Cold War *modus operandi* within a multilateral transatlantic framework in the final Clinton years, drawing the wrong conclusions from the Kosovo air campaign, arguing that “coalition war” was too complicated and “going it alone” was easier, see “Between Kosovo and Iraq,” 13.

79. Anatol Lieven, *American Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 72-80.

80. “Iraq-Krieg: Dick Cheney hat ein reines Gewissen,” *Die Presse*, March 20, 2013 http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/1378658/IrakKrieg_Dick-Cheney-hat-ein-reines-Gewissen?_vl_backlink=/home/politik/aussenpolitik/1377526/index.do&direct=1377526 (accessed March 22, 2013); Cheney is similarly dismissive of critics in his memoirs.

81. Campbell, “From Kosovo to the War on Terror,” 46-61; Ivo H. Daalder/James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 2003).

Between the campaign launched against Afghanistan (October 2001) and the war unleashed against Iraq (March 2003), Austria joined the “coalition of the unwilling” in Europe that produced enormous *transatlantic discord*. While most European allies and the Austrians by and large supported the intervention against Afghanistan to clean out the Al Qaeda nests and remove the Taliban regime (“non-military solidarity”), Austria was not prepared to contribute troops, if the Americans had wanted it (“military solidarity”). Austrian neutrality was not entirely obsolete.⁸² Western European allies began to part ways with the Bush administration when the CIA began to round up suspected terrorists from the Afghanistan/Pakistan/Iraq to the Balkans and detain them on the American naval base in Guantanamo, Cuba, without extending them the protections for “prisoner of war” under the Geneva Convention. Yet at the same time many European allies – among the 54 nations, Austria included – cooperated with the Bush administration in the CIA’s top secret “rendition” program, as has been revealed by the Open Society Institute in a February 2013 report.⁸³ There may have been more collusion between the Bush and Schüssel governments in the post-9/11 era than we know today.

President Bush announced a new “strategy of preemption” in 2002 to fight terrorists worldwide (the “Bush Doctrine”).⁸⁴ At this point many Europeans saw the new policy as a departure from America’s foreign policy traditions and began to part ways. The Iraq war unleashed was a turning point. Bush intervened in Iraq—without the authorization to use force by a resolution of the UN Security Council—to topple the “rogue” Saddam

82. “Was Österreichs Neutralität alles nicht verbietet. Teilnahme an kollektiver Selbstverteidigung,” *Die Presse*, Sept. 26, 2001; see the op-ed – critical of Austrian “neutralism” -- by Wolfgang Streitenberger, “Solidarität: Was verstehen die Österreicher darunter? Eine beunruhigende Frage,” *die Presse*, Sept. 25, 2001; see also Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., *Die umstrittene Wende*, 512f.

83. “Austria permitted the use of its airspace for flights associated with CIA extraordinary rendition, and may have assisted with the apprehension of an Austrian resident extraordinary rendition victim.” See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition* (New York, 2013), 67f (here 67) <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf> (accessed Feb. 7, 2013); see also “54 Staaten halfen CIA mit verschleppten Terrorverdächtigen,” *Der Standard*, Feb. 5, 2013, <http://derstandard.at/1358305742204/Bericht-54-Staaten-halfen-CIA-mit-verschleppten-Terrorverdachtigen> (accessed Feb. 7, 2013).

84. For excellent analyses of Bush’s foreign policies see Timothy Naftali’s essay on the war on terror and Fredrick Logevall’s essay on Bush Iraq invasion in Julian E. Zelizer, ed., *The Presidency of George W. Bush* (Princeton, 2010), 59–113. Leffler notes that the doctrine of preemption (drafted by Rice’s friend Philip Zelikow) did not play as prominent a role in the White House as many of Bush’s critics have it – it was designed more to be an ideological statement like the famous “NSC 68” document, see Leffler, 203.

Hussein regime. Saddam allegedly harbored terrorists and was hiding an arsenal of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD).⁸⁵ Key European countries like Russia and allies such as Germany, France and Belgium, as well as the neutrals, did not join the “coalition of the willing” that supported Bush in the Iraq war. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld castigated these dissenters in Europe as “old Europe,” while supporters of the war such as Spain, Italy and Great Britain, along with the new NATO allies Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, now were advertised as the “new Europe.”⁸⁶ Rumsfeld’s statement further aggravated the deep European divisions over American policy in Iraq. Moreover, Washington did not understand the “endless European infighting” during times of crises. The spring of 2003 is generally seen as the nadir of transatlantic relations (Austrian – American relations included).⁸⁷ National Security adviser Rice recalled that the President was “particularly shocked” about the Germans since Chancellor Schröder had led Washington to believe that he would support the U.S. action against Saddam “as long as it was quick.” Rice’s advice to President Bush in getting back at these recalcitrant European triumvirate was “punish France, forgive

85. Cheney keeps insisting that terrorists at WMD were the principal causes of the U.S. war against Iraq, see Cheney, *In My Life*, 411-20; Rice gives a more nuanced explanation, *No Higher Honor*, 194-24; Rumsfeld claims surprise, when it became clear that Saddam’s alleged WMD caches were not found and the debate shifted to democracy promotion after intelligence failure—(“the shift to democracy seemed to some as a way to change the subject”), Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 500; Tenet asserts that the WMD threat in Saddam’s Iraq was manufactured in Washington – it was an obsession with people like Cheney. The U.S. “did no go to war in Iraq solely because of WMD, I doubt it was even the principal cause. Yet it was the public face that was put on it,” see *At the Center of the Storm*, 301-39 (quotation 331). Leffler surely is correct in arguing that the Bush era memoirists like to “blame one another” when trying to “blunt the attacks of their critics,” see Leffler, “Foreign Policies of Bush,” 206

86. Rumsfeld insists that the comment was “unintentional” and amused that it “entered the vernacular”; he was surprised that it “touched a raw nerve”, see *Known and Unknown*, 444f.

87. Günter Bischof, “American Empire and Its Discontents: The United States and Europe Today,” in: idem/Michael Gehler/Volker Kühnhardt/Rolf Steininger, eds., *Towards a European Constitution: A Historical and Political Comparison with the United States* (Vienna: Böhlau 2005), pp. 185-207; Reinhard Heinisch, “Ungeliebt und unverstanden – die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Europa aus amerikanischer Sicht,” in: Reiter/Embacher, eds., *Europa und der 11. September 2001*, 193-220; William W. Boyer, “Confronting Transatlantic Discord: Major Policy Differences between the United States and Europe,” in: Zacharasiewicz, ed., *Transatlantische Differenzen*, pp. 79-94; Philip Gordon, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide,” *Foreign Affairs* 82/1 (January/February 2003): 70-83. This deep “transatlantic divide” was also extensively analyzed in a special report prepared by the Austrian Embassy for the Foreign Ministry, “Wie tief ist die Krise in den Transatlantischen Beziehungen? Eine Übersicht über Zustand und Zukunft der transatlantischen Beziehungen aus amerikanischer Sicht,” Peter Moser Private Papers, CenterAustria.

Russia, and ignore Germany.”⁸⁸ The Iraq War unleashed the worst crisis in US – EU relations since the existence of the European Communities.⁸⁹



Chancellor Schüssel explains Austria's position on the U.S. invasion of Iraq to parliament. Photo Credit: Presse.

Austria was firmly in the camp of “old Europe”; most Austrians shared in the uniformly hostile critique of the Bush policies in the Near East. After September 11, many Austrians, too, quickly moved from solidarity to *Schadenfreude*, descending into conspiracy history and blaming the Americans themselves for the 9/11 attacks.⁹⁰ Since Bush failed to get a UN Resolution to support his war against Iraq, Austria closed its air routes and roads to American overflights and transports from German bases to the Mediterranean and Near East. The Iraq war was not a NATO-campaign, but many of the new NATO members from “Central Europe” eagerly supported Bush's Iraq invasion to demonstrate their reliability as the allies of “new Europe.” Neutral Austria was firmly in the camp of “old Europe” (Germany, France, Belgium) protesting against the war, distancing itself

88. Rice, *Ho Higher Honor*, 202, 212-15.

89. Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., *Die umstrittene Wende*, 513. Gehler adds that the Iraq War was a major defeat for U.S. diplomacy and its failure in building a solid “coalition of the willing.”

90. For an excellent summary of Austria's 9/11 responses, see Margit Reiter, “Signaturen des 11. September 2001 in Österreich,” in idem/Embacher, eds., *Europa und der 11. September 2001*, 161-92.

even further from Bush's Washington. Almost fifty percent of the Austrian population was against the war in Iraq, the opposition Social Democratic and Green parties argued that Bush's war broke international law.⁹¹ Peter Pilz of the Green Party, denouncing the Washington government as the "junta of the bushmen,"⁹² charged the Schüssel coalition government for having secretly allowed American overflights during the Afghanistan campaign and maybe doing so again in the Iraq war without presenting evidence.⁹³ In Vienna and many Western European capitals there were massive anti-war demonstrations against "Bush's war." Along with many Western European publics, a major upsurge of anti-Americanism marked Austrian public opinion too.⁹⁴ Marc Trachtenberg's spirited defense of America's international law position in the Iraq War suggests how ill-intentioned many of these European critiques were and how much they hurt the future of the NATO alliance.⁹⁵

On May 1, 2004, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia as well as the three Baltic States joined the European Union. After the deep divisions over the Iraq war, this move brought "old" and "new" Europe together and anchored these former communist nations more firmly in the West. Austria had supported these nations accession to the EU with all kinds of technical help.⁹⁶ However, many Austrians did not welcome EU-Eastern expansion. Due to a feared influx of cheap labor from these new EU members, the Socialist Labor Unions and some conservatives militated against it; the populist Freedom Party kept sniping against the accession of the Czech Republic unless they rescinded the "Beneš decrees" (1943-45) that led to the deportation of some three million Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia (1945-47); a broad segment of Austrian

91. "Umfragen; Österreicher lehnen Militärschlag gegen Irak ab," *Die Presse*, Nov. 2, 2003; "Kein Konsens in Österreich zu Irak-Krieg," *Die Presse*, March 25, 2003.

92. Pilz, *Mit Gott gegen alle*, 260. Green Party foreign policy spokesperson Ulrike Lunacek attacked Bush Ambassador Lyons Brown in an open letter printed in *Der Standard* for using napalm bombs again in Iraq, having learned no lessons from Hiroshima/Nagasaki and Vietnam, see her collection *Zwischenrufe: Kolumnen, Kommentare, Interviews* (Vienna: Milena, 2006), 219-21.

93. "Guter Glauben," *Der Standard*, Jan. 8, 2003.

94. On the long history of Austrian anti-Americanism, see Günter Bischof, "Two Sides of the Coin: The Americanization of Austria and Austrian Anti-Americanism," in: Alexander Stephan, ed., *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945* (New York: Berghahn 2006), 147-81.

95. See his article "The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance," in *idem, The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics* (Princeton, 2012), 281-311.

96. Martin Sajdik/Michael Schwarzingger, *European Union Enlargement: Background, Developments, Facts* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2008).

society demanded stricter controls on the Czech nuclear energy industry.⁹⁷ Washington did not consider Austria part of the “Central Europe” due to her failure to join NATO; her old neighbors—and new EU members—did not consider Austria part of their grouping as a result of Vienna’s mixed record in welcoming them, in spite of the Ballhausplatz’s efforts to form a “strategic partnership” with them. Schüssel failed to reign in his Freedomite coalition partners and their constant sniping against EU Eastern expansion and thus further isolated Austrian foreign policy.

In spite of the Iraq war descending into a violent slugging match with local guerillas and terrorists, George W. Bush was re-elected in November 2004. He had begun rebuilding bridges with “Old Europe” and visited Rome and Paris during his visit as part of the 60th anniversary of the Normandy invasion in June 2004.⁹⁸ He continued to “sooth tensions”, visiting Brussels, Germany and Slovakia in February 2005 and Italy, the Netherlands, Latvia, Russia, Georgia, Denmark, culminating in a G-8 meeting in Scotland in April 2005. The Bush Administration clearly snubbed Austria during the May 2005 50th anniversary ceremonies in Vienna of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 by sending retired Minnesota Senator Rudy Boschwitz to represent the U.S. in lieu of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (as one Vienna sage put it: “Who the hell is Rudy Boschwitz?”). Ursula Plassnik clearly suggests in her contribution to this volume that the Ballhausplatz took it as an egregious offense. For President Bush it was “pay-back time” for Austria joining “old Europe” in opposing his war in Iraq.

In the first half of 2006 Austria for the second time (after the first Presidency during January-June 1998) headed the revolving EU-Presidency and Ursula Plassnik notes how much the organization these EU presidencies was a “trial by fire” for a small EU country like Austria. In June 2006 President Bush came to Vienna for a summit—a day of consultations—with EU leaders during the Austrian EU-Presidency. Under the coordination of Eva Nowotny, Austria’s ambassador to the U.S., both sides worked very hard to agree on a “Vienna Summit Declaration” (June 21, 2006) in which a transatlantic agenda was agreed on.⁹⁹ The President

97. Heinisch, “Unremarkably Remarkable,” 137-40; Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., *Die umstrittene Wende*, 514-20.

98. Günter Bischof/ Michael S. Maier, “Sie Kommen: From Defeat to Liberation – German and Austrian Memory of the Allied “Invasion” of June 6, 1944,” in: Michael Dolski, Sam Edwards, John Buckley, eds., *D-Day in History and Memory: Comparative Perspectives on the Normandy Invasion* [Denton: University of North Texas Press, forthcoming in 2013].

99. For the “Vienna Summit Declaration, see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/june/tradoc_129053.pdf (accessed Feb. 6, 2012); see also Eva Nowotny, “Die österreichische

then went on to Hungary and to Russia after Vienna. Many popular local protests against the Iraq war and banners reading “World’s No. 1 Terrorist” marred his visit to Vienna, as did brutal press commentary about Bush being “the worst president of the past 100 years.” While trying to promote transatlantic unity, he had to defend himself against attacks of the U.S. being a “bigger threat to global stability” than the rogue states North Korea and Iran. When asked about polls showing the low opinion Europeans held of him, he passionately defended his policies: “Look, people didn’t agree with my decision on Iraq, and I understand that. For Europe, September 11th was a moment; for us, it was a change of thinking.” Emphasizing peaceful diplomacy over military options, President Bush regained credibility with European governments, but remained highly unpopular with European people.¹⁰⁰ The news magazine *Profil* ran a cover story about “The crazy world of George W. Bush.”¹⁰¹ Bush visited the Austrian President Heinz Fischer who thanked him for postwar economic aid but raised the difficult issues of Iranian nuclear weapons and Guantanamo inmates.¹⁰² Transatlantic relations somewhat improved in the final years of the Bush II presidency.

Conclusion

Austria got caught up in “Obamamania” like the rest of Europe and enthusiastically welcomed the election of the first African American president and the victory of the Democrats in the November 2008 election. This reflected the nostalgia of better times when the democratic world could look up to Uncle Sam and rely on his strong shoulders. “Obamamania” revived the belief in the American dream in Europe and the continent’s need for the U.S. being the *primus inter pares* in the Western world.¹⁰³ After his electoral victory, *Profil* magazine put Obama on its cover as the “man of the year” 2008, expressing the hope that he would visit Austria soon.¹⁰⁴ On her almost 40 trips to Europe, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton probably

EU-Präsidentschaft in Washington - - sechs spannende Monate in den transatlantischen Beziehungen,” in: Anton Pelinka/Fritz Plasser, eds., *Europäisches Denken und Lehren: Festschrift für Heinrich Neisser* (Innsbruck: iup, 2007), 213–218 (here 215).

100. “Bush’s Visit to Vienna Is Marked by Tension,” *New York Times*, June 21, 2006.

101. “Die verrückte Welt des George W. Bush: Wie tickt der mächtigste Mann der Welt wirklich?,” *Profil*, June 17, 2006.

102. “Bush bei Fischer: Bundespräsident sprach Guantanamo an,” *Der Standard*, June 22, 2006.

103. See Ian Buruma’s op-ed “Auf den Spuren einer Liebeskrankheit namens ‘Obamamania’,” *Der Standard*, Nov. 7, 2008.

104. “Barack Obama – Der Mann des Jahres: Wie der neue Präsident das Jahr geprägt hat,” *Profil*, Jan. 1, 2009.

contributed more than anyone in the Obama administration “to negotiate, consult, and mend bridges” with Europe.¹⁰⁵ Yet if Washington focusses on the middle of Europe, it has its sights set on post-communist “Central Europe.” Since the end of the Cold War the State Department has been defining its relations with Central Europe almost exclusively through the lens of NATO membership. “Washington and Central Europe are bound together by shared values and a common commitment to protect those values,” pronounces Philip H. Gordon the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, and adds “NATO remains the bedrock of that commitment.”¹⁰⁶ Eastern Europe expert Charles Gati feels that it was the U.S. that “paved the way” to EU Eastern expansion by “providing security to the countries admitted to NATO” first – in spite of both the opposition of the Pentagon against NATO enlargement and the EU against eastern enlargement.¹⁰⁷ Austria is no longer part of this militarized NATO-“Central Europe” imaginary in Washington.

During the election campaign of 2012, however, the 2008 European high of “Obamamania” had been deflated.¹⁰⁸ In domestic politics as in transatlantic relations, the President could not deliver what he had promised during the 2007 campaign. Anti-Americanism in the Austrian left and far right are slumbering but might be revived any day over issues such as Obama’s lack of interventionism in bloody crises such a Libya and the Syrian civil war and safe long-distance interventionism with deadly drone attacks.¹⁰⁹ His foreign policy has been pivoting to the Asia-Pacific arena and Europe

105. She shaped NATO consensus on Afghanistan, hammered out tighter sanctions on Iran, and a new missile defense strategy while antagonizing Russia less, see Michael O’Hanlon, “State and the Stateswoman: How Hillary Clinton Reshaped U.S. Foreign Policy – But Not the World,” *Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 29, 2013 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138793/michael-e-ohanlon/state-and-the-stateswoman> (accessed Feb. 2, 2013).

106. Philip S. Gordon’s remarks on “U.S. Relations with Central Europe” delivered at the Center for European Policy Analysis, Sept. 20, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/197986.htm> (accessed Jan. 7, 2013).

107. Gati feels that democratization is being arrested in the region in places such as Hungary and that the U.S. should “put democracy promotion and integration promotion first on its agenda” to complement security-military concerns, see his keynote address at the U.S.-Central European Strategy Forum, Sept. 20, 2012, http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=362 (accessed Jan. 7, 2012).

108. See the Karin Krichmayr Interview with Margit Reiter, *Der Standard*, Oct. 30, 2012, <http://derstandard.at/1350259872261/Obama-wurde-eingemeindet-als-einer-von-uns> (accessed Dec. 15, 2012).

109. On the latency of Austrian anti-Americanism and its deep traditions in the elites, see the interviews with Andrei Markovits, “Obama ist das quintessentielle Amerika,” *Der Standard*, Oct. 2, 2012, and Margit Reiter, “Obama wurde eingemeindet als einer von uns,” *ibid.*, Oct. 30, 2012, and Günter Bischof, “Abrufbereiter Antiamerikanismus,” *Profil*, Dec. 10, 2010, 26.

has been losing in importance on the American foreign policy agenda.¹¹⁰ Due to this “Asian pivot” the Atlantic arena is losing in importance for Washington and Europe is in danger of becoming peripheral.¹¹¹ Albeit Vice President Joe Biden averred during the Munich Security Conference in early February 2013 that, “President Obama and I continue to believe that Europe is the cornerstone of our engagement with the rest of the world and is the catalyst of our global cooperation,” the U.S. increasingly acts as both an Atlantic and Pacific power.¹¹² This further diminishes Austria’s dwarfish and insignificant status in the U.S. imaginary. Meanwhile, we are moving towards a “post-American” world with many new regional powers (China, India, Japan, Indonesia, Turkey, Russia, EUrope, Brazil) in which American hegemonic influence may be more regional than global.¹¹³

Austria’s foreign policy continues to be further absorbed into EU foreign policy and has ceased to be exceptional after the end of the Cold War.¹¹⁴ Foreign Minister Michael Spindelegger (2008-) is a neophyte in the foreign policy arena, and like Schüssel is the chief of the ÖVP and more interested in domestic policy – since 2011 he also has been serving as Vice Chancellor. Austrian foreign policy continues to focus on human rights issues and is sending peace keepers abroad. Spindelegger also has developed the Black Sea region as an Austrian foreign policy focus. Bilateral relations with the United States are proper but continue to be conducted within the focus of the EU transatlantic framework. In a late January 2013 plebiscite the Austrian population opted by a large margin for the continuation of a conscript army rather than following the lead of its European NATO neighbors into building a professional army. Austrian politicians continue to “stick their head into the sand” and ignore NATO as a necessity for European and Atlantic security needs and for tying the US to European

110. David Milne, “Pragmatism or what? The future of US foreign policy,” *International Affairs* 88 (2012): 935-51.

111. Turkey therefore is considering joining the Shanghai Group and abandoning its goal of accessing the European Union, see Burkhard Bischof, “Europa den Rücken kehren? Erdogan denkt darüber nach,” *Die Presse*, Jan. 31, 2013 <http://diepresse.com/home/meinung/kommentare/leitartikel/1339028/Europa-den-Ruecken-kehren-Erdogan-denkt-darueber-nach> (accessed Jan 31, 2013).

112. Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden to the Munich Security Conference, Feb. 2, 2013 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/02/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-munich-security-conference-hotel-bayeri> (accessed Feb. 4, 2013).

113. Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008).

114. For the parameters of such a European common foreign policies within a highly heterogeneous Union, where the U.S.’s fundamental role within NATO has changed from a supportive to a divisive one, see Werner Link, “Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer gemeinsamen Außenpolitik,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 63/6-7 (Feb. 4, 2013): 23-30 (for the U.S. and NATO, see p. 25).

security interests.¹¹⁵ Looking at a number of the 1,700 WikiLeaks cables from the Vienna Embassy to Washington, the daily business of bilateral relations is defined by economic issues. Austria's contact with the Iranian government is of interest to Washington and Austria seems to serve as a go-between. Austrian politicians such as (former) defense minister Norbert Darabos are criticized as being "disinterested in international and security issues" – Foreign Minister Spindelegger for only being interested in advancing Austrian economic interests in regions such as the BlackSea/Caucasus. Washington was also disappointed that Austria refused to grant asylum to any of the Guantanamo prisoners. Austrian companies such as the oil multinational OMV are carefully watched in their dealings with Iran and the Nabucco pipeline project. Austrians come across as provincials in the WikiLeaks cable trove, they are disinterested in foreign affairs and among the most "eurosceptic" people on the continent.¹¹⁶ Austrians gloated in *Schadenfreude* about the blow to U.S. secrecy in the WikiLeaks revelations.¹¹⁷ Austrian neutrality continues to be underappreciated in Washington. Given the continued popularity of Austria's (eroded) neutrality in two thirds of the population, the conservatives People's Party never returned to its late 1990s mission to lead Austria into NATO. Austria never had an "America strategy," argues elder statesman Erhard Busek and adds: "We have become a rather unimportant country for the U.S."¹¹⁸

European and American security interests are increasingly diverging; after the provocations of the Iraq War fiasco, the NATO alliance and its transatlantic dimension may indeed be "dying."¹¹⁹ The Obama

115. Burkhard Bischof, "Österreichs Sicherheitspolitik ist auf die Krankenwägen gekommen," *Die Presse*, Jan. 22, 2013, <http://diepresse.com/home/meinung/gedankenlese/1334795/Oesterreichs-Sicherheitspolitik-ist-auf-die-Krankenwaegen-gekommen> (accessed Jan. 22, 2013).

116. The cables from the U.S. Embassy in Austria represent a relatively small number in the massive 250,000 "Secret US Embassy Cables" database in Wikileaks <http://wikileaks.org/cablegate.html>. For a report on the Austrian cables, see Otmar Lahodynsky, "Nebenrollenspiele," *Profil*, Dec. 13, 2010, 25-27; Thomas Seifert, "Wiener WikiLeaks: Rückzug in die geistige Alpenfestung," *Die Presse*, Dec. 5, 2010; Helmar Dumbs, "Die US-Not mit den störrischen Älplern," *Die Presse*, Dec. 5, 2010; Wikileaks: Die wichtigsten Enthüllungen auf einen Blick," *Die Presse*, Dec. 3, 2010.

117. See the op-ed by Christian Ortner, "Doktor Freuds Heimat und ihr unheilbarer Amerika-Komplex," *Die Presse*, Dec. 9, 2010. Ortner saw the roots in the deep-seated anti-Americanism of Austrians in both the resentments of the older generation who never felt liberated but occupied by the Americans after World War II, and the "anti-capitalist poses" of the younger generation of lefty 1968ers.

118. Busek quoted in *ibid.*, 27.

119. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. "is seen as getting so little benefit from its continuing commitment to the security of Europe," see Trachtenberg, *The Cold War and After*, 308f ("dying", p. 309).

administration's reluctance to intervene prompted the French to lead interventions in Libya and Mali. Obama is practicing a cautious "lean back" foreign policy in crises such as Syria. Obama is looking for a "light footprint" in the world and intervening clandestinely with drone attacks and special forces rather than with the overwhelming force of the Bush Wars (Powell Doctrine) and "boots on the ground."¹²⁰ Postwar Western European-American relations were built on common security and defense policies (neutral Austria, of course, was not part of these arrangements). Given that there are no major security threats of the past on the horizon, the Europeans are less inclined to invest in defense. Of course, both Europeans and Americans are redefining security threats of the present and future like terrorism, WMD, rogue and failed states (such as Mali), cyber warfare, etc. Only the British and the French are still willing to spend on defense in order to project power. Germany and most of the European nations "envision Europe as a big Switzerland." Given the weakening of the common security and defense ties that had governed the Cold War transatlantic relationship, the common bonds are slackening too and the U.S. no longer seems to be of "transcendent importance" to most Europeans.¹²¹ Issues such as Syria and WMD in Iran test current transatlantic cooperation. Surveys show that both Americans and Europeans continue to back NATO "but they want out of Afghanistan, currently the joint U.S.-European military operation." Future public support for NATO may well depend on "how that disengagement" will be handled, notes Bruce Stokes, the director of the Pew's Global Economic Attitudes. While the current Euro crisis will continue to absorb the Europeans, Americans are turning more isolationist. 83% of Americans want their leadership pay more attention to problems at home than overseas.¹²²

Yet at the heart of this growing transatlantic divide since the end of the Cold War may well be what is called the "values gap." Of course, Europe and the U.S. still share common democratic values based on human rights and rule of law. Yet one can no longer assume that European and American values are entirely congruent as they had been for much of the

120. John Arquilla, "America in Decline," *Foreign Policy* http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/28/america_in_recline (accessed Jan 30, 2013); see also Leon Wieseltier, Washington diarist: "Welcome to the Era of the Light Footprint Obama finally finds his doctrine," *New Republic*, Jan. 29, 2013, <http://www.newrepublic.com/tags/washington-diarist> (accessed Jan. 30, 2013)

121. Kramer, "The Return of History in Europe," 84.

122. Bruce Stokes special to CNN, "A big year for transatlantic ties?," <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/14/a-big-year-for-transatlantic-ties/> (accessed Jan. 16, 2013).

Cold War when a common enemy bound them together. The two sides of the Atlantic are divided by a number of gaps, namely “market-“, “god-“ war- “and social policy gaps.”¹²³ American values constitute the “American Creed” and continue to represent the belief in American exceptionalism.¹²⁴ These “values gaps” persist as the Pew Research Center regularly documents in its “Global Attitudes Project.” While the pervasive anti-Americanism of the Bush years has receded and the “Obama effect” has produced soaring favorability ratings (from 42% to 75% in France), the values gap in issues such as use of military force, religion, the death penalty and gun laws is alive and well. European models of solidarity grounded in the welfare state and social market economies are quite different from American models grounded in individualism and toleration of excessive inequality.¹²⁵ Europeans and Americans harbor very different ideas about the place and role of religion in society and politics, environmental risks and global poverty, as well as individualism. They differ widely on notions of patriotism, as Timothy Garton Ash has noted: “American-style belligerent patriotism is rare in contemporary Europe.” Americans promote market capitalism, Europeans socially equalizing welfare capitalism. Americans think about international relations in martial terms, Europeans in a peace-making imaginary. The U.S. is good at war-making, Europeans spend little on defense and much on the welfare state – while “the *terribles simplificateurs*” (Timothy Garton Ash) like Robert Kagan and Samuel Huntington “babble glibly of Mars and Venus” or “clashing civilizations.”¹²⁶ The U.S. prefers to act unilaterally in international politics, Europeans with their daily experience in Brussels politicking like to operate within multilateral frameworks.¹²⁷ These differences in values could be multiplied. This transatlantic divide is deepening and will make European (including Austrian) relations with the United States more difficult in the “post-American world.” In Mary Nolan’s estimation: “The American Century in Europe is over.”

123. Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century*, 9, 366-373; negotiating between these differing European and American values discourses has become a big challenge in bilateral diplomacy, see Nowotny, “Die österreichische EU-Präsidentschaft in Washington – sechs spannende Monate in den transatlantischen Beziehungen,” 217.

124. Lieven, *American Right or Wrong*, 48-87.

125. GZ. 1.30/40/03, “Abschlussbericht: 4 Jahre USA, Rückblick,” E-Mail Moser to Foreign Ministry, Aug. 28, 2033, both Peter Moser Private Papers, CenterAustria

126. The reference here, of course, is to Robert Kagan’s controversial essay *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

127. See Tony Judt’s review essay “The Good Society: Europe vs. America,” in: *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 393-409; see also Nolan, *Transatlantic Century*, 331-73.

Appendix

E-Mail # 3/42/10/03, Austrian Embassy Washington to Foreign Ministry, Vienna, Sept. 2, 2003¹

NATO and Austria from a US Perspective

Besides “Mutual Assured Destruction,” the balance of the Cold War rested on two alliances, the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In a manner of speaking, Austria’s neutrality was the third child of the Cold War. The Warsaw Pact dissolved after the end of the Cold War, and NATO changed from an exclusively defensive alliance to a dynamic security organization, with the term “security” extending far beyond its military meaning.

Only the neutrality of Austria—rightly taught to generations of Austrians as an advantage and a marker of their identity—has not changed much, at least on the surface or with regard to the way Austrians understand themselves. Austrians hardly noticed turning points that reach back as far as 1955 and culminated in Austria’s accession to the UNO and the NATO “Partnership for Peace,” a change that was marked by various exceptions in the Austrian constitution. The further development of European solidarity, with its attendant obligation to assist other European nations, will further erode the meaning of Austrian neutrality.

Many arguments support Austrian’s accession to the NATO, but there are some counterarguments that need to be taken seriously, most of them of an emotional, semantic, or moral nature. Because of these emotions and convictions, it is hard to conduct logical debates because Austrian neutrality is too often used as a slogan in electoral campaigns.

The Washington Embassy would like to present a few remarks on the issue of the “permanent” debate of Austrian neutrality, remarks that view the issue from some distance and from an American perspective:

1. The USA has viewed Austrian neutrality with increasing skepticism since the end of the Cold War. Granted, one understands the origin and historical justification of neutrality. One acknowledges the constitutional importance of neutrality, and one knows the legal sanctions of endangering neutrality, but one does not understand why Austria has reacted so sluggishly to recent developments, why Austria has used the domestic difficulties to change its constitution as an excuse for not making changes at all. Americans have at times derided Austria and at times been bothered (e.g. Rumsfeld in

Congress in February), and sometimes they have suspected Austria of not wanting to change at all even though its accession to the EU has demonstrated that it can react very actively to changes in its environment.

2. The trans-Atlantic crisis has made the USA suspicious of European attempts to leave NATO. Even though Austria's military potential in the overall European security structure seems negligible, the USA is watching Austria very closely to see if it would declare its solidarity with a European defense system, with or without NATO membership. Without joining NATO, Austria would appear to be a potential dividing factor to the USA, who would like to see congruency between NATO and any European defense system.
3. In the wake of 10 new states' joining the EU and thereafter becoming members of NATO, Austria will be at a definite disadvantage with regard to the "regional partnership" which it desires to establish with its neighbors and will increase its current irrelevance within NATO and the European security structure. Regular NATO contacts, in particular, would offer opportunities for debate and coordination with our neighbors. Because NATO's influence goes far beyond military matters, Austria would isolate itself in important issues and would earn the same derision from its regional partners that it has received from the USA.
4. In the future, a pan-European security system will lead to a pan-European armament industry. EU members will fight egotistically to get their share of the pie. Austria's rivals will try to thwart Austria because of its refusal of NATO partnership. (On several previous occasions, Austria's neutrality has been used in the USA as an argument against awarding it contracts. Would not our European partners do the same?)
5. Lastly, one has to point out a non-military, but utterly political aspect of NATO membership, a side issue, so to speak, and certainly not the main reason for joining NATO: The USA takes solidarity with and responsibilities toward its allies very seriously. Non-membership is acknowledged as a fact. However, once a state is an ally, much is expected of it, but the USA is very loyal to its allies as well. As long as there are no serious conflicts with US interests, NATO members can count on American goodwill in non-military questions as well. For example, the US is more critical of Austria's Nazi past than it is of Germany's. New NATO members like

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary get more deferential treatment in questions of restitution than does Austria. Austria is always in danger of getting bad press, from which the new NATO members are largely safe.

The Ambassador
Moser

Endnotes

1. This hitherto unpublished document is in the collection of Personal Papers that Ambassador Peter Moser donated to CenterAustria at the University of New Orleans and has been translated by Inge Fink (Department of English, UNO) from German into English. We would like to thank Peter Moser for providing us with the document and Inge Fink for her translation.