INTRODUCTION

In a large cement building on a remote part of Camp Atterbury army base in south-central Indiana, a group of US soldiers prepares to visit a mock Afghan village. The village, part of a simulation, is populated by privately contracted role players acting as Afghan farmers, merchants, religious figures, elders, and other villagers. As part of their predeployment training, the soldiers will survey village needs to identify projects that could bolster local support for the provincial government—a key tenet of the counterinsurgency doctrine their team is implementing. The survey was designed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which hired and sent contractors to provide the military with instruction in international development "best practices." Another contractor—an Afghan American woman working as a translator—wraps a pink headscarf around a female soldier and secures it under her chin. A second female soldier wearing a blue headscarf looks on, eager to learn how to wear the scarf under her helmet and draped over her military-issued camouflage blouse and body armor (figure 1).

The two female soldiers are members of what the military calls a "female engagement team" (FET). The simulation includes a "women's tent" populated by Afghan women actors crocheting, preparing food, and talking. In this context, "FET" denotes the two women on the deploying team who, based on their gender, are presumed to have access to any female villagers the team may confront during the simulation. It is 2011, the height of the US military's FET program in Afghanistan. The headscarves identify the soldiers as female to villagers and send what the military calls a "powerful and positive message" that its "intentions are

good and that the United States is there to protect them."[1] The female soldiers plan to "engage" women they encounter, viewing this as an opportunity to make a positive impression as well as to gather any information about the village that might be strategically useful. This striking combination of actors came about when the US military integrated development into counterinsurgency training, a process that relied on military understandings of the colonial past and new forms of labor for private contractors and female soldiers.[2]

At War with Women examines the forces that brought this simulation into play. These forces drive the modern assembly of imperialism, a concept I will explore more fully and redefine through what political economist Giovanni Arrighi conceptualized as a post–World War II "struggle for world-hegemony."[3] Fought through new forms of US financial and military power, the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq revived counterinsurgency doctrine through explicit reference to the colonial past.[4] Counterinsurgency returned through military uses of development and humanitarianism as weapons of war—for instance, the military's pronounced interest in the mid-2000s in building schools in Afghanistan to gain civilian support for the occupation. The US military looked to women in its ranks, still technically banned from direct assignment to ground combat units, to do the so-called work of "winning hearts and minds," and to access Iraqi and Afghan women and their households. Servicewomen were assembled into FETs that searched and questioned women at security checkpoints and took part in outreach projects distributing humanitarian supplies.

From 2010 to 2017, I observed counterinsurgency trainings and interviewed women who had served on FETs. Drawing on this material, I investigate how the post-9/11 turn to counterinsurgency did not convince soldiers to reimagine themselves as "armed social workers," but it did give rise to what I call here a "new imperial feminism" under which servicewomen came to understand themselves as global ambassadors for women's rights. This new imperial feminism framed members of female counterinsurgency teams as feminist trailblazers for women's equal right to serve alongside men in combat units. Over time, all-female counterinsurgency teams were increasingly attached to special operations missions, in which female soldiers were expected to calm women and children during violent night raids of Afghan homes. The military came to explicitly value women's labor through gender essentialisms, such as claims that female soldiers were "naturally" more emotionally equipped to "soothe and calm" war's victims. Such forms of emotional labor make up what I call a "new military femininity," one component of a broader imperial feminism. Gender operates here and across imperial encounters in relation to constructions of racial difference. In interviews and journal entries, servicewomen contrasted their position as icons of modern women's liberation with that of Afghan women,

whom military trainings framed as universally oppressed by "backward" cultural practices that could be modernized through foreign occupation. Soldiers viewed the subjects of occupation through such cultural and imperial racisms that were enabled by official military rhetoric of "color blindness."

At the height of the FET program between 2010 and 2012, all-female counterinsurgency teams were attached to Army Ranger and Green Beret units and, in violation of military combat exclusion policy that still banned women, participated in combat-intensive special operations missions.[5] Thus, female counterinsurgency teams have been popularly understood as a prehistory to the military overturning its ban on women in combat in 2013 and, since 2016, opening all military jobs to women.[6] Soon after combat exclusion ended, media images proliferated of women such as Kristen Griest (one of the first to graduate from Army Ranger School) performing a firefighter's carry of a fellow soldier. One *New York Times* article describes Griest "joining a branch of the Army that has long been considered the last bastion of traditionally male combat roles, and with the move, the Army has crossed another barrier in its promise to consider women for all roles without exception."[7] The article typifies a popular way of understanding post-9/11 shifts in military gender policies as reflecting a gradual progression toward gender equality in the US military.[8] At the same time as women's integration into US military combat units was popularly interpreted as the achievement of equal rights, a liberal feminist tradition has supported justifications of the US invasion of Afghanistan as a defense of Afghan women's rights. The post-9/11 wars were framed through "the twin figures of the Islamic fundamentalist and his female victim," who appeared everywhere from the *New York Times* to the Feminist Majority to popularize the view that the wars were "for Afghanistan's own good."[9] Counterinsurgency's claims to protect civilians and to operate through development and humanitarianism were central to this liberal feminist narrative. We see these forces at work in Samantha Power's endorsement of the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* in a *New York Times* book review shortly after the manual's 2006 public release. Power—President Joe Biden's USAID administrator and former ambassador to the United Nations (UN)—criticizes President George W. Bush's policies in Iraq while urging readers not to give up what is otherwise a worthy counterterrorism effort. "The challenge now is to accept that just because George W. Bush hyped the threat does not mean the threat should be played down." In her efforts to redeem what she calls "our war on terror," Power lingers on the manual's introduction, penned by her close colleague at Harvard, Sarah Sewall. Power claims that Sewall "can say what the generals who devised the manual cannot," referring to her argument for the greater effectiveness of military strategies that reduce civilian harm in retort to those who see the manual as a mere "marketing campaign."[10]

There is even more that Sewall—and, I add, Power—can say that the generals who wrote the manual cannot. Through figures such as Power and Sewall, we see how liberal feminism and development joined hands to forge a path to permanent war. Power embodies a liberal feminism that was key to securing consent for the post-9/11 wars. Emphasizing workplace equality and sexual violence, she self-identifies as a feminist through a singular focus on gender as the basis for equal rights. A liberal feminist tradition—prominent in the United States and often uncritical of imperialism—informs Power's self-identification when she explains to a reporter that "being the only woman in the UN made me a feminist." Her feminist awakening occurred when she looked up from her seat on the UN Security Council at school tours and was struck by the symbolic harm of being the only woman.[11] On the other hand, she frames her efforts to balance work and home—emphasizing how her young children were "everywhere"—as a positive professional model. "When you are the only woman on the Security Council and you hear men talk about sexual violence in war with great authority and dogmatism, about how certain events couldn't have happened because the men who were accused of rape would have had their wives to go home to, so why would they? Certainly now I'm focused on that set of issues."[12]

Power's understanding of gender and women's rights reveals what Chandra Mohanty calls a "white, Western, middle-class liberal feminism," singularly focused on "gender as a basis for sexual rights." This singular focus stands in contrast to feminist politics forged from an understanding of "gender in relation to race and/or class as part of a broader liberation struggle."[13] As Power's emphasis on workplace equality demonstrates, liberal feminism focuses on legal and economic equality between men and women within a capitalist system.[14] An autonomous, self-determining individual is the subject of liberal feminist scholarship and politics.[15] This subject has produced a "Third World woman" as the "Other" of Western liberal feminism, often homogenizing and victimizing women who are the subject of its gaze.[16]

This liberal feminist tradition underpins interpretations of both the Afghanistan War as being in the name of women's rights and of combat integration as a milestone on a progressive march toward universal women's equality. In contrast to these dominant narratives of war, I offer an alternate framework of a new imperial feminism that has been central to the broader operation of US hegemony and its redefinition of post–World War II imperialism.[17] Counterinsurgency offers a particularly salient lens for examining how imperial feminism is assembled through military doctrine, living colonial and Cold War histories, and practices of US military soldiers and contractors. If Power's endorsement of the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* is a key articulation of liberal feminist narratives of war, it also indicates the significance of development and humanitari-

anism in reformulating the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan from the mid-2000s onward. To understand how the new imperial feminism has taken shape through these interconnected forces, I focus on three key features: the US military's adoption of development and humanitarianism as counterinsurgency weapons, military instructors' reliance on colonial and Cold War histories to produce modern counterinsurgent soldiers, and women's incorporation into those ranks through new forms of gendered labor.[18] This nexus of development, colonial historiography, and gender is crucial to understanding how military labor and militarism as a social way of life were redefined over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early twenty-first century.

A key marker of militarized development's role in counterinsurgency was the military's so-called cultural turn, a response to the realization, soon after President Bush announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May 2003, that the war was not going well.[19] The *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* indicated militarized forms of development and humanitarianism as central to its "population-centric" approach, which emphasized winning the population's support over annihilating the enemy.[20] In an effort to follow counterinsurgency guidelines for engaging local populations and winning their support, military trainings in subsequent years began to include development "best practices" that had been repurposed for military objectives.

Part of what distinguishes counterinsurgency's revival in the mid-2000s from its historical precedents involves private contractors' role in translating development into a counterinsurgency weapon. In 2005, USAID established the new Office of Military Affairs to liaise with the Department of Defense. One of the primary tasks of the Office of Military Affairs was to contract civilian experts to teach a development framework that USAID had written for military instruction. Military personnel learned how to conduct a village needs assessment and then design, evaluate, and monitor irrigation, education, commerce, and other types of projects intended to fulfill a need and draw support away from the Taliban.

The contractors' introduction to bases was framed by gendered counterinsurgency, which Laleh Khalili describes as offering new forms of masculinity "in which 'manliness' is softened, and the sensitive masculinity of the humanitarian soldier-scholar (white, literate, articulate, and doctorate-festooned) overshadows the hyper-masculinity of warrior kings (or indeed of the racialised imperial grunts)."[21] In my research on military bases, I found that both the contractors themselves and USAID's instructional framework embodied this softened masculinity apparent in counterinsurgency doctrine. But in predeployment trainings, contractors' lessons often conflicted with other dimensions of soldiering, such as a security force's prior training in aggressive searching and patrolling tactics. Soldiers made sense of the conflict they experienced in terms of competing

definitions of masculinity: longer-standing associations of masculinity with combat came into direct conflict with softened counterinsurgent masculinity. Some of the soldiers resisted being transformed into what they mockingly called "an NGO with guns." In its most extreme form in the US Marine Corps, trainees challenged the developmental counterinsurgency material outright, claiming they would rather be, in the words of one marine, "kicking in doors, blowin' up something." This resistance was often related to previous specialization in infantry and artillery, including home raids and detonating explosives, and involuntary assignment to more civilian-oriented and developmental military jobs.

In reaction to soldiers and marines who argued that this new material was not part of their job, military instructors provided historical explanations of how, for instance, the Marine Corps built roads and schools, trained local militaries, and managed the civil service of Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic during the early twentieth century.[22] Marine instructors frequently used Haiti as a case study to exemplify a number of unconventional deployments the students might find themselves on. Such examples included the invasion and occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934, when US marines turned to developmental projects in education and public health following a massive peasant uprising; peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and 2000s in Haiti; and the humanitarian response that followed the 2010 Haiti earthquake.[23] Lessons the marines learned in Haiti were incorporated into the *Small Wars Manual* (1940), which became the basis of the *US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (2006).[24]

The history of US imperialism directly informs the present, incorporated into modern military doctrine and in military trainings as evidence that developmental approaches are part of skeptical students' identity. At the same time, military doctrine erases historical geographies of imperialism, particularly their brutality and associated antisystemic movements, in favor of abstract tactics that are removed from time and place.[25] Placing the new imperial feminism within a longer history challenges military historiographies, which are generally told from the colonial officer's perspective, by surfacing the body counts as well as the cultural practices of colonial rule. Keeping the present in tension with the past clarifies where colonial ideologies of race, gender, and sexuality have resurfaced in the present and where they have changed.

New Military Femininity in All-Female Counterinsurgency Teams

Counterinsurgency in its post-9/11 incarnation targeted the household as a key site of military conquest.[26] Military literature from the mid to late 2000s under-

stands the household as the link to the central counterinsurgency category of "the population," whose loyalties determine military success. According to the influential counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen, "Win the women, and you own the family unit. Own the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population."[27] By 2009, anxieties in the military that it was "only reaching half the population" (the male half) became palpable in official statements as well as more informal actions of those deployed, including the assembly of all-female teams to reach Afghan and Iraqi women. Female soldiers increasingly served as a conduit to this coveted domain of the household.

Despite military rhetoric, all-female counterinsurgency teams served an important intelligence dimension of providing opportunities to question women and children residing in a militarily surveilled home and allowing secret missions to remain under the cover of silence by calming the subjects of a home raid. Women's sexuality took on new meaning in these contexts. Whereas historically the military treated women as a sexual distraction that could undermine "unit cohesion," in the context of female counterinsurgency teams, servicewomen spoke of their "allure" as a benefit to collecting intelligence from young Afghan men. Such allure was conceptualized in terms of heteronormative sexuality as well as a racialized emphasis on physical traits such as blond hair and blue eyes—something so exotic that it captivated foreign populations, enchanting them into answering questions that were useful to their military team's intelligence goals. Participants also described their mission as global ambassadorship for women's rights, serving as a beacon of "Western" liberal feminism in a land they understood as backward in history.[28] Servicewomen's understandings of themselves as models of modernity and female empowerment articulate a new imperial feminism that, on the one hand, further entrenches gender stereotypes within the military and, on the other, imagines helpless Afghan people, especially women, requiring benevolent occupation. These linked processes in domestic and foreign spaces challenge popular framings of the post-9/11 wars liberating women abroad at the same time as combat integration brings the US military closer to gender equality.[29]

In the context of women's historical exclusion from combat, scholarship has largely theorized femininity in relation to military support roles, ranging from women's indirect familial or domestic support for male soldiers to long-standing direct employment by the military as secretaries, nurses, and, more recently, combat support roles in logistics, communications, and engineering.[30] Deborah Cowen explores the relationship between sexual violence in military culture and how "military models of masculinity have historically been built around the suppression of femininity and the objectification of women."[31] Scholars have developed a more robust understanding of masculinity's centrality to the construction of war, as well as masculinity's role and associations in structuring

military institutions.[32] Women's integration into previously male and masculinist military domains, along with military praise for their unique contributions, calls for a concept of military femininity akin to more robust theorizations of military masculinity. This requires a move beyond what scholars such as Aaron Belkin have called for in considering military masculinity in its relation to, rather than simply disavowal of, femininity and queerness.[33] Instead, we need a concept of military femininity that captures how the repression framework in foundational work on gender and militarism has not disappeared but has undergone significant change.

New forms of gender inclusion, such as women's integration into previously male-only combat positions, have been accompanied by new exclusions, such as the denial of Veterans Affairs services to women who were "temporarily attached" rather than formally assigned to ground combat units and thus lacked formal documentation of their combat. Leading up to the integration of women into all combat units, the image of a certain military woman—white, heterosexual, capable of soothing and calming civilians—became emblematic of military claims to women's value in the post-9/11 counterinsurgency era. This racially and sexually circumscribed military womanhood is itself a form of exclusion and repression that has accompanied combat integration. By analyzing the female counterinsurgency teams leading up to women's formal inclusion in combat, I found that the forms of inclusion in policy changes have reinforced gender essentialisms such as women's capacity to soothe and calm war's victims.

Although FETs were initially used to search Iraqi and Afghan women, military proponents described them as a way to win the hearts and minds of Iraqi and especially Afghan civilian populations. This distinguishes counterinsurgency from so-called conventional theories of war, which focus on how to defeat another military force. If USAID trainings were one arm of the military's effort to create a force capable of winning such civilian support, gendered counterinsurgency is a second arm of this same military effort to remake itself in a counterinsurgent image. Military and popular media represented female counterinsurgency teams as performing humanitarian work to win the favor of both Afghan civilians and US domestic populations critical of the wars.[34] However, this humanitarian representation conceals a more strategic military interest, particularly in later iterations of the teams, related to intelligence collection and the seizure of high-value targets.

The initial wave of academic literature examining female counterinsurgency as a form of military humanitarianism was accurate in its attention to the affective and emotional dimensions of this military work.[35] But the prevailing military, media, and academic framing of it as an attempt to use humanitarianism to cover up forms of military violence does not adequately explain the combat

uses of gendered counterinsurgency. Female counterinsurgents' own experiences, articulated through interviews and program material, speak to how this new military femininity was constructed through combat. Female counterinsurgency team members spoke of public affairs officers photographing them conducting a medical clinic and distributing supplies to an orphanage, even though most of their day-to-day experience entailed collecting information, which, although technical military language referred to it as "atmospherics," was related to intelligence. Through attention to the gender essentialisms at work when female counterinsurgents are, for example, praised for their emotional capacity to extract valuable intelligence, I develop a concept of military femininity that is formed through the interrelationship between humanitarianism and combat. This emphasis on combat contrasts with the focus on humanitarian rhetoric within scholarship on female counterinsurgency teams, which echoes military and popular media's own representation of the teams as a more humanitarian dimension to war.[36] Taking military and media narratives of humanitarian gendered counterinsurgency at face value, we miss the teams' strong association with combat and what this association might mean for an adequate understanding of military femininity. Women's own narratives of their time on female counterinsurgency teams call for a theorization of "combat femininity" that is akin to Jennifer Fluri's concept of "combat masculinity," which combines violence and heroism with gendered bodily performances.[37]

We must take into account how women's emotional labor—the work they do to manage their own emotions in order to produce a desired state in others according to job requirements—is directly tied to military combat. Writing specifically about flight attendants, although with regard to many gendered forms of labor, Arlie Hochschild defines "emotional labor" as requiring "one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others—in this case, the sense of being cared for in a convivial and safe place."[38] Female counterinsurgents recalled various strategic uses of emotional labor in interviews. Women described placing their hands on the bodies of Afghan women and children, adjusting their voice tone, and removing their body armor to elicit feelings of security and comfort in civilians so that they might allow the military operation to continue smoothly or provide useful information. Particularly among early Lioness teams (from 2003 onward), who received no additional training or preparation for combat operations, women performed emotional labor to suppress their own fear or misgivings about the missions they were on to "get the job done."

Hochschild argues that emotional labor "behaves like a commodity," carrying with it all the vulnerabilities and alienation of the worker established in classic political economy.[39] Because the soldier's labor is a different sort of commodity,

female counterinsurgents' emotional labor creates an interesting puzzle. Cowen has noted the soldier's absence from labor studies and political economy, even though the soldier has been central to modern welfare and citizenship regimes. Military work has also structured civilian work; modern workplace discipline and principles of industrial production and workplace organization originated within the military.[40] Taking from this insight that war work has structured civilian labor, in particular through social welfare, I present soldiering as a form of labor and, in the context of FETs, of emotional labor.

Military women's emotional labor is central to a new military femininity that upholds gender essentialisms such as women's emotional capacity at the same time as it promotes their role in combat. Lioness teams, FETs, and cultural support teams (CSTs, a later special operations program) all operated in violation of military policy that banned women from combat. Women were often in combat roles without the same training as their male counterparts and without the forms of documentation required to access certain Veterans Affairs health care and benefits. By examining where the push within the military to do these illicit forms of labor came from, how these teams were discussed in official military discourse, and how women serving on them understood their work, we see the emergence of a new military femininity that contains a more complex interplay between repression and inclusion than academic frameworks currently provide. I track the emergence of this new military femininity within the military's own labor force, in contrast to the stories the military tells about itself to the public at large. The years leading up to combat integration show how gendered counterinsurgency has taken on a new face of alleged inclusion whereby inclusion reinforces conservative gender roles and in fact exposes some women to heightened risk of injury.[41]

Imperial Histories of the Present

In US military trainings, instructors commonly used colonial history to convince trainees of the value of population-centric techniques such as military development projects. Different historiographical narratives create different historical lenses through which soldiers understand themselves. When instructors teach imperial history, for example, soldiers are asked to imagine themselves in the place of the British colonial soldier on the African continent or the US Army scout "pacifying" Indigenous resistance in the West. Such imperial historiographies operate at multiple levels of military knowledge production, including the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*'s authors drawing directly on historical writings on colonial counterinsurgencies in Algeria, Malaya, Indonesia, and Vietnam.[42] David Kilcullen, one of the most important counterinsurgent voices during the post-9/11 period

and a member of the manual's writing team, considered the Phoenix Program—which tortured, imprisoned, and killed tens of thousands of people during the Vietnam War—a success that had been "unfairly maligned." He thought it was in fact "highly effective" and should be treated as a model for counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.[43] If such military historiographies that treat Vietnam War–era counterinsurgency strategies as successful and call for their revival are so central to the making of the modern soldier, an alternate critical historiography of imperialism raises a series of questions about the forms and scale of military violence enacted upon those who inhabit sites of US military occupation. Critical histories of imperialism flip the script, which in a military historiography focuses on the role of the occupying force, and instead ask about continuity and change of colonial ideologies of race, gender, and other forms of social difference. Finally, alternate historiographies of imperialism enable us to ask what alternate futures may be possible that diverge from military doctrine.

"Small wars" theory originated within the US military in the context of the nineteenth-century Indian Wars of US westward expansion. Tactics the army had derived from the Indian Wars became the "necessary, if unwritten, manual for subsequent overseas asymmetric warfare, in the Philippines, the Caribbean, and Latin America."[44] The use of reservations, Native and settler scouts, and language of "civilization" as instrumental to pacification circulated through the military governors who traveled between sites of expanding US imperial power in the early twentieth century. The Treaty of Paris in 1898 saw the ascendency of the United States as a major imperial power, taking on sovereignty over not only the formerly Spanish-held Philippines but also Puerto Rico and Guam as well as Cuba in the form of a protectorate. The United States was embedded in intra- and interimperial circuits of government in this period, with Native rule and Native racial categories employed in the Philippines.[45] Inseparable in this period were "these two histories—of the racial remaking of empire and the imperial remaking of race."[46] Gail Bederman demonstrates US promotion of racism in this period through the notion of the "strenuous life," exemplified in Theodore Roosevelt's "embodiment of manly virtue, masculine violence, and white American racial supremacy."[47]

This high point of US imperial expansion at the end of the nineteenth century was not so much an aberration—the only time the United States became a "proper imperial power"—but instead, as Amy Kaplan argues, indicated the "multiple historical trajectories of the anarchy of empire," including violent continental expansion in the 1840s and colonization of Hawaii before its annexation as well as imperial ventures that came after.[48] Following this dense imperial node of 1898, the United States undertook military interventions during the first third of the twentieth century in Cuba, Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Collectively known as the Banana Wars, the period between

the end of the Spanish-American War and the beginning of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy marked another crucial turning point in twentieth-century US imperialism.[49] The almost twenty-year US Marine Corps occupation of Haiti (1915–1934) was administered through what historian Mary Renda calls a racialized paternalism. Following the occupation of Haiti, the United States renegotiated race, gender, sexuality, and national identity in direct relation to its imperial orbit.[50]

In the period before US entry into World War II, national debate framed by limitations on defense shifted to Roosevelt's much more expansive concept of national security.[51] The vast network that today encircles the globe in up to eight hundred US military bases has its roots in the World War II era. David Vine pinpoints the birth of what would become "base nation" to September 2, 1940, when Roosevelt exercised presidential power in the destroyers-for-bases deal that promised Britain a fleet of aging naval destroyers in exchange for ninety-nine–year leases on a group of air and naval bases in its colonies.[52] In tandem with this massive military expansion was the establishment of a political and economic order that by 1945 secured US hegemony. In the bipolar world unfolding after World War II, the United States pursued a "positive American world order" that built a network of regional alliances across the capitalist world.[53] Not just security alliances, these were the basis of social, political, and economic transformations cementing American control. As journalist I. F. Stone baldly stated, "Pax Americana is the 'internationalism' of Standard Oil, Chase Manhattan, and the Pentagon."[54] In the postwar era, the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement led to the formation of a global finance system as well as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, central banking institutions that were part of an emerging economic infrastructure dominated by US interests.[55] US military, political, and economic power was fortified in the context of a Cold War whose nuclear character threatened to annihilate humanity, eroding distinctions between soldiers and citizens.[56]

Counterinsurgency returned as the United States became increasingly embroiled in Vietnam. The US wars there were at the center of an early Cold War geography in the late 1940s and early 1950s that was "reorganizing the post–World War II world according to the principles of liberal capitalism."[57] By the time the United States had adopted its fully fledged policy of containment and rollback of Soviet power through the violent suppression of communist and anticolonial movements all over the world, the US war in Vietnam had also become a mirror reflecting bald-faced racism within the United States.[58] At the same time as draft resistance actively intersected with antiracist struggles and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his "Beyond Vietnam" speech that drew connections between domestic racism and imperial wars, the "prose of coun-

terinsurgency" provided the logic of racialized criminality that mainstream media outlets used to describe the Detroit and Watts uprisings. Counterinsurgency directly influenced urban policing in this period. For example, following the Detroit rebellion, President Lyndon Johnson's national security adviser, Walt Rostow, argued, "At home your appeal is for law and order as the framework for economic and social progress. Abroad we fight in Vietnam to make aggression unprofitable . . . [to] build a future of economic and social progress."[59]

The Cold War's "center of gravity" shifted to a series of proxy wars connecting southern Africa, Central America, and central Asia in the period following US defeat in Vietnam in the mid-1970s.[60] Within this broader geography of terrorism, a US-Saudi-Pakistani alliance formed in the late 1980s through which "the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] created the Mujaheddin and bin Laden as alternatives to secular nationalism."[61] Cooperation between the CIA and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence recruited the most radical versions of political Islam to the region and imported large numbers of weapons to fuel the CIA paramilitary anti-Soviet operation. US intervention in Afghanistan and the surrounding region during the Cold War precipitated 9/11 by organizing, arming, and training previously diffuse right-wing Islamists. US proxies recruited Osama bin Laden to promote this newly consolidated notion of global jihad.[62] He circulated between Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan with financial support, construction equipment, and civil engineers who built training camps and other infrastructure for the mujaheddin.[63]

With this in mind, we should understand the September 11, 2001 attacks as what Mahmood Mamdani calls "the result of an alliance gone sour, . . . first and foremost as the unfinished business of the Cold War."[64] Although a geography of interconnection produced the events of 9/11, which were themselves global in nature, the moments following the attacks saw an enormous amount of discursive and explicitly spatial work that produced those events as a US "*national* tragedy."[65] One example of this hardening of geographical boundaries is captured in war college professor Thomas Barnett's division of the world into a "functioning core" of countries, "where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security" and a "non-integrating gap" distinguished mainly by its "bloody boundaries" as well as poverty, disease, and "most important—the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of terrorists." Barnett argues that 9/11 did the security establishment a "huge favor" by showing where the boundaries between the "core" and the "gap" lie and revealing the dangers posed by the "gap." Imaginative geographies such as Barnett's underpinned the ensuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[66]

The "Terminal Crisis" of US Hegemony

Fueled in part by the binary spatial logic of the "Pentagon's new map," the Bush administration quickly set in place the conditions of possibility for a military response to the 9/11 attacks, swiftly signing into law a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those deemed responsible for the attacks.[67] Weeks later on October 7, 2001, the US military opened the Afghanistan War with a British-supported air assault against Afghanistan followed by a ground invasion. Although none of the nineteen hijackers hailed from Afghanistan, this was allegedly a war against terrorism and specifically the terrorist attacks of 9/11. At its height in 2011, about one hundred thousand US forces were deployed to Afghanistan.[68] As we move into the war on terror's third decade, the turning point from "boots on the ground" to covert and air wars whose battlefield spans the globe is a crucial opportunity to understand how the first twenty years of war were fought and to reckon with the consequences.

The 9/11 attacks also served as the catalyst for a group of neoconservative activists to implement a long-standing plan for regime change in Iraq.[69] In 1997, neoconservative activists founded the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), a foreign policy pressure group advocating military intervention to maintain US interests amid a shifting geopolitical landscape in the post–Cold War era. More than half of the PNAC's founding members, including Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Elliot Abrams, went on to assume high-level positions in the Bush administration.[70] In 1998, the PNAC authored a letter to President Bill Clinton advocating for regime change in Iraq as the pillar of the US-centric foreign policy they promoted. Regime change in Iraq became "an obsession" for Wolfowitz, which he continued to advocate for right up until 9/11.[71] Reporter George Packer describes how "within minutes of fleeing his office at the devastated Pentagon" after the 9/11 attacks, "Wolfowitz told aides that he suspected Iraqi involvement in the attacks." Surrounded by longtime PNAC proponents, Bush requested the very next day, even after being told that al-Qaeda was responsible for the attacks, that his counterterrorism team investigate "any shred" of Iraqi connection to the attacks.[72] Based on false premises of weapons of mass destruction, he declared war in Iraq preemptively.[73] The Coalition Provisional Authority, which governed the country in the occupation following invasion, was staffed through the sole criteria of loyalty to the Bush administration.

All of this came at the hefty price of US$8 trillion.[74] Economist Linda Bilmes calls Iraq and Afghanistan "credit card wars" for their historic financing through deficit spending.[75] The human cost of the wars is no less staggering. In Iraq and Afghanistan alone, over 250,000 civilians died violent deaths as a direct result of the wars. When Syria, Pakistan, and Yemen are included, this number grows to

about 387,000 civilians or 929,000 people total (including civilians, military, contractors, opposition fighters, journalists, humanitarian workers, etc.).[76] At least 38 million people have been displaced as a result of the wars the US military has fought globally since 2001.[77] During just the first dozen years of the global war on terror, 6,656 members of the US military were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, with this number rising to 6,956 by the war's twentieth year.[78] More than 40 percent of US service members who returned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and related locations, or 1.8 million people, have a service-connected disability from their deployment and qualify for lifetime disability benefits. The cost of caring for Iraq and Afghanistan veterans into the future will be as high as US$2.5 trillion.[79] These are just some of the human and economic costs of the post-9/11 wars.

Among the many post-9/11 analyses of resurgent US imperialism, Arrighi provides an especially compelling framework of the post-9/11 wars as the "terminal crisis" of US hegemony, following the "signal crisis" of the late 1960s and 1970s marked by defeat in Vietnam. Arrighi argues that "the Iraqi adventure definitively confirmed the earlier verdict of the Vietnam War—that is, that the Western superiority of force has reached its limits and shows strong tendencies towards implosion."[80] In analyzing the distinctive financial, military, and spatial dimensions of the US position in the world after World War II, Arrighi moves from a concept of "imperialism" to a theory of "world-hegemony."[81] This move breaks from extensions of classical theories of imperialism into the present, instead charting a new course that acknowledges how post–World War II US hegemony was formed through very different political, economic, and military conditions than the competition over territory among capitalist states that distinguished the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[82]

Arrighi's concept of a "struggle for world-hegemony" globalizes Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony as "the *additional* power that accrues to a dominant group by virtue of its capacity to lead society in a direction that not only serves the dominant group's interest but is also perceived by subordinate groups as serving a more general interest."[83] It is precisely Arrighi's Gramscian understanding of the political, economic, and military forces through which a *struggle* takes place that distinguishes his theory of US hegemony from more pervasive references to US imperialism. Understanding the social processes at work within this struggle requires concrete attention to military doctrine and practices. I see imperialism as redefined through the specificity of US power that Arrighi calls "world-hegemony." Yet I retain the term "imperialism" to signify new, violent, and expansionary dimensions of US financial and military power and continuities of colonial ideologies of race imported into the present through military trainings.[84] These imperial processes are intertwined with and transformed by struggles for consent signified by the term "hegemony."

Extending Gramsci's understanding of how economic crises alone cannot lead to historical events—"they can simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought"—Arrighi analyzes how the PNAC could not be implemented from above, but necessitated stoking domestic fear.[85] He draws a series of parallels between the Bush administration's response to 9/11 through adoption of the PNAC and President Harry Truman's embrace of Arthur Vandenberg's advice to "'scare hell out of the American people' by inflating the notion of global communist menace" in the early Cold War period.[86] In the post-9/11 period, scaring the hell out of the American people included making a racialized enemy centered on a Muslim "fundamentalist" threat.[87]

The military lessons I examine here contain a counterpart to domestic anti-Muslim racism in their representation of an imagined Afghan Other. But in contrast to the imagined Afghan Other, the new imperial feminism mobilizes particular valuations of racial identity. All-female teams are represented through civilizational rhetoric that attributes value to whiteness but employs the military's actual multiracial composition to do so. A prevalent military rhetoric of color blindness simultaneously denies this valuation of whiteness within the military as it couches imperial racism in the language of "culture" and "civilization." Such civilizational rhetoric is apparent in military claims that Afghan people are incapable of self-government. In contrast to the rugged masculinity reflected in notions of the "strenuous life" at the end of the nineteenth century, a white femininity now associated with counterinsurgency promotes the value of a delicate touch, sensitivity, and tropes of an imagined common humanity. These coupled understandings of race and gender give meaning to female counterinsurgents' work, allowing them, for example, to imagine a common solidarity of womanhood between themselves and the Afghan women they interact with on missions. In contrast to the military historiographies underpinning military doctrine, the alternate critical history discussed here frames the post-9/11 return of counterinsurgency as continuous with a longer imperial enterprise, asking what is distinctive about the modern assembly of imperialism.

Feminist Critics of Imperialism

Rather than accepting combat integration as a milestone on a progressive march toward universal women's equality, and the Afghanistan War as a defense of women's rights, we must ask how liberal feminist narratives of war enable and normalize US imperialism. For example, Judith Butler reflects on the "frames" of war—"the ways of selectively carving up experience as essential to the conduct of war."[88] She considers how sexual and feminist politics have provided a certain

frame for the war effort, including defining modernity in terms of sexual freedom.[89] If feminist politics have been framed in a way that fosters consent to war, the defining features of liberal feminism have been central to this framing. In contrast to the dominant frame of war that liberal feminism offers, feminist critics of imperialism provide an alternative to framing the Afghanistan War as liberating women, or combat integration as indicative of gender equality.

Marxist feminists such as Rosa Luxemburg and Raya Dunayevskaya understood imperialism as a manifestation of capitalism's geographical need to expand. Luxemburg theorized imperialism as a form of ongoing "primitive accumulation," or capitalism's impulse to pillage noncapitalist or "outside" systems in order to reinvest surplus value and continue expanding.[90] Luxemburg develops a concept of militarism as a "province of accumulation," driving imperialist expansion by taxing workers' wages to support an army acting in the bourgeoisie's interests. At the same time, armament manufacture becomes a new opportunity for accumulation.[91] Although Luxemburg wrote little on gender explicitly, she lived out a feminist critique of imperialism. Under her influence, the Second Women's Congress in 1910 called for a day of action against imperialist war, demonstrating the progressive force that women played within early twentieth-century socialist movements.[92]

Marxist understandings of imperialism as rooted in the logic of capital influenced Hannah Arendt's argument in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Although Arendt critiqued and ultimately departed from Karl Marx, she drew heavily on Luxemburg in her writings on imperialism.[93] Arendt came to understand imperialist expansion as a solution to nineteenth-century capitalism's contradiction of "superfluous money and superfluous men." As she saw it, "these two superfluous forces, superfluous capital and superfluous working power, joined hands and left the country together."[94] Such foundational thought linking imperialism to capitalism also informed women's anti-imperial and antifascist organizing through the Cold War period.[95] Historiographies of such organizing describe how liberal feminist framings have silenced this history in favor of a dominant narrative of the women's movement that focuses on equal rights.[96]

Following the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, contemporary feminist theorists have furthered such critiques of capitalism to dissect how gendered, racialized, and sexualized practices consolidate capitalism through imperialist wars.[97] They examine how the trope of "saving and/or protecting women" has been used in Afghanistan to further military violence, which in turn harms women.[98] Such impulses grow out of a much deeper colonial legacy of what Gayatri Spivak famously called "white men saving brown women from brown men."[99] Spivak was writing about Britain's justification of its imperial presence in India based on its abolition of widow sacrifice. Military rhetoric of liberating Afghan

women justified counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, reflected in the photographs of unveiled women handed out to US soldiers as evidence of their "triumph."[100]

Many servicewomen I interviewed described their interactions with Afghan women as an opportunity to demonstrate what a liberated, rights-bearing woman looks like. The female soldier became emblematic of a new imperial feminism that ties Afghan women's liberation to US military occupation. The linkage of this imperial violence to liberation resembles Spivak's critique but with some important differences. Here a multiracial group of US military women does the "rescuing." Many female soldiers also struggled with the dissonance between their imagined Afghan subject—a timid, oppressed, and "traditional" woman hidden under a burka—with some of the women they actually met who were vibrant and modern and resisted patriarchy however they could.

As female soldiers became symbols of feminist liberation, in contrast to their imagined Afghan counterparts, they took on a larger cultural valence within the United States as an equal rights issue. The American Civil Liberties Union advocated for women's rights to serve in all capacities alongside male service members and in 2012 sued the Department of Defense. Feminist critics such as Angela Y. Davis and Zillah Eisenstein have, in the face of ongoing wars, rejected the "fight for the equal right of women to participate in the military, for the equal right of women to torture, or for their equal right to be killed in combat."[101] This equal right to be killed is linked to the framing of US military women as "saving brown women from brown men." Female counterinsurgency teams' allegedly humanitarian activities such as medical clinics were often directly linked to intelligence gathering and combat. The teams were then used by advocates of combat integration as proof that military policy should reflect reality by allowing women to serve in ground combat units. The link between allegedly humanitarian activities and violent forms of combat and intelligence suggests that a more expansive definition of violence is necessary to include the "humanitarian" activities I examine here. This more expansive definition of violence is at work when USAID deploys private development contractors to military bases and when female counterinsurgents offer medical clinics.

Counterinsurgency as a Contingent Social Process

Counterinsurgency's uses of development, how it relies on past histories, and the gendered ramifications of those uses involve multiple interdisciplinary conversations. A conjunctural understanding of development shows how its relation to security must be produced through the intricate, messy social relations be-

tween soldiers, marines, military trainers, contractors, and development professionals whose experiences shape the following analysis. Conjunctural analysis is a Gramscian method for understanding historical moments of crisis, the long duration of which reveals "incurable structural contradictions" and "the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure. . . . These incessant and persistent efforts (since no social formation will ever admit that it has been superseded) form the terrain of the 'conjunctural,' and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organize."[102] A conjunctural analysis of counterinsurgency demands attention to how the relationship between development and security is produced through the political, economic, and military "relations of force" that shape the conjunctural terrain.[103]

Emphasizing the *production* of the relationship between development and security makes military trainings especially relevant sources of evidence. Within these settings, instructors encourage military personnel to internalize a securitized language of development. Such trainings also provoke contention over development personnel's role within military missions, or whether military personnel should be fulfilling a development objective. Trainings and other sites of military knowledge production reveal militarized development to be contingent, or coming into formation through multiple determinations that operate without guarantees.[104]

This contingent understanding of development is markedly different from Mark Duffield's "security-development nexus," which frames underdevelopment itself as dangerous and development as merged with security.[105] By categorizing development as a type of biopolitics within a "liberal problematic of security," Duffield predetermines development as always already conceptually and discursively tied to security.[106] In contrast to this pregiven relationship between development and security, which emphasizes the analytic identification of development's biopolitical traits, my contingent understanding of development emphasizes the practices, meanings, and processes through which development comes into formation.[107]

Examining the practices at work within military trainings allows for perspective into how war making can challenge, reinforce, or change the understandings soldiers carry within themselves. By analyzing military instruction in development, adaptations of colonial histories, and assembly of female counterinsurgency teams, this book advances scholarship on development as a contingent social process by elaborating how development's militarization has also taken shape through efforts to resolve the contradictory impulses of empire making. For instance, FETs were a direct response to soldiers' contradictory role in counterinsurgency of winning hearts and minds with one breath and enacting lethal force in the next.

Considering what happens within military trainings, history lessons, and female counterinsurgency teams also diverges conceptually and methodologically

from much of the existing scholarship on what is often referred to as "military humanitarianism." Derek Gregory has written of the US military's "cultural turn," which was defined by counterinsurgency's emphasis on the "human terrain" as opposed to the physical terrain, and a shift in military optics from territory to population.[108] Gregory's definition of the "cultural turn" as a second phase of the Revolution in Military Affairs is an important intervention into scholarship that sees military emphasis on population and culture as opposed to the use of drones and high-tech lethal instruments. He frames the cultural turn as part of the "re-enchantment" of war in which developmental forms of war are merely a "dress uniform" to distract the public from actual violence.[109] The analytical burden then becomes to strip away the dress uniform to reveal the more significant aspects of war making. Developmental and humanitarian projects pursued as part of counterinsurgency operations become less legitimate objects of study than the "kinetic" (violent) operations they are attempting to "dress up."

Gregory's intervention filled an important political need when counterinsurgency was presented to the public as a "kinder," "gentler," "humanitarian style of military intervention."[110] At the same time, emphasis on revealing humanitarian and development projects within counterinsurgency for their actual military objective has directed attention away from the internal workings of such projects. It has unintentionally replicated the military's own language of humanitarianism, at times neglecting how such projects not only acted as window dressing to obscure military violence but were also themselves part of the operation of such violence.

By delving into the inner workings of developmental and humanitarian forms of militarism, this book shows how their unintended consequences alone merit attention. What may begin as an attempt to dress up militarism in the garb of humanitarianism can also produce new institutions that change the financial and bureaucratic relationship of security to development within the US government. More than an attempt to conceal the truly violent nature of militarism, such projects are themselves integral to military violence. For example, the paradigmatic cups of tea female counterinsurgents describe drinking, often in the language of "winning hearts and minds," actually support intelligence gathering. By asking more about what happens when those cups of tea are consumed, the institutional and financial structures leading up to the "key leader engagement," and the type of soldiering entailed, this book reconceptualizes violence by holding development and humanitarian activities in relation to their military objective.

Such a reconceptualization demands that we move beyond binary military language of "kinetic" (violent) and "nonkinetic" (nonviolent) activities. Counterinsurgency's critics have focused on unmasking the nonkinetic dimensions of counterinsurgency as a "therapeutic discourse" that simply deflects attention from kinetic operations such as the air strikes that intensified in the very years the

counterinsurgency manual was released (2006 and 2007).[111] In doing away with the binary of violent/nonviolent (itself the military's own making), we need to ask how those activities the military describes as nonkinetic are entirely implicated in violence. Pushing on the violent/nonviolent boundary even more, I also treat the dry delivery of a PowerPoint presentation and the seemingly sanguine exchange between Afghan role players and marines in a simulated village meeting as violent processes.[112] It would be a misreading to view such activities as nonviolent military acts. Nor are they simply papering over the more violent aspects of war. Rather, the subtle, even boring aspects of war making such as PowerPoint constitute violence. They make possible the air strike, the civilian casualties, and the thirty-eight million or more displaced: the female soldier's emotional labor facilitates the night raid in which civilians die.

I do not describe in great detail the violence enacted upon Afghan civilians. Studies exist that rightly draw our attention and horror to this violence. We know that about 929,000 people have been killed directly as a result of the post-9/11 wars.[113] But we know very little about how the military's revived penchant for development and humanitarian activities is part of this broader spectrum of violence. Although they have been central to the wars that continue today, we lack an understanding of how developmental military technologies are produced.[114]

The product of military trainings is not the canals the military promises to build but rather the transformation of gendered and racialized meanings of military labor. These struggles are a far more significant outcome of changes in military discourse than the promised wells, schools, and clinics. In contrast to the stated aim of such trainings to convince soldiers of the value of doing "armed social work" in all its feminized light, soldiers' rejection of these lessons ends up reinforcing traditional associations of combat with masculinity. Trainings produce racist, paternalistic understandings of Afghan civilians as incapable of managing their own lives. Within female counterinsurgency teams, gender essentialisms such as women's emotional expertise have taken hold through allegedly humanitarian projects that might otherwise be disregarded as public relations distractions from actual military violence. Female soldiers describe the gendered uses of emotion as a weapon to collect intelligence and raid homes. These activities are integral to, not an adjacent distraction from, the actual violence of war. An eye to the production side of military labor blurs the boundary between what the military claims is and is not violent and reveals the stakes of this boundary: for instance, female counterinsurgents' invisibility in combat limiting their ability to claim service-connected disabilities.

In contrast to existing analyses of counterinsurgency, *At War with Women* offers a contingent understanding of how the relationship between development and security has taken shape in the post-9/11 era. Focusing on practices inside

the programs that other scholarship has dismissed as part of a dress uniform covering up the real stuff of empire reveals the unintended consequences of new bureaucracies and funding sources that have changed the development landscape. This focus also situates the history of colonial and Cold War counterinsurgency in the present, in military classrooms where instructors need this history to make claims for a military identity rooted in "armed social work." All of these components of war making feed into the construction of gender, race, and social difference in the modern imperial United States.

Methodological and Conceptual Approach

I first encountered development contractors working on military bases during fieldwork I began at USAID's Washington, D.C., headquarters in 2010. I had arranged a series of interviews with the agency's Office of Military Affairs because I was interested in a new federal financial mechanism that allowed a small portion of discretionary defense spending to be transferred via the State Department to development projects led by nongovernmental organizations. Some employees there and especially their counterparts in other USAID offices were concerned about the military's encroachment into what they understood as USAID's territory. The new funding stream was one among many institutional linkages in this period that created new relationships between military and development bureaucracies. The Office of Military Affairs was itself a major conduit of these new development-defense linkages; it contracted development experts to provide the military with predeployment training that repackaged development "best practices" for military use. After I interviewed several USAID employees about this military training, my numerous questions resulted in the invitation to observe the training for myself (and perhaps stop asking so many questions!). I spent the following year shadowing contractors hired by USAID as they traveled to different military bases across the United States, observing how they taught the material and interacted with their military audiences. This initial entry into military trainings through development contractors opened into much more extensive opportunities to learn about military training, military knowledge production, and military life more generally. Over time I was able to observe the pieces of predeployment training that came before and after the contractors' materials. Eventually, I was invited to entire trainings that were related to the transformations associated with counterinsurgency but did not include the contractors directly.

This book reflects changing definitions of ethnography.[115] My research questions could not have been answered by a more traditional ethnographic approach

of spending a sustained period of time in one field site. Access to military trainers depended on my ability to circulate with them between different sites as they traveled to interlinked military bases all around the United States. Rather than a year- or years-long engagement in a particular place, my observations on military bases were concentrated into periods ranging from several days to eight weeks. I conducted these concentrated observations on six military bases within the United States, returning to some more than once, mainly between 2010 and 2012. This did not include observations at war colleges (treated separately), which were often located on different military bases. Since base access is often possible only with permission for a specific purpose, my observations were structured by the trainings I was able to observe.

This book uses an ethnographic lens to understand the question of how development became weaponized during the post-9/11 era of counterinsurgency. Applied to military trainings, this lens foregrounds how instructors confronted resistance as they tried to transform soldiers into "armed social workers."[116] The perspective from the training classroom, training material, and informal conversations with military personnel, contractors, and role players reveals the production of "armed social workers" to be quite contentious in practice. Analytically, this provides a perspective of the US military—an object often popularly and academically seen as monolithic—as being full of contradiction and requiring constant work to maintain.

My methodological approach of following the historical examples and justifications that military instructors used into their archives grew out of my observations from these contentious classrooms. The combined action platoons of the Vietnam War—which deployed a small US Marine Corps rifle squad with a South Vietnamese military platoon to a targeted village to deprive the Viet Cong of village access and support—were a key reference point in the trainings I observed.[117] Haiti also featured prominently in these classrooms because my research period dovetailed with the large military response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The earthquake was prefigured by the long-standing relationship between the United States and Haiti, the first occupation of which was itself a strong source of military "lessons learned" regarding training local militaries and the uses of development in counterinsurgency.[118] To clarify the historical texture of these military lessons, I spent six months in Haiti mainly working with collections from the early twentieth-century Marine Corps occupation. Reading this archive against military uses of this same history to teach post-9/11 counterinsurgency revealed how military historical instruction often erases political dynamics in favor of abstract tactics that instructors argue can travel between times and places.

As I saw these histories used in predeployment trainings on military bases, I wanted to know more about their broader role in military knowledge production.

In my initial observations of military trainings, I sat in on instruction at some of the armed forces war colleges, which are the top leadership schools for each of the military's armed services. Initially, I observed several UN-taught courses on humanitarian emergencies as well as military curricula focused on counterinsurgency history, strategy, and policy. In 2016–2017, I conducted a more systematic set of observations at one of these war colleges to gain a greater understanding of how historical material was treated at the highest echelons of military academic instruction. Here, mainly college-educated officers and some civilian defense professionals received detailed lessons on Vietnam War–era counterinsurgency. Vietnam was treated as a case study in relation to the present day in many of the classrooms I observed, but, at this high academic level of military instruction, Malaya and Algeria were also key references that shaped doctrine during the Vietnam War. My methodology of following such historical material from war college classrooms into historiographies and archives is part of a conceptual argument that colonial and Cold War histories actively shape the production of the contemporary soldier. Critical theorists have noted the intensity of US counterinsurgency practitioners' awareness and invocation of historical cases, but we know much less about how these histories inform lower-level trainings and soldiers' everyday experiences.[119]

Through the fieldwork I began in 2010 on military bases, I started to encounter women who had served on all-female counterinsurgency teams. By 2011, the height of the FET and CST programs and my most intensive period of training observations, I also noticed various military trainings promoting the FET program. During a five-week Marine Corps training for civil affairs specialists—a military specialization in civilian interaction that encompasses everything from humanitarian response to processing condolence payments—I spent the final week of the training sleeping on a lumpy plastic cot in the women's barracks alongside the handful of female marines enrolled in the training.[120] Some of these women had been previously deployed on Lioness teams and FETs. Two female public affairs officers were especially interested in my research and invited me to run through the humid forested trails around the training exercise and to join them in early morning sessions completing the "Insanity" workout mix they had downloaded before a breakfast of foamy dehydrated eggs and clumpy oatmeal. I was captivated by their motivations for joining a masculinist institution that so often treated women's bodies as "foreign."[121] The enthusiastic conversations in some military circles about the FETs as the cutting edge of counterinsurgency tactics ran counter to established academic understandings as well as my own taken-for-granted notions of the military as masculinist.

I remained interested in the military women I had met during my first phase of intensive fieldwork on bases and in the female counterinsurgency teams that

continued to play a central role in the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. By 2016–2017, in part because the program had ended and many of its participants were by then able to speak about their experiences, I could again spend several concentrated periods of time on military bases interviewing former members of Lioness teams, FETs, and CSTs. I interviewed twenty-two women who had deployed on these teams and another ten who had trained, partnered with, or commanded such teams. Most of these interviews were on bases. For women who had separated from the military, we had coffee in the towns where they now resided or talked by phone or video call. I was also granted access to twenty-five video interviews conducted by the D.C.-based leadership and professional development organization Women in International Security and housed at the Army Women's Museum. These two sets of interviews, supplemented by media coverage, military documents, and training materials, provide the basis for my discussion of female counterinsurgency teams and their associated gender politics.[122]

Methodologically, this book draws together ethnographic observations of military trainings, archival exploration into the histories that military instructors used to create post-9/11 doctrine, and servicewomen's interviews, journal entries, and other primary military sources. Together, these sources provide insight into the practices within military institutions, how history shapes those practices, and how shifts in military doctrine took shape through changing notions of race and gender. Centering analysis on the practices within military institutions is a methodological preference but also a conceptual argument that these practices are central to understanding the shape of contemporary imperialism and thus warrant scholarly attention.

The Rise of a New Imperial Feminism

The following chapters trace the arc of the US military's integration of development into counterinsurgency training and the reliance of this weaponized development on particular understandings of history, through to its gendered effects in the deployment of all-female counterinsurgency teams. The foundations for this arc are rooted in changes that took place in US military doctrine and training during the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*'s significance in enlisting development, chapter 1 analyzes the development rhetoric located within the manual and related texts. Development has been historically considered a weapon of colonial and Cold War counterinsurgencies. Post-9/11 military discursive and policy shifts provoked institutional changes within the US government that linked the administration of development to defense in new ways. Military claims for soldiering

to now resemble "armed social work" led to the imperative for military trainings commensurate with this newly conceived soldier.

The reemergence of counterinsurgency provoked new forms of military training. Chapter 2 follows a Provincial Reconstruction Team as it moved through the different dimensions of predeployment training for Afghanistan.[123] Drawing on ethnographic observations of development experts whom USAID contracted to train military personnel, I focus on contractors' instruction of a USAID-written framework of development "best practices." The framework most often came after the segment of training on counterinsurgency, offering development as a weapon in the broader counterinsurgency effort. As students moved through the classroom instruction and simulations involved in training, they established intensifying critiques of what it meant to be "an NGO with guns." In response to soldiers who rejected the material through taken-for-granted notions of combat masculinity, trainers invited famous generals to class to explicitly describe the "population-centric" form of war they were learning as "manly." Such visits did not succeed so much in changing soldiers' minds as they did in provoking debate among soldiers, contractors, and military trainers about what it meant to be a soldier today.

At Quantico, instructors used history as a retort to marines who rejected the civilian-centric and nonkinetic (nonviolent) aspects of the course. Instructors met students' critiques that they did not want to be "armed social workers" with stories of how famous marines such as Smedley Butler and Chesty Puller were shaped through their deployments to Haiti training local security forces in the early twentieth century. Chapter 3 follows the construction of military historiographies as they inform present-day doctrine drawing on interventions in Haiti and the Caribbean in the early twentieth century, Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, and Vietnam and Malaya during the Cold War. These three times and places were central to the lessons I saw taught at Quantico Marine Corps Base, Fort Bragg Army Base, and the US Naval War College, respectively. Through a reading of Marine Corps archival documents, the chapter first examines how small wars doctrine was shaped through historical US marines' experiences in places such as Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines. Beginning from a war college classroom, the chapter then traces the influence of Walt Rostow and the Strategic Hamlet Program through post-9/11 military learning about counterinsurgency and connects a Marine Corps instructor's lesson on gendered counterinsurgency to French colonial programs and writings during the Algerian War of Independence.

The legacy of women's military labor being used to shore up empire continues through the military's incorporation of development and humanitarianism. Chapter 4 focuses on how militarized development required new forms of ser-

vicewomen's labor through army and Marine Corps Lioness teams, army FETs, and special operative CSTs. After an overview of the temporal and conceptual development of the teams, I narrate each iteration through in-depth interviews with counterinsurgency team members. Interviews, journal entries, letters home, and training materials pose a paradox of female soldiers as central to militarized development at the same time as they were marginalized within military institutions. We meet women who served on the earliest Lioness teams—who combine memories of searching Afghan and Iraqi women at checkpoints and on home raids with being denied Veterans Affairs services once they returned because their combat was never documented. FET members recall their emotional labor "soothing" and "calming" Afghan women following their infantry division's home raids. Such stories illustrate pervasive military understandings of women as the emotional experts of war.

Humanitarian rhetoric deployed in support of the FETs morphed into promotion of women's utility in combat, often on the basis of their emotional expertise. The work performed by special operative CSTs forms the basis of chapter 5. CST narratives show how even combat-intensive special operative missions further

FIGURE 1. Female engagement team training, US army base. Author photo.

entrenched the basis of women's inclusion in emotional labor. Women also focused on how their physical and biological difference—often framed in terms of sexuality—provided value to special operations missions. Servicewomen established understandings of themselves as global ambassadors for women's rights, a notion that took on gendered meaning through constructions of racial difference. Military representations of phenotypically white women performing counterinsurgent labor not only erased the labor performed by soldiers of color but also articulated a broader imperial feminism that framed female soldiers as a beacon of women's rights that could guide Afghan women into the modern world. Racialized language of culture and civilization is linked to military discourses of a "color-blind" approach to race, which structures racism within military ranks as it enables civilizational arguments for military intervention on the basis of cultural differences.

The United States has been reshaped by twenty years of war. The effects of imperialism and militarism on the country are profound. As the military expands its recognition and inclusion of transgender people, one of these effects is the military's increasing prevalence as a site at which gender and politics produce one another. Through study of the years leading up to the formal integration of women in combat, this book offers a window into how understandings of military labor were being constructed in conjunction with race, gender, and imperialism during the post-9/11 revival of counterinsurgency. This return to counterinsurgency relied on colonial and Cold War histories while military thinkers glossed over the body counts of the Phoenix Program. A new imperial feminism has promoted military women's inclusion at the same time that it has entrenched essentialist understandings of femininity defined through emotion, motherhood, heterosexual marriage, and domesticity. Grasping the construction and dimensions of this new imperial feminism is crucial to understanding how the United States' longest wars have been perpetuated and how their legacy will shape the social fabric of war for years to come.