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## Introduction

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### Background to the Study

The sponsor of our study, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), is the primary producer of ground forces intelligence in the Department of Defense (DoD).<sup>1</sup> NGIC was created in March 1995, when the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) were merged to form a Center of Excellence devoted to providing ground-component intelligence-production support to national and departmental intelligence consumers.<sup>2</sup> Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), exercises direct operational control (OPCON) over NGIC, which is a major subordinate command of INSCOM. NGIC's mission statement is

[T]o produce all-source integrated intelligence on foreign ground forces and support combat technologies to ensure that U.S. forces and other decision makers will always have a decisive edge on any battlefield.<sup>3</sup>

And its institutional vision is

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<sup>1</sup> See Robert O'Connell and John S. White, "NGIC: Penetrating the Fog of War," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, April–June 2002, pp. 14–18.

<sup>2</sup> See DoD, "Memorandum for Correspondents," Memorandum No. 046-M, March 2, 1995.

<sup>3</sup> National Ground Intelligence Center, Web site home page, December 2006.

[To be the] Premier Intelligence analysis organization in DoD . . . [f]rom analytic products that ensure U.S. forces and their allies will always have a decisive edge in equipment, organization, and training on any future battlefield . . . [t]o on-the-spot intelligence for the fight . . . [t]o providing information that affects policy decisions at all levels . . . [i]n an organizational environment of trust, respect, and communications dedicated to selfless service for the nation.<sup>4</sup>

NGIC produces multi-source intelligence products that include scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) and general military intelligence (GMI) on foreign ground forces in support of combatant commanders, force and material developers, the Department of the Army, DoD, and other national-level decisionmakers. Historically, NGIC has produced and maintained intelligence on foreign scientific developments, ground force weapons systems, and associated technologies.<sup>5</sup> NGIC aspires to be the Center of Excellence for ground force irregular warfare (IW) intelligence production.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> National Ground Intelligence Center, Web site home page, “About” section, December 2006.

<sup>5</sup> NGIC analysis includes but is not limited to military communications electronics systems; types of aircraft used by foreign ground forces; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) systems; and basic research in civilian technologies with possible military applications. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Intelligence*, Field Manual (FM) 2-0, Washington, D.C., May 2004, p. 10-2.

<sup>6</sup> According to reports in the media, the classified 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) execution roadmap on IW called for the establishment of a Center of Excellence for IW. See Sebastian Sprenger, “DOD, State Dept. Eye Joint ‘Hub,’” *Inside the Pentagon*, November 16, 2006. The role of the center would be to “coordinate IW research, education, training, doctrine, and lessons learned” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Irregular Warfare (IW) Execution Roadmap,” unclassified briefing, undated, slides 9–13). The Marine Corps has a Small Wars Center of Excellence at Quantico, Virginia, and the Air Force has stood up an IW Center of Excellence at Nellis Air Force Base that aims to “give our foreign and potential coalition partners a one-stop shop for all integration issues with the Air Force.” (Quotation from Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne, “State of the Force,” remarks to Air Force Association’s Air and Space Conference and Technology Exposition 2006, Washington, D.C., September 25, 2006. Information on the Small Wars Center of Excellence can be found at the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars web page, 2007.

This aspiration—and the impetus for the study—derives from the recent emergence and growing importance of IW in DoD:

[W]e must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat. . . . [I]mproving the U.S. Armed Forces' proficiency in irregular warfare is the Defense Department's top priority.<sup>7</sup>

## Study Aims and Analytic Approach

Following its designation as a Center of Excellence for IW intelligence production, NGIC asked RAND to provide assistance in developing an education and training curriculum for improving the capabilities available to NGIC analysts for IW-related intelligence analyses.

In consultation with the sponsor, we divided the problem into two phases. The first focused on identifying the intelligence and analytic requirements associated with IW and developing a framework for intelligence analysis of IW operating environments that subsequently could be translated into an education and training curriculum. The goal of the second phase was to translate this framework into a more detailed education and training curriculum for NGIC. This monograph documents the results of the first phase of the overall effort.


Figure 1.1 describes the approach we took in identifying IW intelligence and analytic requirements. As the figure shows, the study team took three separate passes at the problem.

The team's first pass involved a review of extant Army and other U.S. military doctrine to understand what intelligence and analytic requirements of IW already had been identified. The doctrinal review included a review of mission-oriented doctrine for IW's constituent

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<sup>7</sup> See DoD, *National Defense Strategy*, Washington, D.C., June 2008, pp. 4, 13. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has identified the “long war” against violent extremism as the nation's top priority over coming decades. See Josh White, “Gates Sees Terrorism Remaining Enemy No. 1; New Defense Strategy Shifts Focus from Conventional Warfare,” *The Washington Post*, July 31, 2008, p. A1.

**Figure 1.1**  
**Analytic Approach for Identifying IW Intelligence and Analytic Requirements**



RAND MG668-1.1

missions (more on this later), as well as a review of military intelligence doctrine to see what it had to say about IW.

The second pass took a different approach. The team began by identifying common logical lines of operation (LLOs) for IW's constituent missions that had been identified in U.S. military doctrine and other publications; it then held brainstorming sessions to identify the intelligence and analytic requirements associated with each LLO.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Lines of operation "define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives" (DoD, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2001 (as amended through April 14, 2006), p. 310). In contrast, logical lines of operation, or LLOs, "define the operational design when positional reference to an adversary has little relevance. . . . Operations designed using LLOs typically consist of an extended, event-driven time line. This time line combines the complementary, long-range effects of civil-military operations as well as the cyclic, short-range events characteristic of combat operations" (Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, Field Manual-Interim (FMI) 5-0.1, Washington, D.C., March 2006,

The third pass, which was based on insights from past RAND work and a review of the academic literature,<sup>9</sup> viewed the IW environment through different methodological “lenses,” including expected utility modeling, social network analysis, media content or communications analysis, public opinion analysis, and major theories related to IW, mobilization, and other relevant phenomena.

These parallel efforts led to lists of IW intelligence and analytic requirements that we compiled and taxonomically organized. To assess the comprehensiveness and completeness of these lists of requirements, we then cross-checked them with area study outlines, educational curricula, and military intelligence, academic, and other syllabi that had been developed for the study of IW, as well as with other materials.

In developing a framework for IW intelligence analysis, the study team aimed to identify those features of the IW environment that best captured the inherently dynamic and changing character of IW situations, including mobilization, escalation, coalition formation, bargaining, and influence. Ultimately, this led to a logically related set of analytic tasks that, taken together, are highly likely to lead to complete and comprehensive analyses of any given IW environment.

## Organization of This Monograph

Chapter Two of this monograph evaluates IW through a review of recent DoD efforts to define IW; Chapter Three reviews the analytic requirements of IW and presents the analytic framework the study team developed for assessing IW situations; Chapter Four provides conclusions. Appendix A is a review of official policy and strategy documents

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pp. A-6 and A-7. The LLOs we considered were combat operations, training and employing host nation security forces, governance, essential services, economic development, and strategic communications/information operations.

<sup>9</sup> Eric V. Larson et al., *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations*, MG-654-A, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, forthcoming; and Eric V. Larson et al., *Understanding Commanders' Information Needs for Influence Operations*, MG-656-A, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, forthcoming.

related to IW, and Appendix B lists doctrinal publications identified as addressing the intelligence analytic requirements of IW.