INTRODUCTION

1 Aspects of Urbanization in China: Shanghai, Hong Kong, Guangzhou

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Urbanization is as old as civilization. As societies change and develop, urbanization tends to be part and parcel of that development. In fact, the evolution of the city has mirrored human development in a symbiotic way. Mankind's chief glory has always been its cities. They represent all that is best in human endeavor: the ability to plan, to construct, and to live together in comity. Cities are evidence of mankind's ability to reshape the environment to better suits its needs, and to exhibit the best that can be produced by human hands and minds, not just in engineering terms but in architecture and the arts as well. Cities also act as crucibles of change; the way a society will develop is often first discerned in a city. They have been the birthplace of art, culture, and commerce and have enabled us to be who we are today.

There have been waves of urbanization throughout history, from ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia to the flowering of the Greek city-states, through the rigorous planning of the Romans to the ad hoc mercantilist zeal of the Renaissance. The nineteenth century, with its staggering technological development, saw the Western empires establish new cities all over the world, invariably founded to control the flows of goods and people.

At the end of the twentieth century there was a seismic shift of wealth, power, and influence back to the East. Asia is experiencing its own renaissance as a center of world power, and now it is China's turn to engage in city building. China, of course, has a long and venerable history of urban development. Beginning as far back as the second millennium BCE, Chinese cities were ritual centers surrounded by artisan workshops in service to royal courts. The creation of a united empire under the Zhou Dynasty, around 1110 BCE, saw the development of large walled towns, and it was in the Han and the Tang Dynasties that followed that a pattern of centralized control was first devised that enjoyed an unparalleled duration and thoroughness. For more than a millennium, China's capitals of Loyang, Chang'an, and Kaifeng were among the world's largest cities.

China is now a world power politically, militarily, and economically, and is increasingly being seen as a rival to the United States. China's economy is now second only to that of the United States, the result of almost 10 percent growth per annum for over three decades. A number of countries in the early stages of economic development and/or reform have experienced rapid growth, but nothing has ever come close to the speed of achievement in China in recent years, and one significant factor in China's remarkable economic growth has been its rapid and massive urbanization.

This book examines some of the aspects of this urbanization in China. This will necessarily be an incomplete picture, which is why the book has been called 'Aspects of Urbanization in China', as aspects are all we can hope to look at in such a vast country with so many cities, and all undergoing such rapid change. The papers have been written by academics from different disciplines, primarily architecture and urbanism (indeed some of the contributors have been trained as architects and are still in private practice), but there are also contributions from fields as diverse as social science, area studies and geography. The point of departure for their investigations is always the city – in this case the cities of Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou – and their papers represent ongoing processes of research and exploration which, taken together, give us a useful snapshot of such a rapidly developing discourse.

Split into three parts, the book deals with cities' global ambitions as well as their cultural and architectural expression. Part One examines the role of the architectural icon in the business of city-branding. It also looks at certain specific cities' efforts to brand themselves in an increasingly globalized world – in this case Shanghai (via the 2010 World Expo) and Guangzhou.

Leslie Sklair's chapter 'Towards an Understanding of Architectural Iconicity in Global Perspective' in Part One has a wider breadth of scope than most of the other chapters in the book. In it, he explores the role of icons, especially architectural icons, in a city's identity-building. Sklair posits the idea that certain types of architecture can be hegemonic in a class sense, so that alongside their recognized aesthetic qualities they can also serve specific class interests. Iconic architecture, defined by Sklair in terms of a particular building's fame, is often achieved by rendering it with a distinctive aesthetic or symbolic significance. Historically, this sort of architecture tended to be driven by the state and/or religious elites, but in an era of capitalist globalization it is those who are in control of capital flows – the transnational capitalist class – that have become increasingly implicated in the production of iconic architecture, particularly in service to their own narrow and specific class interests.

Jacob Dreyer's chapter 'Shanghai and the 2010 Expo: Staging the City' explores issues in Shanghai's urbanism, particularly the question of why architecture is the language through which the contemporary spirit of cities tends to express itself. In Shanghai, these concepts can be seen in the futuristic skyline, enormous neon-lit highways, and the 2010 World Expo. Dreyer sees Shanghai as the symbolic outlier of China, a space fundamentally out of step with the rest of the country because it was always ahead of it. The city's clearly expressed aim of becoming (once again) a world city makes use of events like the World Expo as a way of fusing its rich historical legacy with a contemporaneity so fresh that, as Dreyer puts it, it almost seems to be the future rather than the present.

'Guangzhou's Special Path to Global City Status' by Xiangmin Guo and Changtao Liu is the last paper in Part One and looks at this city's long and proud history of foreign trade, where for most of China's imperial history it was the only point of contact with the outside world. During the century or so that it had treaty port status (from 1842 onwards), Guangzhou stayed ahead of its inland competitors by turning itself into a highly cosmopolitan place. But since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, Guangzhou has lost out to nearby neighbor Hong Kong. The city is now trying to reposition itself as a bridgehead for foreign trade in China, while paving the way towards global importance for the rest of the country's cities. Guo and Liu identify one of the main challenges of this task as building an increasing resistance to the negative influences of globalization on the path towards becoming a global city.

Part Two examines the cultural expression of the rural-urban migration taking place in China (the largest anywhere in the world). This is done in two of the papers through the medium of cinema. Ana M. Moya Pellitero's 'Repairing the Rural-Urban Continuum: Cinema as Witness' examines the work of the Fifth- and Sixth-Generation film directors such as Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige, Jia Zhang-ke, and Wang Xiaoshuai. These filmmakers established their reputations by depicting the rural-urban dichotomy that has existed in China since the economic reforms of 1978. Moya Pellitero asserts that until the end of the imperial system in 1911, China was a single hybrid continuum that was neither urban nor rural, and that its civilization was based on a complex web of relationships and hierarchies where individuals could be urban in their political and religious outlook but rural in their bond to the land and their place of origin. In contemporary China, particularly since the economic reforms, the traditional urban-rural continuum has come under attack, a phenomenon that has been in explored in films such as Chen Kaige's *King of the Children* and Zhang Yimou *Shanghai Triad*, as well as Jia Zhang-ke's *Platform* (which forms part of his trilogy *Rèn Xiāo*

yáo) and Wang Xiaoshuai's *So Close to Paradise*, all of which are examined here.

The second chapter that takes cinema as its point of departure is 'Revisiting Hong Kong: Fruit Chan's "Little Cheung"' by Tsung-yi Michelle Huang. In it, Hong Kong's postcolonial condition is examined by initially drawing on a number of commentators, namely Rey Chow, who sees Hong Kong's return to China as marking the beginning of another era of colonization rather than putting an end to one, and Ackbar Abbas, who argues that the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration has played a crucial role in the historical development of the territory's postcolonial consciousness by shaping how Hong Kong people define their own identity. Huang's own analysis, which is subtle and astute, seeks to clarify the interaction between postcolonial writing and the urban space of the global city by examining the cultural representation of the postcolonial consciousness rather than the political structures of postcoloniality itself. She makes telling use of Fruit Chan's film *Little Cheung*, which follows the life of a nine-year-old boy from the winter of 1996 through to the summer of 1997 (and the handover of Hong Kong). According to Huang, this deceptively simple device, generally regarded as the director's 'national' allegory, enabled him to constitute a local identity in response to the political impact of the handover.

Part Two contains one final chapter, and this deals with a portrayal of Shanghai in literature: 'Sensual, But No Clue of Politics: Shanghai's *Longtang* Houses' by Lena Scheen. Ever since Shanghai was opened up to foreign investment in 1984, and particularly since the Pudong area was established as a Special Economic Zone in 1990, the city has been undergoing an explosive process of urbanization. Scheen sees large-scale urban renewal not only transforming the physical appearance of the built environment (through new architecture, etc.) but also transforming the way in which people live in that environment, with profound effects on citizens' daily and inner lives. In identifying an increasing sense of nostalgia for Shanghai's semi-colonial past, Scheen's paper focuses on Wang Anyi's novel *The Song of Everlasting Sorrow* as one of the most representative examples of this new 'Shanghai nostalgia'. This novel centers on the life of a woman living in Shanghai's traditional *longtang* (or alleyway houses) rather than the glamorous Western architecture of the Bund. Its depiction of everyday life for middle-class Shanghainese should not be understood as any kind of negative response to the city's recent transformations; rather, Scheen sees it as a way of celebrating (and negotiating) the modernization process.

Part Three returns to the architectural-urbanistic point of departure of the book, with analyses of Hong Kong and Shanghai. Non Arkaraprasertkul's chapter 'Urbanization and Housing: Socio-Spatial

Conflicts over Urban Space in Contemporary Shanghai' seeks to make sense of the process of urbanization in China in a broader sense, and makes use of an understanding of such a process in a focused case study of local communities in Shanghai. Its discussion of the theoretical frameworks of urbanization takes into account various disciplines including history, geography, architecture, sociology, and anthropology, and tries to shed some light on the conflicts and tensions over urban space brought about by the sort of transformations that have been seen in Shanghai in recent years. It begins with the practical problems of housing in present-day Shanghai, for which the *lilong* (alleyway house[1]) has simply failed to deliver. While these old houses may help the city maintain its connection with the past, most people do not want to live in them because they are old and inconvenient and because there are better options in modern accommodation. Arkaraprasertkul is right to point out that what makes the *lilong* worth preserving is not just the house itself (although this is not unimportant) but rather the dynamism of the community that it forms a part of. This paper reflects an ongoing research that raises as many questions as it answers, including whether enough has been done in the study of *lilong* houses (and neighborhoods) to even understand the nature of the questions posed.

These chapters all represent different levels of academic expertise, and this has been a deliberate decision on the part of the editor. Any perception of unevenness that may result is regretted, but please try to be indulgent: the value of these different perspectives should, hopefully, outweigh any disjunction between the levels of ability in expressing them. This book, as has already been mentioned, has an architectural and urbanistic point of departure, but it is still very much a multi-disciplinary endeavor. This multi-disciplinary approach has been followed in an attempt to mitigate the occasional one-sidedness of the architectural-urbanistic views that tend to take a too rigidly architectonic stance. By placing these analyses alongside the perspectives of other disciplines, we can get a better understanding of what is going on in the cities of rapidly urbanizing China. Having said that, the book's final chapter – 'It Makes a Village: Hong Kong's Podium Shopping Malls as Global Villages' by Jonathan D. Solomon – makes copious use of the medium that architects are most comfortable in expressing themselves: the drawing. As a result, it is a much shorter chapter than some of the others, but this is because so much of its analysis is contained within these drawings.

Solomon points out that, despite its long colonial history, Hong Kong bears almost no physical trace of its past. The city has always been willing to replace buildings and urban fabric with the accouterments of globalism. He finds it unsurprising that links between the local and the global networks should exist in Hong Kong; what is surprising,

however, is the fact that these should be found in the shopping mall – that most iconic of the spaces of globalization. It is this most conspicuously global of urban typologies that ultimately provides Hong Kong with its functional infrastructure for connecting between global and local communities. Solomon's analysis centers on two specific shopping malls: IFC Mall and Elements Mall, each of which has a different character. He argues that instead of being symbolic links to the territory's past and providing a basis for collective memory, these shopping malls provide functional links that bring diverse cultures into propinquity. That this should be achieved by a building typology that is widely considered to be fundamentally anti-urban is remarkable, and is indeed probably a unique characteristic of Hong Kong's urbanism.

The reader must understand that allowing an architect to express his work in this way – the combination of text and drawing – is all part and parcel of the multi-disciplinary ethos that informs the entire book. And even though the natural medium of communication for an architect is not often the written word (although there are some notable exceptions: Le Corbusier, Koolhaas, et al.), academics will perhaps be less familiar with the drawing as a mode of scholarly communication. The attempt to make scholars more aware of what is going on in one another's disciplines is one of the key aims of this book, and it is hoped that with this richer awareness we will be better able to try and make sense of what is happening in China today as its cities and people experience the most massive wave of urbanization in history.

Globalization is not necessarily Westernization

China's rise as a global economic and political power is seen by the Institute for International Economics and the Center for Strategic and International Studies as being 'one of the transformative events of our time'.[2] China has been called the workshop of the world, not because it is home to the world's cheapest workforce (Southeast Asian and African workers get paid significantly less) but because it sits in a relatively stable part of the globe and offers reliable and capable workers who are kept in line by strictly enforced government discipline. This discipline is something that often causes unease in the West, but we must not forget that it is only one aspect of a regime that has managed to lift more people out of poverty in the last thirty years than any other regime in history – communist or capitalist. Hundreds of millions of people have seen their lives vastly improved thanks to China's industrialization and the agricultural and economic reforms that have accompanied it.

One seemingly inevitable outcome of industrialization is urbanization: workers tend to migrate to centers of manufacturing, but it could just as easily be argued that industrialization was the product of urbanization (although the more balanced view would be to suggest that they enjoy a symbiotic relationship). Then there is the question of the wider pattern into which all of this industrialization and urbanization fits into – i.e. modernization. Peter G. Rowe has been examining the cities of East Asia for many years, and he poses the question: how well do cities in East Asia conform to modernization as it is understood elsewhere in the world, particularly in the West? And to what extent does it describe a regional modernity that is '... different in kind, as well as degree, from other modern cities?'[3]

He then quite cleverly answers this by equating any understanding of these views as being a question of perspective. Modernization, in Rowe's view, is 'commonly understood through an ensemble of interrelated characteristics. Chief among them is industrialization, or the conversion of raw materials into marketable manufactured products and sources of power and propulsion, along with tertiary functions to deal with the mass distribution and information transactions involved'.[4] In other words, it was often defined by a combination of processes including 'industrialization, urbanization, labour diversification, social mobility and, as a result, substantially improved material standards of living'.[5]

The perspectives offered by the papers in this book may well afford new insights into what is happening in three different cities in China: Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou. These three different cities all contain different responses to urbanization and the globalization that is propelling it. They also have three different sets of problems: Shanghai has to deal with the sheer scale of its physical size; Hong Kong is trying to come to terms with its reintegration into a country that has undergone massive changes over the last century and a half; while Guangzhou, traditionally the international conduit for China's trade, is having to play catch-up in a rapidly changing world.

All three of these cities have one thing in common: they were all influenced to a greater or lesser degree by colonialism, particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (with Hong Kong remaining a British colony until as late as 1997). Whether as a colony or a treaty port, these cities were what this editor has referred to elsewhere as the 'interface of empire'[6] – the place where Western colonial and imperial ambitions (and later the Japanese) were brought to bear on a fragile and crumbling Chinese imperial system.

In the colonial era, to modernize meant to Westernize – i.e. adopt Western modes of dress, customs, language, laws, moral outlook, etc. Peter G. Rowe reminds us that this is not necessarily a case of

Westernization *per se*; rather, it is more a question of there being only '... a comparatively limited number of ways of accomplishing something efficiently, with the result that things begin to look much the same'.[7] To give an analogy from the motor industry: motor cars are increasingly beginning to resemble one another because they are all designed with the same aerodynamic principles in mind. Rowe's point that 'the similarity in modern building design between one place and the other need not mean that one culture is being converted to another' is a valid one. His notion that modern architectural expression, which began in the West and can be profitably deployed elsewhere, 'represents, in effect, an expansion of local cultural identity in a manner that suits the social, economic and material transformations taking place'.[8] In other words, globalization is not necessarily Westernization.

While this thesis is convincing, there is a downside – something which Rowe himself also mentions, although not in a negative way. He sees another of the developments of modernism as being 'the technological advancement of building materials and mechanical systems' which bring with it 'an independence from local climate and other geographical circumstances, as well as from local building materials, all of which formerly shaped local architectural expressions quite strongly'[9]. This was, of course, the concern of architects like Team Ten and the later Critical Regionalists, who sought to raise valid concerns about the monolith of High Modernism.

Before the advent of air conditioning, factors such as local climate and traditional building methods were taken into account, resulting in environmentally responsible and often extremely elegant styles of architecture. The Singapore black-and-white bungalow is a perfect example of this hybrid style: a subtle mix of the then globally ascendant neoclassicism with a thorough understanding of indigenous Malay building techniques (i.e. raising the house on stilts, making use of overhanging eves and open verandas, etc.). This resulted in a comfortable and indeed attractive home, creating an architectural style that has since become an architectural icon.

China is currently embracing experimental architecture in an effort to bolster its image abroad. It did this with the venues for the Summer Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 and with other ambitious projects such as the CCTV complex. These all tend to be designed by big-name foreign architects, but does this mean that the Chinese are Westernizing? Peter G. Rowe is correct to point out that '... spectators in the future might be forgiven for labelling this form of hypermodernism as a Chinese style'.[10] The fact that most of these projects' architects are actually Westerners would make this a little unlikely, but Rowe does raise a valid point in that we are now at a stage where we have to ask ourselves what is actually Western and what is Chinese? Is

it a Chinese building simply because it was built in China? Would it be Chinese if it were designed by a Chinese architect but built in New York? And what if equal numbers of Westerners and Chinese collaborated on the design team? And what about the places that these designers have been educated in? If they are Chinese or Asian or African for that matter but have been educated in the West and then go on to borrow selectively and cleverly from the West, as the Chinese have been doing, then it is not a simple matter of labelling them one thing or another. These new designers are creating – like the builders of the colonial era's black-and-white bungalows in Singapore – a new kind of hybrid, one that has every potential to be as successful as its colonial predecessor.

Capitalism with Chinese characteristics

As we have seen, urbanization is playing a vital role in China's recent and remarkable resurgence. It is estimated that more than 200 million people have moved from rural areas into China's cities in recent years.[11] These people are taking part in what is the largest mass migration in human history, sparked by Deng Xiaoping's 'Open Door' economic reforms that began in 1978. This 'second revolution' turned China into the world's workshop and enabled the country to move into the footlights on the world stage. A carefully controlled capitalist enterprise, which goes under the rubric of 'capitalism with Chinese characteristics', has enabled China to overtake Japan as the world's second-largest economy (which it did in August 2010). Some commentators even see the country as potentially toppling the United States from its number one position within 20 years. (Although America's economy is still three times that of China, if China manages to sustain a growth rate of 9 percent per annum this could well be a possibility.)

This miraculous economic growth also has its downsides, which are particularly apparent in China's cities. The country has a population five times that of the United States, yet its per capita income is on a par with countries like Algeria, El Salvador, and Albania (i.e. approximately $ 3,600 per annum, while in the United States it is approximately $ 46,000). Despite this, China has become the world's largest market for passenger vehicles, which reflects an interesting new stage in the country's economic development in that it no longer relies on the export of cheap toys and clothes which first earned it the nickname 'workshop of the world'. Instead, it has begun to turn to domestic demand in an effort to boost production and encourage Chinese people to buy products that are made in the country. While this may seem like a step in the right direction, it is having some unfortunate side effects

such as the environmental impact of the increase in steel and cement production as well as an increase in demand for power which is still primarily fuelled by coal (China surpassed the United States as the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2006).

The changes that this rapid economic development have caused have often been painful, even for those who have seemed to benefit – those with good jobs in the country's manufacturing sector. The Chinese government introduced a minimum wage in 2004, yet such moves – promising as they are – do not go far enough to alleviate the problems associated with the country's rapid economic growth, as witnessed by the increase in strike activity in recent years. The government's apparent reluctance to repress these strikes is seen as a turning point in a country known for having little tolerance for labor militancy. This newfound tolerance is yet another sign of China's increasing economic maturity. Concern for workers' rights and the gradual increases in wages that have resulted from it are signs that China is leaving behind the old era of low-wage capitalism.

In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping famously dismissed any potential problems regarding future inequality with the memorable phrase 'some people have to get rich first'. Yet what about those who have been left behind by this economic miracle? Or those who have been imperfectly able to partake in it? This is one of the most important sub-themes of this book: the 'floating population' of millions of migrants to China's cities, victims of the restrictive *hukou* registration system. These people simply disappear when the economy takes a downturn. Of course they haven't disappeared, they have just returned home, which does nothing to solve their problems – in fact it exacerbates them, as there's nothing for them to go home to. A number of the chapters in this book concentrate specifically on the plight of people who are very far from being members of the new global elite – whether Filipina maids in Hong Kong or the *lilong* dwellers of Shanghai – people who are increasingly excluded from parts of the city that have been set aside to cater to the needs of what Leslie Sklair refers to as the transnational capitalist class.

Aspects of urbanization in China

China has anything from 100 to 160 cities with one million or more inhabitants (America, by comparison, has nine, while Eastern and Western Europe combined have 36).[12] Peter G. Rowe points out that China is '... well on its way to becoming a predominantly urban nation by about 2035, before going on to stabilize, with a 60 per cent proportion of urban dwellers, probably around 2050'.[13]

During the last four decades of the twentieth century the world experienced unprecedented urban growth, most of it the result of migration from rural areas. In 1950, approximately 30 percent of the world's population lived in cities (a mere two percentage points under China's current figure). In fact, for most of the second half of the twentieth century, China's pace of urbanization lagged behind the rest of the world, so is it any wonder that it is now trying to catch up? However, according to the IIEC and CSIS, China's current pace of urbanization is unparalleled in history. The estimate is that China's urban population ballooned by 200 million within the space of a decade.[14]

One of the most important challenges facing China's government in the future will be the lessening of the income gap between urban and rural areas. One other area of inequality that has long existed in China is that which exists between the coastal region, which is developed, and inland areas, which are not. This gap has continued to increase in recent years. The infrastructure that is being created in order for the country to compete globally is also causing the displacement of populations, forcing them to make way for new roads, airports, dams, and factories. According to a 2005 report, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimates that up to 40 million peasants have been forced off their land to make way for these infrastructure projects, with an additional two million being displaced every year.[15] These millions become part of China's 'floating population', flocking into urban areas in search of new means of livelihood. Vast migrant-worker 'towns' are springing up on the edges of major cities, engendering potential environmental, health, and safety issues as well as poverty and rising levels of dissatisfaction with the way the country is being run. According to the IIEC and CSIS, China's National Population and Family Planning Commission estimated the number of internal migrants to be 53.5 million in 1995 and well over 140 million by 2004.[16] In fact, migrant workers account for approximately 20 percent of China's working-age population (i.e. those between 15 and 64 years old).[17]

Chinese leaders have begun to take cognisance of the fact that such inequalities between urban and rural areas and within cities themselves could, if they are allowed to increase unabated, lead to political instability. In an effort to circumvent this, they have begun to implement policies designed to accelerate both the pace of farm income growth and the economic development of interior provinces that have been left behind in the rush to a market economy.

This book on some of the aspects of urbanization in China has, as has been pointed out earlier, a distinctly architectural-urbanistic point of view. Whereas architects often tend to concentrate exclusively on buildings (though the better ones do tend to take other factors into account), urbanists are better at seeing the spaces in between them not just as

empty space but as the nexus of connections that link buildings to one another, which of course enables them to function. A popular area like Xintiandi in Shanghai, for example, is full of people going there to have fun; but they don't go there to see the buildings, they go there because of what goes on *in* them. And then there is the public spaces formed in between these buildings. Spaces between buildings function very much like the space between the spokes of a wheel: the wheel's integrity depends as much on the spaces between them as on the material the spokes are made of. However, none of this – neither the buildings nor the spaces – would be anything without the people who inhabit them. And that is one of the themes that unites all of the papers in this book, because these contributors, from different disciplines and at different stages in their academic or professional careers, have all bent their focus to the cities of China in an attempt to understand what life is like for the people who call them home.

Notes

1 N.B. *Lilong* is the Chinese term for the Shanghai alleyway house and is also the one that is more generally used; *longtang* is the word that is used in Shanghai itself.
2 IIEC and CSIS, *China: The Balance Sheet*, p. ix.
3 Peter G. Rowe, *East Asia Modern: Shaping the Contemporary City*, p. 9.
4 Ibid., p. 11.
5 Ibid., p. 12.
6 Gregory Bracken, 'The Interface of Empire', conference paper at the International Forum on Urbanism, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 2006.
7 Peter G. Rowe, *East Asia Modern: Shaping the Contemporary City*, p. 145.
8 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
9 Ibid., p. 17.
10 Ibid., p. 139.
11 IIEC and CSIS, *China: The Balance Sheet*, p. 31.
12 Ted C. Fishman, *China, Inc.*, p. 7.
13 Peter G. Rowe, *East Asia Modern: Shaping the Contemporary City*, p. 24.
14 IIEC and CSIS, *China: The Balance Sheet*, p. 31.
15 Cited in IIEC and CSIS, *China: The Balance Sheet*, p. 41.
16 Cited in IIEC and CSIS, *China: The Balance Sheet*, p. 46.
17 IIEC and CSIS, *China: The Balance Sheet*, p. 46.