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# Introduction

## *The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on the Theory of International Relations, 1953–54*

Over seven months between December 1953 and June 1954, the prestigious think tank the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) held a study group dedicated to the theory of international relations (IR). The group brought together select members of the CFR and prominent thinkers on international affairs. Some are still well-known to scholars of IR, like Yale's Arnold Wolfers and Kenneth W. Thompson from the Rockefeller Foundation. Others have faded from prominence but were influential at the time, such as leading political scientist Robert Strausz-Hupé, from the University of Pennsylvania, and Dorothy Fosdick, an early member of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department before a long career as advisor to Democratic senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson. Together, the experts collected at the CFR spent some thirty-five hours dissecting a variety of approaches to the study of world politics, from the new "realist" theory of Hans Morgenthau, to the theories of imperialism of Karl Marx and Joseph Schumpeter, to the psychological perspective of Harold Lasswell. The group's aim was to discern the basic elements of a theory of international relations.

Hidden until now in the CFR archives at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University, this volume reproduces the digests of discussions from the study group. Also presented are seven papers that laid the groundwork for the group's conversations. The author of the preparatory papers was George A. Lipsky, a former University of California–Berkeley political scientist spending the academic year 1953–54 at the CFR as a Carnegie Fellow. Lipsky's papers introduced the topic to be considered at each meeting, with the discussions ranging far beyond the thinker at hand to the nature of international relations itself, the possibilities and limits of theory, the place of values in theorizing international relations, and the role of the scholar in foreign policy making.

In this introduction to the documents, I ask *why should scholars care to remember a seemingly obscure Council on Foreign Relations study group almost seventy years later?* The answer is that the materials of the CFR study group are an invaluable resource for historians of IR, students of US foreign policy during the early Cold War, and historians of social science. The documents suggest insights for two literatures in particular, one within IR and one in the broader history of the social sciences.

The first literature impacted by the discovery of the Council on Foreign Relations study group is that over the origins of IR and IR *theory* specifically. In recent years, a group of revisionist historians of IR have questioned the standard narrative of the field's origins, showing, among other things, that IR did not emerge fully formed after the First World War, as the common dating of IR's founding to the creation of the first chair of International Relations at Aberystwyth in 1919 holds.<sup>1</sup> The revisionists have also debunked the myth that the interwar years witnessed a "Great Debate" between realists and idealists over the nature of power in world affairs and the possibility for international organization, the first of a series of titanic struggles that was for a long time held to have structured IR's subsequent development.<sup>2</sup> Rather, much of IR's disciplinary architecture, particularly the centrality of theory to the field, were post-World War II constructs, exactly the timing of the CFR study group detailed here.

Publication of the materials from the CFR study group on theory thus offers an opportunity to reassess the current state of the historiographical art in IR. In particular, it allows us to reassess the arguments of historian of IR Nicolas Guilhot,<sup>3</sup> who has analyzed a more well-known conference on theory held in May 1954 at the Rockefeller Foundation. Guilhot shows how the Rockefeller conference was the centerpiece of a "realist gambit" aimed at heading off the incorporation of IR into an increasingly behavioralist American political science. The gambit, on the part of a group of self-defined realist scholars, centered on the thought of Hans Morgenthau, who promoted a non-behavioralist theory of international relations grounded in a prudential form of *realpolitik*.

The existence of the CFR study group is evidence of a more widespread turn to theory in postwar thinking about international affairs in the United States than the notion of a realist gambit suggests. In short, the group suggests that the realist gambit was a crucial stimulus to the birth of IR theory after World War II, but it was not the only one. Theory had captured the imagination of a wider range of scholars and institutions, as indicated by the discussions held at the CFR in the winter and spring of 1953–54.

What remains from Guilhot's realist gambit thesis when juxtaposed with the CFR study group? As I detail further below, while the turn to theory cannot solely be accounted for as a realist gambit, many of Guilhot's arguments remains intact when placed alongside the study group: the CFR group shares with the Rockefeller group a rejection of a narrow behavioralism, in the context of a defense of liberalism and democracy, mounted, importantly, from scholars either hailing from Europe or well-versed in European intellectual culture. Together, rediscovery of the study group promises to further enrich the revisionist account of the origins of IR theory in America.

The second literature impacted by the CFR study group is a debate over the influence of the Cold War state on the social sciences in America. Located primarily in history, sociology, and science and technology studies (STS), a now expansive literature has traced the emergence of what has been termed the "military-academic complex," or for historians Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens "Cold War social science."<sup>4</sup> In academic fields from anthropology to area studies and linguistics and the behavioral sciences, the growth in funding opportunities associated with the expansion of the Cold War state significantly shaped research priorities and disciplinary trends.<sup>5</sup> For Solovey, "A variety of professional, financial and institutional opportunities encouraged social scientists to produce the right sort of knowledge for the Cold-War related tasks at hand."<sup>6</sup>

One might expect maximal impact of the Cold War state on the discussions at the CFR given the prominence of geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time when the meetings were taking place. In fact, the CFR group throws up puzzles for the Cold War social science thesis. The digests reveal multiple explicit traces of the Cold War. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were, as might be expected, common illustrations of theoretical points. At a number of places in the discussions the participants were sidetracked into a discussion of contemporary US-Russian relations, a tendency other members tried to prevent.<sup>7</sup> Elsewhere the inherent evils of communism as the participants saw them became the focus.

Yet the Cold War did not dominate the discussions, which ranged well beyond contemporary US foreign policy, and it defied the political times by including an analysis of Marxist theories of imperialism. For the most part, the Cold War remained an implicit backdrop to the conversations, not their main focal point. The CFR study group on international relations theory thus represents further evidence of IR's problematic relationship to policy relevance.<sup>8</sup> An issue of periodic concern in the discipline, the study group adds weight to

the sense that IR has never fully embraced a policy-driven mission, even as it has taken advantage of government and foundation funding to form itself as an academic field.

In the remainder of this introduction, I provide an overview of the study group and situate it at the intersection of work on the historiography of IR and history of the social sciences in Cold War America. I begin with a description of the study group and its historical context. What was the reasoning behind the study group's creation? Who participated? Who turned down invitations to the group and why? What did the group talk about? What conclusions, if any, did they reach about the most suitable way of theorizing international relations? The chapter then turns first to the implications of the group's discussions for disciplinary history, before examining the significance of the group as an artifact of IR's position within the Cold War social sciences. The introduction concludes with a series of biographical sketches of the study group's key members, followed by a plan of the rest of the volume.

### *The 1953–54 CFR Study Group on the Theory of International Relations*

"The Council on Foreign Relations, in its three decades of work, has ordinarily concentrated its attention on concrete international issues," Columbia University professor Robert MacIver told invitees to a Council study group on the theory of international relations convened in December 1953. But "[r]ecently, it has seemed . . . that there would be merit in examining some of the basic assumptions on which the foreign policies of this country and other countries are predicated."<sup>9</sup> MacIver, a sociologist by profession, had been tasked with chairing such a group, which would set to work with the aim of identifying the most suitable theoretical basis for the study of world politics.

The original idea for the Council to sponsor a systematic study of the theoretical aspects of international relations came from Council member Henry L. Roberts.<sup>10</sup> Roberts was one of the "younger men" of the Council very interested in the group and eager to participate, according to the records.<sup>11</sup> Several of them, such as eventual rapporteur John Blumgart, had been involved since early staff discussions with Lipsky, and according to William Diebold, director of the Economics Program and long-time member of the Council, had shown "themselves to be excellent critics."<sup>12</sup> Their interest was surely vital in persuading more senior members to support the study group.

The reason for their interest was likely the promise of continuing and shap-

ing the CFR's formative role in postwar international relations. The group was explicitly designed as a "complement or sequel" to Grayson Kirk's *The Study of International Relations* from 1947, a CFR-sponsored survey of teaching and research in international studies in America's colleges and universities. Kirk, perhaps predictably, found American higher education in need of serious investment if future leaders were to have adequate knowledge of the rest of the world.<sup>13</sup> Whereas "Grayson was interested principally in method and system" the study group on theory would "deal with the subject matter from the point of view of a political scientist."<sup>14</sup> A handwritten note under these words suggested the aim of the group was to inquire why "men—especially policy-makers—act as they do?"<sup>15</sup>

In his introduction to the group for the invitees, MacIver noted how "For many years Wilsonian idealism dominated American thought. . . . Then a reaction set in and writers who emphasized power politics and "real" national interests came to the fore."<sup>16</sup> Continuing, he said that some of the newer, realistic approaches "stressed national power; others have underlined the role of geography or economic considerations. More recently Christian morals and natural law have been propagated as the true foundations of foreign policy."<sup>17</sup> As a result of these "great debates,"<sup>18</sup> MacIver went on, the CFR considered it a pressing task to "examine these and other approaches . . . and to judge their adequacy as methods of understanding the phenomena of international affairs."<sup>19</sup>

Dedicating a study group to international relations theory meant a real investment of time and resources by the Council. As Peter Grose, the Council's biographer, explains, study groups were the Council leadership's answer to the question of how and how far to shape public opinion when it came to matters of foreign affairs.<sup>20</sup> Unlike more informal "discussion groups," the aim of study groups was to produce a "written analysis with policy conclusions by a single author."<sup>21</sup> The aim was not a public statement by the group or the CFR as a whole: "Rather, as the method evolved, the designated author would guide discussions, present tentative analyses to be considered and criticized by fellow experts and peers, and polish and assemble them in writing under his sole responsibility."<sup>22</sup> The format of the study group explains the prominence of George Lipsky to the discussions represented below, and the lack of a final statement laying out the group's conclusions. As Grose notes, "Rarely would the group leaders attempt to negotiate agreement on a consensus that, in most cases, would have to be compromised into blandness."<sup>23</sup> What we are left with then is a tantalizing record of discussions on the nature and purpose of international relations theory, rather than a finished product.

The study group on theory was a deviation from the more common pattern of convening on pressing issues of the day. Groups convened in 1950–51, for example, to discuss topics like “Anglo-American Relations” and “Questions of German Unity.”<sup>24</sup> The historical backdrop to the study group on international theory offered plenty for the Council to discuss. The early 1950s saw the Cold War and its domestic implications reach fever pitch: the Korean War continued until July 1953, shortly followed by the CIA-backed overthrow of Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh; the failed uprising in East Germany in June 1953; and the height of McCarthyism in America and McCarthy’s demise, which began in early 1954. Yet the dramatic events in the background are little mentioned in the group’s discussions, remaining a context rather than an overriding preoccupation of the participants.

The hosting of a study group suggested serious and sustained interest in the topic at hand. During the War, the CFR had taken on a direct role in relation to US foreign policy through its study groups with the “War and Peace Studies”—dedicated to issues deemed vital to the American war effort—which became increasingly integrated into the State Department and eventually subsumed entirely.<sup>25</sup> While until now lost to the intellectual history of IR, we can be sure of the importance of the group to the Council’s leaders and at least a subset of its members.

### George A. Lipsky and the Formation of the Study Group on Theory

The immediate stimulus for the study group on international theory’s formation was a request from Berkeley political scientist George A. Lipsky, who had been awarded a Carnegie Research Fellowship for the year 1953–54, to be spent at the CFR. The involvement of the Carnegie Corporation in stimulating consideration of international relations theory in the early 1950s should come as no surprise. Carnegie was a generous benefactor of the Council and had made an annual grant to the War and Peace Studies, which was also funded by the other great philanthropic organization at the time, the Rockefeller Foundation.<sup>26</sup> Lipsky’s receipt of a Carnegie fellowship fits with what historians of IR know about the structure of funding in international studies in the late 1940s and 1950s, with legally inclined scholars gaining funding from the Carnegie Endowment and other organizations like the American Society of International Law.<sup>27</sup>

Lipsky, MacIver told the group, had been studying the problem of theory in international relations “for some time,” including in a book on the interna-

tional thought of sixth president John Quincy Adams.<sup>28</sup> In his prospectus for the study group, Lipsky noted, “The study of international relations as a discipline is of relatively recent origin. Quite naturally, therefore, it has been occupied with the gathering of substantive and descriptive data.”<sup>29</sup> The next step was to discern some firm theoretical principles, a cause considered pressing not only for disciplinary reasons but because practitioners used implicit theoretical schemas. The existence of multiple competing theories was thus potentially a debilitating problem in US foreign policy, since “alternations of emphasis in a field where adequate understanding is vital to national and human survival, emphasize the great need for a continuing systematic theoretical analysis.”<sup>30</sup> The purpose of the group was thus to aid Lipsky in his work.

The format for seven meetings that took place between December 1953 and June 1954 was discussion, punctuated with dinner and cocktails, covering the thought of six prominent theoretical approaches, followed by a general stock-taking session. For each meeting, Lipsky circulated a paper that formed the topic of conversation. A more free-flowing discussion continued into the evening.

The participants represented a selection of scholars, government advisors, members of the CFR, and Council staff members (see table 1). A more extensive set of biographical sketches is provided later in this introduction. What should be emphasized at this stage is the professional diversity of the group. The only individuals that may have been considered well-known as IR theorists were Arnold Wolfers and, perhaps, Kenneth W. Thompson. The others represent a cross-section of diverse fields and non-academics, including individuals from business and government. Their membership, however, is evidence of their prominence within American foreign policy circles in the early 1950s.

The group’s racial and gender homogeneity is far less surprising, given what IR scholars now know about the systematic silencing of African American and women international theorists historically and in later historiographical work.<sup>31</sup> Dorothy Fosdick’s inclusion is, therefore, noteworthy as the exception that proves the rule. So sought after was Fosdick’s membership that the CFR bent the informal rules that had until that time kept “lady members” from joining. As Council member William Diebold explained to MacIver, “It would probably require action” by the Council’s Board of Directors to change the rule that female members could not join study groups, “and in any case to make an open breach of the rule would be difficult, since we are often pressed to let much less qualified women participate in some of the things we are doing.”<sup>32</sup> By listing Ms. Fosdick as the secretary and hence staff, which Council



Table 1. Members of the CFR Study Group, and Other Attendees

Name (alphabetical order)	Brief biographical information
<i>(Group members)</i>	
John Blumgart	American Committee on United Europe
Edgar M. Church	Shearman, Sterling and Wright
Dorothy Fosdick	Formerly of the Policy Planning Staff and Instructor in Sociology at Smith College
Hajo Holborn	Professor of History, Yale University
William W. Kaufmann	Professor, Princeton University Center of International Studies
George A. Lipsky	Carnegie Research Fellow, CFR, formerly Assistant Professor of Political Science, UC-Berkeley
Robert M. MacIver	Professor of Sociology, Columbia University
Isidor Rabi	Professor of Physics, Columbia University
Robert Strausz-Hupé	Professor of Political Science, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania
Kenneth W. Thompson	Rockefeller Foundation
R. Gordon Wasson	Investment banker, J.P. Morgan and Co.
Arnold Wolfers	Professor of International Relations, Yale University
<i>(Others)</i>	
Byron Vincent Dexter	CFR staff member
William Diebold	Director of Economic Affairs, CFR
Charles Burton Marshall	Formerly of the State Dept.
George S. Franklin Jr.	CFR staff member (1945–1971)
Grant S. McClellan	CFR staff member
Gerhart Niemeyer	CFR staff member, formerly of the State Dept.
Paul Zinner	CFR staff member, formerly of the State Dept.
Walter Mallory	CFR staff member
Charles M. Lichenstein	CFR staff member
Henry L. Roberts	CFR staff member
William Henderson	CFR staff member
John Armstrong	CFR staff member

Source: CFR archives, Mudd Library, Princeton University.

officer William Diebold explained “in Council parlance was an honorary position just below that of the Chairman . . . [that] would not entail any clerical or administrative duties,”<sup>33</sup> Fosdick would be able to take part in the group’s deliberations.

The Council was not entirely successful recruiting for the study group. As Diebold warned MacIver in a letter of 5 November 1953, “I am reasonably

sure that a few people will turn us down. For instance, George Kennan has been refusing most invitations lately.”<sup>34</sup> Diebold enclosed a letter, sadly no longer with the study group documents, of possible substitutes. In the end, Kennan evidently did turn down the invitation, as did Kennan’s substitute, a Mr. Cohen, along with a Mr. Bennett.<sup>35</sup>

More concrete is that Diebold and MacIver did not consider or failed to recruit George N. Shuster, Frank Tannenbaum, and William E. Hocking to join the group. Shuster was president of Hunter College in New York and chairman of the US National Commission to UNESCO at the time of the study group.<sup>36</sup> Tannenbaum was an Austrian-born criminologist and historian at Columbia University, known for his work in creating the Farm Security Administration during the New Deal era.<sup>37</sup> Hocking was a retired Harvard philosopher, trained by Josiah Royce.<sup>38</sup> Finally, MacIver and Diebold also discussed the importance of having “a clergyman” member, relatively unsurprising given Reinhold Niebuhr’s stature within American foreign policy circles after World War II. There too, they appear to have failed.

The choice of thinkers to engage was contentious, and it changed as the meetings progressed. Early in first meeting, for example, Arnold Wolfers suggested studying concepts rather than authors, while political scientist Robert Strausz-Hupé opposed the tentative list of theorists, saying he believed that “many of the listed authors were simply elaborators of previous theories; [E. H.] Carr, for example . . . , seems to be a restatement of Hegel.”<sup>39</sup> But eventually the first six meetings covered: (1) the international thought of E. H. Carr as the exemplar of historical theorizing; (2) Hans J. Morgenthau, as a means of approaching the issue of the national interest; (3) the scientific approach of Harold D. Lasswell; (4) geopolitical theory, via the work of Yale political scientist Nicholas Spykman; (5) the theory of empire, approached through the thought of Lenin and Joseph Schumpeter; and finally (6) Wilsonian idealism. The final meeting was a general assessment of theory in international relations and an attempt to draw some conclusions from the study group’s work.

### *The Realist Gambit Revisited: The CFR Study Group and the Origins of IR Theory*

The Council on Foreign Relations study group on the theory of international relations took place in the midst of a sharp uptick in interest in the theoretical aspects of world politics. While today the taken-for-granted core of IR, before

1950 theory was largely absent from the field. This was true even for early texts now deemed groundbreaking.<sup>40</sup> The group therefore represents a unique window into the origins of IR theory.

A 1946 survey of International Relations by Waldemar Gurian, a Notre Dame political scientist and editor of the prestigious *Review of Politics*, for example, made no mention of theory. For Gurian, the study of International Relations “involves geography, economics, international law, history, anthropology, demography, social psychology (study of mass emotions, public opinion, propaganda), and comparative government.”<sup>41</sup> Prophetically, Gurian made a point of stressing that “It would be fatal if the study of international relations were to be determined solely by professional and specialistic interests.”<sup>42</sup> Similarly, in 1949 Frederick Dunn of the Yale Institute of International Studies conducted a survey of “The Present Course of International Relations Research” that made scant reference to theory.<sup>43</sup>

But by 1952, when Kenneth W. Thompson published “The Study of International Politics: A Survey of Trends and Developments,” theory was front and center.<sup>44</sup> The first edition of Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* had appeared in 1948,<sup>45</sup> and Columbia Professor John H. Herz’s *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities* three years later.<sup>46</sup> Noting how the primary methodological approach to the study of international relations in the interwar period had been that of diplomatic history, Thompson complained, “The price which was paid for this rigorous, objective and non-generalized approach to the field was the absence of anything corresponding to a *theory* of international relations.”<sup>47</sup> Thompson was concerned that the dominance of the diplomatic history approach left the study of contemporary international relations to journalists: “The ‘bible’ . . . became *The New York Times*.”<sup>48</sup>

A Google Ngram search reinforces a survey impression that serious interest in the theory of international relations only began a few short years before Lipsky, MacIver, and co. gathered in New York. The term *international relations theory* was essentially unknown before 1950.<sup>49</sup> The related terms *theory of international relations* shows a large spike in popularity in the 1950s, following its emergence in the 1920s.<sup>50</sup> The term *IR theory*, however, emerges only much later in the 1980s.<sup>51</sup> While far from exhaustive, these data help demonstrate the emergence and sedimentation of a specific thing called international relations, known increasingly by the acronym IR. In other words, in the 1920s the emphasis was on the theory of *international relations* understood as a feature of the world, whereas by the 1950s it was *international relations theory* understood as a growing body of (at least potentially) theoretical knowledge. By the 1980s, IR was not just a body of knowledge but a coherent disciplinary social sphere. What explains the turn to theory?

## The Realist Gambit

For historian of IR Nicolas Guilhot, the turn to theory was driven by an attempt on the part of “a number of scholars, policy practitioners, and public intellectuals” to “defin[e] IR as a separate field based on a distinct *theory* of politics.”<sup>52</sup> Drawing on the archival record of another conference on international theory, held at the Rockefeller Foundation on 7–8 May 1954, Guilhot describes the activities of a group of scholars—including Chicago political scientist Hans Morgenthau and Morgenthau’s friend and former colleague Kenneth W. Thompson from the Rockefeller Foundation—who made a “realist gambit” aimed at defining IR itself by providing the field a realist theoretical cornerstone.

The group who gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation hoped to head off the absorption of IR into political science, which, as a number of scholars have shown, was becoming increasingly behavioralist in orientation in the postwar period.<sup>53</sup> The *theory* of IR, for Guilhot, was developed by this realist group as a way to secure a space for an alternative vision of politics and scholarship to the behavioralist paradigm.<sup>54</sup> Following the theoretical work of theorist Hans Morgenthau from the University of Chicago,<sup>55</sup> together with others such as theologian Reinhold Niebuhr,<sup>56</sup> a realistic approach to politics placed in the center the struggle over power and the inherently tragic nature of human social life. Realists thus opposed as hopeless the attempt to replace political with scientific forms of solving collective problems, such as the interwar League of Nations. While such instruments might foster trust, they could never replace the need for constant vigilance in the defense of the national interest. As Guilhot explains, because for realists like Morgenthau politics was “ultimately impervious to rationalization, its best rational rendition was under the form of prudential maxims, not scientific principles.”<sup>57</sup>

Alongside other revisionist accounts of IR’s history,<sup>58</sup> Guilhot’s investigations have turned commonsense understandings of the field’s history on their head. For scholars entering IR in the 1980s and 1990s, realism was the chief mainstream approach to world politics. The reasons were twofold. First, realism was supposedly the distillation of centuries of political wisdom, connecting such thinkers as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Bismarck, battle hardened by the First Great Debate in IR between realism and its idealist or utopian alternative. Guilhot proves this was only partially true and wholly manufactured. Second, realism was popular because it was considered adequately scientific in ways competing theories—the much-maligned idealism as well as later “traditional” approaches—were not.<sup>59</sup> Realism was thus thought to represent dispassionate objective knowledge of world politics with a strong lineage.

Guilhot's attack thus takes aim at the centerpiece of IR. He shows that contrary to received wisdom, "realism" was neither separable from the development of the field of IR after 1945 nor ever a genuinely scientific approach. In fact, common wisdom is wrong on both counts. Rather than offering a suitably scientific approach to the study of international affairs, the realists gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation in fact put forward realism as a defense *against* the growing dominance of scientism within political science. IR *theory*, for Guilhot, is best "understood as a case of intellectual irredentism, resisting its own integration into American social science."<sup>60</sup> Moreover, while the "early IR theorists [the Rockefeller group] referred to traditions and historical lineages that had been repressed under the rule of pragmatism and empirical social science (whether Augustine, Machiavelli, or a pre-rationalist views of politics),"<sup>61</sup> realism was very much tied to concerns located in mid-twentieth-century American politics and society.

### Beyond the Rockefeller Conference

Guilhot's intervention has been highly productive, but discovery of the CFR group calls for a reassessment of its central claims since, clearly, thinking about international relations theory in America in the early 1950s went beyond the small but influential group that gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation. Although a Council study group had been proceeding for six months prior to the Rockefeller conference, and that there was significant overlap in membership—namely former Policy Planning Staff member Dorothy Fosdick, Rockefeller Foundation consultant Kenneth W. Thompson, and Yale political scientist Arnold Wolfers (see table 1)—almost no trace can be found of the realist gambit in the archival record.<sup>62</sup>

The lack of any mention of a realist gambit is doubly curious because according to Guilhot, Thompson was the central figure behind the Rockefeller Foundation's decision to host the 1954 conference.<sup>63</sup> Hired by Rockefeller Foundation president Dean Rusk as a consultant in 1953, Thompson was keen to influence the Rockefeller's funding of IR programs away from a narrow behavioralist focus. Yet if this was such a central theme of the Rockefeller conference, why did Thompson make no mention of it at any point? Why did neither Fosdick nor Wolfers?

Of course, the issue could have been discussed at the group's dinners, of which the archival record is silent. Equally possible is that the decision by the Carnegie Corporation to fund Lipsky's year at the CFR was part of an

anti-behavioralist gambit organized at the foundation level, also absent from the documents. But if so, it remains curious that there was no mention of the realist gambit in more than thirty-five hours of on-the-record discussion. Also curious is that Lipsky's theoretical interventions as well as the theories discussed during the study group's meetings were not limited to realism in the vein of Morgenthau and Thompson.

Why then was there no sustained cross-fertilization between the Rockefeller Foundation conference and the similar set of discussions going on in New York at the CFR? Two non-mutually exclusive explanations suggest themselves: first, Thompson was deliberately concerned to keep the discussions separate; or their separateness was so evident that spending the study group's valuable time elaborating on a related set of conversations would have been impolitic. Whichever is correct, it would seem clear that the notion of a realist gambit does not exhaust the reasons for a turn to theory in the 1950s. To be sure, a realist gambit was being made in the manner and for the reasons Guilhot describes. But the turn to theory was broader than the realist gambit allows.

If the existence of the CFR study group on theory proves that the realist gambit of Morgenthau, Thompson, and co. was a reason—but not the sole reason—for the turn to theory in thinking about international relations in the early 1950s, much of Guilhot's interpretation of the origins of IR theory in the early 1950s nevertheless remains intact when juxtaposed with the documents of the CFR study group. In particular, the CFR group highlights the crucial role played by émigré scholars in the formation of IR theory, scholars steeped in long-standing philosophical traditions less prominent in America, in the context of a practical defense of liberalism against totalitarian alternatives that occupied an array of thinkers in the United States after the war. Also highlighted at the CFR and Rockefeller Foundation meetings is the elite institutional context of IR theory's birth and its inherently conservative nature. Finally, George Lipsky's attempts at fashioning a theory of international relations lays bare the practical difficulties faced by both groups when set in the context of the practical power of science in the American political and social disciplines, then as now.

### The Nominalist Gambit: Lipsky, Liberalism, and the Search for Theory at the CFR

Over the course of his seven preparatory papers for the study group, George Lipsky developed a position on the theory of international relations he la-

bels “nominalist.”<sup>64</sup> Lipsky’s thinking was inspired by his engagement with the work of one Karl Pribram,<sup>65</sup> a government economist at the United States Tariff Commission who in 1949 published *Conflicting Patterns of Thought*.<sup>66</sup> Pribram’s book is dedicated to the delineation of four general patterns of thought he terms universalistic, nominalistic, intuitional, and dialectical. Of the four modes, Pribram privileges the nominalistic because in his words—which Lipsky reproduced almost verbatim in his background work for the CFR study group<sup>67</sup>—only nominalism “has rejected [the identity of thinking and being]” and accepted that “to grasp the order of the universe must proceed by way of assumptions and purely hypothetical concepts—whose verity cannot be postulated but whose usefulness must be demonstrated.”<sup>68</sup>

In the terminology of today’s IR, Lipsky’s view of theory might be labeled proto-constructivist: knowledge for Lipsky is perspectival and purposive, rather than objective and disinterested. Humans have an imperfect grasp on the world and it is only through trial and error that they move forward tentatively. Lipsky, following Pribram, criticizes in particular the universalistic pattern of thought—which characterizes religion and dogmatic scientism—for falsely believing in the ability to gain direct access to the order of the universe. For Lipsky, like Pribram, no such direct access is possible. Instead, knowledge is composed of the piecemeal addition of facts collected from testing hypotheses that are limited in scope and provisional. Thus, Lipsky explains to the study group, when it comes to theory the “disposition of this writer is to understand a general theory in a nominalist manner as an organization of hypotheses concerning the nature of objective reality.”<sup>69</sup> Theory is less ultimately true than tentatively true.

Like common criticisms of constructivism,<sup>70</sup> Lipsky’s nominalist theory does not resemble theory at all to our contemporary eyes. Nominalism represents rather a meta-theoretical perspective on the nature of knowledge and hence theory. Therefore, while Lipsky states that his theory “is designed to explain the objective world of reality,” his nominalism seems to militate against precisely the type of theory we understand as theory. Unlike the realists like Morgenthau, for whom international relations is a struggle for power between states, Lipsky does not make similarly strong claims about the object or objects of international relations, of what international relations consists. From a nominalist perspective there can be no ultimate statement of what international relations is. Tellingly, this includes politics, since, “The study of international relations transcends any confining discipline and is an area where data focus with relation to particular problems that cannot be called exclusively or even basically political.”<sup>71</sup> In particular, philosophical issues are

not, in Lipsky's opinion, to be considered adjunct issues that can be discarded: "basic philosophical problems are immediately involved in this field."<sup>72</sup>

From a nominalist perspective it follows that there can be no single and unified theory of international relations. As Lipsky states, although "One is tempted to assert that a search should be undertaken to find a final theory of international relations," this "could only be achieved in the presence of total knowledge. Man will not achieve this result in the foreseeable future."<sup>73</sup> As Lipsky continues, "If these propositions are true, there cannot be a theory of international relations that will be sufficiently operational for all men as to deserve the designation *the* theory of international relations."<sup>74</sup>

But whereas Lipsky's nominalism is opposed to realism on the existence of a clear—"realistic"—referent object for international relations, in multiple other ways Lipsky's nominalism has deep connections with the realists and the broader context of IR's birth, as Guilhot describes. Lipsky's attempts at the CFR to develop a nominalist theory of international relations demonstrates that the search for theory was not simply an attempt to defend IR as a multidisciplinary academic field but was rather reflective of the character of international relations as an elite social space, crossing academia, the world of think tanks and the media, and into government and the intergovernmental sphere, where international relations are practiced. As such, the search for a theory of international relations reflected the priorities of and social forces acting upon American elites at the time: namely the search for an intellectually supported defense of liberalism and liberal democracy against serious challengers, a search heavily influenced by the influx of émigrés from Europe before and after the war.

In this the Rockefeller and CFR conferences are more similar than they first appear. An initial comparison is unfavorable to the CFR group: the Rockefeller conference boasts greater name recognition both within IR, especially Morgenthau, and in the history of American foreign policy, including Paul Nitze, the architect of containment,<sup>75</sup> and future secretary of state Dean Rusk (1961–69) (see table 2).<sup>76</sup> But later notoriety should not hide the similar positions of the elites gathered at the two sets of meetings.

From the Rockefeller Foundation group, Don Price, Dean Rusk, and Kenneth W. Thompson were administrators at the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, respectively, and Robert Bowie and Dorothy Fosdick were then current and former members of the Policy Planning Staff. The CFR group had Thompson and Fosdick, but a broader array of academics. The only major difference was the prominence of journalists and public intellectuals James Reston and Walter Lippmann at the Rockefeller meetings, while the CFR's



Table 2. Rockefeller Conference June 1954 Attendees

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Robert Bowie, Policy Planning Staff (PPS)
Dorothy Fosdick, former PPS
William T. R. Fox, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago
Reinhold Niebuhr, Union Theological Seminary
Paul H. Nitze, Foreign Service Educational Foundation
Don K. Price, Ford Foundation
James B. Reston, <i>New York Times</i>
Dean Rusk, Rockefeller Foundation
Kenneth W. Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation
Arnold Wolfers, Professor of International Relations, Yale University

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Source: Guilhot 2011, 239.

ties to Wall Street and business was represented by banker R. Gordon Wasson and lawyer Edgar Church. As Guilhot notes, therefore, the CFR study group also signifies an attempt to retain a role for elite nonspecialists in international relations quite distinct from later understandings of theory.

Like their Rockefeller counterparts, Lipsky and his CFR colleagues also faced the predominant scientism of the early 1950s within which they were making claims to theory, knowledge, and explanation. Both were trapped by the need to speak the language of science and the search for theory while simultaneously questioning and in large measure rejecting then popular notions of science. The concept of explanation, for example, clearly means for Lipsky something quite different than the approaches that seek to subsume unique events and recurring conjunctions of variables under general causal laws. Since direct knowledge of such laws is impossible from a nominalist perspective, Lipsky's use of the term "explain" does not refer to the subsumption of observed acts under causal laws.

More broadly still, the CFR and Rockefeller groups shared an intellectual background in the United States concerned with defending liberalism and liberal democracy. This context goes well beyond the later IR liberalism focused on intergovernmental cooperation and the coordinating role of international organizations and into the mid-century zeitgeist chronicled by Ira Katnelson.<sup>77</sup> For Pribram, an adequate defense of democracy cannot be based on a universalist pattern of thought alone since "[t]he natural temper of democracy is empirical."<sup>78</sup> By this Pribram means that democracy is based on a fiction that is not universally valid but practically useful, appealing to individual interests. A corollary is that persuasion and education, rather than dogma, are the only

permissible methods of influencing the views of communities and peoples. “A strong case can be made for a defense of nominalist methods, quite independently of the logical validity of other patterns. In all democracies, freedom of thought and individual liberty have ranked among the highest social values. Experience shows that hypothetical thinking provides the safest logical foundation for the experience and protection of these liberties.”<sup>79</sup>

Although he drew heavily on Pribram in 1953–54, it was not until later, in *A Formula for Liberals* (1972), that Lipsky explicitly developed a nominalist theoretical defense of liberalism. There “liberalism” refers to a “political philosophy insisting upon the preservation of individual areas of freedom within which he may associate himself with others in groups in the creation of a tentative, non-dogmatic consensus.”<sup>80</sup> Lipsky asserts that a “formula for liberals” can “be constructed on the proposition that there can be a sound theory which will operate as a continuing restraint on government so that it does not become a vehicle of interests which are adverse to the individual.”<sup>81</sup>

Lipsky’s “formula” for liberals is then a theory in the sense of being a philosophical defense of democracy as the proper vehicle for truly liberal governance, a theory in the sense we might use political theory, not empirical theory. As he goes on, “It must be emphasized that the correctives that may be required to improve our society do not require the acceptance of any authoritarian panacea.”<sup>82</sup> No authoritarian political philosophy—fascist, socialist, communist, or any admixture of them—can be liberal, however efficient or effective. The role of his formula is to provide a robust, philosophically driven vehicle to remind scholars and statespeople of this fact.

Lipsky’s formula is thus similar to, yet at the same time starkly different from, the realism of Morgenthau and the Rockefeller group in revealing ways. Both are, for example, elitist and quite conservative in their vision of foreign policy and how it should ideally be made, a fact emphasized by Guillhot about the Rockefeller group.<sup>83</sup> Whereas Morgenthau foregrounds the role of the prudent statesperson as the proper practitioner of realism and protector of the national interest,<sup>84</sup> in *A Formula for Liberals*, Lipsky shows a marked concern for the role of the intelligentsia versus the “newly enfranchised” masses by emphasizing that his is a formula for elite politicians as defenders of a never-ending process by which something like a common or “national” interest emerges. Having both “a descriptive and a manipulative function[,] [i]t is the responsibility of an intellectual elite, recognizing the limitations upon human knowledge, to build and fight for a nominalist theory that is designed to justify democratic processes.”<sup>85</sup>

Such statements were, of course, likely to resonate at the Council on For-

eign Relations, a key node in the field of elite power in the United States, then as now. They remind us that when analyzing the CFR study group—like that which gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation—the scholar is not only assessing the actions of scholars engaged in an *intellectual* project, but elites in a *political* project. The interconnections between the American state, business, the academy, and organizations like the CFR—unique in their breadth and scale—is one of the most signal features of the American political context.<sup>86</sup>

Lipsky, and the CFR group as a whole, were then bound to be both drawn to yet ultimately dissatisfied with Morgenthau's realism. Realism had a prudent aspect that was attractively tentative, conservative, and elitist, preserving a prominent place for the historically and philosophically informed statesperson, presumably a member of the CFR one could easily add. In the study group documents Morgenthau thus gets a good reception.<sup>87</sup> But the sense from many participants is that the theory is in the end overblown. Lipsky warns that if the theorist exceeds proper scope in his or her generalizations, “the theorist passes beyond the function of the social scientist (or the democratic statesman) and becomes the religious leader, the metaphysician, or political fanatic preoccupied with imposing his values on reality.”<sup>88</sup>

The conceptual centerpiece of realism, the national interest, is a particular weak spot. Not only does it focus unnecessarily on the nation and the state—which, it is noted, have only been around for two hundred years or so—it is philosophically indefensible since each political community defines the national interest differently.<sup>89</sup> Once again, Lipsky's disposition is “to understand a general theory in a nominalist manner as an organization of hypotheses concerning the nature of objective reality,” but “the terms in which man may know reality must forever fall short of totally revealing reality.” Therefore, “Although essence or substance of reality may be assumed, nothing meaningful may be said about it as a totally comprehended truth.”<sup>90</sup> Proclaiming, as does Morgenthau, that international relations ultimately consist of the struggle over power to achieve the national interest is in the end too universalist a pattern of thought for Lipsky.

In place of the prudent search for the national interest and its ongoing defense in the anarchical environment of international politics, Lipsky substitutes “non-doctrinaire empirical liberalism” based on “an intellectual preference for the relative and the tentative.”<sup>91</sup> Even the prudent statesmen, we might say, can sometimes get it wrong. For Lipsky, consequently, “The alternative to the self-limiting democratic process is the application of the authoritarian assumption that the decision of leadership can be and has been produced by a process that can distinguish between good and evil in the ultimate sense.”<sup>92</sup> Liberalism requires instead policy making through trial and

error, popular mandates, education and persuasion, the never-ending search for popular consent, which can be withdrawn as well as given.

In place of the prudent statesperson, Lipsky substitutes the leader aware of when and where to draw on expertise:

The emphasis in the role of the theorist, pure and simple, is upon providing ends and means; in the role of statesmen, upon applying means to desired ends. The ideal would be a combination to discover and apply in the same person or persons. An approach to the ideal is the collaboration of the theorist whose expertise includes capacity to gather sufficient and relevant data and organize them, particular those relating to the political conditions influencing the statesman's activity, and the statesman with the capacity to recognize necessary expertise when he sees it. This collaboration requires some combination of amateur and professional capacity in both.<sup>93</sup>

Lipsky's formula for liberals remains nascent in his preparatory papers in 1953. By the end of the meetings he has elucidated a theory of theories, while hoping that this could inform an actual theory, which remains out of reach. Only later does he develop what counts as a clearly normative theory covering the best mode of governance and its practical implications.

It is perhaps not surprising that, unlike Morgenthau's realism, Lipsky's nominalist theory of international relations has passed largely into obscurity. Lipsky's is a call for a certain type of constrained—or in IR scholar Daniel Levine's words, *chastened*—form of expertise.<sup>94</sup> Lipsky's expertise is a form of knowledge aware of its limitations. No single theory, derived from supposed verities of international life—be they the struggle for power, the effects of geography, or the needs of effective political communication—can nor should seek to provide total knowledge to fully comprehend and control international life. Lipsky's is a call for a self-denying ordinance, directed at IR scholars and to scholars and statespersons in general. No one likes a self-denying ordinance; it does scholars little good in their attempt to speak to power and define the scope of their competence, and it does policy makers little any good in their political projects. Yet its philosophical merit would seem undeniable and well worth revisiting.

### *International Relations: A Cold War Social Science?*

If the CFR study group on international relations theory took place during a period of growth and consolidation of the field of International Relations, its

broader backdrop was a massive and rapid expansion of the social sciences in the United States. In the words of evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin, the “Big Truth” about the Cold War is that it “was responsible for an unprecedented and explosive expansion of the academy.”<sup>95</sup> As Mark Solovey notes, to illustrate, the American Sociological Association had around one thousand members in the early 1900s. By the 1970s, the number was above 14,000.<sup>96</sup> Sociology’s impressive growth was typical of the other social sciences like psychology, political science, and economics.

The Second World War, and the New Deal before it, had witnessed exponential growth of the American state, with unprecedented opportunities for social scientists. As Marshall Planner Jacques Reinstein later commented, to cite just one example, when he was close to finishing college in the mid-1930s the “New Deal agencies . . . were proliferating like mushrooms.” Ambitious men and women like Reinstein spent a good deal of time “hanging around personnel offices, trying to get interviews, one after the other.”<sup>97</sup> After the war, some like Reinstein stayed in Washington, but many others returned to college campuses, which themselves witnessed a boom in admissions from returning servicemen funded by the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act—the GI Bill—and spurred by the institutionalization of government support of the sciences through the creation of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950.<sup>98</sup>

Recent years have seen a corresponding rise in historical attention paid to the interrelationship between the trajectory of the social sciences and the development of the American state after 1945, especially its expansion during the Cold War.<sup>99</sup> Authors contributing to this literature have traced the deep interconnections between Cold War concerns, the provision of state and private funding to the social sciences, and the changing visions of the appropriate scope, methods, and boundaries of social science disciplines. Modifying President Eisenhower’s famous phrase, scholars like Sonia Amadae, David Price, Ron Robin, and Joy Rohde—to name just a few contributors to this generative research agenda—have highlighted episodes like the rise of rational choice theory at the RAND Corporation in the late 1940s and the use of psychology to study populations deemed susceptible to communist propaganda. Solovey explains that “many historical accounts have argued that the social sciences were, indeed, altered in significant ways in accord with these Cold-War inflected visions” of the proper relationship between academia and the state, captured in such labels as the “Politics-Patronage-Social Science” or “Military-Intellectual complex,” and the “militarization” or “weaponization” of social science. For Lewontin, consequently, “When liberal and

Left academics think of the Cold War, they think of research agenda warped by the ideological fervor and political pressures of American foreign policy, and of professional and personal lives ruined directly and indirectly by anti-communist witch-hunts and pusillanimous academic administrators.”<sup>100</sup>

More recent historical scholarship, however, has cautioned the need to resist the assumption that the social sciences were uniformly impacted by the Cold War, and that the imbrication of the social sciences with the American state was the sole or even primary influence on their development in the period.<sup>101</sup> The various social sciences interacted with the state in highly diverse ways, with many scholars having little to do with the funding streams and projects historians have analyzed. In other words, the social sciences in the mid-twentieth century were not passive receivers of government priorities; disciplinary change occurred for broader reasons, both internal and external, and many scholars pursued their own research agendas away from the priorities of the Cold War state.

In this section, I use the scholarly debate over the impact of the Cold War state on the social sciences as a foil to continue introducing the CFR study group on the theory of international relations. To what extent does the study group prove or disprove IR’s status as a “Cold War social science?” Given that the topic was international affairs and foreign policy, we might expect there to be significant or even predominant traces of Cold War concerns. Was that, in fact, the case? If not, what subjects did preoccupy the group’s participants.

Four central issues emerged in the discussions: the nature of international relations as an object of inquiry; knowledge and the corresponding status of theoretical vis-à-vis practical knowledge; the role of values in international relations theory; and the nature and purpose of theory. These four issues do not exhaust the contents of the debates, but they do capture their most salient features, not least because IR scholars to this day frequently disagree on these very questions. In each case, I show they spoke to broader and more long-standing concerns in the social sciences including IR’s status in 1953–54 as a Cold War social science.

### The Nature of International Relations As an Object of Inquiry

Members of the study group considered one of their core tasks to be determining the nature of international relations. William Kaufmann made the point strongly during the first meeting’s discussion. The “first step” in thinking about international relations theory, he argued, “is to define the ‘animal’ . . . [:] the

field of international relations.”<sup>102</sup> Alongside, or even prior to, the question of theory, then, was the issue of object: what is international relations? What does the term cover?

Kaufmann’s suggestion was to “begin with the idea that one is dealing with a system or society.”<sup>103</sup> Such a call should have been familiar to the participants. The notion of “international society” or the “society of nations” was common in prewar scholarship on international relations, and, indeed, in its practice through such international organizations as the League of Nations.<sup>104</sup> A systemic perspective, however, was a more recent and more prominent influence.

As historian Hunter Heyck has shown, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a broad convergence across the social sciences on the power and appropriateness of a systemic perspective, which came to redefine “the central concepts, methods, tools, practices, and institutional relations of postwar social science.”<sup>105</sup> Spurred by the influx of social scientists into government service during the New Deal and the Second World War, and by the “organizational revolution” in twentieth-century business, what Heyck terms the “age of system” was characterized by the rise of *control technologies*, understood as “device[s] or formalized procedure[s] that [are] used to coordinate the operations of multiple components so that they function as a single unit.”<sup>106</sup> As historian Joel Isaacs has chronicled, the creation of the interdisciplinary Department of Social Relations at Harvard provided a fulcrum for formation of systemic approaches in sociology and related fields and for the work of key figures like Talcott Parsons and Clyde Kluckhohn, and within the area of political science and IR, Karl Deutsch.<sup>107</sup> Between approximately 1920 and 1970, Heyck shows, “virtually every field of social science re-conceptualized its central object as a system defined and given structure by a set of processes, mechanisms, or relationships.”<sup>108</sup>

It might be expected then that the CFR study group would adopt such a systemic perspective as the basis of their discussions. Indeed, strong traces of systems theory are evident in the digests, primarily through the discussion of Chicago political scientist Harold Lasswell and David Easton, one of the earliest and most forceful proponents of a systems perspective to the study of politics. The group felt Lasswell’s approach—which centered on the interaction of political psychology and mass communication—was powerful and innovative, despite the opaque style of its author.<sup>109</sup> As a tool to understand the psychological basis of liberal democracy, Lasswell’s work was considered to have significant merit, not least because Lasswell was said to be gaining political influence at the time. As CFR member Charles Burton Marshall impressed upon the group, Lasswell was then currently popular within the

halls of power, as “many members of the ‘new team’ in Washington refer to Lasswell as an authority for their views on how policy should be articulated and communicated.”<sup>110</sup>

The study group ultimately felt that international relations was a broader object than Lasswell’s psychological approach allowed for. “Professor Wolfers,” moreover, felt “that to apply a theory of individual behavior to national behavior is a non-sequitur.”<sup>111</sup> With the movement away from Lasswell, the idea of a systemic or macro-level societal approach failed to gain a foothold in the group’s discussions. In 1953, IR was evidently still some years away from a full engagement with systems theory, indicated by the appearance in 1957 of Morton Kaplan’s *System and Process International Process*, and Kenneth Waltz’s turn to systems theory, as described by IR historians Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot.<sup>112</sup>

The reason a systems perspective did not catch on is telling, however. Over the course of the study group, attempts to fix the nature of “the animal”—in Kaufmann’s terms—on one single aspect of world politics were countered by members asserting the importance of other facets and repetition of the theme that international politics is too complex to be reduced to a single system, however elaborate. Soon after noting the potential for an approach focused on constellations of states, for example, Rabi himself asked “what ‘international relations’ covered. Does it not include international commerce and investment?”<sup>113</sup> Most pressingly, the role of foreign policy makers or practitioners repeatedly intruded, impeding considerations of international relations as a coherent entity. Kaufmann noted the imperative to include the political process in any attempt to explain international outcomes.

Beyond the notion of system, the study group explored other conceptualizations of international relations as an object of analysis through their discussions of the theoretical approaches of Carr, Marx, Wilson, and others.

The idea of the “national interest” gained significant attention. Several objections, however, were quickly raised to an equation of the search for and fulfillment of the national interest and the scope of international relations. The objections equate to what contemporary IR scholars view as the nonobjective, or socially constructed, aspects of the national interest and, indeed, the state itself as a political unit. As Lipsky interpreted Morgenthau’s argument, “the national interest . . . is a subjective abstraction that will receive differing content depending on the outlook of the individual employing it.”<sup>114</sup> Elsewhere, Chairman MacIver noted that “The state . . . , which is the chief object of inquiry in international political theory, is not a datum in nature but rather a construct for serving certain ends.”<sup>115</sup> Thus, while the search for the



national interest could be viewed as part of international relations, it was too narrow as a picture of the whole.

The case of geopolitics provides a further example of the distillation of one crucial aspect of international relations deemed insightful, but ultimately inappropriate as the foundational feature of the object “international relations.” Kenneth Thompson was particularly drawn to the approach. Thompson felt that “there was some merit in thinking of the elements of international politics as a pyramid with the geographic element constituting its base”<sup>116</sup> and that “There is little doubt that this country has suffered from failing properly to appreciate the geographic factor” in international politics.<sup>117</sup> But the group appears ultimately to have agreed with Lipsky’s conclusion that prediction based on geography could too easily slip into self-fulfilling prophecy. Geography mattered, in other words, but was not the only aspect of international relations with which a proper theory of the subject must deal.

Finally, of all the conceptualizations of the fundamental nature of international relations, Marxist theory—and particularly imperialism—got as close as any to garnering general agreement by the group, which must strike us as surprising given the political climate of the early 1950s. For Robert Strausz-Hupé, for example, “Marx offered a superbly intelligent theory.”<sup>118</sup> Hajo Holborn agreed, noting that “while he was, of course, by no means a Marxist, he had the feeling that Marxism has been, in some respects, underrated. As a theory of history, or perhaps of political sociology, it had created certain insights which were an advance over previous concepts.”<sup>119</sup> Holborn argued that Marxism had “contemporary relevance . . . when one notices the extent to which US foreign policy appears to be based on perverted Marxist notions. This country’s economic and technical assistance programs seem to be largely predicated on a theory of economic determinism, yet US policies fail to recognize the power of ideas and the interrelationship between ideas and material welfare in attempting to influence behavior abroad.”<sup>120</sup>

In the end, however, the Marxism fell afoul of its political distastefulness for many of those gathered. The topic was whether the United States could be understood as an imperialist power. Thompson argued that “if imperialism is defined as an alteration of the *status quo*, then direct [American] action in countries like Italy or Guatemala could be termed imperialist.”<sup>121</sup> Dorothy Fosdick, however, “questioned whether US intervention for the purpose of liberating a nation which had succumbed to Communism could be termed imperialist.”<sup>122</sup>

In sum, there was much enthusiasm expressed about coming to some clear understanding of the nature of “the animal” as a first necessary step in the the-

orization of international relations. There were also clear traces of the systems theory in the waters of American political science in the early 1950s. But no agreement emerged on the question of what such an understanding would look like. The group stumbled over multiple insightful yet partial perspectives, concluding that no single approach or master concept could grasp the whole in all its complexity, especially its historical specificity and the crucial role of policy makers in international affairs.

### The Nature of Knowledge and the Status of Theoretical Vis-à-Vis Practical Knowledge

During the group's discussions, considerations of the object of analysis—international relations—frequently slipped into the nature of knowledge itself. In other words, behind or at least alongside the question of what international relations is lay the issue of *how one comes to know* international relations. The group's conversations thus offer a case to examine the position of IR within broader trends in the postwar social sciences concerning the meaning of knowledge and the type of knowledge the social sciences should aim for.

In particular, the study group offers the opportunity to assess the importance of behavioralism, as we have already seen. Based on recent historical work on IR and other fields, there are reasons both to expect behavioralism to be adopted and to expect it to have been rejected by the participants in the CFR study group.

The rise of behavioralism in America is a prominent theme in historical work on Cold War social science. Centered on the RAND organization, Robin shows how a key group of behaviorist academics collected around the study of conventional warfare, as opposed to the more well-known nuclear strategists, the famed “Wizards of Armageddon.”<sup>123</sup> At RAND, behaviorists like Nathan Leites developed ideas such as the “operational code” as tools to explain the foreign policy behavior of foreign elites, drawing on psychology as an inspiration. Largely absent, Robin notes, were humanists, who were suspect due to both understanding of communism and the fact that “the humanities prized the past and put a premium on experience. Such concepts had no place in the military-academic complex.”<sup>124</sup>

The members of the group were “guided by a defining mission to transform American society and control global trends,”<sup>125</sup> a mission that had been nurtured by similar educational training. Many, indeed, had been students of Harold Lasswell at the University of Chicago in the 1920s.<sup>126</sup> The group shared

“a pervasive reluctance to ascribe to others any social or cultural trait that behavioralists could not identify within American society.”<sup>127</sup> To illustrate, Robin cites the example of a late-1940s study for the Office of Naval Research (ONR) on “leadership in early communities” to highlight the absurd effects: a study of urban Philadelphia that did not consider the context to be culturally specific.<sup>128</sup> How, Robin asks, “did behavioral scientists come to monopolize the function of interpreters and developers of modern culture”?<sup>129</sup>

Either to affirm its value or to reject it, therefore, we might then expect behavioralism to have been very much on the table at the study group meetings. As we have already seen, what we actually witness in the meeting digests is little attention to behavioralism, but not because the group coalesced around a non-behavioralist realist perspective, as Lipsky attempted to persuade the group of the merits of a nominalist understanding of theory as the proper philosophical underpinning of a theory of theories of international relations.

Many of the members would have preferred not to spend so much time on the subject of knowledge. Hajo Holborn, for one, made clear at one stage that “The group had been convened to discuss theory of international relations, not theory of knowledge.”<sup>130</sup> MacIver similarly “expressed the opinion that the group would have a hard time reaching agreement unless it avoided metaphysical questions.”<sup>131</sup> Nonetheless, the issue emerged at each of the meetings, and Lipsky’s defense of a nominalist position suggests a view of knowledge struggling against the greater certainty of realist and behavioral perspectives more prominent in mid-twentieth-century social science.

Lipsky’s defense of a nominalist position remains, however, very much relevant to contemporary thinking about the nature of theory and knowledge in international relations, particularly new trends within broadly speaking constructivist work that stress the centrality of practice, practical knowledge, and prudence in international relations. A nominalist perspective by and large accords with accounts that highlight the socially constructed rather than objective or given nature of knowledge. For practice theorists in particular, much social action in international relations is neither based on consequentialist nor norm-governed reasoning, but is rather habitual, everyday, and taken-for-granted. Yet Lipsky posed an interesting question to this literature: Is there a fundamental difference between the knowledge of the statesman and the scholar?

Lipsky disagreed with political scientist David Easton, who had then recently articulated the view that the two were distinct.<sup>132</sup> Lipsky claims instead that “The theoretician may be distinguished from the practitioner of power for some purposes [but] they should not be distinguished for all, even main,

purposes. The knowledge they work with is or should be basically the same, that is knowledge to be understood in terms of a scientific systematics."<sup>133</sup> In relation to the supposed "prudence" of the statesman, for Lipsky, "I have no way of discovering what prudential knowledge is; nor has any theorist ever presented me with any test for separating qualitatively the kind of knowledge that the scientist gathers and the kind that the statesman should act by."<sup>134</sup>

Lipsky's rejection of any difference in the type of knowledge of the statesman and academic leads him to espouse a position close to Plato's call for philosopher-kings: "The emphasis in the role of the theorist, pure and simple, is upon producing ends and means; in the role of the statesman, upon applying means to achieve discerned ends. The ideal would be a combination of capacity to discover and apply in the same person or persons."<sup>135</sup>

Contemporary work on practical knowledge, however, suggests that there is indeed a difference between the knowledge of the policy maker and the academic, only that the difference is practical rather than philosophical. As William Kaufmann noted of Morgenthau's theory, "Morgenthau confuses, Professor Kaufmann felt, his position as an observer with that of a would-be policy maker."<sup>136</sup> While philosophically the knowledge of the policy maker and the scholar is the same, their distinct social locations makes all the difference. Indeed, even Lipsky acknowledges that the difference "between theoretician and statesman is that the former does not have to make decisions as to the means that are to be employed to achieve particular value goals or situations and the latter *does* have that most difficult task."<sup>137</sup> His final plea "is for greater awareness on the part of the natural collaborators, theorist (scientist) and statesman (practitioner of theory) of the nature of the scientific process, for greater awareness of what they are or should be doing."<sup>138</sup>

## The Role of Values in International Relations Theory

The third major issue confronted by the study group was the role of values in international relations and International Relations theory. Value-freedom cropped up numerous times during the discussions. We should not be surprised. The role of values has been a persistent source of contention in the social sciences, back to the *methodenstreit* of the late nineteenth century. By extension, value-neutrality has been key to long-standing debates over the relationship between the state and the academy, and whether the term "Cold War social science" is an appropriate umbrella term for developments in America after 1945. The role of values has been central to those in favor of the designation

“Cold War social science,” due in large part to the prominence of episodes like the Project Camelot affair, which placed the role of government-funded social science in American foreign policy firmly in the political spotlight during the mid-1960s.

As historian Joy Rohde recounts, Project Camelot was a counterinsurgency campaign in 1964–65 funded by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), a multiyear research institute created by the army in 1956 and housed at the American University in Washington, D.C.<sup>139</sup> SORO was designed “to be a hybrid institution that would seamlessly meld social scientific expertise with the operational concerns of army officers,” and it carried out numerous empirical studies on the ideas and doctrine of real and potential enemy populations, with the aim to “usher gradual, stable change toward and American-led world order.”<sup>140</sup> Along these lines, Project Camelot aimed to study counterinsurgency techniques in real conditions in Latin America. That was before, that is, Chilean scholars realized the study was being paid for not by American University, but by the Pentagon,<sup>141</sup> raising criticism that spread to the Chilean government and critics of the military-industrial-academic complex in the United States, “who hoped to draw attention to the problems of militarization in social science and American foreign affairs.”<sup>142</sup>

Historian Robert Proctor, has shown, however, that the meaning of value-freedom or value-neutrality has changed over time, which cautions against careless contextualization or periodization of the form in which it emerged during the study group’s conversations. Value-neutrality, Proctor argues, “far from being a timeless or self-evident principle, has a distinctive geography: ‘value-freedom’ has meant different things to different people at different times.”<sup>143</sup> “Slogans like “science must value-free” or “all knowledge is political” must be understood in light of specific fears and goals that change over time,” he goes on. Arguments for value-neutrality “may be a response to state or religious suppression of scientific ideas; value-neutrality may be a way to guard against personal interests obstructing scientific progress. Value-neutrality may reflect the desires of scholars to professionalize or to specialize; value-neutrality may conceal the fact that science has social origins and social consequences. Neutrality may provide a path along which one retreats or a platform from which one launches an offensive.”

In sum, “value-neutrality” to those who raised the issue at other times and places might not have meant the same thing as at the CFR in 1953 and 1954. Indeed, voices in favor of value-neutrality were muted at the CFR meetings, which accords with the general skepticism shown toward more objective and formalized understandings of both international relations and knowledge de-

tailed above. As group chairman MacIver noted, the supposedly value-free methods of the natural sciences “could not be utilized by the social scientist. The fields of investigation are not analogous.” The example he drew on was the state, “the chief object of inquiry in international political theory.” For MacIver, the state “is not a datum in nature but rather a construct for serving certain ends.”<sup>144</sup> As such, it was “shot through with value.”<sup>145</sup>

Physicist Isidor Rabi disagreed. When confronted by Lipsky as to his reasoning, Rabi expressed the view that the question of the role of values in theory “is an aesthetic question, not one related to the problem of knowledge.”<sup>146</sup> Lipsky used the opportunity to explore further the implications of his nominalist understanding of theory. Nominalism, he suggested, asserts the nonidentity of thinking and being, which, it follows, implies that the function of value is related to the indeterminacy of knowledge, since if a “theory is complete, if it explains all phenomena, then value is irrelevant since absolute predictability exists and one would not value or desire that which one knows is impossible.”<sup>147</sup> As a further implication, “all statements of ends are attempts to freeze the status quo, a situation, on the time continuum. This is an impossible task at best, and there is no scientific basis for asserting the goodness of such an illusion.”<sup>148</sup>

The issue reared its head during the discussion over the reality of “realism” and the question of the national interest. In terms that might have come from debates in political science and IR from the early 1990s,<sup>149</sup> Carr, Lipsky suggested, “underestimates the power of ideas.” Interests come from ideas, Lipsky asserted. “Interest is not a tangible thing that exists externally; it is related to a theory and value system.”<sup>150</sup> Again, if Carr saw revolution as an inevitable feature of international change it was because, for Lipsky, he must desire it: “Carr is basically a man of violence who, driven by his desire for the fulfillment of a revolution, defined in his own terms, has not taken the time to be philosophically precise.”<sup>151</sup>

Value-freedom, for Lipsky, was not appropriate, since “It is the academic theorists or the political leaders who lead in giving reality to interests by defining them, by producing theories outlining them.”<sup>152</sup> Thus,

In this light, single or multiple causes, long-range explanations or predictions of what will occur are highly questionable ventures, especially in history and the social sciences. To the extent that long-range predictions are undertaken in these areas, they tend to admit value preferences under the guise of science. What man predicts in history, beyond his scientific capacity to know, is what he wishes to happen. . . . A sound methodology can propose to do no more

than provide a dynamic guide to assist the analyst in distinguishing between the suggestion of possibilities and the prophecy of the course of history.<sup>153</sup>

Yet there was a limit to the rejection of value-freedom, which emerged particularly during consideration of the theoretical contribution of none other than Harold Lasswell. Lasswell, Lipsky's preparatory paper explains, thinks social science should be able to help teach society what to value and how to realize values.<sup>154</sup> Poles apart from Morgenthau, it explained, Lasswell wanted to develop a *policy science* of political science: a management science, which could tell leaders how to manipulate political society to want international organization.<sup>155</sup> Drawing on Freudian psychology and the notion of id, ego, superego, transposed to the level of the state, Lasswell's desire was for the social scientist to be able to "make recommendations with more confidence regarding the development of an elite appropriate to the needs of a society that aspires toward freedom."<sup>156</sup> Lasswell's policy science was aimed at supporting and promoting democracy through the creation of democratic personalities. Although the group found the approach unsuitable as a basis for a theory of international relations, "Lasswell's contribution is or could be enormous. At least here is a forthright attempt to embody a discipline in the social sciences within the framework of science in the conventional sense."<sup>157</sup>

At one stage of the meetings, Charles Burton Marshall—who later became a noted IR theorist<sup>158</sup>—shared his impression that he "thought that the group's discussions regarding the criteria of international relations theory often wandered from one yardstick to another . . . sometimes an aid to understanding, sometimes for advice to policymakers."<sup>159</sup> Marshall gave voice to precisely the predicament the study group approached but had no way to overcome over the course of their meetings. Thus "Professor Wolfers observed that political scientists would like to be able to perform two functions: the capacity for fairly accurate prediction and the capacity to make constructive political choice."<sup>160</sup> Holborn "suggested that a lesser, but perhaps more practical, objective of international relations theory than that suggested by Professor Wolfers is the counseling of shorter-range improvements in relationships between nations."<sup>161</sup> And Rabi asked, "Is [the theory of international relations] a theory which attempted to define what was good and bad in a global sense? Or is it a theory which would be suitable for guiding policy-makers?"<sup>162</sup>

The concern with offering relevant policy advice is telling. It is perhaps less surprising that value-neutrality was not trumpeted by Lipsky and the study group, as value-neutrality was quite simply a good fit in the context of organizations like the CFR. While sharing the moniker "think tank" with Feder-

ally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) like the RAND Corporation, organizations like the CFR and the Brookings Institution are in reality quite different, straddling as they do the boundaries between the government, academia, and the world of business. As Robin notes, FFRDCs like RAND were a new intellectual format, which “appeared to be creative, uninhibited meeting points between government clients and innovative scholars for solving the nation’s problems.”<sup>163</sup> As such, RAND’s government clients apparently preferred behavioralists, who “claimed supposedly value-free skills.”<sup>164</sup> Unlike RAND et al., the knowledge the CFR and similar organizations, like Brookings, provide to policy makers may be nonpartisan, but it is not value-free.

### The Lure of Theory

The final issue central to the study group’s discussions was the nature of theory. What was “theory” when it came to international relations? What was it for? Not surprisingly given what has been said above about organizations like the CFR, members of the group thought that at the heart of the task of answering these questions was settling on an account of the relationship between the theorist and the policy maker. Should the theory of international relations offer “shovel ready” advice to the decision maker, or merely guide them in the exercise of their judgment?

The study group concluded in June 1954 without clear agreement on the proper parameters and unmistakable attributes of a theory of international relations. Seemingly mutually exclusive notions emerged alongside one another. On one side were voices sympathetic to Lipsky’s, for whom theories were necessarily partial, multiple, and practically oriented, militating against the possibility of a theory of international relations. On the other were accounts of theory more in line with natural science models, where the task of delineating the core aspects of international politics were precisely what a theory of international relations should aim at.

For Lipsky, theory was primarily “a basis for practice.” Policy makers, he argued, employ theory, however implicitly.<sup>165</sup> A primary function of theorizing international relations, then, is to engage in a “A constant process of refinement in the understanding of this implied theory.”<sup>166</sup> At the same time, Lipsky’s nominalism led him to caution against what is in other philosophical terms referred to as “reification” or the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” The role of the theorist of international relations, then, is to uncover the



implicit theory held by policy makers “without letting it become ossified or stereotyped.”<sup>167</sup> That, he opines, “would be an advance in knowledge.”<sup>168</sup>

Others espoused a form of theory closer to the natural science model. Professor Kaufmann, for example, “thought a sounder criterion [for the value of a theory] is that of operational utility; that is, a theory which would furnish the observer with a greater capacity for understanding the political process and hence the ability to “predict” in a more limited sense.”<sup>169</sup> As might be expected from a hard scientist, Rabi was eager to narrow down the scope of international relations so as to facilitate conceptualization along a model familiar in physics. “[F]rom his own point of view,” he made clear, “a theory starts with a number of concepts elaborated to simplify the material with which the theory is concerned. Relations between these concepts are also an inherent part of a theory. The concepts are then tested with reference to their predictive value for the future or their predictive value in the past.”<sup>170</sup>

Rabi’s understanding of science seems to have been for the group a clear touchstone around which to discuss the uniqueness of international relations. For CFR staff member Zinner, “With regard to the question ‘what is theory?’ . . . the following definition might be considered appropriate; ‘a theory is a generalized explanation pertaining to a set of related phenomena.’”<sup>171</sup> For Strausz-Hupé, professor at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, as a young science international relations was like “botany in the time of Linnaeus . . . concerned more with classification than experimentation. To evolve further, International Relations must create criteria for measuring the phenomena of politics. As yet, however, no adequate means for testing has been found.”<sup>172</sup>

Yet at the same time as affirming Rabi’s commonsense model, Strausz-Hupé raised a fundamental question about its suitability for the study of international affairs. The role of prediction in any theory of international relations once again raised the issue of the normal science model’s suitability. Rabi himself, for example, noted that full predictability is a big aim for IR since even in physics “most so-called prediction is merely extrapolation on the basis of previous experience.”<sup>173</sup> Therefore, “Professor Kaufmann thought a sounder criterion is that of operational utility; that is, a theory which would furnish the observer with a greater capacity for understanding the political process and hence the ability to ‘predict’ in a more limited sense.”<sup>174</sup> As already noted above, others at the meetings—notably Lipsky and the chairman, sociologist Robert MacIver—were skeptical about the importance of prediction, however limited, to theory.

The existence of disparate, perhaps even opposed or mutually exclusive

understandings of theory did not go unacknowledged. As Marshall expressed, “the group’s discussions regarding the criteria of international relations theory often wandered from one yardstick to another.”<sup>175</sup> At some points theory meant an aid to understanding, he showed, sometimes for advice to policy maker. Theory remained, then, an elusive goal, shared by the group in the abstract more than in the detail.

The CFR study group on international relations shines a much-needed light on the development of the field of international relations and its position within the military-industrial-academic complex. Of more interest than the multiple notions of theory is the question of why despite very different understandings of theory, the diverse members of the study group could nevertheless agree that theory remained of vital importance to the field of international relations. What does that tell us about the role of the Cold War in the development of IR?

The CFR study group took place at a time of increased interest in international affairs in the United States, an effect of America’s emergence as a global power during the Second World War. Newfound global primacy stimulated the creation of an expansive institutional architecture of world power, which included the academic specialty of International Relations (IR). As historian of IR Brian Schmidt has shown,<sup>176</sup> individuals considered experts in international relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s were not only located in universities, but in think tanks, the government, philanthropic foundations like the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations, and, through organizations like the CFR, in business too.

IR’s “in-between-ness” or interstitiality, I would argue, underpinned both the strong lure of theory and the difficulties in agreeing on what a suitable theory would look like. To highlight IR’s interstitiality in the postwar years is not simply another way of saying that IR had not yet undergone disciplinary specialization. IR had indeed not undergone disciplinary specialization, but the point goes further. Both the CFR study group and the Rockefeller Foundation conferences featured participants that today we would not consider IR specialists at all, but policy makers and elites with an investment in foreign affairs. Yet at the time they were thought suitable participants not merely to speak about the *practice* of foreign policy, but the *theory* of international relations.<sup>177</sup>

As historians of IR have shown, the specific importance imparted to theory within that context lay with theory’s capacity to provide a core to the nascent field. As Schmidt suggests,<sup>178</sup> there was a feeling of urgency among many IR specialists in the early 1950s to define the subject of international politics by developing a distinct theory, since the “very act of defining international

relations, both as a distinct realm of political activity and as a separate and autonomous field of study, is inherently theoretical.” Thompson himself noted elsewhere that “It is frequently said that one test of the independent character of a discipline or field of study is the presence in the field of theories contending for recognition by those engaged in thinking and writing.”<sup>179</sup> Theorizing IR and defining international relations as a field thus went hand in hand.

While there was much interest in Lipsky’s nominalist “theory of theories,” defining international relations as—in Schmidt’s words—a “distinct realm of political activity and as a separate and autonomous field of study” was precisely what a nominalist approach *did not do*. Hans Morgenthau’s emphasis on the national interest, and the reality of power politics as the proper domain of IR, provided such a theory. Lipsky’s nominalist approach was weak by comparison. Unlike Morgenthau’s realism, it neither defined the nature of international politics “as a distinct sphere of political activity,” nor did it represent a strong and coherent position on the role of the scholar of IR in relation to their subject matter around which the group’s diverse membership could converge. The power of a realist approach was later amplified by the more structural realist theory of Kenneth Waltz, which further delimited the domain of IR and its object of study.<sup>180</sup>

From this perspective, the study group represents an early episode in what Stanley Hoffmann would a few years later term IR’s “long road to theory,” the ongoing search among scholars of international relations for a theoretical core to their field.<sup>181</sup> As Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach and others have detailed, an almost obsessive quest for theory is in many ways the defining feature of IR’s development during the Cold War and after.<sup>182</sup> Paradoxically, therefore, it might be suggested that IR’s very *proximity* to the state in the early Cold War helped insulate it from the more overt politicization scholars have detailed of other cognate social science fields. Through theoretical reflection, IR scholars sought to identify a unique contribution IR could make to the conduct of American foreign relations.

### *The Study Group Participants: A Biographical Analysis*

Thus far I have said much about the group’s formation and the content and context of its discussions. But who were the participants? Why were they chosen as authorities on theory and international relations theory more specifically? In the remainder of this introduction, therefore, I inquire into the turn

to theory not by theory, but by the theorists—actual or potential—brought together in New York in 1953–54.

### George Arthur Lipsky (1912–1972)

Born in 1912 in Seattle, George Lipsky studied at the University of Washington and the University of California–Berkeley before serving in the army (1942–46).<sup>183</sup> After a stint as an instructor at West Point, he returned to Berkeley as an assistant professor in political science. In 1950, he published a study of the political thought of President John Quincy Adams,<sup>184</sup> which appears to have been broadly well-received.<sup>185</sup> Lipsky left Berkeley shortly before beginning the CFR fellowship in the fall of 1953.

Lipsky was a good match for a Carnegie Fellowship, which again was interested in funding scholars with an interest in legalistic analyses of international politics. He had edited a volume just before joining the CFR on the work of legal theorist Hans Kelsen.<sup>186</sup> In his introduction, Lipsky notes that Kelsen's project was to eliminate the problem of natural law from the science of law. Natural law, for Kelsen, is a metaphysics of law, in which description and evaluation are deeply and problematically intertwined. For Kelsen, natural law had no place in a dispassionate legal science. The pure theory of law Kelsen was developing thus excluded morality and was based instead on positive law as characterized by the hierarchy of legal norms acting in society. Given the prominence of international legal scholarship among scholars of world politics in the 1940s, and Morgenthau's own engagements,<sup>187</sup> Lipsky's shift from interest in international law to the theory of international politics is a recognizable transition.

Lipsky's interest in developing a theory of international relations waned after the study group, however. He published a version of the working paper on the international relations theory of Harold Lasswell in the *Journal of Politics* in 1955, but none of the other working papers, or a promised book manuscript, saw the light of day. Lipsky's interests shifted to East Africa and the Middle East, and he published surveys of the economy and culture of Saudi Arabia<sup>188</sup> and Ethiopia. After leaving the CFR, he spent a year as a visiting instructor at Yale before beginning a long and successful career at Wabash College in Indiana, where an undergraduate prize in political science still bears his name. Lipsky remained at Wabash until his death in 1972.<sup>189</sup>

### Robert Morrison MacIver (1882–1970)

Sociologist Robert MacIver's appointment as chairman is surprising from the present-day vantage point, yet in addition to the social connections he enjoyed on account of his location in New York, MacIver's work on politics and political theory qualified him for the position.<sup>190</sup>

Born in 1882 in Stornoway, Scotland, and educated at the universities of Glasgow and Oxford, MacIver emigrated in 1915, becoming a political scientist at the University of Toronto. Moving to Barnard College in 1927, MacIver joined Columbia in 1929, where he stayed until 1950, holding the presidency of the American Sociological Association in 1940.

There is no record of MacIver and Lipsky's connections before the study group, but the two shared a broadly humanist approach that may have further supported the choice of MacIver. In *The Web of Government* (1948), MacIver described politics as more of an art than a science and explored the myths and techniques through which man "has outdistanced all other animals and made himself lord of creation."<sup>191</sup> By *techniques*, MacIver means "the devices and skills of every kind that enable men to dispose of things—and of persons—more to their liking."<sup>192</sup> By *myths*, he meant "the value-impregnated beliefs and notions that men hold, that they live by or live for. Every society is held together by a myth-system, a complex of dominating thought-forms that determines and sustains all activities."<sup>193</sup> *The Web of Government* thus focused in a proto-social constructionist way on the emergence of the state, the bases of authority in law and social forms, and the changing structure of governmental organization over time.

As his ASA obituary notes, MacIver distrusted the move toward academic specialization and "sought to define an integrated social science that could understand people in their economic, political, and social aspects simultaneously." Drawing more on classical philosophers (Plato, Aristotle) and theoretically inclined sociologists like Émile Durkheim, MacIver "focused instead on human agency, methodological diversity, and ethical issues."<sup>194</sup> MacIver had attempted to develop at Columbia a premier generalist sociology department based on the name recognition of members Robert Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld. As Elzbieta Halas shows, in this endeavor MacIver had much success, despite the prominence of Chicago and subsequently Berkeley overshadowing MacIver's contributions to American sociology.<sup>195</sup> The reason, most likely, is the increasing predominance of the strongly quantitative methods associated with Lazarsfeld, which occurred to MacIver's regret.<sup>196</sup> MacIver "pitted his polemical strength against the use of natural science methods in sociology, espe-

cially of quantification and measurement,” but in many ways he was swimming against the tide within the discipline and beyond.

### Dorothy Fosdick (1913–1997)

Educated at Smith College and Columbia, Dorothy Fosdick joined the State Department in 1942 after teaching sociology and politics at Smith.<sup>197</sup> Fosdick served on the US delegations to the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences and for the preparatory committees for first three UN General Assemblies. In 1948, she was appointed to the new Policy Planning Staff,<sup>198</sup> created by Marshall in spring 1947 under the direction of George Kennan. Fosdick left government in 1953 following the Republican victory and became a writer for the *New York Times* and a consultant with NBC.

Fosdick was the daughter of religious leader and pacifist Reverend Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick and the niece of Raymond Fosdick, the prominent international lawyer and supporter of the League of Nations. But she came to hold more tough-minded foreign policy views than either. Fosdick advised Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson in 1952, but in 1954 she met Washington Democratic senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, becoming his principal foreign policy advisor until 1983. Fosdick and Jackson “were both cold war liberals who were committed to government support for social causes at home and a strong, intrusive government abroad.”<sup>199</sup> Jackson’s position on the Senate Armed Services Committee gave him and by extension Fosdick significant influence. Fosdick worked principally in the background as a speech writer and close confidante of Jackson and as leader to a group of later prominent individuals who began their careers on Jackson’s staff, including Richard Perle (assistant secretary of defense, 1981–87) and Elliott Abrams (assistant secretary of state of for inter-American affairs, 1985–89, and advisor on human rights to George W. Bush from 2001).

Fosdick gave expression to her foreign policy views in the 1955 book *Common Sense and World Affairs*, where she argued for the application of principles common in American society, like “Whoever says he has the solution to our problems speaks too soon” and “Fashioning your methods in light of your end is prudence.”<sup>200</sup> Fosdick’s emphasis on prudence, together with the role of power, raises obvious comparisons with both Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr (who had been a family friend and mentor she had met while growing up in faculty housing of the Union Theological Seminary, where Niebuhr taught). Fosdick was in agreement with Niebuhr’s belief that, as her *New York*

*Times* obituary put it, “evil is a palpable world force that must be resisted and overcome,” which “became the geopolitical creed of a generation of cold war theorists.”

Fosdick’s emphasis on preparing the ordinary citizen for participation in foreign policy deliberation, however, is a telling departure from Morgenthau. The reason is that Fosdick displayed a commitment to liberalism and democracy that was distinct from Morgenthau, both intellectually and perhaps practically. Like Lipsky and MacIver,<sup>201</sup> her writings indicated a concern for the maintenance of liberty and democracy at home.<sup>202</sup> In her 1939 book, *What Is Liberty?*, Fosdick interrogated the various uses of the term “liberty” in contemporary political discourse. Arguing that the word afforded no fixed definition yet rested at the base of the individual’s desire for control over his or her self-expression and its means, she asserted the need to think separately of the ways of maximizing liberties in the different economic, cultural, and political spheres.<sup>203</sup>

The question of the nature of liberty was not merely intellectual, however, and placing Fosdick into the context of liberal politics in the 1940s and 1950s, rather than a seemingly timeless debate within IR between “realists” and “liberals,” is telling. Liberalism was still recovering from the deep divisions that had emerged during the late 1940s, when liberals had split on the question of the possibility of continued cooperation with the Soviet Union, leading liberal favorite and former vice president Henry Wallace to split from the Democrats and run as a Progressive Party candidate in 1948.<sup>204</sup> The significance of her father was that his Riverside Church was backed by the Rockefeller Foundation and was, according to Fosdick’s obituary, a “bastion of New York liberalism.” Niebuhr was prominent in the anticommunist wing of liberalism, strongly tied to New York City (which Morgenthau was apart from in Chicago), and was a founding member of the anti-Soviet Americans for Democratic Action (ADA),<sup>205</sup> which tried to define the nature of liberalism and whose members came to have significant influence over the Kennedy administration.

### Hajo Holborn (1902–1969)

One of the most vocal members on the question of the theoretical basis of international relations was Yale historian Hajo Holborn.<sup>206</sup> Born in Berlin in 1902, Holborn was a student of Friedrich Meineke at the University of Berlin, receiving his doctorate in 1924 (at the age of only twenty-two). After spending time in Heidelberg, he returned to Berlin to the Carnegie-funded

Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, where fellow study group member Arnold Wolfers was also employed.<sup>207</sup> Holborn, it should be stressed, was chair in international relations at the Hochschule. He was dismissed in 1933 by the Nazis but had already left for the UK, reaching the United States in 1934. Holborn spent six years at Tufts University (1936–42) before joining Yale at the end of the conflict. A historian of Germany, Holborn was the president of the American Historical Association in 1967.

Holborn had written his habilitation on the history of the Reformation period, but after joining the Hochschule he returned to modern diplomatic history and “became attracted to the methods of the study of international relations which had been developed in the Anglo-Saxon countries.”<sup>208</sup> *The Political Collapse of Europe*<sup>209</sup> is the clearest example, a book that for historians Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern became the “standard treatise on the decline of the Great Powers in Europe, whose early dominance [Leopold Von] Ranke had authoritatively depicted.”<sup>210</sup> More important for the study group perhaps is that a version of the book appeared in the journal *World Politics*,<sup>211</sup> where Holborn also published on the subject of American foreign policy and European integration while the study group was ongoing.<sup>212</sup>

Holborn’s academic credentials were then more than adequate for inclusion in the CFR study group. But so too were his connections with the world of policy making. During the war Holborn worked for the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (1942–46), where he counseled a softer line than the tough approach that became the Morgenthau Plan for the pastoralization of Germany.<sup>213</sup> Holborn later consulted for assistant secretary of state John Hilldring on US policies toward occupied Germany and Japan.<sup>214</sup> As a German, Holborn was a perfect go-between for the US government with German leaders.<sup>215</sup>

### William W. Kaufmann (1918–2008)

The importance of resisting equating name recognition within IR as it developed later with prominence in the field of international relations in the early 1950s is nowhere more telling than with William Kaufmann. An advisor to secretaries of defense between the 1960s and 1970s, during the late 1940s Kaufmann was one of the RAND Corporation nuclear strategists later dubbed the “Wizards of Armageddon,” alongside others such as Herman Kahn and Albert Wohlstetter.<sup>216</sup>

Born in New York in 1918, Kaufmann attended the same Connecticut



school as John F. Kennedy, before going to Yale to study international relations.<sup>217</sup> Kaufmann joined the faculty of the Yale Institute for International Studies (YIIS), which uprooted for Princeton in 1951. According to historian Fred Kaplan, YIIS—which also housed study group member Arnold Wolfers, as well as other early IR theorists William T. R. Fox, Frederick Dunn, and sociologist Nicholas Spykman—was then a “prime mover” in thinking about the implications of nuclear power for world politics.<sup>218</sup> Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and several other corporations like J. P. Morgan and Union Carbide,<sup>219</sup> YIIS provided a link between the East Coast schools and the University of Chicago, where in addition to Morgenthau both Bernard Brodie and Quincy Wright were spearheading a more realistic approach to the study of international relations. The latter was engaged in a sixteen-year study on the causes of war, a topic most students of international affairs had ignored during the 1930s.<sup>220</sup>

Kaufmann’s influence over US nuclear strategy came later, during the early 1960s, when he was hired as one of new secretary of defense Robert McNamara’s “whizz kids.”<sup>221</sup> His hiring was based, at least in part, on the challenge he and others offered during the late 1950s to the government’s strategy of “massive retaliation,” which many were beginning to view as impractical and morally indefensible. Kaufmann cautioned a more flexible response and the building up of conventional weapons.<sup>222</sup> But Kaufmann is interesting for us in the way he embodies some crucial links in the interstitial field of international relations in the early 1950s. YIIS was thus connected to Princeton, where Professors Edward Mead Earle and Klaus Knorr worked, and to the State Department and the Pentagon. Brodie, for example, had been a friend of Chicago economist Jacob Viner, who was both influential as a theorist and advisor on trade policy and a believer in the potentially peaceful effects of the atomic bomb.

### Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903–2002)

The case of Robert Strausz-Hupé further confirms the disjuncture between later notoriety within IR and influence in the interstitial field of international relations from the 1940s onwards. If known at all today, the University of Pennsylvania political scientist is recognized as the author of *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power*,<sup>223</sup> which was representative of a resurgence of interest in geopolitical thinking in US international studies, best exemplified by Yale IR scholar Nicholas Spykman’s *America’s Strategy and World Politics*.<sup>224</sup>

But Strausz-Hupé was also the author of a number of works on US foreign policy that put him at the forefront of both the national debate and the emerging political science writing on international politics in the postwar years. These included the 1941 book *Axis America: Hitler Plans Our Future, The Balance of Tomorrow: Power and Foreign Policy in the United States* (1945), and *The Zone of Indifference* (1952).<sup>225</sup>

Strausz-Hupé was born in Vienna and moved to America in 1923, joining the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania in 1940, supposedly after piquing the university's interest during a campus lecture on "the coming war."<sup>226</sup> His position within the academic study of IR was solidified with the publication, with Georgetown's Stefan T. Possony, of the textbook *International Relations in the Age of the Conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship* (1950), which was popular enough to run to a second edition in 1954.<sup>227</sup>

Evidence of Strausz-Hupé's broader influence, however, can be gleaned from the trajectory his career took after the CFR study group ended in 1954 and beyond disciplinary political science. The following year, Strausz-Hupé founded the Foreign Policy Research Institute, which later began publishing the public engagement journal *Orbis*, which remains influential today. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Strausz-Hupé also had a long stint in government, including ambassadorships in Sri Lanka, Belgium, Sweden, to NATO, and finally Turkey. This suggests significant influence within the field of International Relations in the first decades after 1945.

### Kenneth W. Thompson (1921–2013)

Alongside Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson is the protagonist in Nicolas Guilhot's account of the birth of IR theory at the Rockefeller conference. Born in Des Moines, Iowa, in 1921, Thompson served in the army between 1942 and 1946 before studying at the University of Chicago (upon the suggestion of Quincy Wright), where he received his PhD in 1950.<sup>228</sup> Thompson spent the first half of career (1953–74) at the Rockefeller Foundation before taking up a professorship at the University of Virginia, which he held until 2006 and where he also directed the Miller Center of Public Affairs.

At Chicago, Thompson came under the influence of both Wright and Morgenthau, whom he considered "the pivotal and dominant figures" of "the Chicago School of International Thought."<sup>229</sup> Morgenthau called Thompson "his best student"<sup>230</sup> and coauthored with him a selection of readings in IR that appeared shortly after Thompson received his PhD.<sup>231</sup> The analysis pre-

sented in Thompson's most well-known work *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy* (1960) certainly bears out Morgenthau's praise.<sup>232</sup>

Once again, however, Thompson's theoretical contributions inform us less about the field of international relations (both in the early 1950s and since) than does his biography: the trajectory that indicates how he was shaped by and in turn shaped the field. Thompson later argued that his signature interest in international relations was the interplay between theory and practice, which he in many ways embodied at institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation and Miller Center.<sup>233</sup> As he noted, "because of my allegiance to *both* theory and practice, I have never been entirely at home in either world," feeling the scorn of academics when a practitioner, and vice versa. Along with a fear of professionalization, this feeling led to consistent concern with finding ways to "close the gap" between the two worlds.<sup>234</sup> As only one example, in 1959 he published a book with Nitze for the Foreign Policy Association (FPA)'s "Headline Series" titled *Great Decisions, 1960—U.S. Foreign Policy—Ideals and Realities*.<sup>235</sup> Likely a product of interactions stimulated first by the Rockefeller conference, the book represents yet another institutional link between theory, philanthropy, and a hybrid institution like the FPA that conducts research and outreach while trying to influence policy.

### Arnold Wolfers (1892–1968)

In the vast number of works re-examining the work of the early IR theory over the past two decades or so, it is surprising that Yale's Arnold Wolfers has been largely passed over.<sup>236</sup> Born in St. Galen, Switzerland, and trained as a jurist, Wolfers spent 1924 to 1933 (when he left Germany) at the Hochschule für Politik.<sup>237</sup> While there, Wolfers developed a center of international studies using, as noted above, both Rockefeller and Carnegie money, and he was joined for a time by Hajo Holborn. In the United States, Wolfers joined the faculty at Yale, where he stayed until 1957.

Wolfers produced a number of important works, many collected in his 1962 *Discord and Collaboration*. He is most commonly known among contemporary scholars for the distinction he drew between "possession goals" and "milieu goals" in national foreign policies.<sup>238</sup> Possession goals are things a nation wants to keep intact, like territory or membership of an international organization, and which the state must compete to achieve.<sup>239</sup> Milieu goals are different, concerning the shaping of a state's foreign policy environment,

like promoting international law.<sup>240</sup> Without milieu goals, Wolfers argues, international affairs would be closer to the Hobbesian world and peace would be impossible.

Wolfers has been termed a “reluctant realist.”<sup>241</sup> Yet while the breadth and subtlety on display in his writings in trying to assess the complexities of foreign policy justify such a label, when compared to more hard-nosed writings in early realism, the term does little to capture his influence and thus his social capital within the emerging field of international relations after the war. Wolfers was active beyond the academy, including being a member of the CFR and advising the government.

During the war, for example, Wolfers consulted with the Office of Strategic Services from 1943–45, acting as a key node in the network that saw Yale, and the Institute for International Studies, provide an outsized proportion of individuals to positions at the State Department, the OSS, and other government agencies.<sup>242</sup> As Master of Pierson College, one of the residential colleges at Yale that represented the center of campus life, Wolfers would be the designated host when important visitors came to Yale, which they frequently did. In particular, the YIIS strengthened links between the university and the State Department.<sup>243</sup> As historian Robin Winks notes, Wolfers also stood at the center of a group of scholars referred to as “the State Department,” which met regularly to discuss world affairs and which included Corbett, Kirk, Dunn, Spykman, and Yale economist Richard Bissell, who would later direct the Economic Cooperation Administration, the organization founded to run the Marshall Plan.<sup>244</sup>

After the war less clandestine matters intervened as Wolfers founded the journal *World Politics* in 1948. At the time, as was discussed at length at the Rockefeller conference, there were a limited number of possible outlets for theoretical work on international studies. *International Organization* (also founded in 1948) offered primarily overviews of the activities of international organizations, which left political science journals (like the *American Political Science Review*, *Journal of Politics*, and the *Review of Politics*) as the main recognized outlets. *World Politics* was thus a crucial venue legitimizing theoretical work in the nascent field of IR, as noted by Thompson at the Rockefeller conference.<sup>245</sup> The editorial and advisory board of *World Politics* thus identifies many of the main actors in the field.<sup>246</sup> The managing editor was William T. R. Fox, with Bernard Brodie, Frederick Dunn, and Percy Corbett. The board consisted of, among others, scholars Edward Mead Earle, Grayson Kirk, Klaus Knorr, Harold Lasswell, Wolfers, Derwent Whittlesey, and Quincy Wright. Perhaps more interestingly, it also included governmental insiders Viner and

Leo Pasvolsky, a state department economist active in postwar planning and in the design of the United Nations, who was head of international studies at Brookings between 1946 and 1952.<sup>247</sup>

In addition to the invited study group members, a number of staff members of the CFR for 1953–54 joined in the discussions. While many attended infrequently, Gerhart Niemeyer, Grant S. McClellan, and Charles M. Lichenstein attended often and made numerous interventions in the debate, while John Blumgart was assigned the important role of rapporteur.

### Gerhart Niemeyer (1907–1997)

Of the CFR staff who attended the meetings while not being formally members of the study group, the most influential at the meetings was Gerhart Niemeyer, whose biography is an illuminating snapshot into the context of the study group. Born in Essen, Germany, Niemeyer studied at Cambridge, Munich, and Kiel, where he received his doctorate in jurisprudence in 1932 under the supervision of the legal theorist Hermann Heller.<sup>248</sup> Heller was the author of the book *Staatslehre* and was engaged in a set of debates with Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen (who was also Hans Morgenthau's advisor) over the causes of the weakness of Weimar democracy. Niemeyer followed Heller to Madrid as he fled the Nazis before Niemeyer emigrated to America in 1937. Niemeyer held positions at Princeton and Oglethorpe University in Atlanta before spending three years at the State Department Office of United Nations Affairs. At the time of the CFR study group, Niemeyer was working as a research analyst at the CFR (1953–55). Niemeyer spent most of his subsequent career as a conservative political theorist at the University of Notre Dame (1955–76) before leaving to become a priest in the Episcopal Church.<sup>249</sup>

In his career before the CFR study group, Niemeyer wrote principally on international organization,<sup>250</sup> politics, and law. In "World Order and the Great Powers" (1944), he extolled the responsibilities of the great powers after the war, by which he meant Britain, Russia, and the United States.<sup>251</sup> Striking a notably realist tone, he argued, "It is the absence of an adequate moral basis for international 'order' founded in superior power that gives aggression a plausible cause"<sup>252</sup> and is thus deemed legitimate to its bearer. Not intending to minimize the guilt of those who initiated war, it was nonetheless important to recognize that the war, "like past aggressions, has sprung from conceptions of international politics to which all nations, through their own practices, have at one time or another made a contribution."<sup>253</sup> The only way to end

aggression then is to end power politics, which is unlikely since “it is commonly assumed that power politics is the very essence of international relations.”<sup>254</sup> Like Morgenthau, Niemeyer saw prudent statesmanship on the part of the leaders of the great powers, not international organization, as the basis of peace: “The prevention of war, like the prevention of revolution within the state, does not depend on legal procedures, but on the art of adjustment.”<sup>255</sup>

Niemeyer’s most substantive contribution prior to 1953–54, however, was his 1941 book *Law without Force*, where he elaborated on his skepticism of law and organization as the basis of international peace.<sup>256</sup> Niemeyer dedicated the book to Heller, who had insisted that political theory must be understood as a cultural science grounded in reality, which relies therefore not on “abstract concepts but individual characteristics of political standards and forms.”<sup>257</sup> Following this line of thought, Niemeyer repudiated the natural law tradition of Hugo Grotius, which was prominent in international legal theory and practice and which grounded international law in person, property, injury, and contract. Niemeyer saw this metaphysic as an unsuitable basis for opposing the forces against peace and security in the mid-twentieth century, and he sought a more realistic basis for international law based on the empirical analysis of political practice.<sup>258</sup>

Via Heller, then, Niemeyer was led to the thesis that “political reality has become unlawful, because the existing system of international law has become unreal.”<sup>259</sup> Adopting a historical perspective, he argued that the decline of international law was not caused by its frequent violation in modern times, but because it was no longer backed by either a common moral code underpinned by a shared religion, as originally, or an independent bourgeois political society. Rather, international law is meant to rein in states at the same time the state is viewed as the ultimate power over human association. International law for Niemeyer, by contrast, is not a property of states but an artifact of relations between them. Accepting this allows him to see that international reality, as a cultural thing, has inherent law-like features, of which the pre-eminent role he later gave to the great powers in the postwar world is a good example. As a practical and not merely descriptive theory, Niemeyer’s approach sought to show that making international life more peaceful does not require making more formal law through additional institutions (as this will only exacerbate the problems), but by making international relations, whether conducted through international institutions or not, more *functional*, i.e., to correspond better to how to how international reality actually works.

John D. Blumgart, Grant S. McClellan, Charles M. Lichenstein,  
and Paul Zinner

Council staff members Blumgart, McClellan, Lichenstein, and Zinner were each frequent attendees. McClellan and Lichenstein in particular were not overawed by the higher status afforded the permanent members of the group and offered numerous interjections into the debates. But each is less easily traced through prosopographic research, despite going on to prominent careers. Piecing together what information has been available thus indicates the types of people brought together by the clarion call of theory in 1953.

McClellan appears to have been working as a research analyst at the CFR at the time of the study group.<sup>260</sup> In 1955 he contributed to the CFR volume, lead authored by Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1953*.<sup>261</sup> His whereabouts after leaving the CFR in the mid-to-late 1950s can only be traced through the short biographical statements at the beginning of a number of books (on topics ranging from “The Two Germanies” to civil rights and road safety) he wrote for the series the “Reference Shelf,” published by H. W. Wilson.<sup>262</sup> From these we can discern that McClellan went on first to a position as a staff member with the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) before moving by 1964 an associate editorship of *Current Magazine*.<sup>263</sup>

McClellan’s move to the Foreign Policy Association is interesting in that it highlights the interconnections in the interstitial field of international relations, here between two hybrid organizations, the FPA and the CFR, and also between them and the media field. Like the Council on Foreign Relations itself, the Foreign Policy Association was born of the First World War, founded in New York 1918 as the League of Free Nations Association, before changing its name in 1923. Its focus was, and remains, on stimulating discussion of international affairs among elites and the public, through public lectures and locally chartered meetings. Not to be confused with *Foreign Policy* magazine (founded in 1970), the FPA publishes *Great Decisions* to this end, which also appears on public television in the United States.

Charles Lichenstein’s (1926–2002) biography highlights a different trajectory one could take after a position at the CFR early in one’s career.<sup>264</sup> Born in Albany in 1926, Lichenstein studied at Yale. After the CFR, he worked for Richard Nixon’s 1960 presidential campaign and four years later for Barry Goldwater before a short stint at the Republican National Committee. Entering government, he served in the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations. Lichenstein later went on to work at the conservative Heritage Foundation.

Lichenstein is most well-known for an incident on 19 September 1983

while serving as America's second-highest-ranking envoy to the United Nations, in which he told a UN committee the United States would wave a "fond farewell" if the members decided to move the UN elsewhere. The context was a New York and New Jersey ban on Soviet aircraft landings, which followed the Russian downing of a Korean airliner on 1 September 1983 that killed 269 people. Lichenstein's ire was directed at a UN committee set up to assess relations between the UN and United States, to which he said, "The members of the U.S. mission to the UN will be down at dockside waving you a fond farewell as you sail off into the sunset." Lichenstein was publicly backed by Reagan himself when controversy arose.<sup>265</sup>

John Blumgart was charged with recording the study group's proceedings. His early years are obscure, but he was educated at Oberlin College and Columbia. Blumgart spent the bulk of his career working for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which provided the rationale for an oral history interview conducted in 1995 containing information about his pre- and post-CFR trajectory.<sup>266</sup>

At Columbia Blumgart worked on international relations at the School of International Affairs, then headed by Grayson Kirk. Kirk was linked to the CFR as the author of a CFR-sponsored survey of teaching and research in international relations in US colleges and universities.<sup>267</sup> Indeed, as CFR staff member William Diebold noted in his letter inviting MacIver to chair the 1953–54 study group, the group was expressly meant as a follow-up to Kirk's evaluation of the state of the field.<sup>268</sup> Kirk may well then have been influential in gaining Blumgart access to the CFR.

But Blumgart was also linked to other Council members through his job at the American Committee on United Europe, the organization set up in 1948 to support European integration, which included funding European grassroots federalist movements (leading the British *Telegraph* recently to label the European Union as "always a CIA project."<sup>269</sup>) Founded by former OSS director William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan (1883–1959),<sup>270</sup> the ACUE's board also featured Allen Dulles, Lucius Clay, Robert Patterson, Walter Bedell Smith, and one George S. Franklin Jr., also of the CFR and later of the Trilateral Commission. Franklin attended the first study group meeting on E. H. Carr but did not attend any of the subsequent meetings.<sup>271</sup>

The final member of the study group deserving of biographical analysis is Paul Zinner. Zinner spent most of his subsequent career at the University of California–Davis as an expert in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.<sup>272</sup> Born in then-Czechoslovakia, Zinner moved to New York in 1940 before joining the US Army, being posted to the Office of Strategic Studies. He then



spent six years as an analyst with the State Department. In California, Zinner was a frequent consultant to government and a media commentator, working particularly on issues of nuclear power and the relationship between the University of California and the government concerning the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

### *Plan of the Book*

The remainder of the volume faithfully reproduces the group's records. Each chapter details one of the group's meetings, beginning with Lipsky's discussion of the approach under scrutiny during that session and followed by the digest of the meeting. The study group covered the following subjects: (1) the theory of E. H. Carr as an exemplar of what Lipsky termed the "historical approach" to international relations; (2) the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau and the issue of the national interest; (3) the theory of Harold D. Lasswell; (4) Marxist theories of imperialism; (5) political geography and geopolitics; (6) Wilsonian idealism; and finally (7) a general discussion of the nature of theory in the study of international relations.


I have adopted a light touch in editing the documents, standardizing formatting slightly for aesthetic reasons, and correcting the occasional typographical error. I have provided a small amount of extra information to make reading the discussions more straightforward where helpful, and I am sure it is correct. Beyond that, the materials are as they appear in the archives.

## Biographies



*George A. Lipksy*

George A. Lipksy (1912–1972), former Berkeley political scientist, was the main figure at the study group. Lipksy’s commitment to philosophical nominalism significantly shaped the discussions, preventing any one approach from monopolizing the subject matter of “international relations.”



*Robert M. MacIver*

Robert Morrison MacIver (1882–1970), Columbia sociologist, chaired the CFR study group. Now largely forgotten, even within sociology, in the 1940s and 1950s MacIver was one of the foremost social scientists and public intellectuals in the United States, promoting a humanist approach in the method wars of the period.



*Dorothy Fosdick*

Dorothy Fosdick (1913–1997). Former member of the State Department’s Policy Planning staff, Fosdick’s membership of the group was so sought after the Council bent its rules on “lady members.”



### *Hajo Holborn*

Hajo Holborn (1902–1969) was a prominent scholar of international history and professor at Yale University. Holborn spent the interwar years in Berlin at the Carnegie-funded *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*, with fellow group-member Arnold Wolfers, and later consulted for the US government on policy toward occupied Germany.



### *William Kaufmann*

William Kaufmann (1918–2008) was another Yale affiliate. A scholar of international relations at the Yale Institute for International Studies, Kaufmann specialized in military strategy, following the institute to Princeton in 1951 before later joining the RAND Corporation as a nuclear strategist.




### *Robert Strausz-Hupé*

Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903–2002). A professor of political science at the Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, Robert Strausz-Hupé was a prominent proponent of geopolitics to the problem of American strategy, offering a stark warning of Germany's plans for the United States in *Axis America: Hitler Plans Our Future* (1941).



### *Kenneth W. Thompson*

Kenneth W. Thompson (1921–2013) was an accomplished theorist, administrator, and institution-builder. Thompson played a key role alongside Hans Morgenthau in the development of realist theory, utilizing to good effect his administrative position in the early 1950s at the powerful Rockefeller Foundation.



### *Arnold Wolfers*

Arnold Wolfers (1892–1968) of Yale University is today the most recognizable theorist who attended the CFR study group meetings.



### *Gerhart Niemeyer*

Gerhart Niemeyer (1907–1997) was in 1953–54 a staff member at the Council on Foreign Relations. Niemeyer later went on to a long and distinguished career as a political theorist at the University of Notre Dame.



### *Paul Zinner*

Paul Zinner (1922–2012) was a staff member at the CFR during 1953–54, and would spend most of his subsequent career at the University of California–Davis, a noted expert in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.



### *Charles Lichenstein*

Charles Lichenstein (1926–2002) was a staff member at the CFR during 1953–54 and graduate of Yale University. Lichenstein later served in the presidential administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan.

