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The end of the line?

‘Often, when people come here, they look around and say, “There is nothing here!”’ Fatim complained, thrusting her arm out to indicate the space around her.¹ She and I were sitting in her tiny market stall under a tattered, weather-worn parasol which provided scarcely any respite from the scorching sun beating down on the dusty marketplace. Fatim watched over her goods balanced on top of old, repurposed metal drums. The rusty tracks of the former Dakar–Niger railway line lay stretched out on the ground behind us, forming the backdrop to this small outdoor market. A few dozen other rickety stalls were lined up along the old platform leading to the abandoned terminus building, known as *La Gare*. ‘Some people think the *Marché de la Gare* doesn’t exist any more, so they don’t come’, she added, disappointed.

La Gare, where Fatim’s small market was located, was the former terminus station of the Dakar–Niger railway line in the historical city centre of the Senegalese capital, Dakar (see [Figure 1.1](#)). For nearly a century, women had travelled regularly on the trains between the capitals of Mali and Senegal, transporting and trading goods all along the line (cf. [Jones 2007](#); [Lambert 1993a, 1993b, 1998](#); [Lambert de Frondeville 1987](#); [Laurent 2007](#)). By the end of the colonial period, a wholesale market had emerged at the Dakar Terminus, after traders from Mali took over the old warehouses at the station to store their goods. Women, who had been transporting and trading goods on the railway line, expanded the Malian market at the Terminus and a retail market emerged in the 1980s. Trade was thriving, and even retailers would take home substantial sums of money. One woman, who traded retail at the market from the mid-1990s to 2007, recalled: ‘From 8 to 10 o’clock in the morning, I had already sold goods for 100,000 CFA [150 euros approximately].² During Ramadan we sold so many dates. At the end of the day, you left with 300,000 to 500,000 CFA’. This was the



Figure 1.1 La Gare, the former terminus station of the Dakar–Niger railway in the Senegalese capital. Photo by Peter O. Jonsson, 2013.

bustling market some people were still expecting to find when turning up at the old Terminus – not the short stretch of modest retail stalls run by Fatim and her colleagues.

In April 2006, the traders at the Terminus had been handed an eviction notice and, over the next three years, the authorities persistently threatened to demolish the entire market but without taking any action. The traders were given no official warning before the market, along with the nearby barracks for railway workers, was bulldozed in April 2009. Billions of CFA worth of goods were destroyed by the police during the night of demolition, and the market traders were never compensated for their losses. This was supposedly done to make way for a prestigious construction project, envisioned by then-President Abdoulaye Wade: a ‘Cultural Park’ which would contain ‘The Seven Wonders of Dakar’. At the face of it there was now ‘nothing’ left at the Terminus. The appearance of empty space, of cleared land, an unoccupied *terra nullius* at the old Terminus where ‘Seven Wonders’ would emerge from the ground to rebirth the city – was, however, deceptive. As I soon realised, the Terminus was still associated with Malian trade and the traders were still around. Their networks, their scattered new markets, and the imaginaries and history they associated with the Terminus were just not visible to the random passers-by rocking up at the abandoned old station.

My phone rang. It was Oumou asking if I was going to join her and her young daughter for lunch at her market. Oumou had worked at the former market at the railway terminus, where Fatim and I were now sitting in a semi-deserted space. I accepted Oumou's lunch invitation and thanked Fatim for the chat. I then began the 15 minute trek down to Oumou's market, along the dual carriage road which had been constructed only five years earlier. The shiny tarmac reflected the bright sunlight forcing me to squint as I wandered half-blinded and alone down the straight pavement that seemed to stretch endlessly out ahead of me into the horizon. When I reached the roundabout beneath the flyover for the Autoroute of the Future, I turned left. After a few more minutes of walking, I arrived at 'the village'. This was how one of the traders at Fatim's market jokingly referred to Sugunikura, and was in many ways an apt description of this new little market. The market was enclosed: its roof was covered with cloth and cardboard, and it was surrounded by a concrete wall. Being sheltered under this tent-like structure added to the sense of having entered a bounded village, where trade, domestic work and family life intertwined. At one end of the market, women stood over big cooking pots, preparing food for sale to the traders. The traders' young children ran and played in the aisles of the market, and infants were looked after by their mothers or older women in their stalls. The soundscape was a familiar Malian one, as most traders spoke in Bamanankan, while the rhythmic tapping sound of wooden clubs beating *bazin* cloth could be heard in the background. When Oumou was evicted from the former market at the Terminus, she had joined several of the other displaced traders at Sugunikura. As we began eating, I told Oumou that I had recently met several shuttle traders from Mali. One of them was Nanajan, 'tall Nana', who used to supply goods to the traders at the Terminus before the market was demolished. Did Oumou know her? 'I have known Nana for a long time, ever since she carried her baby on her back', Oumou replied. I commented that several of the Malian shuttle traders seemed to know Oumou. 'They know me from the Terminus', she explained, smiling at the flattery.

This book argues first of all that destruction and ensuing displacement does not produce a *tabula rasa*, a clean slate where identities, networks and histories must be produced from scratch. Traders and their markets do not simply vanish into thin air when eviction and demolition happen. Like Oumou, many of the displaced traders had relocated to new marketplaces that had been set up in the close vicinity of the Terminus, in the wake of the demolition. I spent many weeks during the early period of fieldwork trying to keep up with




Figure 1.2 Map of Malian trade and transport hubs in Dakar.

the fast pace of the shuttle traders from Mali as they walked around downtown Dakar, visiting the constellation of sites that continued to be associated with Malian trade in the old city centre. Sugunikura was just one of the scattered places to where Malian traders had dispersed, situated within a radius of a few kilometres which still had the Terminus at its epicentre (see [Figures 1.2](#) and [1.3](#)). This book thus examines not only what is lost but what emerges when a dense node, such as the Terminus, is dissolved, emptied, scattered and fragmented. It explores the different displaced traders' capacities for adjustment and highlights three salient aspects that mark the aftermath of such socio-spatial rupture: claims to and (re)production of place and belonging in a context of dislocation, dispersal and disorientation; negotiation of inclusion and exclusion within networks and markets in a context of socio-spatial fragmentation; and re-establishment of livelihoods and the organisational basis of trade in the context of reconfigured spaces of commerce. In other words, the focus is on the impact of urban displacement on three closely intertwined relations – namely relations to place, interpersonal relations and economic exchange relations. These are dimensions of displacement that not only affect traders and




Figure 1.3 Map showing the location of the main fieldwork sites in Dakar.

that are not only relevant in contexts of urban displacement, but which resonate with people’s experiences of displacement in a great variety of contexts and at different scales beyond the city level.

The ethnographic exploration of the aftermath of rupture, and its generative aspects, informs a second, more abstract, argument of this book: eviction, displacement and exclusion in cities may lead to identity formations and forms of consciousness which are analytically comparable to those occurring on a larger transnational scale among globally dispersed migrants originating from the same place (or ‘homeland’). Rapid urban development under neoliberal capitalism produces dislocations, uprooting and dispersal of urban residents. These urban phenomena in certain ways mirror the migration, displacement and diasporic formations witnessed on a much larger scale under global capitalism. As this book shows, people who have been uprooted and scattered *within the city* may maintain and re-create translocal networks among themselves and they may produce

ongoing attachments to the place of 'origin' from where they have dispersed. For example, they may reproduce a version of this place in a new location or relive it through collective memories and active engagement with that place of origin. Indeed, 'The Terminus' was still very much an everyday reference point and a real *place* in the imagination of the dispersed traders who had been associated with the former market at the train station in Dakar.

Oumou told me we could leave Sugunikura after she had prayed at 5pm. When she was done, she packed up her stall and, as we moved towards the boundary of the marketplace, called over a boy and told him to go and look for her daughter. The youngster was her son, she revealed. I wondered why I had never seen him at the market. 'He is doing mechanics here during the school vacation. He has done that from a very young age. He started by helping out at the Terminus. Now he knows how to fix a scooter engine', Oumou explained proudly. Her daughter joined us and we walked all the way back to Fatim's market, where Oumou began talking to a woman at one of the stalls. The woman handed her 25,000 CFA, the revenue from some dates that she had been selling on Oumou's behalf. Then we crossed the street. Oumou wanted to buy fish for dinner from the traders who were selling in the evening on the wide pavement opposite the Terminus. She started haggling with the fish sellers in Wolof, meanwhile greeting several Malian people around her in her native Bamanankan. I heard someone calling me from the top of one of the long, steep staircases that lead from the pavement up to the building that hosted a new Malian cloth bazaar. It was Safi, who was standing at the top of the stairs at the end of the aisle that led down to her cloth stall. She and several other Malian cloth traders had joined this new bazaar after being evicted from the Terminus. I greeted her back. Oumou interrupted, telling me she was disappointed that the fish was too expensive and that we needed to go. I shouted up the stairs to Safi that I would come back and talk to her tomorrow. Oumou and I then continued our walk towards the market at the bus terminal Garage Petersen, where the fish was apparently cheaper. I parted ways with Oumou at Petersen market and decided to head over to the commercial complex by the Grand Mosque to see if Nana was there. When I arrived, Nana's small hangout place by the Malian bus company Sira was full of women from Mali. Everyone was showing off their purchases and discussing the bargains they had found during their day among Dakar's markets. Nana was not there – she had gone to talk to her Lebanese supplier of children's bicycles – but Fatou Fall was. She greeted me loudly and then asked me to join the conversation: '*An ka baro kè!*' she excitedly commanded in Bamanakan – let's chat!

As the ethnography of this book engages with the lived and recounted experiences of displaced traders like Oumou, Fatim, Nana, Safi and Fatou Fall, it sheds light on a range of personal coping strategies, adaptations of livelihoods and diverse femininities. The book does not view the displaced people – the traders from the Terminus – as a monolithic, homogenous group but as composed of a variety of networks consisting of multiple and intersecting hierarchies and identities. This diversity informed their varied responses to displacement. Displacement, whether on a local or global scale, demands difficult adjustments, and people's capacities to adapt to new circumstances and environments vary. This book uncovers some of these different capacities and variations in traders' reactions to displacement.

Combining approaches from urban studies with migration and refugee studies in novel ways, this book sheds new light on dynamics and experiences of 'urban displacement' among market and shuttle traders. Its analytical approach to urban displacement addresses several blind spots in these two areas of scholarship. On the one hand, scholarship on displacement is dominated by migration and refugee studies. Such scholarship does not address displacements of relatively short distance, particularly those occurring within cities, dealt with in this book. On the other hand, urban scholars who study displacement in the context of urban renewal and gentrification focus overwhelmingly on residential eviction and, for various reasons, tend to overlook the systematic uprooting of traders and marketplaces in cities and its long-term consequences. Analyses of urban displacement also tend to address more immediate responses to such disruptive events but do not shed much ethnographic light on what happens in the aftermath of eviction and dislocation. This book therefore places itself at the intersection between migration and refugee studies and urban studies, enhancing understandings of the aftermath of urban displacements of traders. The ethnographic perspectives on urban displacement offered in this book are applicable beyond the narrow experiences of traders in Dakar and are salient to other networks of people who find themselves uprooted, fragmented and scattered across the city in the wake of disruptive and uneven urban development. These are processes which are occurring on a global scale in the present context of rapid urbanisation and neoliberal gentrification.

The similarities between urbanisation in Dakar and *global* urban displacement regimes allow for potential comparisons between what is happening in a relatively 'ordinary city' in West Africa, as described in this book, with dynamics occurring in cities in many other parts of the world, including global cities (Robinson 2002; Robinson 2006). In the

context of what James Freeman (2020) terms the ‘neoliberal gentrification displacement regime’, ordinary (read ‘not wealthy’) urban residents in many parts of the globe are increasingly excluded from access to public space and the right to produce and shape the cities they live and work in (cf. Harvey 2008). In this book, I draw attention to how the (global, capitalist) phenomenon of displacement occurring in the context of neoliberal urbanisation is experienced at the detailed, micro level of the everyday lives and struggles of West African traders in the Senegalese capital. This location may seem arbitrary, even irrelevant or marginal, when observing neoliberal urban development from a global vantage point. Yet, the city of Dakar, particularly during the past decades of liberal reform and urban renewal under former President Wade, in many ways epitomises life in the neoliberal city and its precarious, disorienting and uprooting condition, which urban residents all over the world are confronted with.

The ethnography brings attention to the migrants and mobile people who are trading in an African city. Diverging from the mainstream research focus on men, it places the spotlight on Muslim women’s active participation in commercial activities and networks that span the borders of the West African region. Most of these women were the primary breadwinners of their families, and many were divorced and some widowed. Focusing on these groups generates new insights into the workings of urban economies and dynamics of inclusion and place-making in cities in this part of West Africa. Contemporary manifestations of regional and urban flows and circulation of money, goods and people *within* West Africa, and Muslim women’s contributions to these, have until recently received relatively little scholarly attention (but see Chort, De Vreyer and Zuber 2020; Moya 2017). This oversight is surprising given the enthusiasm among Africanists for studying migration, long-distance trade and other manifestations of extraversion and interconnectedness across space. Anthropologists have long been keen to dispel the myth that Africa consists of isolated and unchanging localities and ‘cultures’, and this argument is often made by drawing attention to local–global relations, for example in the form of transnational and diasporic connections beyond the continent and local experiences of neoliberal capitalism and development imposed by external actors (Diouf 2000; Ferguson 2006; Piot 1999). Yet, globalisation is not the only way that the continent’s inhabitants and places are connected to ‘elsewheres’. As the following chapters emphasise, there are numerous flows and circuits at other, smaller scales that make up the regions and urban centres of Africa (Amselle 1977; Boesen and Marfaing 2007; Cohen 1969; Gregoire and Labazee 1993; Gugler 1971; Scheele 2012).

In the context examined in this book, women's economic activities in public space, their involvement in international shuttle trade, and their accumulation of wealth through trade were contentious issues which raised gendered concerns and moral dilemmas (as discussed in [Chapter 5](#)). Exploring how women overcome such gendered obstacles and persist in trade, especially in the aftermath of eviction and displacement, the ethnography brings to light the diversity of femininities and changeability of gender ideologies in the region. Studies of mobilities and trade in West Africa have largely neglected the active contributions of Muslim women to urban economies and their participation in mobile livelihoods and economic flows within the region. This oversight is particularly striking in the light of the expanding autonomies of women, which is a wider global trend, and there is a risk that this neglect of women may reproduce prevailing gender biases. This book challenges the dominant binary conception of gender in this region by highlighting women's active part in income generation, mobility and spatial flows.

An anthropology of endings

In a sense, this book begins at the end. The end station of the railway line in Dakar, where the former Malian market was located, is the location from where the story unfolds. The end of the Malian market is the central event around which the chapters revolve. What happens at the end? What does it mean to say that something is 'ending'? This book is an anthropological exploration of endings.

The terminus station at the end of the railway line in Dakar is considered, in this book, not as a bounded spatial entity but as a social setting where social worlds have emerged and developed. The Dakar Terminus was more than simply a train station; it was a marketplace and a hub for people of Malian background. Indeed, for my interlocutors, the name *La Gare* referred both to the train station and to the market at the Terminus. In the past, when the train was still running, the two were in close synergy (see [Chapter 2](#)). Most marketplaces in West Africa are in fact located near transport terminals or have entirely merged with these ([Asante 2020: 133](#); [Hill 1984](#); [Stasik and Cissokho 2018](#); [Thiel and Stasik 2016](#)). On the one hand, as the word implies, a terminus is a place where movement 'terminates'. On the other hand, as a transport node a terminus station is also a place where things emerge and where journeys begin. As Michael Stasik and Sidy Cissokho put it, stations 'serve as feeders of movement, as they facilitate the traffic of people and goods; in turn, they

Table 1.1 Timeline of events.

1960s–1970s (immediate post-colonial period): Malian kola traders in Dakar take over the warehouses at the Dakar–Niger Railway Terminus to store their kola nuts.
1980s: Women trading <i>fruits secs</i> take over the warehouses and a Malian wholesale market emerges at the Terminus.
Late 1980s or 1990s: Smaller retail traders join the market at the Terminus and the market gradually expands in size.
2000: Abdoulaye Wade elected president on a neoliberal platform.
2003: Dakar–Niger railway is privatised.
2006: Eviction note served to the traders at the Terminus.
2007: Construction begins on a new tarmacked dual-carriageway, cutting through the western part of the market at the Terminus, where several market stalls have been demolished by the authorities in the previous year.
2009: The market at the Terminus is demolished without formal notice. After years of decline following privatisation, the Dakar–Niger railway passenger train stops running in Senegal.
2011: The model of the Cultural Park containing ‘The Seven Wonders of Dakar’ is presented to the public. It is to be built on the cleared land at the Terminus.
2012: President Abdoulaye Wade is democratically defeated at elections in Senegal.
2013: Fieldwork is carried out with the traders displaced from the Terminus.

are fed by movement, because the activities and relationships of travel and roadside communities keep them running’ (Stasik and Cissokho 2018: vii).

The ethnography of this book focuses not merely on the role of the Dakar Terminus in the emergence of marketplaces and trade networks and its continued symbolic relevance for Malians in Dakar. It also examines the destructive event of market demolition and displacement. This was a moment of significant rupture – an ‘ending’ in a metaphorical and temporal sense when things are never going to be the same again. The narrative of the ethnography presented in the chapters of this book

follows a temporal structure, reconstructing the before, during and after of demolition and displacement (see [Table 1.1](#) for a timeline of events). The book invites a deeper examination of such moments of rupture, drawing attention not only to ‘endings’ as conclusion, but also to what *emerges* at the end.

The anthropology of endings presented in the following chapters captures the *ambiguity* surrounding rupture and displacement: simultaneous endings and beginnings, and the co-existence of movement and stasis and of mobility and place. The ethnography examines the fates of people whose livelihoods were disrupted and who endured demolition of and eviction from their familiar surroundings. Where do such people go? What do they do in the aftermath? How do they reassemble their lives and re-establish their social worlds, their livelihoods, their sense of place? This book explores what happens at ‘the end’ of the disruptive event, when it is all over, so to speak – when the dust has settled and people find themselves scattered in sometimes unfamiliar surroundings, trying to pick up the pieces and creating something meaningful: a market, an income, a network, a sense of purpose and belonging, respectability and trust.

By making a particular destructive event its analytical point of departure, this book revives a tradition of ‘situational analysis’ in anthropology. This approach, pioneered by Max Gluckman and the Manchester School, focused on disruptive events and transformative moments as epistemological windows onto the ever-dynamic and conflictual constitution of society ([Gluckman 1940](#); [Evens and Handelman 2006](#)). In recent years, anthropologists have started once again to turn their attention to such events ([Holbraad, Kapferer and Sauma 2019](#); [Meinert and Kapferer 2015](#)). This book contributes to this recent scholarship on the aftermath of destruction and displacement, emphasising the productive and generative aspects of such ruptures – not in an optimistic sense that ‘good things come out of destruction and displacement’ but in the sense of what *emerges* from rupture and the socio-spatial dynamics it generates. In their comparative study of the aftermath of earthquakes, Edward Simpson and Michele Serafini correct the popular misconception that disasters lead to a *tabula rasa* and that destruction ‘wipes things clean so that they can be remade anew’ ([Simpson and Serafini 2019](#): 211). Instead, they argue, old features reappear in the aftermath of destruction: ‘An aftermath is a product of the longer history of the locality. The world does not implode into the moment of disaster to emerge afresh or ready to be remade in any old way. Older ideas will not disappear’ ([Simpson and Serafini 2019](#): 211–12).

A related insight comes from Amanda Hammar's (2014) 'displacement economies' approach, which is based on the premise that alongside closures and losses, displacement circumstances also lead to unexpected openings and gains. Hence, Hammar argues, it is necessary to focus 'not only on what and who generates displacement and why but on *what displacement itself produces*' (Hammar 2020: 70). Similar to these and other authors' work, the following chapters highlight what Martin Holbraad, Bruce Kapferer and Julia Sauma (2019) call 'the dual aspect' of rupture: the character of rupture as at once destructive and generative. As Holbraad et al. point out, rupture is 'a dynamic of sociocultural formation' (Holbraad, Kapferer and Sauma 2019: 22). While rupture implies destruction, 'such destruction has immanent within it a creative and regenerative potential that is never the reproduction of the same but always of difference' (Holbraad, Kapferer and Sauma 2019: 22).

The study of rupture and displacement raises a question of scale: how does one relate change at the 'local' scale to broader dynamics of social and economic transformation? In other words, how would I, as anthropologist, know which dynamics were caused merely by demolition and displacement from the Terminus, and which were caused by more general tides of ongoing neoliberalisation in Dakar and the wider region, which was reconfiguring space, economies and other social relations? At the ontological level different 'scales' do not exist: all aspects of life are intertwined, and while the analyst may try to artificially distinguish them, in some ways even analytically they are inseparable (Howitt 2000; Tsing 2000). Some of the conflicts and transformations I observed among the traders, including for example the dismantling of female networks and encroachment of male traders and intermediaries at the new markets (Chapter 5), were not simply caused by displacement, although this particular rupture probably exacerbated these dynamics. I acknowledge that various scales of transformation and disruption are closely intertwined, and in this book I therefore try to account for wider, relevant dynamics occurring beyond the confines of the specific places I was observing. At the very concrete and small-scale level, I focus on the demolition of the Malian market in Dakar and the kinds of adjustments and 'endings' it brought about. At the level of the city, I view this demolition in the context of destructions and clearances that were part of urbanisation and contemporary politics of space and land use in Dakar. At a regional level, I view the dynamics at play at the Terminus as reflecting the wider social shifts that have occurred over recent decades, where

neoliberal policies have closed down many opportunities for making a living while creating certain new ones. Paying attention to such simultaneously occurring shifts helps to create a more encompassing understanding of the people and places discussed in this book. In this sense, the Terminus provides a view onto wider dynamics; and this wider view helps us to better understand the issues at stake among the traders displaced from the Terminus.

Here it is worth pausing to clarify that the analyses in this book are not aimed at proving any cause–effect relationships between neoliberalisation and the various changes described in the ethnography. In other words, this book does not aim to explain the specific urban impacts of neoliberal policies and reform. Rather, neoliberalisation is part of the bigger political and economic picture that forms the contextual backdrop to the stories being told in this book. In this regard, it is important to avoid imposing a monolithic conception of ‘global neoliberalism’ upon the Senegalese context and portraying this as the essential cause of Dakar’s socio-economic predicament. The neoliberal condition in Dakar should rather be thought of as but one of many different and hybrid variants of processes of neoliberalisation (Fredericks 2018: 5; cf. Larner 2003; Peck and Tickell 2002; Parnell and Robinson 2012; Robinson 2022). Regional experts have argued that, although he was a self-declared neoliberal, Abdoulaye Wade departed from a classic neoliberal reform agenda, as his neoliberal experiment was ‘a nonlinear, messy process anchored in an autocratic approach to combat his waning legitimacy’ (Fredericks 2018: 53). Wade for example privatised ‘in fits and starts’ (Fredericks 2018: 53) and many of his major projects (‘*grand projets*’) of infrastructure expansion and modernisation remained unfinished (de Jong and Valente-Quinn 2018). Furthermore, neoliberalisation is not the only salient process shaping urban development in Dakar but exists alongside other styles of political engagement and longer historical trajectories that predate the neoliberal framework and which also impact upon the city (Mizes 2021). There is a much longer history of displacement in Dakar dating back to colonial times, as Chapter 2 explains. Given long-standing contestations over the proper use of Dakar’s streets, even without the neoliberal reforms and visions introduced during the Wade era, markets in Dakar might still have been demolished. Meanwhile, such speculations about the impacts of specific policies upon urban displacement and its aftermath are beyond the analytical scope of this book. The focus, rather, is on *what life was like* in these conditions.

Urban displacement in Dakar and beyond

Although the displacement of the traders from the Malian market at the Terminus had serious consequences, there was nothing particularly unusual or remarkable about it for most residents of Dakar: the evicted traders were the victims of a wider process of urban exclusion that has been ongoing since the establishment of the city in the mid-nineteenth century, and which was spurred under President Wade's liberal and kleptocratic regime (cf. [Betts 1971](#); [Bigon 2009](#); [de Jong and Foucher 2010](#); [Delcourt 1983](#); [Melly 2010, 2013](#); [Sow 1980](#); [Tall 1994, 2009](#)). This process has affected many of the city's residents, particularly native and poorer residents of Dakar who have historically been marginalised by colonising foreigners and those with economic and political power (cf. [Bigon 2009](#)). As the Senegalese scholar Fatou Sow succinctly stated, 'Basically the entire history of Dakar is intertwined with that of evictions and successive clearances that accompany it' ([Sow 1980](#): 159).³

The Cultural Park and its Seven Wonders, which were to replace the Terminus market, were part of former president Wade's wider fantasy of creating a spectacular, modern metropolis which would find its place among the ranks of prominent 'global cities'. During his presidency Wade's administration prioritised massive investment in urban construction projects, including roads and monuments, with the aim of turning Dakar into 'West Africa's showcase capital' ([Melly 2010](#): 40). As Caroline Melly points out, significant private sector investment in infrastructure was meant to globally connect Senegal, both physically and symbolically ([Melly 2013](#): 395; see also [de Jong and Foucher 2010](#)). The Seven Wonders was only one of several grandiose projects announced during Wade's regime, the majority of which were never built. One of the most controversial projects he planned and realised was the Monument of African Renaissance, a 52-metre-high statue representing an African family that cost 21 million euros to build ([de Jong and Foucher 2010](#)).⁴

While Wade's presidency officially ended in 2012, its controversial legacy was still strongly felt in Dakar the year after, when I conducted fieldwork. His reign had marked a significant break with past politics, famously overturning 40 years of unbroken rule by the Socialist Party (PS) in Senegal. Wade's party, the *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS), had a resolutely liberal platform. The PDS and other opposition parties formed the coalition Sopi, meaning 'change' in Wolof, which came to power in 2000 and which promised to defend democracy and a free-market economy ([Ross 2008](#)). For the Senegalese who had experienced

the tough structural adjustments in the 1980s and 1990s, the 2000s were more encouraging (Dahou and Foucher 2009: 14; de Jong and Foucher 2010: 192–3). Between 2000 and 2006, Senegal experienced a construction boom. This partly reflected a change in the international development paradigm in Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century, which revived an emphasis on the importance of infrastructures (de Jong and Foucher 2010: 193; Melly 2013; cf. Nugent 2018). The previous decades of austerity and state withdrawal in many parts of Africa began to be replaced in the new millennium by liaisons forged between states and private investors and international donors, with a view to undertaking large-scale projects of infrastructure construction and renewal (Stasik and Cissokho 2018: xvii).

Wade's grand plans for the nation and its capital were highly exclusionary. Primarily aimed at luring international attention and foreign investment to Dakar, his vision focused only on a few spaces in the city and ignored the needs of the majority of the population (Melly 2013: 385–6). The promises of progress, prosperity and global connectivity, which the city's various new monuments and construction projects represented, never materialised for the majority of the city's inhabitants. Despite the mirage of infrastructural renewal and neo-modernist rhetoric of development, neoliberal reforms were accelerated during the Wade era, exacerbating social inequalities and enabling unprecedented wealth accumulation (Fredericks 2018: 137; de Jong and Valente-Quinn 2018). During his presidency, Wade's party faced increasing allegations of corruption and nepotism, and the population grew frustrated with his ostentatious spending and megalomaniac public projects in the face of growing unemployment and escalating food costs (Dahou and Foucher 2009; Gaye 2010; Melly 2010, 2017). In 2011 Wade tried to change the constitution to allow for his re-election to a third term in office, and attempted to appoint his son, Karim, as his vice president and immediate successor (Karim Wade was already nicknamed the 'Minister of the Earth and the Sky' due to his colossal ministerial portfolio under his father's government). Massive street protests erupted in Dakar, and various citizens' movements consolidated into the 'June 23 Movement' (M23), resulting in the withdrawal of the controversial bill (cf. Kelly 2012a Scheepers 2011; Diallo 2013; Kelly 2012b). Leaders of the various groups that made up the M23 and different opposition parties eventually rallied behind Macky Sall as presidential candidate, which led to the democratic defeat of Abdoulaye Wade in the March 2012 elections. In April 2013 Abdoulaye Wade's son, Karim, was detained on charges of 'illicit enrichment' at the Reubeuss prison in Dakar.

While the defeat of Wade in some ways marked the end of an era, the political regime change in Senegal was not as radical as some had hoped. The election of Macky Sall in 2012 promised to bolster democratisation in Senegal, particularly through the increasing political involvement of civil society. However, Sall's second term in office was characterised by democratic backsliding and a growing crisis of Senegalese democracy (Ghosh 2021). In March 2021 Senegal witnessed its worst unrest in many years. Widespread violent protests particularly in Dakar were triggered by the arrest of the opposition leader, Ousmane Sonko, over allegations of rape. The charges against Sonko were viewed by the opposition as politically charged and his arrest was seen by some as a move to eliminate the political opposition. At least 10 people died as live ammunition was allegedly used by security forces against protesters; the authorities also temporarily suspended two television channels, and social media and messaging apps were disrupted (Africanews 2021; Human Rights Watch 2021). The protests were partly motivated by wider political grievances, including growing frustrations over the lack of progress on democratic reforms. They erupted in the wake of President Macky Sall's suggestions that he would be running for an unconstitutional third term in 2024, after he earlier in the year signed a law to abolish the post of Prime Minister of Senegal (Freedom House 2021). Meanwhile, the protests, triggered also by growing poverty, reflected deep economic anxieties. Many people took to the streets to express grievances over the increasing lack of jobs, especially for youth, and a general deterioration of the economy because of the Covid-19 pandemic and related restrictions (Human Rights Watch 2021). The living conditions of many of Dakar's residents remain largely unchanged under the presidency of Macky Sall.

This book joins recent calls to redefine 'what, who, and where counts as displaced', and to consider different scales of analysis of displacement beyond merely those determined by national boundaries (Adey 2020: 4; cf. Horn and Parekh 2018). Scholarship on displacement has been largely orientated towards research on refugees and certain forms of international migration. Analysis has therefore usually focused on movements that cross international borders, particularly movement between the so-called Global South and North. This ignores displacements happening within cities in the twenty-first century, including forced movements resulting from eviction, gentrification and exclusion in the context of urban development, which is occurring rapidly on a global scale. Indeed, for migration scholars the term 'urban displacement' tends to refer to the phenomenon of people being displaced by war and disaster

seeking refuge in urban areas instead of refugee camps. In this book, however, I use the term to refer to the situation of people being displaced by uneven development processes occurring in the cities in which they are living and working.

The different forms and scales of displacement happening around the world, whether urban, regional or international, are not unrelated. Various scholars drawing on historical structuralism have argued that capitalism is a system that has always generated and depended on the displacement of human populations (Freeman 2020; Harvey 2004, 2008; Sassen 2014; Cohen 1987; Ferguson and McNally 2015). As capitalism evolved and expanded since the 'Age of Discovery', the world has gone through a series of global displacement regimes including trans-Atlantic slavery; the movement of forced labourers during the colonial era; rural populations displaced by industrial agriculture and enclosures, forced to seek work in cities; and the 'new helots' of unfree global labour migrants. Urban scholars argue that these processes of displacement are increasingly taking place within cities, which have become a key site for the extraction of surplus value required for the reproduction of the capitalist system. In the twenty-first century, urban displacement associated with gentrification has become a generalised global phenomenon (Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales 2018; Freeman 2020; Harvey 2008; Desmond 2016).

Urban displacement has historically gone hand in hand with urban development and the expansion of cities globally. The geographer James Freeman has identified three successive global urban displacement regimes, each of which has been historically accompanied by a new set of internationally circulating technologies and ideas (Freeman 2020). The theoretical framework he proposes pinpoints some of the key global capitalist dynamics that have contributed to urban displacement in cities around the world, from the beginning of nineteenth-century industrial capitalism, through urban renewal after the Second World War, to present-day neoliberal gentrification. This trajectory is in some ways mirrored in the history of urban displacement in Dakar, which I outline in [Chapter 2](#). Meanwhile Freeman's conception of global urban displacement regimes, although it provides a useful heuristic framework, is too universalist and unidirectional to explain the historical complexities and contingencies of exclusion and eviction in Dakar. In this regard it is important to remember that contemporary urban renewal under the neoliberal paradigm does not take the same form everywhere, and scholars have even debated whether gentrification is truly a global phenomenon (cf. Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales 2015).

The urban studies literature on displacement has primarily focused on the issue of housing and residential evictions in the context of gentrification, frequently overlooking other types of urban displacement. Partly, traders have been overlooked in the mainstream literature on urban displacement because, as Myfanwy Taylor (2020) has pointed out, there has been a tendency in the gentrification literature to pit ‘economy’, represented by an aggressive capitalist system extracting surplus value from cities, against ‘society’, represented by residents inhabiting the city. In this context, commercial and workspace displacement of traders and small business owners has been neglected by the urban displacement literature. Displaced entrepreneurs do not fit the Marxist conception of class underpinning the original conception of gentrification, where those being displaced by the incoming middle class or ‘gentry’ are supposedly the ‘working class’ (cf. Glass 1964).

Arguably, though, the limited research on urban displacements of traders, and the long-term consequences of this, is first and foremost due to the geographical bias of urban studies. Urban studies has for a long time been skewed towards the interests and preoccupations of the wealthier regions of the world, focusing almost exclusively on North America and Europe and their ‘global cities’. Like many other academic disciplines, conceptual frameworks in urban studies are still largely informed by research agendas set by the Global North (Pieterse 2010; Robinson 2002; Robinson 2006; cf. Bakewell and Jónsson 2013). In those Western contexts, informal markets and street trade do exist but dominate far less compared with cities in the Majority World, where they are both widespread and are common targets for eviction (González 2017; Asante 2020). The literature on urban displacement and gentrification has therefore focused overwhelmingly on the issue of housing and residential evictions. This overlooks the long-term consequences of the systematic uprooting of merchants and marketplaces – particularly in the cities of the Majority World, where these are widespread and are common targets for eviction.

While there is an emerging and groundbreaking body of scholarship on African urbanism, it still remains the case that urban studies do not take African experiences and analyses seriously enough (Malefakis 2021; Pieterse and Parnell 2014; Pieterse and Simone 2013; Stacey 2021; Thieme, Ference and van Stapele 2021; Todes et al. 2014). Mbembe and Nuttall lament that scholars continue to describe Africa as an object apart from the world; instead, they argue, scholarship on Africa should be de-provincialised (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004: 348). This echoes Jennifer Robinson’s (2002) call for urban studies to embark on a *cosmopolitan*

project of understanding ordinary cities (cf. Bakewell and Jónsson 2011: 20). Indeed, as Jean and John Comaroff have argued, the socio-economic processes unfolding in contemporary Africa may in fact provide important 'universal' insights and lessons, because 'in the here-and-now, it is regions in the South that tend first to feel the concrete effects of world-historical processes as they play themselves out' (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012: 121). Indeed, rampant urban expansion is now happening much faster in Africa, Asia and Latin America than in Europe or North America, and this will continue to be the case in the next decades. The historical experience of urbanisation in Western cities, spurred by nineteenth-century industrialisation, is largely irrelevant to contemporary forms of global (or 'planetary') urbanism (Myers 2018; cf. Lees, Shin and López-Morales 2016).

Given the biases and research gaps of mainstream urban studies, I found much of this scholarship to be of relatively limited use for analysing the socio-spatial dimensions of my interlocutors' lives and livelihoods following eviction and displacement. I turned instead to refugee and migration studies, which in some ways proved more relevant. Hardly any of the literature on urban renewal and gentrification has ethnographically examined the aftermath of eviction and displacement in relation to traders and marketplaces, beyond the immediate impacts of and responses to such disruptive events. As I embarked on my analysis there was therefore not much in the way of conceptual frameworks or comparative cases to draw upon from urban studies for making anthropological sense of my interlocutors' experiences of displacement, including the longer-term re-establishment and re-organisation of markets; traders' adaptations to different spaces and infrastructures; and their changing networks, identifications and relationships, all of which are topics that are covered in the chapters of this book. The field of refugee and migration studies, by contrast, has developed analytical approaches and concepts to make sense of the forms of identity and consciousness that emerge among displaced populations, albeit in transnational and diasporic contexts. Such research examines, among other things, displaced people's ongoing attachments to an idealised place of origin or 'homeland', whether these be tangible or imaginary attachments; the group consciousness that develops among displaced people (and their descendants) on the basis of, for example, their collective history and shared experiences, their common ethnic and religious backgrounds, and their cultivation of shared values and norms; as well as the networks sustained among dispersed members of this group, who are scattered in different places

(Bakewell 2008a; Cohen 1997; Hage 2021). These were dimensions highly relevant to understanding the urban context of displacement on which I was focusing, and all are addressed in various ways in this book.

There is, however, a distinct body of research on evictions of urban street vendors in the Global South (Adaawen and Jørgensen 2012; Swanson 2007; de Pádua Carrieri and Murta 2011; Mackie, Bromley and Brown 2014; Lawal 2004; Steel, Ujoranyi and Owusu 2014; Musoni 2010; Bromley and Mackie 2009). Caroline Skinner's review of the research on street traders in Africa suggests that state responses to the presence and activities of such traders have often been oppressive and even violent, ranging from large-scale, sustained evictions or sporadic event-driven evictions, to lower-level ongoing harassment (Skinner 2008: 8–10). In recent years, smaller traders across urban West Africa have increasingly been driven out of downtown areas, as a result of policies of urban regeneration aiming to decongest and beautify cities (Spire and Choplin 2018; Marfaing 2015; Bouquet and Kassi-Djodjo 2014). Amandine Spire and Armelle Choplin (2018: 4) point out that mega events, megaprojects and new masterplans have recently provided opportunities to cleanse street traders from strategic parts of West African cities, including Accra, Abidjan, Bamako and Dakar. As in many other African cities, urban authorities in West Africa are striving to produce competitive world-class cities and have been implementing major urban transformations in attempts to make their cities conform to international standards (Watson 2014; Myers 2015; Spire and Choplin 2018; Gillespie 2016). Skinner's (2008) review identifies only a few examples in Africa where street traders have actually been integrated into urban plans, notably in Tanzania and South Africa. In Dakar, traders lack collective rights to public space and fixed property and, as Brown, Msoka and Dankoco note, 'official policy continues to try and ban street trade from the city centre, maintaining a traditional urban management view of the need for "tidy" streets' (Brown, Msoka and Dankoco 2014: 2241). Studies of evictions of street traders from city centres in West Africa have meanwhile highlighted the ineffectiveness of such oppressive measures, since traders are continually attracted to these spaces due to the high footfall and the associated profit to be made (Asante 2020: 4; Steel, Ujoranyi and Owusu 2014; Lawal 2004).

Several studies have focused on the process of eviction of street traders and its immediate social, economic and spatial impacts; yet, research rarely focuses on the longer-term impacts of street trader displacement and its anthropological dimensions (Mackie, Bromley and Brown 2014; Bromley and Mackie 2009; Omoegun 2015; Omoegun,

Mackie and Brown 2019). Ademola Omoegun, Peter Mackie and Alison Brown point out that, 'Little is known about the agency and actions of traders in the aftermath of evictions' (2019: 8). According to these authors, immediate impacts of evictions include 'the damaging of previously existing networks and reductions in sales due to reduced footfall, particularly due to the displacement of traders from central locations to peripheral sites' (Omoegun, Mackie and Brown 2019: 3). Alison Brown and Alastair Smith's (2016) research has highlighted the cumulative poverty impacts of evictions on informal traders, compounded through the loss of assets during eviction; fear and uncertainty, which entail, among other things, a reduced likelihood of investment; and the loss of business networks with suppliers and customers. Ademola Omoegun and his co-authors Alison Brown and Peter Mackie have recently contributed to filling the knowledge gap on the aftermath of West African traders' evictions and displacement, with studies focusing on displaced traders' rights claims and political activism to reclaim public space (Omoegun 2015; Omoegun, Mackie and Brown 2019). They do not account for the multiple ethnographic and socio-spatial dimensions of urban displacement, however.

A couple of recent ethnographic studies exist that consider the aftermath of evictions of traders and other urban dwellers in neighbouring cities, notably an article on Accra (Ghana) by Spire and Choplin (2018); and a chapter on Cotonou (Benin) in a doctoral thesis by Alice Hertzog (2020). Spire and Choplin's study follows street vendors who 'accepted' to be displaced and have their activity 'formalised' and analyses the manner in which socio-spatial order was reshaped within the relocated space (Spire and Choplin 2018: 3). The authors note that six years after the displacement, there was no lingering criticism or resistance to the public authorities who had orchestrated the forced eviction (Spire and Choplin 2018: 11). Instead, the group of women who had fought against the displacement had broken down and power dynamics had changed among the displaced vendors. Furthermore, new conflicts had broken out, focused on the space each vendor occupied in the new markets. Hertzog's (2020) thesis focuses on intersections of urbanisation and mobilities. In Chapter 6 she analyses an event of demolition and eviction, and its aftermath, focusing on the 'Liberation of Public Space' order carried out in Cotonou in 2017. Ordering the demolition of various stands, workshops and shacks built on public land, the operation that ensued left buildings along central avenues in ruins, destroying thousands of urban livelihoods. Hertzog argues that such destructive events reflect a 'collapsible urbanism' whereby the state acts

to collapse cities, ‘undermining decentralisation and local governance whilst also weakening the urban economy’ (Hertzog 2020: 16). Evictions caused by collapsible urbanism in turn trigger mobility, migration and forced displacement; mechanisms of collapsible urbanism are thus key to understanding urban mobility, argues Hertzog.

This book accounts for a variety of aspects of what actually happens to traders and markets in a context of (urban) displacement both in the immediate and, especially, the longer term. Rather than viewing displaced people as a homogenous mass or as passive victims deprived of agency – a stereotype which is particularly prevalent when it comes to refugees – the book considers the *differentiated* experiences, losses and gains, and capacities for adjustment among different people within the same context of displacement (cf. Hammar 2014). The chapters address the spatial, social and symbolic aspects of urban displacement. In this regard, my analysis fits the conceptualisation of ‘displacement’ proposed by Amanda Hammar in her edited volume on displacement economies: ‘I define displacement as enforced changes in interweaving spatial, social and symbolic conditions and relations’ (Hammar 2014: 9). Hammar’s book offers an approach to displacement that ‘focuses on the relational qualities and the paradoxes of displacement in general, and on both what produces displacement and what it in turn produces’ (Hammar 2014: 4). While the chapters of Hammar’s edited volume mainly focus on forced migrants, this framework captures well the approach to the displacement of markets and traders taken in the present book. Its chapters examine the multiple and generative dimensions of the process of displacement, including what happens to social relationships (such as trade networks, gender relations, trust and collaboration); to relations to space and the use and production thereof (such as changing or persistent relations to familiar places and place-making in new environments); and to symbolic and cultural aspects of life (such as moral economies or femininity).

The city through the eyes of women

Anthropologists have long been keen to dispel the myth that Africa consists of isolated and unchanging localities and ‘cultures’, and this argument is often made by drawing attention to local–global connections and migration beyond the continent (Diouf 2000; Ferguson 2006; Piot 1999). Similarly, urban scholars have increasingly drawn attention to the ‘worlding’ of African cities (Landau 2010; Simone 2001). Globalisation,

however, is not the only way that the continent's inhabitants and places are connected to 'elsewheres'. There are numerous other flows and circuits at other (smaller) scales that make up the urban centres and regions of Africa (Amselle 1977; Boesen and Marfaing 2007; Cohen 1969; Gregoire and Labazee 1993; Gugler 1971; Scheele 2012). Like the mythical 'African village' portrayed as remote and exotic, Muslim women in West Africa still appear relatively isolated and 'immobile'. By focusing on some of the other (smaller) scales and spaces besides 'the global', this ethnography paints a relatively dynamic picture of the lives of women residing in urban West Africa, which emphasises change, mobility and connections across space.

The traders represented in this book were generally mature women in their thirties, forties and fifties, who were financially in charge of their own households, even if they were married (see Table 1.2 for an overview of the main interlocutors referred to in the book). Almost all of them were Muslim and had Malian backgrounds, having either been born there or having parents from Mali.⁵ I usually spoke with my interlocutors in a mix of French and Bamanankan, an official Malian language. In the context examined in this book, women's economic activities in public space, their accumulation of profit through commerce and their involvement in international shuttle trade were contentious issues which raised gendered concerns and moral dilemmas (as discussed especially in Chapter 5). Women in Islamic West Africa rarely preside over significant business and trade capital or engage independently in long-distance mobility and commerce. This differs from the 'market women' in matrilineal societies of West Africa, particularly Ghana, where women are known to dominate marketplaces and trade.⁶ By comparison, in Senegal, women are less likely to be economically active, and as traders they are mainly involved in selling prepared foods, whereas other forms of trade are usually dominated by men (Lyons and Snoxell 2005). This book to some extent explores how women's practices of trade were 'embedded' in certain social relationships and identities, cultural norms and values and moral concerns, which shaped the women's aims and strategies (cf. Akerlof and Kranton 2010; Granovetter 1985; Meagher 2010). Meanwhile, the book does not just examine conformity and consensus but also discusses the conflicts and ongoing negotiations over women's economic activities. Studies of West African (male) traders have been notable for their emphasis on the embeddedness of economic behaviour, analysing the significance of social networks and ethnic and religious identity in particular in constituting successful trading networks and institutions (Amselle 1985; Cohen 1969; Diouf 2000; Ebin 1992;

Table 1.2 Overview of main interlocutors.

Main fieldwork sites:	Name (pseudonym)	Occupation	Marital status	Age (approximate)
Outdoor market at the Terminus	Aminata	retailer	divorced	early 30s
	Ami	<i>bazin</i> cloth retailer	monogamy (husband in Ivory Coast)	early 30s
	Ba Fanta	retailer	widow	50s
	Djenneba Sylla	retailer	monogamy	30s
Indoor cloth bazaar	Fatim (daughter of Ba Fanta)	retailer	divorced	30s
	Rokia	<i>bazin</i> cloth retailer	monogamy (husband in Burkina Faso)	early 30s
	Aissa	<i>bazin</i> cloth wholesaler	monogamy	early 40s
	Kadidia	<i>bazin</i> /wax cloth wholesaler	unmarried	late 20s
Sugunikura	Safi	<i>bazin</i> /wax cloth wholesaler	divorced	late 30s
	Aissatou	<i>bazin</i> cloth retailer	monogamy	early 20s
	Mah	wholesale trader	monogamy	late 40s
	Oumou	wholesale trader	polygamy (husband in Mali)	late 40s
Grand Mosque	Bintou	occasional shuttle trader	widow	late 40s
	Fatou Fall	wholesale shuttle trader	divorced	late 30s
	Nana	wholesale shuttle trader	recently married	late 40s
	Tènè	wholesale shuttle trader	divorced	late 30s
Other female interlocutors:				
Garage Petersen market	Hawa	retailer	monogamy	late 20s
Garage Petersen market	Fili	retailer	widow	late 40s
My Malian neighbour	Maimoona	housewife	monogamy	mid 20s
Itinerant shuttle trader	Ramatoullaye Diallo	small-scale shuttle trader	monogamy (husband in France)	early 40s

Gregoire and Labazee 1993; Meagher 2010). It is, however, important to note that the social rules and regulations that apply to male traders do not necessarily apply in the same way to women traders, who may be subjected to different social and moral constraints than men. Women traders do not necessarily organise themselves in a similar way to men. Their motives and strategies and the networks they rely on may differ significantly from men's, due to inequalities that limit women's power and access to resources and contacts (Clark 1994, 2003; cf. Meagher 2005: 231).

The distances involved in the commerce carried out by my female interlocutors, where trade journeys lasted several days and spanned more than 1,000 kilometres, were remarkable. The participation of Muslim women in transnational commerce, as observed in the Mali–Dakar corridor and at the Dakar Terminus, appears to be unique in Islamic West Africa where long-distance trade has traditionally been dominated by men (cf. Amselle 1985; Cohen 1969; Gregoire and Labazee 1993; Warm's 1992, 1994). The mobilities and migration of women from Mali are usually depicted as exceptional, resulting from poverty and famine, and associated with destabilising social effects (Findley 1989, 1993; Grosz-Ngaté 2000; Guilmoto 1998; Hertrich and Lesclingand 2003; Lesclingand 2004; Vaa 1990; Vaa, Findley, and Diallo 1989). Meanwhile, beyond the 'rural exodus' from the countryside into towns, hardly any research has looked at Malian women's international mobilities and transnational commerce. In contrast, in the last decades scholars have documented *other* West African women's increasing involvement in international shuttle trade to destinations outside the African continent (cf. Bredeloup 2012; Buggenhagen 2012; Diallo 2014; Dianka 2012; Ebin 1993, 1995; Evers Rosander 2005, 2010; Haugen 2013; Marfaing 2007).

Until recently, Muslim women's active participation in migration, mobility and long-distance trade in West Africa has been largely neglected in academic scholarship, thus inadvertently (or deliberately) reproducing prevailing gender stereotypes. This oversight is particularly striking in the light of the expanding autonomies of women (Antoine and Dial 2003; Grange Omokaro 2009; Dial 2008; Rondeau 1996; Rondeau and Bouchard 2007). Indeed, while African women have always migrated (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997; Rodet 2009), most scholars agree that female autonomous migration in West Africa is on the increase due to increased education, the changing structure of economic activities, and lack of access to land for agricultural purposes, among other things (Adepoju 1995; Hertrich and Lesclingand 2003; van Dijk, Foeken and van Til 2001). According to Sylvie Bredeloup (2012: 26), the deterioration of living and

working conditions in Africa, coupled with the globalisation of labour markets – a process which has intensified and feminised – explains the increasing involvement of African women in long-distance migration and trade since the 1990s. Women have increasingly been entering shuttle trade, a business involving travelling back and forth across borders with trade commodities. This phenomenon emerged in the 1990s partly due to advances in transport and telecommunication technologies at the time, which made long-distance travel and interaction cheaper and easier (Freeman 2001). In Africa women's entry into shuttle trade was also commonly spurred on by the imposition of structural adjustment which entailed that conventional livelihoods were put at risk while new opportunities for transnational trading opened up (Haugen 2013: 22; cf. MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Meagher 2003; Peraldi 2005).

Despite these developments over the last several decades, Muslim women in West Africa are often portrayed as the relatively static nodes in the flows and networks produced by mobile men: women are the anchors of transnational families, the receivers of remittances, and the consumers of goods flowing in from elsewhere (cf. Buggenhagen 2001; Diagne, Mondain and Randall 2010; Guilmoto 1998). By ignoring or pathologising the economic contributions and mobilities of women, conventional analyses naturalise a binary conception of gender in this region. This contributes to a discourse that equates 'woman' with the domestic sphere, consumption, 'immobility', passivity, and dependency (Freeman 2001; Hann 2013; Massey 1994; Ortner 1974; Rosaldo 1974). This book challenges such dichotomous thinking by highlighting women's active part in income generation, mobility and spatial flows as well as the diversity of femininities and changeability of gender ideologies in the region.

For most of the married women traders I worked with, their husbands were unable to provide for them and their children, usually because their income was irregular and insufficient. This reflects wider trends in the region where men are increasingly unable to live up to the masculine ideal of establishing independent households and providing for their families due to the lack of economic opportunities. Generalised unemployment and lack of permanent jobs keep men dependent on their families and in a prolonged state of youth, and marital projects are difficult to realise, entailing a prolonging of celibacy (Grange Omokaro 2009: 200–1). In turn, West African women now participate more actively in the capitalist economy, contribute more to household budgets, and are increasingly educated. Hence, marriage is often postponed and conjugal unions are less stable than before (Antoine and Dial 2003; cf. Brand 2001: 103–4, 121 n.24). Indeed, about half of my main interlocutors were either

divorced or widowed and had not remarried. After menopause there is usually less social pressure on a woman in Mali to remarry, especially if she has already had children (Rondeau 1996: 162). Meanwhile, the institution of marriage remains strong in both Mali and Senegal, and social recognition of a woman usually requires that she be married (Dial 2008; Whitehouse 2016). Indeed, in lieu of having no husband some of my interlocutors preferred what Chantalle Rondeau (1996: 163–4) calls a ‘social husband’, who did not live with them or contribute financially, to having no husband. For example, the shuttle trader Nana, who had been a single mother for almost 15 years, had married late in life to a man who was financially dependent upon her. It appeared that she had married to relieve the pressure of social expectations, and less so for the affection or companionship of a spouse.

Even if a woman was able to financially support herself, she would suffer social stigma if she did not (re)marry. A number of my main interlocutors were married to what Rondeau (1996: 162) calls a ‘*mari de passage*’ (a ‘transit husband’) – that is, largely absent husbands who were residing in another country, including the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Mali, France and Spain. If these men came to visit their wives at all, then it was only temporarily. During the husband’s absence, many of these women were expected to provide for themselves and their children, and only some husbands sent remittances to pay for bills and other major expenses (see Rondeau 1996: 156–7). Oumou was married to a Senegalese Soninke man working for the railway who had another wife in Mali. Similarly, Oumou’s polygamous father, who ran a transport business, had maintained a household in the Ivory Coast with two wives, and travelled frequently back and forth across the border to Oumou’s mother in Bamako. Meanwhile, I suspect that at least some of the traders I met, who claimed they had a husband who was living elsewhere, were covering up the fact that they were actually not married, thus evading social judgement or sexual harassment (cf. Rondeau 1996: 163–4). One of my interlocutors, the shuttle trader Tènè, deliberately used this strategy while travelling alone to Dakar, telling suspicious or nosey strangers that her husband was living in the US – although she confided in me that she was in fact divorced.

My female interlocutors in Dakar represented a wide spectrum of mobility and belonging. Some were newcomers to the city, while others had immigrated decades earlier; some came straight from Mali, while others had lived for long periods in other countries where they may have been born and raised by Malian parents; some had been born in Dakar to Malian parents or had arrived from Mali during childhood,

and some had mixed Malian/Senegalese parentage or were themselves in mixed marriages. Historically, Malian women have long used poly-residential strategies to facilitate their circulation in the region, moving between the different places of residence of the members of their extended families (cf. [Rodet 2009](#)). The female traders on the Dakar–Niger railway drew on connections to kin to facilitate their entry into the trade and the circulation of their goods ([Lambert 1993a, 1993b](#)). As this book illustrates, however, such reliance on extended families and dispersed lineages was no longer available to a growing group of women, including divorcees and widows who had been rejected by their kin. Poly-residential strategies appeared to be mainly a male preserve particularly for the ‘transit husbands’ of some of my married female interlocutors, who in turn often had to provide for themselves and their children while their husbands were away. In this sense, women’s involvement in transnational and shuttle trade reflected both the need to generate cash and, increasingly, the atomisation of families.

Assembling an urban ethnography of displaced traders

My initial intention, as I embarked on a year of anthropological fieldwork in Dakar in early 2013, was to focus on the Malian presence in the city. I had previously conducted research on migration aspirations in the Kayes region of Mali and a long-standing Malian friend, Checkne, who now worked in the import business and therefore regularly came to Dakar to fetch his goods in the harbour, helped me launch my investigations (cf. [Jónsson 2007, 2012](#)). Checkne arranged accommodation for me with a Malian family in the city centre. He also took me around to the various Malian trade and transport hubs in the city. I visited a parking ground for Malian trucks and another one for Malian buses, the Malian zone of the Dakar harbour, the Malian customs office, and the new station for the goods train from Mali (see [Figure 1.2](#) for a map of Malian trade and transport hubs across Dakar). I quickly realised that the Malian presence in Dakar was closely related to commerce (cf. [Jónsson 2019](#)).⁷

My explorations soon took me to the old Terminus – a place with highly symbolic significance for the generations of Malians settled in Dakar. For nearly a century it had been a central node in Malian trade, transport, and migration networks. It was only at the turn of the twenty-first century that the roads connecting Dakar and Bamako were fully asphalted. Before then, most Malians had to take the train to the Terminus to access Dakar and its harbour. The Terminus was located next to the

port of Dakar at the sea-side entrance to the city centre, on the southern tip of the Cap Vert Peninsula. Dakar's old city centre was characterised by government offices and embassies, luxurious skyscrapers, and broad tree-lined boulevards planned by French colonial administrators. Yet, walking from my flat to the Terminus, I had to weave in and out through chaotic traffic and the street-level traders, hawkers and beggars who crowded the pavements. I lived just outside the historical city centre, next to the bustling Garage Petersen, in a neighbourhood known as 'Difonsé' (the French *défoncé* means potholed, battered, broken, drugged up), on the border between the raucous neighbourhoods of Reubeuss and Medina. There were not only several Malians living in this area, but also numerous Guineans, Ivorians and other migrants from the sub-region as well as from North Africa and Asia. The families of successful former Malian kola traders lived in relatively spacious houses, which in the chaotic surroundings constituted tranquil oases, each containing a central courtyard with a tree and a functioning well, and one of them even with its own mosque. These scattered Malian households were situated in the midst of numerous new apartment buildings, which were often quickly and poorly constructed as part of the ongoing building frenzy in the city (cf. Melly 2010; Tall 2009).⁸

One of these Malian houses in the old city centre belonged to Papa Traore. I was introduced to Papa via his eldest son, who was the *jatigi* (host, tutor, broker in Bamanankan) of my Malian friend Checkne. Papa and his two wives ran a massive household where several dozen people, including their children, grandchildren, other relatives, visitors and occasionally myself, regularly turned up for their three daily meals. Papa was also a *jatigi*, providing food, accommodation and general hospitality to female shuttle traders from Mali during their regular business trips to Dakar. The first Malian shuttle trader I met at Papa's house was Fatouni. I chatted to her after dinner and the next morning she allowed me to accompany her on her errands in the city centre with her colleague Fanta who, like her, was an older woman from Kayes in western Mali. At one point we started walking down what seemed an incredibly long street. The midday sun was out and we had already been roaming about for hours, and I was becoming exhausted. The women were mostly silent and Fatouni only occasionally responded to my endless stream of curious questions with short dry answers. Intrigued as to where the women were leading me, I asked Fatouni. In her typical fashion, she answered sarcastically, 'If you want to do research, you have to search!' I silently trudged along, soon discovering that we were going to a small market located at the end of a long, inconspicuous alley. There I met Fatouni's

old friend: the loud, chatty and welcoming Oumou, by whose side I ended up spending countless days at ‘the little Malian market’, or Sugunikura as it was also known.⁹ Sugunikura was one of the few markets that had emerged in the vicinity of the Terminus after the Malian market there had been demolished.

I also realised that there were several other Malian shuttle traders like Fatouni and Fanta who continued to travel back and forth with goods even after the passenger train had stopped running. Malian bus companies had begun servicing this transnational route during the last decade when the national highways had been tarmacked. While Fatouni largely confined herself to Papa’s household during her short trips to Dakar, other shuttle traders tended to socialise at a small gathering place in front of a Malian bus company. I discovered this one day as I walked past and was seduced by the banter and intriguing personalities of Nana and Fatou Fall. These women were both successful Malian traders who travelled alone to Dakar where they spent weeks purchasing large quantities of goods and arranging their transport by truck back to Bamako.

By walking, observing and searching, I gradually retraced the displaced market traders and the shuttle traders who were continuously on the move. I thus assembled an empirical field of research, whose boundaries were traced by the constellation of scattered new Malian marketplaces and the networks of traders in Dakar who were formerly associated with the Malian market at the Terminus. This book is therefore not about ‘Maliens in Dakar’ as such; instead, it focuses on a dynamic network of traders of Malian background. Migration scholars in particular have been criticised for construing immigrants as constituting discrete, homogenous communities (‘ethnic enclaves’) within cities (Gidley 2013; Glick Schiller and Wimmer 2003). This book does not assume a ‘community’ among Malians in Dakar (or in Mali for that matter). Rather, it examines some of the networks established among certain Malians in Dakar. The ethnography highlights the diversity of interests and identifications among the people who were part of these networks, while also exploring why some people of Malian background were not part of some of these networks.

As my mental map of the Malian presence in Dakar became increasingly detailed, I decided to focus primarily on four sites in the old city centre to where many of the traders from the former market at the Terminus had dispersed, all located within a radius of one kilometre (see Figure 1.3 for a map of the main field sites). All of these marketplaces were dominated by traders of Malian origins. One of these

sites was also the place where many of the Malian shuttle traders, who had previously travelled on the Dakar–Niger train, tended to congregate in the vicinity of the offices of the Malian bus companies. The four sites included a small outdoor retail market by the railway tracks, next to the old terminus building. This was the only remnant of the former Malian market at the Terminus. The second site was located a few hundred metres diagonally opposite this outdoor market, on the ground floor of a large apartment building. It resembled a bazaar with several aisles containing numerous stalls, where traders were mainly selling cloth. The third site was Sugunikura market which was located northwest of the Terminus within 15 minutes' walking distance. The fourth site was another 15 minutes' walk from Sugunikura, in a southwesterly direction, at a commercial centre located between the Grand Mosque of Dakar and the bus and taxi rank, Garage Petersen. This was where the female shuttle traders socialised in their *grin* ('clique' – see [Chapter 4](#)).

Thus, unlike multisited ethnography, which aims to study aspects of 'the world system', the constellation of sites that I was interested in capturing ethnographically was mainly within walking distance. I decided to map and investigate the displacement and scattering of the traders after the dismantling of the old Malian market at La Gare. Had I conducted my entire study in just one of the new Malian marketplaces, it is unlikely that I would have properly grasped the nature of that site, including how it was constituted through its relation to other past and current places in Dakar and the reasons for its particular location in the city.

As the evicted and displaced traders had scrambled for new trading spaces to sustain their livelihoods, this had entailed a sort of 'migration within the city', and my aim was to capture this spatially dispersed network within Dakar. My methodology in some ways resembled the multisited approach adopted by scholars studying diasporic and transnational networks, who spend time in various sites around the world where members of the geographically dispersed groups under study reside ([Dia 2013](#); [Olwig 2007](#); [Paul 2011](#)). I too was studying people who had dispersed from one original location, namely the traders who had been associated with the Dakar–Niger railway line and the market at its terminus in Dakar. Like a diaspora or transnational network, this was a group that had dispersed from one site, but who maintained certain imaginary and tangible connections to each other and to that original site, as will become evident in the forthcoming chapters. This spatially and network-orientated fieldwork took me all over Dakar, from the city centre to the near and distant

suburbs, which was both exciting and exhausting (my field notes include interviews and conversations with over 150 interlocutors in several dozen locations). It was clear, however, that I needed to have some grasp of the huge network of traders, migrants, transport hubs and markets before I could identify those places that were more marginal to my study, and those to 'zoom in' on. Once I had done that, my fieldwork became more squarely focused on the city centre, where I could walk from one site to the other.

The following chapters examine various anthropological dimensions of endings, both as metaphor and empirical object, to capture the ramifications of urban displacement and its aftermath for the traders from the Dakar Terminus. [Chapter 2](#) begins by situating the eviction from the Terminus in its wider historical context of continuous urban displacement in Dakar since the inception of the city. The chapter then zooms in on the literal 'end' of the Dakar–Niger railway line, exploring how the Dakar Terminus over time evolved into a dense node as a place where travellers, traders, visitors and goods intersected and exchanged hands. It was a place filled with meaning, particularly for the women who had pioneered and expanded the marketplace at the end of the line and for the generations of Malians settled in Dakar. The traders fought to hold on to this space when presented with eviction notices, and they continued to identify strongly with the Terminus even after displacement. The subsequent [Chapter 3](#) homes in on the process of eviction and market demolition, thus focusing on 'the end' in a temporal sense: a moment of rupture, a destructive event which concluded an era at the Terminus. A multi-vocal account of the end of the market documents differently situated knowledges about the city, ranging across city authorities, Malian elites and intellectuals in Dakar, vocal male traders, and largely silent women and other feminised traders. Their different reactions and responses to the eviction and clearance at the Terminus reflected divergent understandings of urban membership and how to claim the right to the city in a context of widespread urban informality and exclusionary governance.

[Chapter 4](#) moves beyond the sense of 'conclusion' to explore what eventually *emerged* at the end, when the traders sought to reestablish their livelihoods and spaces of work. Stories of eviction, gentrification and urban displacement often leave out the aftermath. The chapter reveals not only what is lost but also, the opportunities and gains which paradoxically emerge when people displaced in the city restore and adapt their spatial environments. The symbolic significance of the Terminus was not simply erased when the market was demolished, and the space cleared of traders. The memories, networks, place attachments

and economic practices lived on. The market, as trade networks and as activities of exchange, emplaced itself in new ways after demolition and eviction. Market demolition does not actually create a 'blank slate'. The historical roots and spatial imprint of the former marketplace persisted in people's memory, facilitating its re-emergence: like rhizomes, it sprouted in new places nearby.

Continuing the inquiry into the aftermath of displacement, [Chapter 5](#) illustrates how the examination of a rupturing event can reveal broader, ongoing tensions and transformations in society. The chapter documents the weakening of female networks and a growing marginalisation of women traders in favour of men at the newly established markets. These shifts were, however, not simply related to the closure of the Terminus but were also closely associated with wider transformations occurring during the decades of increasing political and economic liberalisation in Dakar and the wider region. The rupturing event at the Malian marketplace in Dakar had both generated and exacerbated certain gendered constraints and conflicts experienced by women traders; but it also brought to the surface wider, ongoing moral dilemmas regarding gender roles and ideologies faced by many residents of Dakar. The ethnography documents changing and competing conceptions of what it means to be a woman in this part of urban West Africa.

The final [Chapter 6](#) considers endings in the metaphorical sense of 'means and ends', asking what ends the marketplaces served. Given that they no longer appeared to constitute actual 'markets', due to a significant decline in demand and profit, what were they ultimately for? Taken together, the different chapters show how the dense node and network that emerged at the Dakar Terminus were ruptured, and what became of the scattered fragments. The Conclusion in [Chapter 7](#) draws on the concept of 'diaspora' to capture the group consciousness and spatial orientation evident among several of the traders in the aftermath of their urban displacement. While I acknowledge the problems of applying this terminology to this context, I ultimately invite readers, and in particular urban scholars, to consider the analytical possibilities that open up if we conceive of the urban condition as partly *constituted* by forced displacement. Instead of focusing merely on the immediate causes and consequences of evictions and clearances, what would it mean if we began to think about how the city is actually configured by urban displacement? Rather than focusing merely on destruction, this book turns attention to what is *generated* by urban displacement.

Notes

- 1 The interlocutors of this book have been anonymised with pseudonyms, since I feel it would be too controversial or insensitive to associate their names directly with the very intimate and personal stories they shared with me. I have however decided not to anonymise place names and historical figures in the Malian trade networks in Dakar, as these would be of interest to future research.
- 2 At the time of fieldwork, 1,000 CFA was equal to about 1.5 euros (rate on 1 March 2013 retrieved from www.xe.com). For comparison, the guaranteed minimum wage in Senegal in 2013 was 36,243 CFA/month, equivalent to 55.25 euros (<http://www.travail.gouv.sn/node/203>, accessed on 20 August 2018).
- 3 My translation from the French: '*Au fond toute l'histoire de Dakar se confond avec celle de refoulements et déguerpissements successifs qui la jalonnent*'.
- 4 According to de Jong and Foucher (2010), a North Korean construction company was responsible for executing the work. As part of the construction project, the Senegalese state transferred 27 hectares of publically owned land situated around the airport of Dakar to a businessman who was a member of the ruling party. He then resold the land under favourable conditions to the Senegalese Pension Fund (*l'Institution de prévoyance retraite du Sénégal*), a public body. In addition, President Wade affirmed his rights to the monument and claimed 35 per cent of potential revenues made from it.
- 5 None of my female interlocutors were part of any of the Sufi orders that constitute the dominant form of Islam in Senegal, and which often form the basis of trading networks in the region and beyond (cf. Diallo 2014; Dianka 2012; Diouf 2000; Ebin 1992; Evers Rosander 2000). While nearly all my interlocutors were Muslim, their religious convictions, adherences and practices varied to such a great extent that I could not consider them a religious 'community'.
- 6 Much research among women traders in West Africa focuses on Ghana, a small country with good transport links, and involves more or less nominally Christian women, including Asante who are matrilineal (see for example Burrell 2014; Chalfin 2004; Clark 1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2010; Robertson 1984). These distinctive features make such studies a problematic comparison for the present ethnography.
- 7 Mali is landlocked and depends greatly on maritime traffic for its international trade, primarily through the port city of Dakar. The Malian state has been granted a section of the port in Dakar (the Zone Malien at pier number 8 where containers arrive; goods in bulk destined for Mali arrive at pier 3), as well as a truck park on the outskirts of the Cap Vert Peninsula (the Parking Malien in Rufisque). Senegalese law does not apply in these zones, and foreign goods imported via Dakar and transited through Senegal to Mali are not subject to Senegalese customs duty.
- 8 Such properties, including the one I lived in, were often owned and managed by migrants from Lebanon and their diasporic descendants, who have had a significant presence in Dakar since the early twentieth century (Bigon 2009: 204; Delcourt 1983: 78–82 and 92).
- 9 Sugunikura literally means 'the new little market' in Bamanankan. Sugunikura is also the name of an important market in Bamako, known in French as *Marché de Médine*.