

Chapter Title: Editors' Introduction: Religion and Politics

Chapter Author(s): Patricia Sohn and Simone Raudino

Book Title: Beyond the Death of God

Book Subtitle: Religion in 21st Century International Politics

Book Editor(s): Simone Raudino, Patricia Sohn

Published by: University of Michigan Press. (2022)

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.11866503.3>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). To view a copy of this license, visit <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>. Funding is provided by Knowledge Unlatched.



University of Michigan Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Beyond the Death of God*

PART I

Introduction and Comparative Themes

Editors' Introduction

Religion and Politics

Patricia Sohn and Simone Raudino

University of Florida; Kyiv School of Economics, Bridging Gaps

In 1882, Friedrich Nietzsche announced that “God is dead.” However, that was not the end of his speculations on the subject. He continued: “And we killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers” who brought God to die “under our knives.”¹ In Nietzsche’s text it is, in fact, “the madman” who cries in an open marketplace filled with atheists: “I seek God!” And then, later, in despair: “Whither is God? . . . I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? . . . Whither are we moving? Away from all the suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, side-ward, forward, in all directions?” Finally, after visiting many churches with the same rant, ignored and “mocked by the crowd, the madman concludes: “I have come too early.”²

Nietzsche is writing about his own society as he witnesses science murdering religion.³ The seventeenth-century’s scientific advances, turned into “revolution” by the eighteenth century and steadily gaining terrain through-

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. and commentary by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 181–82.

2. Nietzsche, *Gay Science*.

3. Nietzsche was born and raised near Leipzig, Prussia, which later became part of Germany. He was educated in Prussia and Germany, and he taught at the University of Basel in Switzerland. Lesley Chamberlain, *Nietzsche in Turin: An Intimate Biography* (New York: Picador [Macmillan], 1997); and Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-christ* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

out the nineteenth century, had, by the time Nietzsche wrote, already unraveled for many the widely held belief that God exists in some ontological form. With God apparently dead, Nietzsche asks whether we now become gods to replace this being, “the holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned.”⁴ Is our becoming God to replace that which we have killed an achievable goal? In answer, it seems that Nietzsche’s primary concern is that the death of God will cause the death of all absolute principles of appeal based on a divine order and reason. He predicts that these will give way, instead, to *nihilism*, or a will to nothingness. Meanwhile, the lack of divine order and otherworldly authority undergirding the worldly order of monarchy and the divine right of kings would be replaced by something decidedly less preferable.

Nihilism, for Nietzsche, is both a social and a psychological condition. It is both the result of the downfall of the temporal power of Christianity and an outcome of too many centuries of absolute certainty on moral questions, or what Nietzsche calls “fanatical faith.”⁵ In Nietzsche’s analysis, fanatical certainty, over time, inevitably leads to an equally fanatical disbelief in any moral good whatsoever, or a throwing of one’s hands in the air on moral questions. And, now, “All is False.”⁶

How are we humans, then, to live alone, ourselves, with no divine entity (or divinely appointed monarch) to lead us? Can we abandon the safe shores of “true world” beliefs—of the type that Christianity had provided for centuries—while maintaining social order, individual purpose, and our very psychological sanity?

Nietzsche does not have final answers to these questions. Yet Nietzsche’s speculations on how modernism killed the idea of God left fundamental ramifications for both the inner and outer spheres of human thought. The introspective, speculative world of philosophy and psychology, on the one side, and the outwardly directed efforts at understanding and organizing societies, through sociology or political science, on the other, are equally affected. In fact, in Nietzsche’s thought, the two spheres are so intimately intertwined as to effectively become mutually constitutive: anthropological speculations on the different natures of men, and on their capacity to react to the death of God, ultimately led him to a theory of society. By walking the

4. Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, 181.

5. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. and ed. with commentary by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1973), 7.

6. Nietzsche, *Will to Power*.

treacherous path linking psychology to action, Nietzsche simultaneously spoke to the two provinces of religion: as an intimate belief and as a source of political power.

FROM PSYCHOLOGY TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Nietzsche's path to a social theory based on the concept of (the death of) God begins from his intimate knowledge of human psychology. Nietzsche is well aware of people's fundamental need for a meaningful existence, and he anticipates that, without God and the prospect of an afterlife,

nihilism . . . [will] appear . . . not [because] the displeasure of existence has become greater than before but because one has come to mistrust any "meaning" in suffering, indeed in existence. . . . It now seems as if there is no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain.

The Will to Power

The lack of the idea of a god brings out human primordial fears: living without a cause, a reason, or an aim—what ultimately amounts to life without meaning. In particular, it raises the ghastly prospect of going through one's life suffering without any anchoring hope or belief that can help face such suffering. Nietzsche believed that men could only overcome the dreadful state of *personal nihilism* by finding meaning in something else.

And what is this "something else"? According to Nietzsche, it depends upon the defining qualities of the single person facing the death of God. Fundamentally, he identifies two categories of men.

The *Übermensch*—Superior Men or Super Men—will find such "something else" in the acceptance that personal nihilism is the result of a misguided and sterile desire to find objective meaning in life, and subsequently in coming to terms with the absence of such objective meaning or absolute truth in life. These people will accept existence as a subjective experience to be fostered through life-promoting actions. They will find the inner resources necessary to navigate their existential fears and to achieve their own life-affirming morality, consisting in giving themselves their *own* good and evil as *laws*. These are superior beings who will manage to move from the "death of God" to "becoming God" by realizing that the need to find meaning in life's suffering is what had originally brought humanity to externalize its highest values and ideas of perfection into God. These superior

beings will now recognize themselves as the legitimate creators of such values and renounce their dependency upon external institutions and creeds. Nietzsche makes a mission of incentivizing this process by creating an ethic of self-deification:

To lure many away from the herd, that is why I have come. . . . I teach you the superman. Man is something that should be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All gods are dead: now we want the superman to live.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Yet, this approach is not for everyone. Not all men are equal and not all men are *Übermenschen*. Not everyone can react to the skepticism stemming from the death of God by turning themselves into a new god. The masses that have been guided for centuries by religious morality, by the drive to obey socially accepted norms, and by the need to be given a fixed designation of what is good and what is bad will remain the majority. Herd morality will continue to have the better of them, instilling the idea that mediocrity is strength rather than weakness, and that the qualities that the herd lacks are evil:

High and independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, even a powerful reason are experienced as dangers; everything that elevates an individual above the herd and intimidates the neighbors is called evil.

Beyond Good and Evil

For these people, the “something else” that will allow overcoming personal nihilism will come from the ideology of the day. The more pervasive the ideology, the more reassuring the result to its followers. These people will avoid personal and social nihilism by becoming the Last Man, the man who, like *Candide* in Voltaire’s novel of the same name, believes he already lives in the best of all possible worlds. As his religious predecessor, the secular Last Man lives a quiet life of psychological comfort without thoughts for individuality or personal growth. Ultimately, this conformation process will be so entrenched and encompassing as to shape a world where there is

no herdsman and one herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra

As the Super Men are the few and the Last Men are the many, this condition is the world Nietzsche sees coming throughout his lifetime. He experiences a tumultuous nineteenth century, witnessing the consolidation of nationalism and imperialism, the rise of anarchism, trade unionism and socialist movements, and the first signs of feminism. Nietzsche did not live long enough to see the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century; yet the Nietzschean reader has often recognized in the Last Men's mentality the ideal psychological and social ground for such movements to breed, wherein masses of Last Men stood ready blindly to follow an encompassing, ready-to-use, secular, and high modernist *Weltanschauung*. Others have noticed a return to the Last Man's herd mentality on occasion since World War II. It has seen its influence in some movements on both the left and the right in Western democracies, particularly in those contexts in which efforts to standardize results within society have been characterized rather by homogenization than by merit or the encouragement and raising of the exceptional. Under such conditions, talent becomes suspicious, possibly associated with the charismatic, and therefore conceptually tied to superstition, religion, or even divine gift, which is then seen as unfair. There is a conceptual contradiction, of course, in acknowledging divine gift enough to see it as unfair, all the while denying God as relevant to the social or political order (e.g., "God is dead").

There is little scholarly agreement as to where Nietzsche's social analysis has led—or should have led—his normative political theory. This scholarly impasse arises because the large literature on Nietzsche's purported political philosophy is effectively built upon limited ground, to the extent that many question whether Nietzsche had any political philosophy at all.

On the one side, the proclamation that "God is dead" has often been understood by advocates of secularism in the West, to use Geertzian terms, as a *model for*⁷ rather than a *model of* late-modern society and politics. That is, the death of God became for some a rallying cry, providing a blueprint for action rather than an empirical map.⁸ For such fans, it became one foundation for the notion that secularization was part of the modernization process, while also being a normative justification of such a process. The followers of this understanding had their view reinforced by a wide range of especially rationalist liberal Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment think-

7. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 93–95.

8. Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, 93.

ers, including Karl Marx, who began writing before Nietzsche, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim, all of whom conveyed in various ways the normative idea that the world's progress toward secularization was to be welcomed.⁹ Thus, the *secularization thesis*, whose origin, in hindsight, can be seen as strictly entangled with the origin of the modern disciplines of sociology and political science, could confidently posit that, as societies modernize, and as nation-states expand their reach over societies, religion will decline. In this particular *Weltanschauung*, Nietzsche's analysis of European society echoed with a fairly common nineteenth-century belief that religion "would gradually fade in importance and cease to be significant with the advent of industrial society."¹⁰

A *secularization thesis* reading of Nietzsche's work might also conclude that, by Nietzsche's time, such ideas could rely on a strong and reputable track record in government. For example, the French Revolution, which predates *The Gay Science* by almost a century, had already created, through a difficult, protracted, and nonetheless successful process, a praxis of secularization in the public administration. The French Revolution led to a practical roadmap for "how to" modernize the state machine, its officials, the populace, and the (urban and rural) landscape, taking its bureaucratic and technocratic efficiencies to new levels.¹¹ In this sense, the French revolutionary state contributed

9. See, for example, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3–5, 7, 9; Craig Calhoun, "Secularism, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere," in *Rethinking Secularism*, ed. Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 77–78; Saba Mahmoud, *Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 33; Jocelyne Cesari, *The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 5–6; Jonathan Fox, *Universal Human Rights: Political Secularism, Religion, and the State: A Time Series Analysis of Worldwide Data* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 18; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 25–28. For a critique of the historical development of the idea of the death of God in the United States, and particularly its connection with secularism as well as notions of scientific progress and what might be called, in contemporary terms, extreme production, see Denis Lacorne, George Holoch, and Tony Judt, *Religion in America: A Political History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011; first published as *De la religion en Amérique* [Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2007]), 106, 119, 122.

10. Norris and Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular*, 3.

11. See James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). See also Michael Mann,

a material precedent: societies that wanted to be modern and efficient must secularize. For these views, Nietzsche's tragic cry that "God is dead" became one of the foundations for justifying the secularization process.

Yet, from a historical perspective, such clear-cut exegesis of Nietzsche's thought is unwarranted. To begin with, the description of the death of God does not strike the Nietzschean reader as an entirely good thing, at least from a sociological perspective:

When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out from under one's feet. This morality is by no means self-evident. . . . Christianity is a system, a whole view of things thought out together. By breaking one main concept out of it, the faith in God, one breaks the whole.

Twilight of the Idols

Just as the individual finds himself struggling with the psychological consequences of losing the idea of God, so a society needs to find new sources of legitimacy in order to organize itself. Yet, herein lies a paradox: What is the nature of this new legitimacy? If society drops the idea of the ontological existence of God—if "everything is false"—subsequently to embrace a new credo, is not society substituting one false belief for another (as Nietzsche feared, God for nihilism—or relativism)? And what is this other belief that should be embraced in exchange for God? Nietzsche attacks all the modern moral or political surrogates for God—trade unionism, democracy, feminism, socialism—and *the state*. Nietzsche does not trust the *state*, and even less so the secular social contract upon which it is ostensibly based. On the contrary, his hostility is evident:

A state? What is that? . . . State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters.

Coldly lies it also; and this lie creeps from its mouth: "I, the state, am the people." It is a lie! . . . Destroyers, are they who lay traps for many, and call it the state.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra

The Sources of Social Power Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

Nietzsche could hardly be seen as an advocate of secularism, at least in the sense of being a proponent of a modern and centralized state founded upon a contract. To the contrary, he saw the state's effort to appropriate the space and authority that religion had once held as just that—negative appropriation.¹² Many agree in crediting Nietzsche with skepticism for rationalist forms of political power held by the state,¹³ including Tamsin Shaw, who stresses Nietzsche's hostility toward the state.¹⁴

With this skepticism of secular power in mind, it seems legitimate to the current analysis to read Nietzsche's death of God as presenting a violent and illegitimate crime of the secularists against monarchy and its religious foundations. With the disposal of the divine right of kings, which had characterized the *ancien régime*, first in France and later in Nietzsche's Prussia, as well as other European countries swept by regime change in 1848,¹⁵ Nietzsche warns that traditional slavery to a potentially false God only risks being substituted by even more irrational and uncertain beliefs.

THE ORIGIN OF SECULAR POLITICAL POWER

While the normative interpretation of Nietzsche's political philosophy remains controversial, there is no doubt as to the centrality that Nietzschean thought on psychology and social organizations has acquired in subsequent debates on religion and politics. For, if human nature is congenial to superior aims, if the hunt for meaning is the defining feature of the human condition, and if the vast majority of people remain incapable of finding such meaning within themselves, having to rely instead on externalized authori-

12. Tamsin Shaw, *Nietzsche's Political Skepticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

13. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 45.

14. See Tamsin Shaw, *Nietzsche's Political Skepticism*, 12: "Nietzsche had . . . come to the conclusion that religious belief had been discredited and was destined to die out. But we do not find in his work any celebration of victory on behalf of the secular political powers. Instead we find an increasingly cautious and even hostile attitude to the state and its ideological approach."

15. See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (New York: Beacon Press, 2001), and Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: 1798–1848* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996).

ties embodying superior values, then the question of the alternative to God is the question of the alternative to traditional sources of political legitimacy. Hence, the question of what could become a functional alternative to the ontological existence of God is intrinsically linked to the question of what political order is there beyond God.

By the time that Nietzsche began writing about religion and society, the interpretative question of the origin and legitimacy of secular power had already been debated by social contract theorists for over two centuries. In *The Leviathan*, which was published only three years after the signing of the Peace of Westphalia, Thomas Hobbes had firmly underpinned the sovereign's right to impose civil society even against his subjects' own will. In a post-Westphalian world freed from the yoke of the two universal authorities who had commanded spiritual and temporal authority throughout the Middle Ages—the pope and the emperor—absolute sovereignty was justified upon people's pragmatic desire to escape the prospect of living a "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, short" life outside of society. Because of the importance of the matter at stake, the subjects of the Leviathan have no right to revolution. Moreover, Hobbes asserts that even when the sovereign's laws occasionally contradict God's *prophetical* laws, his subjects must still obey the sovereign's laws.

While the work of subsequent social contract theorists—most notably, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau—maintained more balanced approaches to the rights and duties of the citizen and the state, notably establishing the citizens' right of rebellion against the state, this refitting continued to be done at God's expense. In particular, Locke explicitly refuted the idea that kings rule according to divine right, arguing that human beings have human rights upon which no one can infringe. He also maintained that neither knowledge nor faith demand the use of force against persons who differ intellectually or religiously. Writing almost a century later, Rousseau considered the advantages and drawbacks of different types of religion upon societal organizations, eventually concluding in favor of a religious tolerance in which religion was effectively relegated to the sphere of matters of private conscience.

Thus, in the 200 years separating the Peace of Westphalia from Nietzsche, the international political system had already placed the legitimacy of political power above the emperor and beyond God (the pope). Mainstream political philosophy, on its side, had sanctioned the view that the state was the depository of original (e.g., not derived), absolute (*superiorem non reco-*

gnoscens), inalienable, and imprescriptible power. To this extent, Nietzsche's death of God is considerably more original in portraying the revolutionary changes existent in the belief systems of contemporary European societies leading up to his time, as they moved toward *modernism* understood as a particular type of social development,¹⁶ than it was involved in justifying any alternative, subsequent political system emerging from these processes.

The "death of God" is the expression of a new age and a new cultural movement, Romanticism, describing in three words how this new era related to both the dismissal of the idea of the ontological existence of God and the percolation of such an idea through the European low and middle classes, a process otherwise known as the *secularization thesis*.

This was a process happening over several generations. Karl Marx, who was one generation older than Nietzsche, held the belief that religion was a symptom of all that was wrong in society and thought that it would eventually die out when a perfect socialist state would eventually be achieved. Durkheim, who was a contemporary of Nietzsche, thought that, as society modernizes, the role of religion, which is primarily to bind people together, was progressively becoming redundant. The fundamental social bonds that religion constituted in villages were destined to be broken as people moved to cities. As with Nietzsche, Durkheim expressed some concern about this process and was not a wholesale advocate of all changes related to it, as seen in his works on suicide, anomie, and the lost social solidarity of the extended patriarchal family. Max Weber, who was a generation younger than Nietzsche, reflected upon the sociological consequences of the rise of scientific knowledge, concluding that the application of rational and bureaucratic standards in life would eventually create a way of reasoning destined to take the magic out of religion.¹⁷ In different ways, all these thinkers were evolutionary—their theories are tied to the idea of progress toward an ulti-

16. Steve Bruce, who is explicitly indebted to Max Weber, has defined modernization as "the rationalization of thought and public life; increasing individualism, egalitarianism, and social diversity; industrialization and growth in technological consciousness; structural-functional differentiation; increased social differentiation; increased literary and education; democratization; the demographic transition from high fertility and high death rates to low death rates and low fertility; and urbanization." Steve Bruce, "Secularization Elsewhere: It Is More Complicated Than That," in *Política & Sociedade* 16, no. 36 (2017): 196–97.

17. While we do not claim to have a deep expertise on Weber's extensive works in comparative sociology of religion, we note that some parts of the general framework we mention can be found in Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, introduction by Talcott Parsons, foreword by Ann Swidler (Boston: Beacon Books, [1963] 1993).

mate ideal of modernism. For some of them, in their own turn, the ideas of modernism and progress become bound up with the idea of nation-states expanding their reach in society.

The secularization thesis survived throughout the first half of the twentieth century, and arguably strengthened in its second half, sustained by a number of theoretical refinements. Writing from the 1960s onward, Brian Wilson of Oxford University points to key distinctions between different types of secularization, suggesting that "religion—seen as a way of thinking, as the performance of particular practices and as the institutionalization and organization of these patterns of thought and actions—has lost influence."¹⁸ Wilson thus traces this loss of influence at three levels: (1) the societal; (2) the individual; and (3) the institutional and organizational levels.¹⁹ Typically referring to the Catholic Church, Wilson notices that religion has lost authority over people's private lives, the organization of their communities, and its own capacity to propose substantive values that give social significance to religion and that allow people to socialize. David Martin, a British sociologist of religion, also worked on refining secularization theory in the 1960s; in particular, he analyzes "under what conditions religious institutions, like churches and sects, become less powerful and how it comes about that religious beliefs are less easily accepted."²⁰ He does so by looking at the specific role played by religion in specific societies and at specific historical junctures. Martin argues that religion has a tendency to be identified with a particular political position and concludes that, by observing the role of churches in defending national identities and in relating to reactionary and revolutionary forces, it is possible to explain the amount of influence they hold over society.

Steve Bruce's work portrays the secularization paradigm as not a "single concept," while bringing powerful empirical evidence to the general idea that "a long-term decline in the power, popularity and prestige of religious beliefs and rituals [caused] individualism, diversity and egalitarianism in the context of liberal democracy."²¹ In particular, Bruce brings hard data into the debate, showing how the declining importance of religion in the West can be measured empirically.

18. Karel Dobbelaere, "Bryan Wilson's Contribution to the Study of Secularization," *Social Compass* 53, no. 2 (2006): 141–46.

19. Dobbelaere, "Bryan Wilson's Contribution to the Study of Secularization."

20. David Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

21. Steve Bruce, *God Is Dead: Secularization in the West* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

Until the 1980s, while remarkable analytical works on religion persisted in many disciplines,²² religion was somehow segregated to second-class status in political science and international relations. Throughout the twentieth century, Western political scientists and international relations theorists continued to treat religion as an anomaly to be corrected rather than to be studied by unpacking its impacts upon, interactions with, or influences from society and politics. The presumed anomaly of religion came in part because the prevailing theories in these disciplines continued reading the world through the prism of social contract and the secularization thesis under the assumption that, at least in the West, the separation between religious beliefs and political legitimacy was a manifest, unambiguous fact.

In these academic disciplines, the death of God was seen as an accomplished phenomenon, the natural arrival point of an ideational trajectory that, from the Reformation through the European religious wars, the Peace of Westphalia, the rise of modern science, the French Revolution, the creation of modern state bureaucracies, and to the present had shaped the ultimate model of secular society. These standards have since been presented through international organizations of various types as the standard to which nondemocratic societies should strive to conform.

During the Cold War years, socialist alternatives from the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China, as well as their many satellite allies scattered across Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, only seemed to confirm such prevailing views on the separation between religion and politics, even competing with Western rhetoric in representing the expression(s) of the people in governments. During these years of bipolar confrontation, some religious societies across the world—particularly across the Middle East and Asia—effectively renounced their primary religious identity and accepted secular political institutions (at least formally, and not without internal conflict) in order to access support from one or the other camp.

22. Complementary to the works mentioned so far, see also Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959); Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (New York: Routledge, 1966); Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1969); and Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

As a result, throughout the twentieth century, the default epistemological approach in mainstream political science and international relations remained an “unquestioned acceptance of the secularist division between religion and politics.”²³ Within this narrative, the existing contact points between religious and state institutions—including religious-inspired political parties and state-recognized or state-controlled churches—were understood as carefully defined and strictly regulated by the state itself. All indications of a persistent religious meddling in politics were either downplayed or seen as exceptions to be corrected.

It is only recently, with the crisis of the secularization theory itself, that it has appeared increasingly evident that the very conceptual arena inhabited by the idea of a separation between religion and politics had always been socially and historically constructed rather than ontologically given. Moreover, these socially and historically constructed concepts owed far more to religious structures and worldviews than the secularists were ready to accept.

First, the very “ideological conditions that give point and force to the theoretical apparatuses employed to describe and objectify” the secular and the religious²⁴ were themselves religious. They came from what Elizabeth Hurd defines as “Judeo-Christian secularism,” that is, the idea that religion can be disentangled from social action, that its principles pertain to specific religions rather than to all religions, and that it is unthinkable to assume that such a Judeo-Christian-West-oriented worldview might be compatible with or even comparable with other religions, particularly including Islam. Far from being religiously or ideologically neutral, secular political authority as it emerged in Europe was historically constructed and was “deeply” Christian from its origins in the Peace of Westphalia onward.²⁵ Indeed, some of the forms that it has taken have been precisely dominating rather than creating a liberating neutrality, particularly vis-à-vis religious traditions for which separation of religion from the public sphere is antithetical to foundational principles or to people’s lived existence, or both.²⁶

Second, long-held epistemological positions in political science and international relations had affirmatively answered the question of whether

23. Hurd, *Politics of Secularism*, 1.

24. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind, “Introduction: The Anthropological Skepticism of Talal Asad,” in *Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors*, ed. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006), 3.

25. Hurd, *Politics of Secularism*, 1, 3, 5–6, 25.

26. Hurd, *Politics of Secularism*, 3, 27. See also Mahmoud, *Religious Difference*.

purposefully using secularization as a blueprint for changing societies and states (e.g., in a normative view) was the only possible approach to studying religion and politics. That is, the question of whether secularization could be an empirical phenomenon simply to be observed, analyzed, and commented upon in the same way that other political phenomena are treated (e.g., a non-normative analytical view), did not arise until recent years. Instead, Western political scientists have long been more concerned with normative political theory, by implementing a modernization always understood inherently to include secularization, than with comprehending or theorizing religion and politics on their own terms throughout various religious, cultural, national, and regional empirical contexts.²⁷ These academic perspectives have been mirrored in many Western foreign policy efforts bent on establishing pro-Western secular governments, often in otherwise overwhelmingly religious societies.

With the end of the Cold War and the growing importance of nationalist centrifugal forces backed by religious components—in the former Soviet

27. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd explains in some detail that the US government did include religion in international policy considerations even in the mid-twentieth century when modernization theory and the secularization thesis were predominant. According to Hurd, these policies occurred mainly in the context of the Cold War and involved the encouragement of certain forms of religion that would be peaceful and supportive of US interests. The American Political Science Association was, at the time, cognizant of these efforts and formally supported certain of these policy initiatives. Contrary to the implicit claims in some of the works in this volume, Hurd argues *against* the inclusion of religion as an organizing principle around which some human rights frameworks should be structured in the international legal arena. See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 69–70, and chapter 6. Regarding the tendency of disciplinary research in the mid-twentieth century through at least the 1980s to address religion in terms of modernization and secularization, see, for example, Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); David E. Apter, *The Modernization Process* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Donal Cruise O'Brien, "Modernization, Order, and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science 1960–70," *Journal of Development Studies* 8, no. 4 (1972): 351–78; Dean Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of National Societies: A Critical Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15, no. 2 (March 1973): 199–226; and Zehra F. Arat, "Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited," *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 1 (1988): 21–36.

Union as in the Balkans and other regions—some scholars reevaluated the weight of religion in comparative politics. Scholars such as Mark Tessler²⁸ and Samuel Huntington²⁹ were in the vanguard of changing the predominant epistemology regarding religion and politics by making the rather Weberian³⁰ suggestion that religion and culture could have a great impact not only on local or national dynamics but on international affairs as well. Tessler, for example, was among the first political scientists to note, as early as 1980, that religion in the Middle East was on an upsurge, in contravention to the expectations of the secularization thesis.³¹ Tessler pioneered the field of religion and public opinion research in the Middle East and North Africa (as well as public opinion in other topical areas in the region); his work on Islam, Judaism, gender, identity politics, and democracy has sought to establish statistical and causal relationships between religion, national politics,

28. See Mark Tessler, "The Identity of Religious Minorities in Non-Secular States: Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 3 (1979): 359–78; Mark Tessler, "Political Change and the Islamic Revival in Tunisia," *Maghreb Review* 5, no. 1 (1980): 8–19; Mark Tessler, "The Political Culture of Jews in Tunisia and Morocco," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 11, no. 1 (1980): 59–86; Jamal Sanad and Mark Tessler, "Women and Religion in a Modern Islamic Society: The Case of Kuwait," in *The Politics of Religious Resurgence in the Contemporary World*, ed. Emile Sahliyah (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); and Mark Tessler, "The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis," in *Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa*, ed. John P. Entelis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).

29. See Samuel Huntington's highly controversial work on the "clash of civilizations," positing a potential "Islam-Confucian Bloc" with which Western secularists may have to contend: Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49. See also Samuel Huntington, "Religion and the Third Wave," *National Interest* 24 (1991): 29–42; Samuel Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics* 25, no. 3 (1973): 333–68; and Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). For work on the vanguard of bringing religion into the study of American politics, see Kenneth D. Wald, Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill, "Political Cohesion in Churches," *Journal of Politics* 52, no. 1 (1990): 197–215; Clyde Wildox and Ted Jelen, "Evangelicals and Political Tolerance," *American Politics Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (1990): 25–46; David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, eds., *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993); and Kenneth D. Wald and Corwin E. Smidt, "Measurement Strategies in the Study of Religion and Politics," in Leege and Kellstedt, *Rediscovering the Religious Factor*.

30. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. with commentary by Stephen Kalberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

31. Tessler, "Political Change and the Islamic Revival in Tunisia," 1980.

cultural factors, and international politics in those contexts.³² And, while Samuel Huntington's work has been at times controversial, he was one of the early scholars to bring the attention of comparative political scientists to religion and politics as an empirical area of study. Like Weber, Huntington's work presents religion and cultural variables as potentially causal in world-historical political analysis. In many ways, Huntington,³³ like John Esposito in religious studies,³⁴ energized the field in the 1990s. The rise of terrorist-linked organizations such as Al Qaeda in the early 2000s, moreover, contributed to creating interest around religion and security studies, and, more broadly, around cross-national studies, effectively highlighting the continuing universality of religion in society and politics.³⁵

THE ONTOLOGY OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

While the twentieth century's commanding epistemology on the subject of "religion and politics" was coming from scholars imbued with Western secularism, it appears increasingly evident that the ontology of their studies was deeply, and increasingly, removed from such a vision. The Western—and, especially, the US and French—emphasis on the strict separation of religion and state have made these countries outlier cases rather than average models

32. For work in more recent decades, see Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao, "Gauging Arab Support for Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005): 83–97; Mark Tessler and Michael D. H. Robbins, "What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts against the United States?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 2 (2007): 305–28; Mansoor Moaddel, Mark Tessler, and Ronald Inglehart, "Foreign Occupation and National Pride: The Case of Iraq," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (2008): 677–705; Mark Tessler, "Religion, Religiosity and the Place of Islam in Political Life: Insights from the Arab Barometer Surveys," *Middle East Law and Governance* 2, no. 2 (2010): 221–52; Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins, "New Findings on Arabs and Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 4 (2012): 89–103.

33. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations?"

34. See, for example, John Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); John Esposito, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment," *Muslim World* 76, nos. 3–4 (1986): 181–202; John Esposito, ed., *The Islamic Revolution: Its Global Impact* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1990); John Esposito and James Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," *Middle East Journal* 45, no. 3 (1991): 427–40; and John Esposito, "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace," *Current History* 93, no. 579 (1994): 19–24.

35. Norris and Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular*.

of religion, society, and politics around the world.³⁶ One need only think of the dozens of religious-inspired political events throughout the twentieth century—both toward the secular, as in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Turkey, and toward the religious, as in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Iran—to realize that such a world could not be understood without factoring religious determinants into the equation.

The weight of religion in politics is arguably even more evident in the twenty-first-century international community, where more than 20 percent of countries have an official state religion, and a further 20 percent have a preferred or favored religion—while 5 percent of states either tightly regulate religious institutions or actively ostracize them.³⁷ That is to say, almost half (45%) of the world's governments have an official religion, a preferred religion, or tight regulations against religion; at the same time, these figures do not reflect some of the more nuanced ways in which religion and politics may interact or affect one another in the remaining 55 percent of countries worldwide.

As expected, the two-in-five states that have a privileged relationship with religious institutions are primarily located in developing regions, including the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America. Because of the contrasting demographic trends between these regions and the developed regions of the world, there are today more people with a religious *Weltanschauung* than ever before. Crucially, these constituencies also represent an ever-growing proportion of the world's population.³⁸

This empirical datum is also what indirectly emerges from this collection: the broad summa of the different contributions to this volume is that, while Nietzsche's "death of God" might have given momentum to secular forces in the West throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, God was proliferating in the rest of the world to a far greater extent.

Outside Europe, very few countries were witnessing secularization

36. Norris and Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular*, 4.

37. Pew Research Center, "Many Countries Favor Specific Religions, Officially or Unofficially" (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2017).

38. "With rising levels of existential security, the publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during at least the past fifty years. Earlier perceptions of this process gave rise to the mistaken assumption that religion was disappearing. 'God is Dead,' proclaimed Nietzsche more than a century ago. A massive body of empirical evidence points to a very different conclusion." Norris and Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular*, 240.

phenomena,³⁹ while even in the West religion was playing more continuing institutional and political roles than normative accounts of modernization often suggest. Inside Europe, the expression of this continuing salience has taken different shapes.

First, belief in the traditional God is still prominent in a number of countries, ranging from 95 percent in Roman Catholic Malta to 16 percent in Lutheran Estonia.⁴⁰ Generally speaking, Roman Catholic countries in Europe have high degrees of religious belief, excepting France, in which belief (34%) is almost the same as nonbelief (33%).⁴¹ Salience can be found in countries in which religious communities and institutions have formalized relationships with the (secularized) institutions of the state,⁴² as well as in cases in which formal separation corresponds with a powerful historical legacy associated with one religion.⁴³

Second, religion and religious identities have continued to show a predominant role in the relatively few conflicts the continent has witnessed after 1945—from Northern Ireland to the Balkans to the multiple fracture lines inside the former Soviet Union: Abkhazia, Chechnya, and, more recently, between Russia and Ukraine.

Third, religion has an overwhelming presence in identity and material exclusion, a phenomenon that continues to be used as a basis for domestic national unity: in a number of European democracies, it is the norm to see strong divisive patterns along overlapping ethnic, religious, social, economic, and professional cleavages, to the extent that segregation has brought some metropolitan areas to vast protests, or even riots, as happened in Paris

39. José Casanova mentions New Zealand and Uruguay as possibly the only countries with a similar development to Europe. In José Casanova, "Religion, European Secular Identities and European Integration," in *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, ed. Timothy Byrnes and Peter Katzenstein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

40. See *Special Eurobarometer*, "Social Values, Science, and Technology" June (Brussels: European Commission, 2005).

41. *Special Eurobarometer*, "Social Values, Science, and Technology."

42. Silvio Ferrari and Rosella Bottoni, "The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe," in *The Oxford Handbook of European Islam*, ed. Jocelyne Cesari (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). See also Christopher Sopher and Joel Fetzer, "Religious Institutions, Church-State History, and Muslim Mobilization in Britain, France, and Germany," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33, no. 6 (2007): 933–44.

43. See John Richard Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 60, 20.

in 2005.⁴⁴ With some caveats, the terror wave that has swept the US and Europe since 2001 can also be framed as one of correlation between religious communities and the socioeconomic exclusion of the groups or subgroups they represent.⁴⁵

Fourth, as noticed by Peter Berger, since the post-Reformation era, religion has also taken different and less orthodox forms of manifestation. For example, indications of religious influence in Europe can increasingly be found in loosely constrained, and nonetheless highly pervasive, attitudinal factors, such as belief in some type of "spirit" or "life-force" (a sort of "new age" way of talking about divinity). Such views remain high in Estonia, 54 percent; the Czech Republic, 50 percent; Sweden, 53 percent; and, to a lesser degree, France, 27 percent. In some states, belief in God and belief in "spirit" or "life-force" combines in high degrees: Slovenia, 37 percent God / 46 percent spirit (a combined 83% belief in God or spirit); Latvia, 37 percent God / 49 percent spirit (a combined 86%); and the United Kingdom, 38 percent God / 40 percent spirit (a combined 78%).⁴⁶

The third and fourth points above are also to be found in the United States, where religious institutions are strictly separated from state institutions. In particular, religiosity remains high (approximately 83% certain or fairly certain belief in God in 2014).⁴⁷ These numbers are even higher in

44. The 2005 French riots saw thousands of youth, mostly from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, engaging in the burning of 10,000 cars and the ransacking of 300 public buildings. These were only the latest episodes of a long string of violent demonstrations by Muslim minorities in France. See Fabien Jobard, "An Overview of French Riots: 1981–2004" (HAL, 2015), <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00550788/document>

45. The poverty-terrorism link is highly contested. Recently, while noticing how "most individual-level studies of terrorist groups have concluded that these groups are composed of people wealthier and better educated than the average member of the societies from which they recruit," political scientist Alexander Lee has concluded that "members of violent groups . . . tend to be lower status individuals from the educated and politicized section of the population." That is, compared to the population as a whole, terrorists tend to be wealthier and better educated; however, compared to the politically involved and nonviolent subgroups pertaining to similar ideologies, terrorists tend to have a lower social status measured by education and employment. In Alexander Lee, "Who Becomes a Terrorist? Poverty, Education, and the Origins of Political Violence," *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011): 203–45.

46. See *Special Eurobarometer*, "Social Values, Science, and Technology."

47. "2014 Religious Landscape Study (RLS-II), Main Survey of Nationally Representative Sample of Adults, Final Questionnaire," May 30 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2014).

the US South (approximately 87% certain or fairly certain belief in God in 2014).⁴⁸ Nationally, religious practice in the United States is moderate to high (approximately 36 percent weekly service attendance, and another 33 percent twice a month to a few times per year service attendance, meaning 69 percent religiously engaged to some degree in terms of religious practice);⁴⁹ while religious practice, per se, tends to be lower in Europe.⁵⁰

Thus, even in paradigmatic Western cases of “secularism,” religion remains important either directly in relation to political institutions or in the various forms of interaction among specific communities (religious or secular, or both), local, and national political issues. It is a truism today, for example, to note the significance of Christianity in US politics since the late 1960s.⁵¹ While scholars have tended to address the impact of religion and migration on national and regional politics as being more salient for Europe than for the United States,⁵² such an assessment may change in coming years.

Ignoring these trends due to normative proclivities—or, perhaps, only to habits of mind—that suggest modernizing is inherently tied to secularization makes opaque an empirical world that it is important to know. The notion advocated in some religious contexts that modernism and religion are *not* inherently oppositional bears serious consideration, and deserves more attention than only the dismissive turn of the hand.⁵³ Indeed, the continuing

48. “2014 Religious Landscape Study.” See summary results, religion in the US South.

49. “2014 Religious Landscape Study.” See summary results, religious service attendance (national).

50. Parts of the discussion of the Eurobarometer and Pew Research Center surveys herein has been presented previously in a blog piece, Patricia Sohn, “Inhabiting Orthodoxy: Discussing Islam and Feminism, Continued,” *E-International Relations*, December 9, 2016. It is presented here with permission.

51. Andrew Lewis, *The Rights Turn in Conservative Christian Politics: How Abortion Transformed the Culture Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

52. See Jocelyne Cesari, *Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Paul Sniderman, Michael Pedersen, Rune Slothuus, and Rune Stubager, *Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy: Islam, Western Europe, and the Danish Cartoon Crisis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Joel Fetzer and Christopher Soper, *Muslims and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Christian Joppke, *The Secular State under Siege: Religion and Politics in Europe and America* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015); and Claire de Galember, “The City’s ‘Nod of Approval’ for the Mantes-la-Jolie Mosque Project: Mistaken Traces of Recognition,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 6 (2005): 1141–59.

53. See Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*

salience of religion in politics—even in the West—appears to bear out some parts of this basic idea simply on the empirical merits. That is, the reality of the place of religion in politics today is significant for hard geopolitical reasons of “failures of imagination,”⁵⁴ as well as for more lofty reasons of pure science seeking to know the real world as it exists rather than as we wish to imagine it.⁵⁵ Indeed, the two may well be related in various contexts—that is, we are only as good as our scholarship.

THE VOLUME

This volume is based upon the qualitative methodology of *triangulation*—that is, the use of multiple themes, data sources, and data analyses as a deliberate methodology to enhance the comprehensiveness of the discussion. Triangulation is one methodological answer to addressing complex and difficult topics, or controversial claims. It calls for the use of multiple methods and types of data in order to achieve sufficient methodological leverage in regard to the question at hand: if all—or most—arrows point in the same direction, then we have increased the degree of confidence in the claim being made. While these degrees of confidence are not numeric in qualitative case study research, they are, nonetheless, the tangible difference between compelling or not compelling, as arguments go. Thus, while the contributors to the volume differ in their methodological approaches, the architecture of the collection remains geared to the ultimate finality of discussing the common question: How, where, why, and through which

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 20015), 117, and Lara Deeb, *An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi'i Lebanon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 19, 25, 143. In Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 67, 74, see, for example, schools of thought seeking to rediscover “modernity” in the origins of Islam, as well as modern scientific disciplines emerging from medieval Islamic sciences.

54. Erik Dahl, *Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013); see also Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, Government Publishing Office, 2004).

55. See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 50th Anniversary Edition*, introduction by Ian Hacking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 111.

modalities does religion matter across different sociopolitical micro and macro contexts?

What unites an otherwise heterogeneous set of chapters is therefore the discussion of how religion affects, interacts with, and transforms society and politics throughout the many thematic, theoretical, geographical, and historical intersections analyzed in the volume. It is the similar conclusion across regions, cases, theories, and modalities of analysis that strengthens the basic finding: religion matters, and it matters increasingly, not decreasingly, to politics.

We see *triangulation* as an opportunity to bring together multiple perspectives around the many facets of the rich and controversial relation between religion and politics. We see this multipoint, multilayered, and multicontextual approach as a resource in bringing strength to the collection's ultimate claim: the grip of religion over politics is strong and clearly on the rise, both outside and inside the Western world.

The collection offers case study analyses looking both at Western and non-Western cases, as well as including "East meets West" political and cultural debates. All chapters are unified by the methodological question of building theory—in this case, theories regarding the relationship between religion and politics—using case study research.

Authors build "theory" in various ways. Some case studies develop theories regarding patterned institutional, social, or individual dynamics or factors in which religion affects or is affected by politics. That is, the arrow may go in either direction depending upon the study; religion may be an independent or a dependent variable. Others link their case studies to social theory and ask how their cases may expand upon that social theory, or may reinforce it. Still others suggest ways in which their cases may require that we ask jarring new questions of existing social theories with which we have become perhaps too comfortable. Others yet again remain more comfortable with existing social theories but use their case studies to stretch those theories further than before, or in ways that are surprising to the current generation. There may be historical antecedents for this "stretching," or periods in which it was the norm; so, such conceptual "stretching" may not be so much *nouveau* as a renewal of past interpretations. Some chapters test hypotheses against empirical data, be those data qualitative or quantitative in nature, while others make the theoretical attempt to draw broad operating principles from the qualitative or quantitative data before them. In all of these ways, the case studies in this volume offer new empirical information

regarding the panoply that is religion and politics in the world today, drawing upon cases from Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

The ethos of this volume strives to step beyond the assumption that “either a country is prodemocracy, pro-Western, and secular, or it is religious, tribal, and theocratic.”⁵⁶ By leveraging empirical research, the volume offers, instead, detailed studies of how, where, and why religion matters in contemporary sociopolitical (thematic or country) contexts, and what we might be able to learn from the patterns discerned therein.

The volume is organized into six sections: Introduction and Comparative Themes; Christianity in Europe; Islam in Africa and the Middle East; Judaism in the Middle East; and Hinduism, Buddhism, and Syncretic Religions in Asia. Each section begins with an introduction by the editors framing the methodological, substantive, and theoretical contributions of each chapter, and the relation of the section as a whole to the volume. A commentary by one veteran scholar of religion and politics in the Introduction and Comparative Themes section offers insights into how this volume fits into current debates regarding religion and politics within political science.

In all, the studies in this volume present a nuanced picture of specific cases, and a broadly global or theoretical picture of the phenomenon of religion and politics through country and thematic case studies. They draw upon social theory, offer taxonomies, and bring our attention to variations in the specific mechanisms, variables, institutional, and ideational factors through which religion matters to politics in different country cases and regions. For example, theological debates are significant in some places, whereas communal issues are more prominent in others. Factors internal to religion itself are significant in some cases, whereas exogenous or international trends relating to religion and politics are more critical in others, depending on locale and time period. Local context matters in all cases. Quantitative and material analyses are used in some case studies together with qualitative data and analyses, while many draw upon qualitative data only. Most studies use some form of causal (or, perhaps, neo-Positive) analysis. Broad philosophical questions are raised and—tentatively or conclusively—answered.

This volume contributes to the claim that the weight of religion in twenty-first-century international politics has been on the rise. It is suggestive of *how* religion matters in different ways in a number of specific polities at specific junctures in their histories. Far from upholding the thesis that

56. Hurd, *Politics of Secularism*, 5.

"God is dead," proffered by Nietzsche's madman, and perhaps suggested by Nietzsche himself as a more empirical than normative claim, the volume suggests that an appreciation of divinity as holding a significant place in the hearts, minds, social orders, and political organizations of many polities around the world is a more apt empirical conclusion from the works found herein.

References

- "2014 Religious Landscape Study (RLS-II), Main Survey of Nationally Representative Sample of Adults, Final Questionnaire." May 30. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2014.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Apter, David E. *The Modernization Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- Arat, Zehra F. "Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited." *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 1 (1988): 21–36.
- Bowen, John Richard. *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Bruce, Steve. *God Is Dead: Secularization in the West*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.
- Bruce, Steve. "Secularization Elsewhere: It Is More Complicated Than That." *Política & Sociedade* 16, no. 36 (2017): 195–211.
- Calhoun, Craig. "Secularism, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere." In *Rethinking Secularism*, edited by Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Casanova, José. "Religion, European Secular Identities and European Integration." In *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, edited by Timothy Byrnes and Peter Katzenstein. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Cesari, Jocelyne. *The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Cesari, Jocelyne. *Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Chamberlain, Lesley. *Nietzsche in Turin: An Intimate Biography*. New York: Picador (Macmillan) USA, 1997.
- Cruise O'Brien, Donal. "Modernization, Order, and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science 1960–70." in *Journal of Development Studies* 8, no. 4 (1972): 351–78.
- Dahl, Erik. *Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013.

- Deeb, Lara. *An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi'i Lebanon*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
- De Galembert, Claire. "The City's 'Nod of Approval' for the Mantes-la-Jolie Mosque Project: Mistaken Traces of Recognition." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 6 (2005): 1141–59.
- Dobbelaere, Karel. "Bryan Wilson's Contribution to the Study of Secularization." *Social Compass* 53, no. 2 (2006): 141–46.
- Douglas, Mary. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. New York: Routledge, 1966.
- Eliade, Mircea. *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959.
- Esposito, John. *The Islamic Revolution: Its Global Impact*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1990.
- Esposito, John. "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace." *Current History* 93, no. 579 (1994): 19–24.
- Esposito, John. "Sudan's Islamic Experiment." *Muslim World* 76, nos. 3–4 (1986): 181–202.
- Esposito, John. *Voices of Resurgent Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Esposito, John, and James Piscatori. "Democratization and Islam." *Middle East Journal* 45, no. 3 (1991): 427–40.
- Ferrari, Silvio, and Rosella Bottoni. "The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe." *The Oxford Handbook of European Islam*, edited by Jocelyne Cesari. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Fetzer, Joel, and Christopher Soper. *Muslims and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Fox, Jonathan. *Universal Human Rights: Political Secularism, Religion, and the State: A Time Series Analysis of Worldwide Data*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- Geertz, Clifford. *The Religion of Java*. Rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. *The Age of Revolution: 1798–1848*. New York: Vintage Books, 1996.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "Religion and the Third Wave." *National Interest* 24 (1991): 29–42.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "Transnational Organizations in World Politics." *World Politics* 25, no. 3 (1973): 333–68.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

- Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. *Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
- Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Jobard, Fabien. "An Overview of French Riots: 1981–2004." HAL, 2015. <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00550788/document>
- Joppke, Christian. *The Secular State under Siege: Religion and Politics in Europe and America*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015.
- Kaufmann, Walter. *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- Kean, Thomas H., and Lee H. Hamilton. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, Government Publishing Office, 2004.
- Kuhn, Thomas. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 50th Anniversary Edition*. Introduction by Ian Hacking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
- Lacorne, Denis, George Holoch, and Tony Judt. *Religion in America: A Political History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011 (first published as *De la religion en Amérique* [Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2007]).
- Lee, Alexander. "Who Becomes a Terrorist? Poverty, Education, and the Origins of Political Violence." *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011): 203–45.
- Leege, David C., and Lyman A. Kellstedt, eds. *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993.
- Lerner, Daniel. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. New York: Free Press, 1958.
- Levi-Strauss, Claude. *The Savage Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
- Lewis, Andrew. *The Rights Turn in Conservative Christian Politics: How Abortion Transformed the Culture Wars*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Mahmood, Saba. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Mahmoud, Saba. *Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
- Mann, Michael. *The Sources of Social Power Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Martin, David. *A General Theory of Secularization*. New York: Harper and Row, 1978.
- Moaddel, Mansoor, Mark Tessler, and Ronald Inglehart. "Foreign Occupation and National Pride: The Case of Iraq." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (2008): 677–705.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*. Translation and commentary by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1974.

- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will to Power*. Translated and edited with commentary by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1973.
- Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Pew Research Center. "Many Countries Favor Specific Religions, Officially or Unofficially." Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2017.
- Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. New York: Beacon Press, 2001.
- Rahman, Fazlur. *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- Sahliyah, Emile, ed. *The Politics of Religious Resurgence in the Contemporary World*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.
- Sanad, Jamal, and Mark Tessler. "Women and Religion in a Modern Islamic Society, the Case of Kuwait." In *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World*, edited by Emile Sahliyah. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.
- Scott, David, and Charles Hirschkind. "Introduction: The Anthropological Skepticism of Talal Asad." In *Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors*, edited by David Scott and Charles Hirschkind. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006.
- Scott, James C. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
- Shaw, Tamsin. *Nietzsche's Political Skepticism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Sniderman, Paul, Michael Pedersen, Rune Slothuus, and Rune Stubager. *Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy: Islam, Western Europe, and the Danish Cartoon Crisis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Sohn, Patricia. "Inhabiting Orthodoxy: Discussing Islam and Feminism, Continued." *E-International Relations*, December 9, 2016.
- Sopher, Christopher, and Joel Fetzer. "Religious Institutions, Church-State History, and Muslim Mobilization in Britain, France, and Germany." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33, no. 6 (2007): 933–44.
- Special Eurobarometer*. "Social Values, Science, and Technology." June. Brussels: European Commission, 2005.
- Tessler, Mark. "The Identity of Religious Minorities in Non-Secular States: Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 3 (1979): 359–78.
- Tessler, Mark. "The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis." In *Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa*, edited by John P. Entelis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

- Tessler, Mark. "Political Change and the Islamic Revival in Tunisia." *Maghreb Review* 5, no. 1 (1980): 8–19.
- Tessler, Mark. "The Political Culture of Jews in Tunisia and Morocco." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 11, no. 1 (1980): 59–86.
- Tessler, Mark. "Religion, Religiosity and the Place of Islam in Political Life: Insights from the Arab Barometer Surveys." *Middle East Law and Governance* 2, no. 2 (2010): 221–52.
- Tessler, Mark and Eleanor Gao. "Gauging Arab Support for Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005): 83–97.
- Tessler, Mark, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins. "New Findings on Arabs and Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 4 (2012): 89–103.
- Tessler, Mark, and Michael D. H. Robbins. "What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts against the United States?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 2 (2007): 305–28.
- Tipps, Dean. "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of National Societies: A Critical Perspective." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15, no. 2 (March 1973): 199–226.
- Turner, Victor. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1969.
- Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill. "Political Cohesion in Churches." *Journal of Politics* 52, no. 1 (1990): 197–215.
- Wald, Kenneth D., and Corwin E. Smidt. "Measurement Strategies in the Study of Religion and Politics." In *Rediscovering the Religious Factor*, edited by David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993.
- Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Translated with commentary by Stephen Kalberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Weber, Max. *The Sociology of Religion*. Introduction by Talcott Parsons, foreword by Ann Swidler. Boston: Beacon Books, [1963] 1993.
- Wildox, Clyde, and Ted Jelen. "Evangelicals and Political Tolerance." *American Politics Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (1990): 25–46.