INTRODUCTION

In his study of the rise of the modern penal system, *Discipline and Punish* (1979, 6–7), Michel Foucault juxtaposes two modes of punishment: a spectacular and grisly execution from 1757, and a prison timetable from 1837. During this relatively short period, to rehearse his well-known argument, the predominating power modes of an emerging liberalism shifted away from public torture, with its focus on the visibly suffering body, and toward self-regulation. In the latter mode of power, subjects (of whom the prisoner was paradigmatic) were supposed to internalize a sense of constantly being supervised, such that they managed their own behavior. Their bodies took meaningful shape and intentionality in relation to, and ideally by incorporating as second nature, an externally imposed order of minute differentiations, emblematized by the timetable.

It is surprising in some ways that Foucault's figure for this external order is a timetable, because timetables

greatly preceded the shift he describes, originating as they did in early monastic communities.[1] But as Foucault tells it, the period from the mid-1700s to the mid-1800s saw the rise of a technique of power—he calls it, famously, discipline—whose method and modality temporalized the human body more completely, more thoroughly, and more minutely than ever before.[2] His focus is thus less on the organization *of* time that the timetable seems to represent than on the regulation and instrumentalization of human capacity *through* time. That is, the aspects of the timetable that interest him are not units such as the day or the hour but the fact of collective human punctuality itself: specific actions, such as rising and dressing in silence, lining up to a sequence of drum rolls, and submitting to inspection, were to be performed by groups, within allotted and very specific times, in an unchanging sequence, at regular intervals. Indeed, Foucault speaks of the "three great methods" of control enabled by the timetable: more than simply demarcating the hours, the timetable was part of a project that intended to "establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, [and] regulate the cycles of repetition" of human activities (Foucault 1979, 149). Though all three of these aims take the body as their object, the first and last are matters of timing that body in relation to other bodies as well as to the clock, in a choreographed chronometrics. In short, the timetable is less another iteration of the calendar than it is the representation of a newly systematized body moving deliberately in concert with other bodies.

In Foucault's eye, what distinguished modern institutions of power from their medieval counterparts was that precision of time was met by precision of bodily movement, such that even gestures came under the control of "collective and obligatory rhythm[s]" (Foucault 1979, 152). Discipline's quintessential procedure was the exercise, in which the body itself was broken down into parts, each of whose forces was rearticulated in relation to other parts, objects, and bodies, thereby recomposing the body into, itself, a part-object in relation to a larger machine. This was accomplished in the military through the drill; in schools through increasingly organized physical activities culminating in gymnastics and eurythmics in the late nineteenth century (see, e.g., Budd 1997); and in workplaces through management techniques that peaked with Taylorism, also in the late nineteenth century (see, e.g., Seltzer 1992). These processes were matters, not exclusively but foremostly, of timing: of flesh

coming into meaningful embodiment and connectivity through adjusting itself to particular rhythms, that is, particular muscle memories whose accomplishment and automation felt like a form of both selfhood and community (see McNeill 1997).

To sum up the temporal aspect of *Discipline and Punish:* Foucault argues that during the eighteenth century "[a] sort of anatomo-chronological schema of behavior is defined. . . . . Time penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power" (Foucault 1979, 152). Here, time is both the dominant instrument of control and a means by which other forms of control, such as occupational training, enter the body and come to feel organic, as body parts are coordinated and choreographed in their relation to other body parts, to the body as a whole, to other bodies, and to external stimuli. In fact, Foucault goes so far as to argue that this process formed a "new object" (155): a body that was felt and understood as natural, as agential and enduring, and as prior to any operations enacted upon it, even as these operations were also understood to bring out the body's true arrangement, capacities, and functions. The instrumentalization of time, coextensive with the temporalization of the body, (re)produced the "true" body. This newly naturalized body, Foucault writes, was "composed of solids and assigned movements"; that is, it was stable, measurable, and separate from other bodies. In other words, discipline's "docile body," as Foucault (135) calls it, was profoundly individualized, insofar as discipline isolated and specified not only singular human beings but also minute gestures. This is the Foucauldian body we know and have critiqued for decades in queer, feminist, and antihumanist theory: the singular body proper to the atomized subject of liberal rationality.[3]

But this newly timed body is also, Foucault goes on to say somewhat enigmatically, one of "speculative physics . . . imbued with animal spirits. . . . [a body] of rational mechanics" (Foucault 1979, 155).[4] His tilt toward speculation, the animal, and the mechanical thus also invokes a combinatorial ethics, hinting at the way that the disciplined body was newly imagined as, and trained to be, both porous to and associative with other bodies, objects, and machines. That is, the disciplinary techniques of the military, schools, factories, and so on worked to collate and to instrumentalize the time of individuals in order to amalgamate them into new kinds of massified *forces*: armies, student bodies, and workers whose

carefully arranged combinations of human energy maximized production and effect.[5] The temporalized body of *Discipline and Punish,* then, was also collectivized in new ways prior to, and eventually alongside of, its biopolitical management as population: population, we might say, was the horizon of engroupment produced by the state, but it was made flesh by, and also contested through, smaller forms of association. And as Kyla Schuller (2017, 20) notes, in the nineteenth-century United States these smaller forms of association—"private sector sites such as the plantation, slave ship, church, orphanage, domestic home, domestic novel, factory, women's auxiliary societies, reform movements, and extranational settlements"—were just as vital to the operations of power as were explicitly state-run institutions such as schools, hospitals, prisons, and the military. Local forms of sociability and agency shaped the capacities of individual US American bodies into small-scale forces: constellations of nonstate, collective actors.

What Foucault describes in *Discipline and Punish,* then, is something like a Deleuzian assemblage, a collectivized body that represents a contingent gathering of connected forces whose component parts shift in relation to one another and whose interior and exterior are not stable—albeit one that discipline immediately reterritorializes for the state, the market, and other entities of control (see Deleuze and Guattari 1988). This early Foucault also has in common with Deleuze an understanding of how bodies communicate with other bodies to form alliances and modes of being together without passing through cognition or through the linguistic forms of identity—and thus intersects with some of the concepts foundational to contemporary fields such as the new materialisms and affect studies, both of which turn away from the social constructionist position that language determines the field of action, being, and collective possibility. The new materialisms are most concerned with the agential properties of matter, the processes by which matter becomes meaningful, and the interactions between the human and the inhuman world. Stacy Alaimo's (2010, 2) new materialist concept of "trans-corporeality," for example, captures some of the porosity of human bodies that Foucauldian discipline makes it possible to apprehend, though Alaimo is concerned with the interface between bodies and environments. Affect studies, too, focuses on the body as a "sensitive interface" (Gregg and Seigworth 2010, 12), exploring thresholds of sensation that may or may not be dis-

cursively codified as emotion, that blur subject-object and mind-body distinctions, and that constitute "asubjective forces" for sociopolitical action (Gibbs 2010, 187). Congruent with the aspect of discipline that I am describing here, and crucial to at least some versions of affect studies, is Marcel Mauss's "habitus," or the learned disposition of the body that allows culture to feel like nature and to be "passed on" from body to body (Mauss 1973; Bourdieu 1977).[6] Similarly, the temporal remaking of bodies into forces entails the idea that bodies communicate directly, in what affect theorist Davide Panagia calls "somacognition" (Panagia 2009). Finally, the scientific concept of "entrainment," or the tendency of rhythmic patterns to synchronize and, more broadly, of moving bodies to align with one another, has been fundamental to affect studies (see, e.g., Brennan 2004, 9–11, 68–73). None of these theories of materialism or of affect draws directly from *Discipline and Punish*, yet the process Foucault describes, of timing the body, seems vital to all of them.

To return, then, to Foucault, the invention of the subject, a modern body with an interior life understood as separate from that body, was, at the same time, the invention of the possibility of local assemblages, novel and contingent forms of belonging that neither required nor resulted in a subject. Yet the genealogy of queer theory that has taken up the porous, combinatorial body as a wedge against the liberal politics of identity has generally followed Deleuze and Guattari's interest in space, or "planar relations" (E. Sedgwick 2003, 8), and thus has not taken up the role of timing in making assemblages possible. Leo Bersani (in Dean, Foster, Silverman, and Bersani 1997, 14), for example, imagines engroupment formally, in terms of visual and tactile correspondences between bodies, as "a kind of solidarity not of identities but of positionings and configurations in space." Eve Sedgwick, in *Touching Feeling* (2003, 8), pivots from a hermeneutics of "beneath" to a politics of "beside," another spatial relation. In *Queer Phenomenology,* Sara Ahmed (2006) dissolves the boundary between bodies and objects through interrogating the normative spatial arrangements that naturalize and reproduce some bodies at the expense of others. Even Jasbir Puar (2007), in *Terrorist Assemblages,* is predominantly interested in the role of the assemblage in deconstructing linear-progressive time through its juxtapositional logic, as opposed to the role of timing in making assemblages possible in the first place.

In contrast, I maintain that the *temporalized* invention of the subject, which is simultaneously the dissolution of the subject, should be of interest to any scholar of sexuality. Indeed, it seems crucial that the body was understood as being fully penetrable by time before it was understood as being fully penetrable by desire: discipline's temporalization-subjectification precedes and then overlaps with the solidification of sexuality as such, or what Foucault elsewhere (1990a, 129) calls "the regime of sexuality"—by which I understand him to mean, briefly, the bundling of anatomy, object-choice, desire, fantasy, gender expression, and sex practice (among other things) into a specific kind of person, narrowing by the middle of the twentieth century into the heterosexual/homosexual binary. Foucault's account of the disciplined body as something whose potentialities were latent and brought out through applied techniques—penetrations of power—that retroactively confirmed the very innateness of those possibilities sounds very much like his account of how sex came to be installed as the true meaning of personhood, and indeed the two intersect and coarticulate.

But in his shift to the study of sexuality, Foucault himself also loses time. He describes the invention of sexuality as a series of predominantly spatial techniques: implantation, interiority, proliferation, distribution, annexation, peripheries, dissemination, penetration, saturation, areas, surfaces, networks, and spirals. Only in his suggestions about the *ars erotica*—in cultures he describes in his four-volume *History of Sexuality* as either non-Western or premodern, in which the practice of pleasure in the pursuit of truth includes attention to the frequency, pacing, rhythm, and duration of sensual activities—can we see the timing of erotic life as a central part of how subjectivity and personhood come into being.[7] In Foucault's ([1976] 1997, 240) work on modern Western biopolitics, on the other hand, the chronometrics of the body disappear into a large-scale "state control of the biological" focused on sequence and duration. In biopolitics, populations—masses of bodies—are created and managed through temporal techniques that change the arrival time, order, and length of life and life events. These include birth control or fertility enhancement, policies designed to promote or delay marriage, reduction of the morbidities associated with chronic illnesses, and so on (243). And, of course, as the work of Ann Laura Stoler (1995) has clarified, this is a partial treatment of the role of temporality in biopolitics in any case, for

Foucault does not account for the role of sequential or durational time in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' racialization of sexuality, which is equally the sexualization of race, in which colonized populations were cast as primitive and savage—as both developmentally behind and historically prior to their colonizers. But even in bringing out this history, Stoler follows Foucault in imagining the work of time on sex and sociability only on a very large scale and not in terms of rhythm, synchrony, timing, or metronomics.

To sum up, Foucault offers no description of the role of time between the two poles he describes for the organization of life: the individualizing work of anatomo(chrono)politics that depends on timing specific bodies, and the massifying work of biopolitics whose temporal aspects seem limited to rearranging life events or periodizing populations. There is no explicit account in Foucault of how social formations are temporally created and regulated by forces other than the state, as they so clearly were in the United States; as Dana Luciano (2007, 11–12) puts it in her call for an affective history of sexuality, "[a] different analysis [of power and 'sex'] might have been produced had Foucault incorporated other addresses to the body within this chronology [of the movement from anatomopolitics to biopolitics]." The temporalizing address to the body clarified in *Discipline and Punish,* then, clearly involves bio*power,* or the work of organizing the sensorium and the physical habits that give rise to it (see Lemke 2011, 36), but may not be apprehensible under the state-centered understandings of bio*politics* that have emerged after Foucault, such as those of Giorgio Agamben (1998) and Achille Mbembe (2003).[8] Nor does Foucault explore how the timing of bodies in local instances might disrupt the rhythms, durations, and sequences imposed by the state and other large-scale institutions. Only in Foucault's early descriptions of bodies as accumulating into forces do we see a glimpse of what we might call an *ars sociabilis,* or the attention to frequency, pacing, rhythm, and duration that tunes bodies to one another even in the absence of physical contact. We need a story of how discipline's temporalized body met other bodies in modern social formations reducible neither to institution nor population, neither to identities nor genital sex—but in ephemeral relationalities organizing and expressing themselves through time.

This book is that story. It identifies sites of temporal control, of the rupture of that control, and of the temporal rupture of other forms of

control, which are bigger than the individual body and for the most part smaller than populations. It is most interested in small-scale techniques that might be conceptualized as coming between anatomopolitics and biopolitics; that may be aimed at subjectification but may produce a small-scale collective consciousness instead of an individual, interiorized subjectivity; that may be produced within, by, and even for a biopolitical project but that do not necessarily serve it at all times. Foucault's theory of discipline teaches us that the body may be a site of inscription, but also makes it possible to see the body as an instrument in and for acts that cannot be reduced to identities but are social nonetheless, in a process that I will eventually link to incipiently queer modes of belonging and becoming. Similarly, the proliferating inclinations between the bodies that discipline fosters do not necessarily solidify into a figure or a form of being but may stay entirely in the register of doing. Finally, we can see through *Discipline and Punish* that temporality is a nonreproductive, but nevertheless somatic and material, mode of sensory receptivity that collates bodies in relations of affinity across space and, I would add to Foucault's analysis, even across historical period.

Beside You in Time contends, then, that subjugated knowledge is often lodged in the flesh itself, and lives as timed bodiliness and as styles of temporally inflected sociability, predominant in the nineteenth century, that we have forgotten, or never learned, how to see.[9] Broadly, the sites of temporal control and response to that control that I discuss in this book are religious rituals (those of the Shakers in chapter 1, and Catholics in chapter 5), racialization (slavery in chapter 2, and racial uplift in chapter 4), historiography (chapter 3), health and conservation culture (chapter 4), and sexuality (chapter 5), all appearing or intensifying during a period that I call the very long nineteenth century, whose contours I will outline more carefully below. Within these sites, fictional characters and actual historical actors struggle both to inhabit the dominant temporalities that organize them, and to tap into other rhythms, other ways of feeling like they belong to a history, and/or other modes of arranging past, present, and future, that will foster new forms of being and belonging. In what follows, I call these temporal encounters *sense-methods*, foregrounding time itself as a visceral, haptic, proprioceptic mode of apprehension—a way of feeling and organizing the world through and with the individual body, often in concert with other bodies.

On Sentimentality and Sense-Methods

Any theory of the time-sense as a method for creating sociability in the nineteenth century must be squared with the extant work on sentimental culture, for as numerous critics have shown, the latter was the nineteenth-century United States' dominant machine of sociability and intimacy—its *scientia sociabilis,* to riff again on Foucault's (1990a) *History of Sexuality*. By "sentimental culture," I mean the wide variety of institutions and discourses that turned what were understood as raw physical sensations into meaningful emotional concord with others, with those meanings organized and recontained around, or reterritorialized in and as, race, buttressed by gender, class, nationality, religion, and sexuality (and of course this list could go on).[10] The promise of sentimental culture was, and remains, its capacity to extend face-to-face rituals and practices into forms of belonging that affiliated people beyond immediate community, to build cohorts of fellow feeling (Kete 2000; Coviello 2005). But its ideological currency was, and remains, a highly racialized language of emotion, whereby white people's, particularly white women's, fragility, interiority, receptivity, porosity, and expressivity are produced and maintained in relation to other subjects and populations cast as overly susceptible to their sensations or as impervious to feeling.[11]

This book's object of analysis, in contrast with sentimental studies, is neither raw sensation nor the nineteenth century's codified language of emotion and its attendant identities. *Beside You in Time* turns from the passions back to the body receiving sensations and puts the body at the center of analysis, but focuses on ways of using and tuning the body in relation to other bodies present, past, and future, in an extension of Foucauldian discipline toward ends that may not serve identity or dominant forms of the social. However, the best recent work on nineteenth-century American sentimentality has also illuminated something crucial for this project: how biopower takes shape through culture's management of the affects, particularly the sense of time, in processes that sometimes historically precede the state's relatively more brute interventions on the physical body and sometimes justify the latter. Dana Luciano's *Arranging Grief* (2007), for example, clarifies how non-state-centered rituals and symbols of mourning conscripted the body for a form of slow, nonlinear time that seemed to be a bulwark against both national-progressive and

commodity-capitalist time, even as it clearly buttressed them. For Luciano, biopower, or what she calls "chronobiopolitics," involves the production of "life" in the coordinated temporal terms of linear reproduction, accumulation, and accomplishment on the one hand, and a replenishing cyclical and sacred domesticity on the other (10). Luciano's work on the "temporalities of social belonging" (17) demonstrates that time and its regulating functions take shape in and through collective bodily praxes that are not coterminous with the state's inventions of and interventions into populations—an insight key to this book.

In a related project, Kyla Schuller's *The Biopolitics of Feeling* (2017, 2) asserts that sentimentalism "operates as a fundamental mechanism of biopower." As with Luciano's work, Schuller argues that this affective form of biopower preceded state-centered biopolitics in the United States, and provided a means for the latter to operate: "the tasks of the biopolitical state," writes Schuller, "evolved out of the private institutions of sentiment" (21). These institutions, in Schuller's view, focused on the capacity of the body to receive and coordinate external stimuli. The scientific discourse of impressibility, or the capacity of the body to receive sensations and incorporate them into heritable qualities, Schuller argues, was used to differentiate "civilized" subjects, who could progress through time, from "savage" ones who were "suspended in the eternal state of flesh and linger[ed] on as unwanted remnants of prehistory" (8). Impressibility was understood as a literal binding mechanism, connecting bodies to their environment and to each other in ways that were eventually managed by the state as race, gender, and sexuality. Furthermore, impressibility organized linear-historical time through the rubric of heritability.

What brings these two projects together, and makes them so important to this one, is their understanding of the role of bodily sensation, prior to the regime of "sexuality" and expanding our understanding of biopower to include affect, in disposing subjects toward one another socially. As Schuller puts it, "Sex before sexuality manifested as a proliferating dynamic between bodies" (2017, 34). I've attempted to capture this dynamic with the term "sense-methods." Sense-methods consist of bodywork, of inarticulated or unspoken, carnal forms of knowledge, intervention, and affiliation inhabited and performed either in groups or on behalf of them. They are nonverbal, and often nonideational—not so much Foucault's ([1976] 1997, 7) "non-conceptual knowledges," which

are unsystematic or seemingly unsophisticated ideas that merely rank below the knowledge systems of elites, but rather somatic manifestations that are not, however codified they might be on their own physical terms, typically understood as concepts or methods at all. Neither are sense-methods necessarily keyed to the traditional five senses of sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste. Instead, they might be synaesthetic, or entirely beyond those five senses, insofar as they often involve the visceral, the proprioceptive, or muscle memory—and in this book, I am particularly interested in a sixth sense, the sense of timing, or synchronization (temporal coincidence) and alternation (turn taking), which, though some scientists have described it as innate (Trevarthen 1999/2000, cited in Gibbs 2010, 198; see also Strogatz 2004), seems a site wherein the cultural and the biological meet one another.

Sense-methods do not necessarily operate from the top down, as Foucault would have it in *Discipline and Punish* and beyond. Curiously, *Discipline and Punish* has virtually no theory of resistance, and even in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* (1990a), in which Foucault does theorize resistance, the idea of "reverse discourse" shears the term "discourse" of any but its linguistic aspects, insofar as it names the way that individuals could reappropriate a form of selfhood by claiming the terms and concepts produced by the institutions of law, medicine, and psychiatry, rather than by arrogating techniques of power that were applied directly to the body: there is, for example, no "reverse implantation" in Foucault. But amassed and recombined human energies—engrouped, disciplined bodies—can certainly turn together against the very institutions in which they were organized, as in the factory strike that turns the sociability of wage workers against the owners of production, or the urban flash mob that turns the anonymous consumer crowd into a juggernaut. Judith Butler (2015, 8) calls this "concerted bodily enactment, a plural form of performativity," focusing on "forms of coordinated action, whose condition and aim is the reconstitution of plural forms of agency and social practices of resistance" (9). Butler's horizon is the demonstration aimed at the official national-political sphere, where bodies gather and do things in concert in order to signify and to perform their persistence in the face of being relegated to the biopolitical status of disposability: notably, according to Butler, plural actions intervene in a specifically temporal way, showcasing the quality of endurance. Butler's

heuristic is the performative, or the way that popular sovereignty can be enacted in advance of or as a relay to its achievement as policy. My horizons and heuristics are somewhat broader: in my view, coordinated, informal sense-methods can effect any number of social possibilities, and enactment of a national ideal is only one of them. They can also generate social forms that do not respond to or mimic an official, legible version. In other words, if Butler's performative theory of assembly focuses on the embodiment of "the people" through protests and occupations, my own theory of sense-methods focuses on the embodiment of a relationality that does not always refer to or result in a stable social form but instead *moves*, with and against, dominant timings and times.

On Queer Hypersociability and Method

"Sense-methods" comprise, above all, a queer theory of relationality and sociability. If engroupment is a sensory matter, one particularly inflected by the senses of time and timing, this is because the senses are necessarily more promiscuous than the discourses that reterritorialize sensations into identities and populations. In their treatise *The Undercommons,* Stefano Harney and Fred Moten (2013, 15) describe the social in some of the terms that I am after, gesturing toward "the re-routing encoded in the work of art: in the anachoreographic reset of a shoulder, in the quiet extremities that animate a range of social chromaticisms." In these brief, evocative phrases I can see several elements of what I mean by sense-methods: an emphasis on body parts (shoulders, extremities) as metaphors for and means of rearticulating the social; a compositional theory of the social itself (here, it is imagined through choreography, through the jazz technique of chromaticism, and through color theory, whereas my predominant rubrics are temporal); an unpredictable sense of direction (the prefix *ana-* meaning upward, backward, again, against). *Beside You in Time,* in keeping with these elements, tracks a series of social reroutings that take place through embodied temporal recalibrations. These reroutings are extensive, as centrifugal as they are centripetal: sense-methods, I contend, are key to imagining queerness as not antisocial or antirelational, as in recent work by Lee Edelman and others, but *hyper*social.

To briefly rehearse the antisocial thesis of queer theory: foundational to it is Lacan's (1999, 126) dictum that "there is no such thing as a sexual re-

lation," meaning that desire is a series of self-projections onto the Other, in which the Other's subjectivity has no place or real impact. Early gay male theorists such as Guy Hocquenghem ([1972] 1993) and Harold Beaver (1981), who theorized the antirelational aspect of homosexuality in advance of its contemporary articulations, understood homosexuality as, precisely, a breaking of the social contract through which imaginary identities recognize and enter into exchange with one another. Extending the Lacanian formulation and borrowing from Laplanche ([1970] 1976) the idea of sexuality as "unbinding" the energy that the ego seeks to bind into coherence and functionality, Leo Bersani (1987) has famously posited the receptive sex act—the state of being penetrated sexually—as fundamentally anticommunitarian and antiidentitarian. Sex, in Bersani's view, is anti- or nonrelational not just because desire is a hall of mirrors but also because receptive sex shatters the contours of the bodily imago and of the ego, which is at first a bodily one and the grounds from which we enter into relations with others. Receptive sex, then, is a figure for the promisingly destructive potential of all sex, a theoretical insight that spans Bersani's work from at least *The Freudian Body* ([1986] 1990) through *Homos* (1995). For Lee Edelman (2004), this destructive potential, which Edelman links tightly to the figuration of queers as avatars of death and to the Freudian death drive, makes queerness into a wedge against a particularly US American form of futurity in which reproductive heterosexuality and the figure of the child are the horizon for politics, for life, for the politics of life.

For my part, and despite how compelling I find these formulations, I see queerness less in terms of the pulsations of the death drive that insistently undermine the coherence of ego, identity, and politics—or what Lynne Huffer (2009, xvii) calls the "ironic" mode—and more in terms of a drive toward connectivity, conjugation, and coalescence that produces new forms, however momentary, which Huffer (xvii) calls the "generous" mode (see also Freud [1920] 1964), and which cannot be equated with the biopolitical understanding of life as that which must be optimized at the expense of those deemed unworthy of life. As theorists from Deleuze and Guattari (1988) through Elizabeth Grosz (2004), Jasbir Puar (2007), and Tim Dean (2000, 2009) have clarified in different ways, biological reproduction need not be the telos of the life drive: its point is to mix substances, to coalesce with others, to self-extend and thus retroactively

transform the self, to renew living on different terms and in ways that need not culminate in the schemes of personhood we know today but may pass through styles of affiliation that we can learn from. And of course the generous mode can equally discombobulate the status quo as long as its practitioners remain ironic enough not to let the social forms they generate petrify and become inevitable.

Returning to Harney and Moten: they insist on a social imaginary that focuses on "reroutings" rather than on negation. This idea of rerouting may have been lost in queer theory's handing off of the baton of queer antirelationality from Bersani to Edelman, for one distinct strand of Bersani's thinking involves the way that art and sex alike, in shattering the forms through which we perceive ourselves and the world, open up the potential for new connections among psyches, bodies, and environments—new relays for connectivity. Bersani actually has a very lush social imagination, for he posits new relationships based on aesthetics, even on design—on the visual rhymes of body parts in anonymous sex acts, or on what he calls (in Dean et al. 1997, 6) a "correspondence of forms" that extends the self toward others in relations of partial sameness, ringing changes on the couple-centeredness of sociality itself. But this, too, is a spatial and effectively visual formulation, however useful I have found it. The hypersocial, by contrast, is not just excess sociability but sociability felt and manifested along axes and wavelengths beyond the discursive and the visual—and even beyond the haptic, for the synchronization of bodies does not require their physical touch, but rather a simultaneity of movement in which the several become one. In theorizing sense-methods as a means toward and a way of thinking queer hypersociability, then, I lean on the prefix "hyper" meaning not only over, above, beyond, in excess, but also (in its more present-tense, truncated usage) a suggestion of excessive motion, as "hyper" is slang for "hyperactive."

Furthermore, the forms of sociability afforded by alignments and realignments in and through time are not just synchronous—they also hop the timeline in ways that the term "hyperlink" invokes. In this book, then, I also want to draw out an aspect of an older, Marxist materialism, which sees history not as a congealed past but as the continual making and remaking of the social field—of the relations among people, including between the living and the dead as well as the not-yet-born, as in Walter Benjamin's ([1950] 1968, 260) reminder that the working class, figured

as the redeemer of future generations, forgot a hatred "nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren." But even this is too linear and too aligned with genealogical descent. Meanwhile, Deleuzian assemblages are often theorized as taking place within a particular time period (usually the present), rather than vertically, across eras in ways that blur the boundaries between now and then, and in doing so change social possibilities in the present. My concept of sense-methods, on the other hand, intersects with an underdiscussed element in Foucault (1990a, 143), his idea of biohistory, or the process in which the history that humans make, their organization of power, intervenes in what seem like immutable laws of biology, changing the physical constitution of the human. Foucault (143) describes biohistory as "the pressure through which the movements of life [i.e., what would seem to be merely biological] and the processes of history [i.e., collective human activity] interfere with one another." While *Beside You in Time* does not track the biological per se, it does explore how physiological acts and social formations intersect with and reconstitute one another across time as well as within particular spaces. I take up, therefore, not only the rhythms of discipline but also another mode of subjectification, engroupment, and self-dissolution that is connected to the invention of race: the rise of historical feeling, or the sensation of being connected to and derived from non-kin ancestors or prior to non-kin progeny, which partially contributed to the periodizing of populations that Stoler (1995) describes but is not reducible to that function. Among denizens of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and beyond, the feeling of belonging to and extending into time from out of a particular past was inculcated through reading secondary histories, historical fiction, and anthropological treatises about the development of humanity's various cultures. Historical feeling also took shape through physical practices that involved the temporal recalibrations of bodies and subjects: rituals of patriotism, grief, and other shared emotions; heritage activities such as collecting and tourism; and especially the historical reenactments that became popular beginning with eighteenth-century *tableaux vivants*—all tuned the body to other epochs, just as discipline tuned it to new rhythms.[12] In this book, I contend that sense-methods can rearrange the relations between past and present, linking contemporary bodies to those from other times in reformulations of ancestry and lineage.

Finally, the idea that the sensory register can organize what belongs together, what can be brought together, and how that "bringing" happens, also influences the way I read and think in this book, which I am not sure boils down to a method I can formulate for transfer to students and colleagues or a gambit in the current method wars. But let us call it, too, a sense-method. I begin, always, with finely grained close readings of imaginative and documentary texts, whose "reroutings" of bodies, relationships, and perceptual possibilities take patience to apprehend. Part of that apprehension includes a kind of ingathering of a critical and historical archive whose contours I don't have in mind in advance, as the primary work begins to speak outward, to incline me toward material that further illuminates it or that it suddenly casts in a different light. I've always described my method to students as slow, blind, groping in the dark, but that seems an especially apt metaphor for a book on embodied ways of knowing that are at a temporal slant to official knowledge. As disability studies has taught us, slowness and blindness are not lesser forms of understanding but merely alternative ones. And groping, despite its bad reputation as a sex act, is just a mode of sensory improvisation. All of this is to align my method with, itself, a promiscuous hypersociability of approach of the sort that will be recognizable to anyone trained in cultural studies, in which we cannot know in advance with what materials our objects will demand proximity. My hypersocial method may also resonate with some current discussions of surface reading as a "mutual pedagogy of erotics" (Cheng 2009, 102) between text and critic, text and contexts, text and other texts, rather than as a hermeneutic aimed toward the recovery of unconscious material or hidden historical causes—though I cannot lay claim to never reading symptomatically.

It might be more modest, and more honest, to claim both the methods of mutual attunement and resonance that I track between bodies in *Beside You in Time* and the methods I use to reorganize literary texts in relation to one another and to other materials, as feminine, feminist, or even lesbian-femme, with an emphasis on the critic's, and even the textual object's, receptivity and susceptibility to various "outside" materials.[13] In fact, queer hypersociability is not tuned to the drama of the antisocial thesis, a theory developed in urgent response to the early AIDS crisis in which gay white men were portrayed as forces of death and to the rise of a gay movement insistent upon normativity, but responds instead to the

erosions of everyday life that have perennially characterized female, nonwhite, lesbian, poor, disabled, and other less privileged existences. My touchstone thinker, then, is not the Freud of the death drive but Audre Lorde, whose 1978 paper "The Uses of the Erotic" advocated the feeling body, in common pursuit with others, as a source of knowledge and power.[14] Lorde writes, "In the way my body stretches to music and opens into response, hearkening to its deepest rhythms, so every level upon which I sense also opens to the erotically satisfying experience, whether it is dancing, building a bookcase, writing a poem, examining an idea" (Lorde [1978] 2007, 341). She links the mutual timing of bodies, which she calls "self-connection shared" (341) and satisfying "our erotic needs in concert with others" (342) to a political demand for structures based on human need rather than on profit. The stakes for sense-methods and for queer hypersociability, then, are both contemporary insofar as they address the twentieth and twenty-first centuries' acceleration of ordinary modes of debilitation, and specific to the long nineteenth century insofar as they address the historically specific role of time in maximizing the force of the human body, wearing it down, and countering its reterritorialization as endlessly useful for state and market interests.

To clarify my argument once more: this book claims that the sense of time is instrumental to becoming social in an expansive mode I call a queer hypersociability, and that time is itself a mode of engroupment for both dominant and subordinated human energies. I track queer hypersociability through dance in chapter 1. In chapter 2, I explore a form of this drive to combine with both the dead and the living in African American performances of playing dead. In chapter 3, I investigate queer hypersociability across time in amateur historiography. In chapter 4, I show how the use of chronic time expands queer relationality. And in chapter 5, I connect queer hypersociability back to the sacramental and incarnational. To see the very long nineteenth century in terms of sense-methods, then, is to see the overlapping and shifting powers of discipline and sexuality, the ordering force of time in the production of bodies and collectivities, and the racialization of time in places within, alongside, or instead of the official political state. The scenes in which sense-methods do their work, as the chapters to come will show, are variously rhythmic, historical, and/or divine, and they expand not only the boundaries of the human body but also those of the nineteenth century itself.

On the Archive and the Period

My archive of very long nineteenth-century texts is perhaps most notable for what is not in it: much of the gay white male corpus of the period that has been foundational to queer nineteenth-century American literary studies. For Thoreau, Whitman, most of Melville (though I do nod to "Bartleby, the Scrivener"), Charles Warren Stoddard, Henry James, and others, I've substituted the celibate Shakers, ex-slave writers who are ambivalent about the family, the ostensibly heterosexual Mark Twain and Pauline Elizabeth Hopkins, and the Sapphic modernists Gertrude Stein and Djuna Barnes. These are all artists whose chief aims seem to be an expansive vision of sociability rather than a drive toward identity or even queer sex practices. I'm not convinced that the white male archive, especially that of the nineteenth century, leads inexorably to homosexuality or to the antisocial thesis, and indeed, Peter Coviello (2013) has made a persuasive argument, in *Tomorrow's Parties,* that much of that archive—Whitman, Thoreau, and Melville in particular—elegiacally preserves forms of sociability that would become illegible under the regime of sexuality. I feel greatly indebted to Coviello's project. But I do think that my alternative constellations of texts have brought me to the idea that the time-sense produces forms of collectivity and association that "sexuality" and even Coviello's more diffuse erotics may not fully contain.[15]

Even given this shift in archival materials, though, it may seem incongruous to make an argument about the uses of the timed body through analyses of linguistic texts, as this book does. To this I would argue that the sense-world of the past is available to us only at one remove, through representation. Nonrepresentational sound recordings can give us back the sonic past, but only a very specific slice of it—a single performance, a particular ambient soundscape. Old smells, also indexical rather than representational, can body forth the remains of the past, as when an opened grave smells of rot, but these smells are not composed of the original object's molecules, because if they are, then the object that they emanate from still exists in some form in the present. Similarly, we can touch or taste objects *from* the past, but not *in* their past. We can "feel" the past only through a second-order representation of it, in a visual or linguistic medium that evokes other senses, or through a physical reenactment that, given the new context in which it takes place, can never be a perfect cap-

ture. But even reenactment cannot recreate the way that performances worked in their own moment to recruit beholders into their scene. We can see the horizontal process of recruitment, of belonging, mapped out *as process* only in second-order presentations whose participants, witnesses, and commentators—as narrators and characters—appear on the same historical plane as the activity itself.

Of the various media through which representation takes place, only the durational ones—the ones that unfold over a stretch of time rather than being apprehensible all at once, like a painting—can capture the process of coordinating, gathering, transmitting, and otherwise transferring energies from one body to another. Thus the works explored in this book are almost all prose (some supplemented by images), precisely because prose takes place through linear time, establishing relations of cause and effect and highlighting process. The works I take up are also predominantly *narrative* prose, because seeing the processual nature of sensory engroupment depends, in part, on the narratorial commentary surrounding it. And they are predominantly but not entirely fictional because characters too can comment on the recruiting process and thus offer a glimpse of how sense-methods worked in their own moment. Therefore, many of the texts I discuss in this book depict performances, among them song and dance, stage shows, and liturgical acts; many of them include commentary and other reactions by witnesses who are, or resist being, pulled into the scene of performance. I examine anti-Shaker tracts whose polemic is supported by lurid descriptions of the Shakers as well as lithographs of their performances in chapter 1; narratives of former slaves as well as folk tales, stage performances, and illustrations in chapter 2; newspaper accounts of performances in both chapters 1 and 2; Mark Twain's short essays and speeches in chapter 3; and short stories and novels in all five chapters, including fiction by Catharine Maria Sedgwick, Sutton E. Griggs, Pauline Elizabeth Hopkins, Mark Twain, Herman Melville, Gertrude Stein, and Djuna Barnes. In all of them, we can see historically specific bodies at work in and through time in ways that would otherwise be difficult to take hold of.

The span of these works, from the late 1700s to the mid-1930s, is unwieldy only according to traditional nation/period demarcations. *Beside You in Time* tells a story about the power of the timed body during the very long nineteenth century, a period that I first understood as a period

at all through the history of sexuality. This period is bookended by the consolidation of discipline in Europe and its colonies on one side in the late eighteenth century, and on the other, the somewhat belated consolidation of sexual identity in the United States after European sexological texts were translated and made available here—a consolidation not complete, if it ever was, until after the first third of the twentieth century (see Chauncey 1995 and Kahan 2017). Or, to put it more simply, I am interested in the period bounded on one end by the European prison/factory/hospital in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* and refracted in the experience of the Shakers that I discuss in chapter 1, and on the other end by the American gay bar that glimmers through the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1990a) and Foucault's essay "Friendship as a Way of Life" ([1981] 1984) and that shows up in Djuna Barnes's *Nightwood* ([1936] 2006), the subject of my final chapter. But I am less interested in these as spaces than as temporal orders.

Another way to look at the very long nineteenth century, then, might be in terms of shifts in the lived experience of temporality. On the one hand, by the late eighteenth century, Europe and the United States had seen an intense solidification of the power of clock time (Sherman 1997; O'Malley 1990) and work discipline (Thompson 1967), the temporal motors of Foucault's prison/factory/hospital complex. By the mid-nineteenth century, these interrelated phenomena had dispersed over new domains such as slavery (see M. M. Smith 1997) and, as Catharine Beecher's *A Treatise on Domestic Economy* (1841) makes clear, housework. At the apex of discipline's regime, we can presume, time began to seem immutable and unmalleable both because it was orchestrated by institutions large and small, and because it was seen to emanate from the individual body's very gestures—though, as I will go on to argue, these orchestrations could be turned into forces that countered institutional modes of temporality. But during the latter half of the nineteenth century through the period before World War II, new technologies such as the railroad, photography, the cinema, and air travel made time seem suddenly pliable, such that the ordinary rhythms of things sped up or slowed down, events could be made to run backward, or a juxtaposition of disparate moments could invoke change over time (see Schivelbusch [1977] 1986 and Doane 2002). A multiplicity of possible times, and interventions in the systematized time of capitalism, opened up during the

latter part of the long nineteenth century, emblematized by the wanderings and flaneurship that comprised life for the denizens of urbanized spaces such as Wall Street in "Bartleby, the Scrivener," which I explore in chapter 4, and Djuna Barnes's Paris in *Nightwood,* which I explore in chapter 5. Rather than tracking a teleological history of time as it moved from discipline to flaneurship, though, this book names and locates some of the prevailing temporal regimes of the period I describe in the United States, and places some alternate sense-methods in relation to them. To put it yet another way, I track the timed body across several proximate and entangled regimes—religion and secularity, race, historiography, health, and sexuality—a body that acts in various and varying relation to the most legible imperatives of those regimes.

Chapter Breakdown

The modes of bodily control I explore in this book are also specific, though not always unique, to the United States and its empire. The first of these I explore, in chapter 1, is the order of secularity, otherwise known as mainline Protestantism, which demoted cultures that were seemingly too dependent on bodily means of worship to the status of savages racialized as Native American or, less often, automatons or machines racialized as black. The United Society of Believers, or Shakers, is a case study for the way that rhythmic alterity, when seen as countervailing the norms of gender and sex, could racialize people who in other ways seemed thoroughly white, for the Shakers were New England Protestants hailing from the mother country itself. But the dominant forms of Protestantism emerging in the late eighteenth century, in keeping with Puritan ideals and as a way of distinguishing themselves from ecstatic worship, subordinated the liturgical body to the word—to scriptural exegesis, verbal confession, and homiletics. Protestantism became less and less apprehensible as a system that, itself, temporally ordered bodies and life trajectories as it took shape in negative reaction to communities such as the Shakers, who used explicitly somatic, rhythmic modes of belonging to counter heteromarital hegemony and to express their ideal of celibacy. The Shakers' method of worship, I argue, was simply too corporeal, even when Shaker elders reordered it into highly disciplined, patterned dances. In fact, as I demonstrate, the Shakers' reformed dance style doubly racialized them

as so overly regulated that they hyperbolized whiteness into a form of deathliness associated with blackness and enslavement.

Following up on this association of blackness and death, the second order of timing that I explore, in chapter 2, is the one that regulated chattel slavery in the United States. This was not primarily the proto-Taylorization of plantation work, as the latter was influenced by the factory system, even if the reordering of plantation time was a second-order way of making slave bodies docile (M. M. Smith 1997). More fundamental to the system of slavery was the fact that slave owners had absolute power to wrest enslaved people from genealogical time, and to shorten or terminate slaves' lives—to effect what Orlando Patterson (1982) calls the "social death" of enslaved people as a prelude to and rehearsal of an actual death imposed from without as a matter of murder or enforced deterioration. The sense-method that emerged in response to this condition was a performance of death that I call *chronothanatopolitics,* or playing dead, reenacting social death so as to both refuse the consolations of a liberal, white humanism that depends on antiblackness for its meaning, and gesture at other forms of sociality. As my archive for this chapter—several African American folk tales; the ex-slave narratives of Harriet Jacobs ([1861] 1987), Henry Bibb ([1850] 2001), and Henry Box Brown ([1851] 2008); and Sutton E. Griggs's novel *Imperium in Imperio* ([1899] 2003)—clarifies, playing dead is a performance, but not a mode of performativity dependent on resignification in the idiom of queer theory. Rather, what it has in common with queer theory is an asocial, though not entirely antisocial, mode of relationality counter to marriage, kinship, and reproduction—saturated as these latter forms are with the temporalities denied to people of African descent.

The concept of social death is also precisely what allows the temporality of slavery to be understood as enduring beyond the period in which white Americans legally owned black ones. It ruptures any easy periodization of before and after 1865—the dominant periodization for scholars of American literature and culture. Related to slavery, then, is a third form of temporal control that congealed in the long nineteenth century, that of academic history. The dominant historiography of the nineteenth century was made up of firm boundaries between then and now, between bodies categorized as modern and those cast as savage or primitive, and between bodies of different eras: in other words, historical

writing was a way of ordering time in and for a nineteenth-century present tense deeply invested in hierarchical differentiations between bodies. In chapter 3, I explore how two fin de siècle authors, Mark Twain and Pauline Hopkins, burst these temporal boundaries to write histories that, as fictional versions of historical reenactment, thrust then-contemporary bodies into much earlier times in ways that contested and still contest both the periodization of US history and the rigid categories of gender, race, and sexuality. In Twain's *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court* ([1889] 1982), a white traveler to medieval Camelot fails to see, though Twain's readers are set up to recognize, how medieval forms of power and violence persist in the wake of US chattel slavery, particularly in post-Reconstruction America. In Hopkins's *Of One Blood* ([1903] 1988), a traveler to the ancient seat of Ethiopia finds it preserved underground as if time has stopped, and discovers that Western culture derives from African people's inventions and ideas: the novel effectively rewrites global history. Importantly, these ruptures of historical periodization are also ways of reconstituting erotic life, as if writing or experiencing history otherwise might be a form of sex. Twain's main character "abuses" history as a mode of "self-abuse," masturbating his way out of linear-historical time and clarifying how a sexual disorder is understood as a temporal one, and how "bad," amateur historiography is linked to aberrant sexuality. Hopkins's main character literally marries his way back into a dynastic Afrocentric history on a somewhat more conservative note, but the trope of reincarnation that animates *Of One Blood* moves beyond the genitality of masturbation in Twain to suggest a form of reproduction and cross-temporal contact that supersedes marriage and dynasty.

As Twain and Hopkins show, nineteenth-century American history proper—both the writing and the making of dominant history—was linked, in turn, to the production of normative bodies, those understood to lead the project of nation building and hence modernity. Early in the very long nineteenth century, disciplinary techniques such as those Foucault describes were used to hone the militaries that fought in the name of American independence (see von Steuben 1779), and these remained fairly stable through the War of 1812, a battle that defined US nationhood. As weapons technology developed, infantry tactics followed in a variety of manuals pertinent to each US war (see *Military Field Manuals, 1782–1899*, 2007). And reenactments of wars and battles were a

mode of masculine self-fashioning (see Schneider 2011). But drills and exercises with a nationalist horizon were not just the purview of the military and its civilian imitators. The rise of the Boy Scouts, the physical culture movement, and organized sports involved ordinary people in projects understood to contribute to the destiny of the United States. By the late 1800s and into the first quarter of the twentieth century, imperial might was idealized in the figure of the white, able-bodied, sporting man (Bederman 1995; R. Dyer 1997; Green 1986). Concomitantly, after the failure of Reconstruction, proponents of racial uplift envisioned the future of black people in terms of middle-class norms of sexual propriety, domesticity, and heteronormative gender roles (Carby 1987), terms that framed particular routines and rhythms of work, leisure, and home life as vital to the future of that particular population and to humanity as a whole. Both imperial white masculinity and black racial uplift were framed in eugenic terms. By the early twentieth century, the idea of "human resources" was born to address the problem of national vitality and, in particular, the role of chronic maladies in sapping it: chronic time, we might say, had become a national problem precisely insofar as the state and the market fostered an almost machinic productivity. This is the context I use in chapter 4 to explore Gertrude Stein's novella "Melanctha" ([1909] 2000), which pits the time of the chronic, embodied in the eponymous female protagonist, against racial uplift's discipline of "regularity," embodied in her lover, Dr. Jeff Campbell. Reading "Melanctha" alongside of Melville's short story "Bartleby, the Scrivener" ([1853] 1979), which in many ways anticipates it, allows us to see chronic illness, recalcitrance, and lack of will as forms of resistance to the temporally disciplined bodies that supposedly make history national, and make national history.

In chapter 4, I describe how chronic time, grammatically inflecting "Bartleby" and elaborated both as plot and as style in "Melanctha," also opens bodies to new forms of connection with the world and with others by slowing them down, dilating, and intensifying them. Chronic time decalcifies and disaggregates "sexuality" thought in terms of object-choice, bringing us back, conceptually, to the way that discipline reassembles individual and social bodies, opening them to one another in new ways. But as experienced by those left out of the times of empire and uplift, chronic time does not always produce a mass that can be managed

as a population, nor does it necessarily work in service of projects that serve the state or capitalism. As "Melanctha" clarifies, the connections that chronic time forges are micrological, temporary, and uninevitable. Surprisingly, Stein characterizes these moments of connectivity and assemblage as religious, which hearkens back to my analysis of Shaker worship practices. While sacred ritual can directly serve dominant institutions of power, the religious feelings Stein conjures up are rooted in bodily experience in ways that recall an American history of dissident, enthusiastic, emphatically minor sects. My final chapter, then, turns back to a stigmatized and especially visceral religion in the United States, Catholicism, and its incarnational doctrine of the sacraments. The sacraments, I argue, are in many ways a consummate sense-method, for they involve contact between the body and material understood to bring participants closer to God and to one another through the body of Christ. Baptism, for example, uses water—by sprinkling, pouring, or even complete immersion—to transform the baptismal candidate into a Christian and bring him or her into the spiritual kinship of Christianity, as well as to renew the baptismal vows of observers who have pledged to support the candidate's life as a Christian. Even as the sacraments bring people together horizontally with one another and with the divine in earthly form, they also enfold Catholics and their Anglican counterparts into a vertical form of history and descent, as with the laying on of hands that accompanies ordination and folds the ordinant into a history of apostles, or as with the chrism (anointing oil) that is part of the sacrament of extreme unction, which signifies that the dead person is now part of a genealogical line of saints. I locate a sacramental mentality, which I call a *sacra/mentality*, in a counterintuitive place: Djuna Barnes's high modernist novel *Nightwood* ([1936] 2006). In the teeth of a homosexual identity that has by the time of *Nightwood*'s first publication begun to consolidate, the novel offers up the sacraments as an alternative route to human connectivity and lineage. It does so with deep irony, of course, for in *Nightwood* baptism, the laying on of hands, and especially the Eucharist are modes of linking together those who are—by Christian and state standards—damned, including the lesbian Nora Flood, the cross-dresser Matthew Dante O'Connor, and the androgyne Robin Vote. Detached from the institutional Church, the sacramental becomes this book's final vision of queer hypersociability.

I finish with a coda that brings *Beside You in Time* into the twentieth century, via Amiri Baraka's short-short story "Rhythm Travel" ([1995] 2009), which turns rhythmic entrainment toward both reparations for slavery and an Afrofuturist horizon. Here, the time-sense connects the narrator to others in a way that no timetable could contain, queering affiliation and succession far beyond the work of Foucauldian discipline. "Rhythm Travel" reminds us that, as slaves and their African forbears understood, timing allows bodies to find one another in ways that have the capacity to reformulate social life as we know it.